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Abstract 
 
Recent estimates of Vietnamese GDP during the colonial era show a large gap between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina: per capita GDP in Tonkin was less than half the per capita GDP 
in Cochinchina from 1900 to 1940. The aim of this thesis is to understand this gap: its 
origins, nature and impact.  
Although most scholars of Vietnamese economic history acknowledged this gap, it 
has never been studied and only a few suggestions for its origin exist. In this thesis, we 
revisit these suggestions. Firstly, we establish that demographic differences certainly had 
an impact on the economic performance of the country, not only through an impact on 
potential yields but also through an impact on land and labour utilisation. Secondly, we 
show that the colonial policy did not explain the origin of the economic gap, but that it 
may have perpetuated circumstances that led to it.  
Next, we evaluate the nature of this gap: how did the productive sectors (agrarian, 
industrial and commercial) of the economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina differ? We find 
that production patterns differed markedly between Tonkin and Cochinchina. In Tonkin, 
diversification and production for the home market defined its production possibilities 
and its economic performance. In Cochinchina, specialisation and engagement with the 
international economy defined its production possibilities and economic performance. 
The regions' different production patterns were responsible for their different engagement 
with the international economy.  
Finally, we investigate the way in which the economic gap between the two regions 
affected the living standards of their populations. We find that despite a large GDP per 
capita gap, the living standards of the rural populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina 
differed only marginally. Even in the urban sectors where there was a significant gap 
between the two regions, it was only a fraction of the one suggested by GDP estimates. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Recent research has generated the first estimates of Vietnamese GDP during French 
colonial rule, separated in its three component regions of Tonkin, Annam and 
Cochinchina (see Map 1). These estimates show a staggering gap in the GDP per capita 
of Tonkin and Cochinchina, as seen in Figure 1.1, with Cochinchinese GDP per capita 
more than twice Tonkinese GDP per capita throughout the period 1900-1940. This gap 
seems to widen throughout the colonial period, even after a short convergence during the 
main years of the Depression.  
 
Figure 1.11 
Certainly, these are preliminary estimates constructed using indirect methods, 
however they do seem to match qualitative discussions of the economic gap in Indochina 
during the colonial era and serve as an illustration of the context discussed in this thesis. 
Many scholars of Indochinese economic history have acknowledged and mentioned this 
                                                
1 Using constant prices would result in an equally significant gap. 
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gap before, these new estimates prompt further questions. In fact, in Chapter 2 we show 
that despite an apparent knowledge of such a gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina, it has 
never been examined in detail and evaluations of its origin, nature and impact remain 
superficial. This is surprising considering that number of quantitative indicators that show 
a distinct gap between the two regions, as well as the possible explanations for its 
existence. Indeed, population density in Tonkin was twice population density in 
Cochinchina by 1936; per capita government expenditure and revenue were, on average, 
twice as high in Cochinchina than in Tonkin; and wages were also, on average, twice as 
high in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. Each of these phenomena will be discussed in this 
thesis, but they clearly indicate that a signficant gap between the two regions existed and 
needs to be further understood. 
Two competing perspectives exist to explain the origin of this gap: demographics or 
colonial influence. However, neither side has shown conclusive evidence in support of 
either suggestion. Much of the literature based their evaluations not on data, but on 
logical rationales and knowledge of the country's history. The first part of this thesis re-
evaluates the role of demographics and colonial policy in prompting Cochinchina's higher 
GDP. In addition, the literature has not yet shown how the gap manifested itself in the 
performance of the various sectors of the Vietnamese economy. This is surprising as an 
understanding of production possibilities, production patterns and trade activity can go a 
long way in explaining differing economic performances. The second part of this thesis 
thus looks at the agrarian, industrial and commercial sectors' performance during colonial 
rule. Finally, GDP per capita differentials do not necessarily result in welfare 
improvements for the population. Studies have yet to evaluate to what extent the gap 
between the economic performances of Tonkin and Cochinchina also manifested itself in 
a gap between the living standards of their population. This is the subject of the third and 
final part of this thesis. These gaps in our understanding of the economic history of 
Vietnam require some more research, not just for a more accurate historical narrative, but 
indeed for a better perspective on current developments in the Vietnamese economy. 
For example, according to the Vietnamese government in 2002, the Southern region 
of Vietnam (mainly what used to be Cochinchina) has more potential for economic 
growth than the Northern regions (mainly what used to be Tonkin): 
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The Southeast [of Vietnam,] including the southern focal economic region has a 
basic advantage of infrastructure and other development potentials, the region is 
a key dynamic economic region and needs to be developed comprehensively; 
strive for the average economic growth of 1.5 times that of the national average 
level mainly by means of dynamic business, develop local comparative 
advantages, enhance the effectiveness and competitive strengths in domestic and 
overseas markets.2 
Contemporary Vietnamese economic development is clearly led by the Southern region, 
as acknowledged above, but official statisticians explain this difference by a vague 
allusion to 'basic advantages'. These basic advantages may point to better commercial 
infrastructure, better climate, etc, but at no point in recent political discourse have these 
been clearly explained. In fact, the reference to ‘basic advantages’ suggests that the 
economic history of Vietnam has had a long-term impact on current economic trends. 
Considering the country's turbulent past, it is very possible that the current North-South 
gap has different origins and impacts than its historical counterpart, but without a clear 
study of the historical gap, this cannot be argued. It is thus with this in mind that our 
research focuses on understanding the historical North-South gap of the Vietnamese 
economy. 
Similarly, because of Vietnam's turbulent past, much of the academic research on 
Vietnam has investigated the wars and their consequences on the country. Thomas 
Hodgkin, a historian, argued that to properly understand any revolution, a better 
understanding of the country’s past is crucial.3 An economist would add to Hodgkin’s 
argument that the economic discord that ravaged Vietnam in the post-war era demands a 
specific emphasis on the economic history of Vietnam. Sadly, such a history is rather 
slim and may therefore be qualified as insufficient to justify the exhaustive literature on 
the revolution itself. This thesis does not address the history of the revolution, but rather 
tries to establish a better understanding of the economic history of Vietnam during French 
colonial rule. As such, this thesis can also serve to provide a more detailed background to 
analyses of Vietnam's post-colonial history and on the rise of communism and 
nationalism in Vietnam. 
                                                
2 LSE 598(I51): Vietnam, Public Investment Program Period of 2001-2005, (Hanoi: General Statistical 
Office, 2002), p.82. 
3 Thomas Hodgkin (ed), Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path, (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p.4. 
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Various historical circumstances help us contextualise the origin of the economic 
divergence between the regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina. The three administrative 
regions of French Indochina: Cochinchina in the South, Annam in the middle and Tonkin 
in the North were created in 1887 as part of the colonial administration. The emperor at 
Hue did control all three regions under a unified government for a period of time, 
specifically 1802-1858, but it is division, rather than unity, that historically prevailed 
between Vietnam’s territories.4 There is no doubt that this division had a long lasting 
influence on the economic divergence between territories. 
Initially, ‘Vietnam’ was only the area known as Tonkin. In the 17th century, the Le 
Dynasty, based in Hanoi, encouraged migration to the South. This migration marked the 
beginning of South Vietnam, although this was progressive, starting first with the 
populating of central Vietnam. Prior to this southward migration, there had been no 
official form of government but Khmer and other small ethnic minorities had populated 
the region. It was primarily demographic growth resulting in land pressure that 
encouraged the 17th century southward expansion. More land was needed to 
accommodate and feed the growing population. Considering this history, it comes at no 
surprise that many in the literature use demographic pressure when explaining the 
economic development of the country. 
Administrative divisions, as a result of this expansion, may also have affected 
economic performance. Officially, the Le Dynasty was the head of the Vietnamese 
government. In reality, political power was divided between two big families: the Trinh 
and the Nguyen. Such a division of power, mixed with the prospect of new land, 
eventually resulted in civil war, leading to Trinh governed North Vietnam and Nguyen 
governed South Vietnam.5 The administrative division, and the resulting relative isolation 
of Southern Vietnam from Northern Vietnam, favoured the development of the 
“autonomous ambitions of the governors [of the Southern provinces]”.6 The Trinh later 
attempted to conquer the Nguyen territory. Their seven attempts were, however, all 
unsuccessful and the country remained divided, further allowing the development of 
autonomous political and economic choices.  
                                                
4 Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam histoire et civilisation, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1955), p.321. 
5 ibid, p.244. 
6 ibid, p.242. 
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At the end of the 18th century, the Tay Son brothers hoped to reunite the regions of 
Vietnam. These three brothers, supported by an agrarian revolution, defeated both the 
Nguyen and the Trinh and ended the Le Dynasty.7 Unfortunately, discord between the 
brothers soon occurred and resulted in a renewed division of the territory, this time into 
three administrative parts, each under the command of one of the brothers. It was not 
until 1802 that Nguyen Anh, the last descendant of the Nguyen family who had taken 
refuge in Bangkok with Rama I,8 managed to oust the Tay Sons and to re-conquer all of 
Vietnam.9 Having regained power, Nguyen Anh styled himself Emperor and changed his 
name to Gia-Long. He centralised power in the hope of concretising unification.10   
This proved shortlived: when Napoleon III ordered France’s first intervention in the 
‘Orient’ the precarious unification again came under pressure. Napoleon's campaign 
resulted in France gaining control of Cochinchina, Vietnam’s most southern region, in 
1859.11 The Vietnamese Emperor, in the hopes of maintaining peace, tried to compromise 
with the French by slowly agreeing to more and more foreign control and allowing a 
return to the historical administrative division of Vietnam.12 Finally, in 1884, a newly 
chosen emperor signed the Hue Treaties, officially recognising Indochina as a French 
protectorate and adding Tonkin to the French empire.13  
To concretise colonial power, the Union of French Indochina was declared when 
Laos joined the other territories in 1893. In 1897, French colonial rule was strengthened 
in Annam and Tonkin: links to the imperial city of Hue were formally broken and the 
General Residents of the two provinces took over the councils that had previously made 
decisions in the administration of these territories.14 Indochina’s borders were finalised in 
1907, after negotiations with the British, Siamese and Chinese governments. French 
Indochina consisted of five territories: Cochinchina, Annam, Tonkin, Laos and 
Cambodia.15 There is no doubt that many aspects of this history affected economic 
development. There is never one explanation for diverging performances and scholars on 
                                                
7 Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam a Long History, (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2002), p.100. 
8 Le Thanh Khoi, op.cit., p.313. 
9 ibid, p.321. 
10 ibid, p.325. 
11 ibid, p.366. 
12 Nguyen Khac Vien, op.cit., p.136. 
13 Le Thanh Khoi, op.cit., p.366. 
14 ibid, p.400. 
15 ibid, p.398. 
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Vietnamese economic history agree that many factors together explain Cochinchina's 
superior economic performance in this time period.16 Consequently, this thesis does not 
hope to provide a unique explanation for the colonial North-South gap. Instead, this 
thesis' aim is to evaluate previously made suggestions, link diverging economic 
performances to production patterns and commercial links and examine if these 
differing economic performances were also reflected in the standards of living of the 
populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
 
Sources 
Before the questions addressed in this thesis are fully outlined, it is crucial to understand 
the constraints that data quality and availability pose. Firstly, these characteristics guided 
our choice of 1900 to 1940 as the scope of this thesis. Although 1954 was the official end 
of French control over Indochina, the years between 1940 and 1954 were filled with war 
and inconsistent political leadership, prompting the latter bound of 1940. As early as the 
Second World War, French control of Indochina was beginning to falter, indeed between 
1941 and 1945 the Japanese occupied Vietnam and statistics compiled by French 
authorities are difficult to rely on. The initial bound of 1900 is more arbitrary: it was not 
until 1922 that the French authorities founded the Société Générale des Statistiques in 
Indochina and its data only go back to 1913. Nonetheless, some arguments will go back 
to 1893, when French Indochina was founded and when other data sets allow. Going back 
any earlier might be misleading, because French control prior to the early 1900s was 
tenuous at best, especially in the North. Indeed the French did not gain passage to some 
of the main routes of Tonkin until 1888 and the final borders of Indochina were only 
decided in 1907.17 
The main sources used in this dissertation are from the French colonial 
administration, which documented nearly every aspect of its ‘mission’ in Vietnam. These 
documents are mostly stored in the archives of Aix-en-Provence, but the public cannot 
                                                
16 Jean-Pascal Bassino, “Indochina” in Joel Mokyr (ed.) The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Economic History, 
Vol. 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.36. 
17 Nguyen Khac Vien, op.cit., p.150 & p.400. 
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access many of the records because they have not yet been classified.18 What is available 
nevertheless provides a wide variety of sources that have been underused in recent 
published research. Other available data from research on Vietnam’s colonial economy 
originated from French scholars during French control of Indochina. These records 
comprise two types of studies: projects undertaken for the benefit of the colonial 
authorities and more independent research undertaken by economists and academics. The 
limitations, however, is that only some facets of the colonial period can be evaluated. 
Few records exist on industrial developments or on specific landholding patterns. The 
data available do provide an initial picture of how the economies of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina evolved, but it remains true that they can be quite scattered and are rarely 
available as complete time-series. 
Since most of the sources are from the colonial authorities, they need to be used 
with caution. A possible limitation in analyses of economic trends based on these data 
comes from ideological biases. As primary sources, they are somewhat biased: these 
sources are essentially pro-colonialist. Their analyses present partly objective reasoning 
and partly subjective opinions. For example, judgments on native Vietnamese were 
considered entirely factual when today they would be considered derogatory. 
Furthermore, these sources are often discontinuous time series and the way much of the 
data were gathered is not explained. A further limitation is therefore the quality and 
clarity of the data: it is unlikely that the officials obtained precise data and, indeed, they 
even warn that this is a problem.19 Some data, such as population censuses and yields, are 
probably underestimates rather than precise, as peasants tended to under-report output 
and births in order to avoid increasing their tax burden.  
Little is known of the ways in which these data were collected, or what they include 
and do not include. For example, in the wage data, it is difficult to know how comparable 
the information is: how many hours were worked in a day, how many days a year were 
people in these professions working, what exactly did the job consist of, how much 
                                                
18 Much of the archives for French Indochina held in Aix-en-Provence and in Paris are, as of yet, 
unclassified, meaning unobtainable to the public. I offered to classify the archives, but not being a trained 
archivist, the offer was turned down. 
19 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, 1913-1922, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927). 
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training had previously been given, etc?20 It is very possible that the answers to these 
questions differed between the two regions. In some cases, informed guesses are made to 
evaluate the method of statistical compilation, using related articles on the matter. For 
example, in the case of cost of living compilations, F. Leurence, a statistician of the 
colonial authorities, explained the method by which the indices were compiled. Such 
problems with sources and data are difficult to avoid in economic history. However, the 
main assumption in this paper is that, since this is the only information available to 
researchers and was compiled by the French authorities, who arguably wanted the 
information for strategic reasons, the information is mostly reliable and, most importantly, 
comparable between regions. These official data remain the basis for new estimates being 
constructed and are the main resource for research on the economic history of Vietnam.  
The French were keen to understand the economic realities of the Indochinese 
colony, if only in order to maximise potential public revenue. Since they relied on these 
statistical reports for their colonial policy and especially for fiscal policy, these data are 
mostly accurate. Jean-Dominique Giacometti clearly outlines the many advantages of 
working with these data,21 even if many subsequent estimates need modification to reflect 
biases we can now rectify. These data are used in the recent quantitative research that 
constructed estimates for many aspects of the economic life of colonial Indochina. The 
Hitotsubashi Project is the main example of this and is an invaluable resource for further 
analysis of Vietnamese economic history. Despite the potential problems associated with 
these data, they form the crux of all research on Vietnamese economic history to date and 
likewise form the starting point of our analysis. While we do not construct new estimates, 
this thesis' contribution to the literature rests in re-evaluating previously hinted at 
hypotheses on the origin, nature and impact of the North-South gap in the colonial era. 
Our research was in part motivated by the current Vietnamese government's 
acknowledgment of a North-South gap in today's Vietnam. It would have been interesting 
to study these regions according to their current specification. The 1954 Geneva accords 
                                                
20 “[In the South] tenants ate better and worked less intensively than in the rest of the North” from James 
Scott, Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976), p.78. This quotation makes us hesitant in assuming the data collected is 
comparable even if leisure was valued, but it may bias the results in favour of our conclusions. 
21 Jean-Dominique Giacometti, “Sources and Estimations for Economic Rural History of Vietnam in the 
First Half of the 20th Century” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka 
(eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 
2000). 
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separated North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Unfortunately, because this 
differed from the colonial administration of the Vietnamese economy, the records for that 
time period are not organised in the easy category of ‘North’ and ‘South’. The specificity 
of the geographic division would imply that in our analysis, all provinces of colonial 
Vietnam that were south of the 17th parallel should be taken as part of South Vietnam, 
and all provinces that were north of the 17th parallel should be part of North Vietnam. 
Unfortunately, the information available is rarely divided by provinces and such a 
methodology is not always possible.  
In the national colonial archives of France on Indochina, although most of the data 
is available for the three regions of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, at times the data 
separated Vietnam in only two parts: Cochinchina and Tonkin-Annam. Including all of 
Annam in the North may have resulted in a bias that would affect the scale of the 
economic differences between the two regions. Some of the literature has presented a 
solution for how to use such data when comparing North and South Vietnam. Jean-Pascal 
Bassino and Severine Blaise estimated links between the pre-1945 and post-1954 
economic performances of Vietnam.22 To achieve their historical comparison, they made 
estimates for Northern and Southern Annam by using “a share of 50% corresponding to 
the share of population”.23 Although this methodology is the only one in the literature that 
addressed our particular problem, it poses difficulties for our purposes. Previous research 
asserted that the different population densities between North and South, due to the fact 
that Southern Vietnam was populated more recently, might explain the North-South gap. 
Adjustments relying on demography may thus eliminate or distort the effect of 
demographic differences on the economic performances of North and South, even though 
by 1954 it was considered that Annam's population was almost equally divided between 
North and South. Nonetheless, the results might be biased by such a calculation. In light 
of this difficulty, the research questions look specifically at the economic gap between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina during the colonial era. As Figure 1.1 showed, these displayed 
clearly the colonial North-South gap. 
                                                
22 Jean-Pascal Bassino & Severine Blaise, “Linking Pre-1945 and Post-1954 Series for Estimating North 
Vietnam and South Vietnam Long Term Economic Performances, 1935-1975” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, 
Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-
1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000), p.410. 
23 ibid, p.413. 
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 Structure 
Although this chapter has alluded to the literature's relative silence on the economic gap 
between colonial Tonkin and Cochinchina, this will be made clearer in the next chapter. 
Chapter 2 traces a historiography of the literature on the economic history of 
Vietnam and highlights the contribution this thesis is making to this literature. 
Specifically, the chapter will show that despite a tacit acknowledgment of a North-South 
gap in economic performance during the colonial era, it has not been adequately studied. 
This thesis' contribution will therefore be to re-evaluate some of the basic suggestions 
made in the literature as to the origin of this gap, illustrate the nature of this gap in the 
agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors of Tonkin and Cochinchina, and evaluate 
its impact on the standards of living of these two regions' populations.  
The first part of this thesis, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, is a re-evaluation of the 
two suggested 'explanations' for the colonial North-South gap: demographics and 
colonial policy. In Chapter 3, we re-visit the hypothesis that stronger demographic 
pressure in Tonkin explains its more limited economic growth relative to Cochinchina. 
The main question of this chapter is "in what ways could demographics have influenced 
differing economic performances"? We show that the effect of population pressures on 
yields was not the only significant way in which differing demographic characteristics 
influenced economic performance. We suggest that land and labour utilisation would also 
have been influenced and that differences within these would have altered the way in 
which production occurred. Furthermore, we suggest that any impact demographic 
differences would have had on economic performance between the two regions would 
have continued throughout French colonial rule because migration between the two 
regions was limited. In Chapter 4, we re-visit the hypothesis that colonial policy explains 
the divergence of Tonkin and Cochinchina during colonial rule. The main question of this 
chapter is "to what extent did the colonial administration's actions reflect or encourage 
the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina"? The literature on colonialism 
generally evaluates the costs and benefits of colonialism, or whether colonialism was a 
“good or bad thing”,24 because it is mostly accepted that “the rule under colonialism was 
and is that the interests of the colonialists were always satisfied first, and the interests of 
                                                
24 Patrick Manning, “Analysing the Costs and Benefits of Colonialism”, African Economic History Review, 
Vol.1, No.2, Autumn 1974, p.18. 
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the [colonised people] were satisfied only insofar as it fit the needs of the colonialists”.25 
Such an evaluation of colonialism in French Indochina is outside the scope of this thesis, 
Instead, we examine the way in which the French governed their territories. We argue 
that there is limited evidence that colonial policy was a prime mover in the differing 
performances of Tonkin and Cochinchina. Certainly colonial policies may have helped 
perpetuate the significance of differing circumstances, but we claim policy choices were 
mainly a reflection of these initial differences.  
The second part of this thesis focuses on understanding the nature of the economic 
gap. Firstly, in Chapters 5 and 6, we evaluate the way in which the North-South gap 
manifested itself in the production characteristics of the agricultural and industrial 
sectors of Tonkin and Cochinchina. Chapter 5 addresses how the economic divide that 
existed between Tonkin and Cochinchina manifested itself in the output and productivity 
of the agrarian sector. We argue that agrarian production was more productive in 
Cochinchina and that the two regions had differing production patterns. Cochinchina 
engaged in specialisation while Tonkin engaged in diversification. By evaluating trends 
in land and labour productivity as well as in output, we argue that this reflected the 
different characteristics seen in Chapter 3 and that these would have been perpetuated by 
the colonial decisions outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 asks the same question with 
respect to the industrial sector. In this chapter, we show that the Northern region was 
more industrial than its Southern counterpart and that this conclusion further emphasises 
the Northern region's tendency towards diversification. We suggest that this 
diversification in activities other than agriculture could in part have attenuated the 
perceived demographic pressures in the region's agrarian sector, but that Tonkin's 
industrial sector was not large enough to attenuate its economic gap relative to 
Cochinchina.  
Secondly, Chapter 7 is an evaluation of how the differing production patterns 
shown in Chapters 5 & 6 impacted the regions' commercial activity. We analyse 
balance of trade, trade partners and the details of the trading activity of both regions. We 
show that there were no real differences in the commercial regulations Tonkin and 
Cochinchina faced. We argue that the key reason for differences in commercial activity 
resulted from Cochinchina's specialisation and consequently larger tradable output. These 
                                                
25 ibid, p.20. 
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tendencies explain Cochinchina's ability to have a positive balance of trade, its larger 
volume and value of exports as well as its more substantial commercial ties with 
neighbouring countries. However, Tonkin's sizeable demand of international imports also 
suggests that its economy was unable to achieve the self-sufficiency that seems to have 
guided its production patterns. This chapter provides further evidence of how the 
economic gap manifested itself in the economic activity of the two regions, while 
showing the links between production patterns and commercial activity. 
In the last part of this thesis, Chapter 8, we discuss to what extent the superior 
economic performance of Cochinchina (with respect to GDP) was reflected in 
standards of living for its population relative to Tonkin's. Although this chapter looks 
at health and education provisions, it mostly evaluates income and cost of living 
differences between the two regions in both the rural and urban sectors. We construct 
indices to compare wages and prices in Hanoi relative to Saigon. Furthermore, we 
suggest a preliminary population distribution to show why rural incomes and 
expenditures have more relevance for evaluations of average standards of living in 
Tonkin and Cochinchina than urban data. We argue that although there was a significant 
gap in standard of living between the urban populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina, the 
larger share of the populations of both regions were engaged in agricultural production 
and was unlikely to experience vastly different standards of living.  
Our conclusions are summarised in Chapter 9. We conclude that differing 
circumstances pre-dating French colonial rule are more likely to explain Cochinchina and 
Tonkin's differing economic performances than colonial policy. Production patterns 
differences in the agrarian sector were largely due to demographics and landholding 
patterns, which evolved from historical differences. Furthermore, although Tonkin did 
seem to have a head start in industrial development, the sector was too small to close the 
gap between the two regions' economic performances during the colonial era. The 
differences in the production patterns of the two regions had a significant impact on their 
ability to extract revenue from integrating to the world economy, with Cochinchina a 
much larger benefiter from this integration than Tonkin. However, despite the higher 
GDP per capita in Cochinchina, standards of living for much of its population were 
similar to those of Tonkin's population. In addition, we suggest how this thesis may fuel 
further research into analyses of contemporary Vietnamese economic development.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The previous chapter stated the questions and explained how they would be answered; 
this chapter explains why these questions should be answered and how this thesis adds to 
the existing literature on both Vietnamese economic history and Southeast Asian 
economic history. Scholarship on colonial Vietnam is varied and at times quite rich, 
particularly within some topics such as colonial ideology or agricultural development. 
However, it has been dwarfed by scholarship on the rise of nationalism and communism 
and the country’s post-colonial history. The literature is also scarcer than one would 
expect for a country that is both populous and economically significant. A striking aspect 
of the literature on colonial Vietnam in recent times is the recognition of the economic 
differences that existed within the country, particularly the north-south economic gap. 
Although most authors agree on the existence of such a gap, no research specifically 
shows the nature of the gap, how it came about, or how it may have impacted the 
economic life of the regions.  
This chapter will look at some of the key works on colonial Vietnam. These sources 
have been separated in both chronologic and linguistic categories: starting with official 
colonial publications, pre-1950 French, pre-1950 English scholarship, post-1950 
French/Vietnamese and post-1950 English language scholarship. In addition, a section on 
key works on Southeast Asian colonial history will be presented. Some of these works 
include Vietnam in their analyses of the wider Southeast Asian economic history. Other 
works are on specific countries within Southeast Asia, such as Burma or the Dutch Indies, 
and these help contextualise the research presented in this thesis. Finally, a section on 
contemporary writings on Vietnamese economic performance highlights why more 
research into the colonial economic history of Indochina is needed to understand 
Vietnam’s current economic performance.  
It will be shown that while the Vietnamese North-South gap has almost always 
been acknowledged, it has never been explained, nor has it been clearly defined. There 
are therefore a number of contributions that this thesis makes: a re-evaluation of the 
previously suggested origins of the North-South gap; an explanation of the nature of this 
gap with respect to the agrarian, industrial and commercial sectors of Tonkin and 
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Cochinchina; and an evaluation of the impact of this gap on the living standards of the 
populations of these two regions. The novelty of this thesis is not only the emphasis on 
comparing the two regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina, but also an emphasis on the 
relevance of this gap on their economies, rather than a tacit acknowledgment of its 
existence.  
 
2.1) Official French colonial publications 
The initial literature on Indochinese economics was that of the French administration, 
both in its official publications and through commissioned work from some of its 
administrative staff. These are crucial resources, sometimes for the statistical information 
that was gathered, other times for the viewpoints and analyses that were presented. Whilst 
Indochina was nominally a Union, its component parts were generally studied 
individually and they were rarely compared to one another. Instead, the administration 
focused on looking at foreign colonial domains (such as the Dutch Indies, Burma or the 
Philippines) as a basis for future policy changes.  
The Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine (ASI) is a necessary primary source for 
any research on Indochinese economic history. This work started late in the colonial 
period: its publishing authority, the Société des Statistiques Générale, was only instituted 
in 1922. The ASI mainly published statistical information and is thus a rich resource for 
further analytical work on French Indochina. Because of the publication’s role as one of 
data gathering, no analysis of the data is included in its volumes. However, the ASI 
provides us with some interesting guidelines as to what was considered significant to the 
authorities. For example, daily wage rates were only recorded for the year 1929, showing 
the limited importance the administration placed on monitoring ‘free’ labour, as opposed 
to contracted labour, prior to this date. 
While the ASI was mainly a statistical publication, the Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine (BEI) was a more analytical and descriptive publication and its volumes 
provide the first real exposure to the available literature on the economic history of 
colonial Indochina. It was first published in 1898 and remained an important publication 
until 1952. Unlike the ASI, the BEI contained more than just data. Not only were various 
studies on the state of rice culture or details of plants found in Indochina published in the 
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BEI, but evaluations of agrarian credit institutions in the Dutch Indies or reports on the 
state of the Philippines' economy were also frequent. Members of the administration 
wrote most of the works published in the BEI. The bulletins often include excerpts of 
speeches, policies or other official documents, as well as excerpts of other government-
encouraged research, such as explanations of the ways in which cost of living indices 
were constructed in Indochina. The BEI’s many articles show how the French studied 
other colonial administration’s works: consistent research on Java, the Philippines, 
Burma… was published, although none compared these economies specifically to French 
Indochina's. The BEI also published attachments with vast statistical records, not just for 
Indochina, but for other Southeast Asian economies. For example, the Tableau du 
Commerce Extérieur, which was at times attached to the BEI, recorded data on trade. 
Unfortunately, limited evaluations of trends were included in this specific publication. 
Unlike the ASI, the BEI evaluated trends in economic development to a larger extent. 
However, the BEI rarely, if ever, compared development between regions in Indochina, 
focusing instead on specific aspects of specific regions. 
The interesting aspect of these official publications is that whilst some general 
points are made for all of Indochina, it is clear that the authorities looked at each 
component part of the Union as separate and distinct, requiring its own research and 
records. At times, the authorities recorded statistics for the Union as a whole. However, 
often they tried to isolate each region, so that they collated data for Tonkin, Cochinchina, 
Annam, Cambodia and Laos individually. Although their data often highlighted major 
gaps between regions, at no point in the BEI or the ASI is any explanation made as to 
why the differences arose. It was clearly felt that each region had different advantages 
and obstacles and should thus be studied independently. An exception to this was F. 
Leurence’s suggestion, in the BEI, that the cost of living in Saigon was higher than in 
Hanoi.26  Even in the rare cases when such ‘evaluations’ were provided, there was no 
analysis of the reasons or consequences for such differences. Either Indochina was 
considered a united territory, or its component parts were evaluated in a vacuum. As 
shown in Chapter 1, recent estimated data show there was a GDP gap, particularly during 
colonial rule. Perhaps the government’s neglect in comparing economic differences was 
                                                
26 SOAS: F. Leurence, “Les variations du coût de la vie pour les Européens à Saigon de 1910 à 1925”, 
French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine 
Année 1925, (Hanoi: 1926), p.438. 
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due to the fact that they did not have access to GDP data of this kind. Having this data 
now reinforces the need for answers to our questions: why did this gap exist, how did it 
manifest itself in the economy and what was its impact on the population? 
 
2.2) Analytical studies by French scholars on Indochina during colonial rule  
The administration did not limit itself to these technocratic publications. In fact, many 
more works were done during colonial rule on the economy, government and history of 
Indochina. Many of these works were done by active or retired civil servants, while 
others were written by academics, often with the help of the administration. In these cases, 
more analysis was provided than in the BEI or ASI and many of the authors noted 
differences between the territories of Indochina. However, as with the official 
publications, these differences were rarely fully evaluated. This suggests that the 
differences between the regions of Indochina were considered irrelevant to the research 
agendas of scholars at the time. Indochina was a French colony and what mattered to 
these writers was how to understand its colonial development as a unit. This literature 
further prompts us to question why a gap that is now so evident in GDP terms failed to 
capture the interest of the French academic sector then. 
 
French colonialism in Indochina 
Because many of the authors on Indochina in this time period were in some ways 
associated with the colonial regime, many focused on explaining the ways in which the 
colonial administration worked. For example, Colonel Albert Duboc’s work on Indochina 
focused specifically on the necessity of improving the approach of the colonial 
government, away from assimilation towards association.27 While his work included a 
very brief overview of the economics of French rule with respect to taxes and welfare 
investment, the work is typical of that of many writers in this time period. The focus is on 
the colonial concept rather than on the reality of colonial rule. It is mainly a theoretical 
and ideological approach in which few details specific to Indochina were used to add 
context to the analysis presented.  
                                                
27 Albert Alfred Leon Duboc (Colonel), L’Indochine contemporaine, (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 
1932), p.178. 
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This is equally true of Albert Sarraut’s works on colonial ideology. Sarraut was the 
longest holding governor general of Indochina, serving two terms (1911-1914; 1916-
1919). After this, he joined the ministry of colonies. He is famous for establishing the 
‘mise-en-valeur’ ideology that shaped the economic development of French colonies in 
the post-WW1 era.  In his 1923 work, Sarraut provided both an overview of all French 
colonies and a discussion of what he believed French colonialism brought to these 
colonies. It is in this book that he first advocated France's responsibility to provide 
colonies with large-scale infrastructural work, if only in order to appease anti-colonial 
sentiment and keep the colonies part of the Empire.28  In his later work, he provided a 
reflection on colonialism and established more clearly the way in which colonial ideology 
was formulated in Indochina.29 Again, these works focused on an overall approach of 
French colonialism and on ideology rather than on the realities in each colonies.  
In certain circumstances such an approach is sensible: some research clearly shows 
that specificity might have been irrelevant to some aspects of French colonialism. Indeed, 
Albert Sabes’ 1931 doctoral thesis discussed the Indochinese bank, a topic that did not 
necessarily need to address economic differences.30 Moreover, Arthur Girault’s research 
evaluated the tariff policy of France and its empire before 1916.31 Many aspects of 
colonialism were common to all French-ruled territories, particularly trade policies: these 
were at the centre of the colonial ideology, as exemplified by Jules Ferry’s belief that 
colonies were necessary for France’s industrial growth.32 However, the idea of a single 
colonial ideology might have obscured some of the realities of colonial economics, 
focusing rather on colonial politics.  
For example, George Maspero’s work outlined the responsibility of France towards 
Indochina and the legacies of the many Governors General of Indochina.33 Maspero 
himself had been superior resident in Indochina. Many of the other contributors were also 
associated with the administration: George Lamarre had previously been in charge of 
                                                
28 Albert Sarraut, La mise en valeur des colonies françaises, (Paris: Payot, 1923). 
29 Albert Sarraut, Grandeur et servitude coloniales, (Paris: Editions du Sagittaire, 1931). 
30 Albert Sabes, Le renouvellement du privilège de la banque de l’Indochine, Thèse pour le doctorat en 
droit, (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1931). 
31 Arthur Girault, The Colonial Tariff Policy of France, (London: Humphrey Milford, 1916). 
32 Raoul Girardet, L’idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972). 
33 George Maspero, Un empire colonial français l’Indochine, Tome I: Le pays et ses habitants – l’histoire 
la vie sociale & Tome II: Indochine française – l’Indochine économique l’Indochine pittoresque, (Paris: 
Les Editions G. Van Oest, 1929). 
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economic services in Indochina and Pierre Pasquier was the current general governor of 
Indochina when this work was published. The first volume mentioned differing aspects of 
the geography within the Union, but this served a descriptive rather than an analytical 
purpose. Moreover, the second volume at times stopped short of evaluating some of the 
phenomena it highlighted. For example, the book suggests that migration from Tonkin to 
Cochinchina was rather scarce because of the industrial growth in Tonkin,34 but does not 
expand on the idea. The authors suggested that economic differences were indeed 
significant for the economic development of the Union, but seem to have conformed to 
the apparent paradigm of researching Indochina in a holistic manner and not dwelling on 
differing circumstances. 
A more significant contribution to the literature is found in Paul Bernard’s two key 
works on what he termed the ‘economic problem of Indochina’.35 The first of these two 
works is one of the most interesting general overviews of the Indochinese economy in the 
1930s. Bernard specifically looked at production, population and other aspects of the 
economy and explained how the French contributed to the development of the 
Indochinese economy. He then looked at the various crises that had come about and 
identified what he considered where the key problems for the Indochinese economy as a 
whole, specifically with respect to trade, credit and general colonial policies that did not 
seem to have worked. Bernard estimated the shares of contribution each region made to 
the national budgets in 1934. He noticed the disproportionate contribution of Cochinchina 
to the Indochinese budget: the region contributed forty per cent of the budget.36 However, 
he did not question why that was: was Cochinchina richer, or was the tax burden stifling 
the domestic economy? Interestingly, this shows that, at least from a budgetary point of 
view, scholars were aware of Cochinchina’s higher level of economic performance. Yet 
studies investigating the differences were never undertaken during the colonial period and 
contemporary studies still have not fully explored it. 
In his second book, Bernard’s approach was almost more historical: he evaluated 
previous public works and their sustainability and profitability. His research is an in 
depth analysis of the problem of under-industrialisation in the Indochinese economy. He 
                                                
34 ibid Tome II, p.213. 
35 Paul Bernard, Le problème économique Indochinois, (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latina, 1934) & Paul 
Bernard, Nouveaux aspects du problème économique Indochinois, (Paris: Fernand Sorlot, 1937). 
36 Bernard 1934, op.cit., p.49.  
 
 
39 
suggested that between 1900-1930, little progress had been achieved. Whilst he again 
acknowledged some of the differences between the two regions, Bernard, in much the 
same way as others in this time period, did not question why these differences existed or, 
and surprisingly in light of his work, what the resultant economic impact was. This is 
equally noticeable in Charles Robequain’s oft quoted L’évolution économique de 
l’Indochine française.37 Robequain made clear points on what France did to develop the 
economy, however his general overview of the economy is not extensively analytical or 
comparative. He made a number of allusions to differences between the two regions, 
whether in agriculture or industry, that were not subsequently discussed.  
This tendency to gloss over differential economic performance is perhaps best 
exemplified in André Touzet’s key work L’économie Indochinoise et la grande crise 
universelle.38 By 1934, Touzet was the ex-governor of the colonies and an adjunct 
director of Indochinese finances. His political career and close association with colonial 
affairs and Indochinese finances is clear in his work: his analysis is well informed. 
However, it is also biased by the need to not only brush over policy mistakes, but also 
defend them. This is particularly clear in Touzet's defence of the stabilisation of the 
piastre in 1930. He argued that no nation that dropped the gold standard saw 
improvements in its economic situation.39 In 1934, it may have been too early to see the 
inaccuracy of this statement, but it clearly displays some of the problems of this literature. 
Hindsight and distance from colonial actions may help clarify developments in the 
Indochinese economy.  
Nonetheless, Touzet’s seminal work showed the development of agrarian 
colonisation, market movements and colonial policies to do with economic development, 
particularly tariffs. Touzet highlighted differences between the regions in terms of what 
crops were favoured. However each aspect of the economy was evaluated for the 
Indochinese Union as a whole and differences between the Union's territories were not 
considered relevant. It may be that these differences did not have a real impact on how 
the colonial government worked or how the economy progressed during the Great 
Depression, which would justify this holistic approach. Indeed, Touzet argued that a key 
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finding of his work was that French colonisation did not seem to have provided a huge 
amount of help to a predominantly agrarian nation.40 Since national accounting was not 
yet prevalent, the gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina might not have been noted. 
However, considering what new estimates reveal, it seems clear that work on 
understanding and evaluating the economic gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina needs 
to be done.  
Touzet’s lesser known work on the governance of Indochina is, in a way, far more 
informative than some of the previous work on colonial ideology: he focused on 
separating the ‘theory’ from the reality of federalism in Indochina.41 His work quite 
rightly points out that Indochina was probably federal only with respect to its finances. 
He suggested that in 1887, an administrative union had been designed, but that by 1911, 
it was moulded into a federation of countries.42 Touzet was one of the first to recognise 
that such a federation was not necessarily possible because of the variations within each 
country. Essentially in his view, Indochina was simply a group of neighbouring countries 
administered together by a foreign power.43 This work is unique, particularly in light of 
the previously cited works, insofar as it is one of the only works to highlight that the 
countries of the Indochinese Unions differed and therefore that it was not necessarily 
possible, or advisable, to lump them together.  
Other works further evaluated this financial federation through analyses of the 
Indochinese budgets. Henry Marc and Pierre Cony’s work focused in more detail on the 
historic formation of the Indochinese Union and the ways in which the various budgets 
were organised.44 Roger Pinto’s legislative work on the political system and how it was 
devised is crucial in understanding the differences in the administration of each region.45 
Pinto’s work reflects his academic background in law, but it remains a useful marker in 
the literature, as it highlights the need to look at the administration of Indochina in a more 
country-specific perspective. These contemporary French authors seemed to have been 
keen on looking at Indochina as simply another part of their colonial domain and their 
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research topics imply limited desire to look into the distinctiveness of Indochina's 
member states in a comparative light. These works contain data and information that 
point to existing differences between the two regions. That an analysis of this was not 
done is almost shocking considering that the prevalent mind-set in France, after Sarraut’s 
work, was on encouraging the economic ‘development’ of the colonies. If administrative 
decisions differed and the colonial administration was supposed to be the key mover in 
encouraging development, why were no evaluations of economic differences undertaken? 
 
Specific aspects of French colonialism 
The limited effort of colonial contemporary writers in evaluating the economic 
differences that existed within the Union becomes particularly puzzling when looking at 
the research on more specific aspects of the colonial administration. For example, Henri 
Guermeur studied the establishment of the taxation system in Indochina in the early 
1900s. His work very clearly showed that the tax system initiated under Doumer's 
governorship (1897-1902) differed markedly between the regions of Indochina. 46 
However, even he did not further look into the reasons why, or the implications this may 
have had on economic development. Similarly, the research that was done for the 
government’s potential use in designing new administrative ways tended to be 
concentrated on general recommendations for Indochina as a whole. Indeed, A. 
Boudillon’s work as inspector of the land registry to the Minister of Colonies focused on 
evaluating taxation on land and making recommendations for how to increase public 
revenue,47 without recognition that this may have differed depending on the region.  
H. Simoni’s work on capital in the Indochinese economy provided some further 
material for evaluations of differences within Indochina. 48  His work provided an 
overview of general conditions within the Union. Whilst at times he included evidence on 
specific circumstances, his comparisons tend to be with other French colonies and, for the 
most part, his work seems more descriptive than analytical. He showed what public 
works were done and gave estimates on investment made in key sectors, but he did not 
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evaluate how each region's economy responded to these circumstances. In fact, research 
on how each colony fared with investors is scarce, despite the recognition that there were 
different economic activities undertaken in each region.  
Demographic differences seem to have been a key source of concern for the 
administration. There was much discussion as to how to enable the lands of Cochinchina, 
and of Cambodia to a smaller extent, to be fully utilised. Many believed in the necessity 
of displacing labour from ‘overpopulated’ Tonkin to the southern regions. E. Delamarre’s 
report for the colonial exposition of 1931 in Paris highlighted the various regulations and 
processes that were put in place by the administration to ‘solve’ the labour issue.49 Jean 
Goudal’s work on labour conditions went farther than Delamarre’s.50 Rather than simply 
looking at the legislation, Goudal looked at the wider implications of labour movements: 
from undernourishment to the need for cooperation between the administration and the 
peasant. However, neither of these works looked into how the labour market impacted the 
economic development of the Union, or indeed vice versa. 
However, a separate strand of research used demographic differences to suggest 
these might have explained the presence of an economic gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, at least with respect to the agricultural sector's performance. The two key 
works of French scholars on the subject are those of Pierre Gourou and Yves Henry.51 
Both observed that differences in the population density of the different administrative 
territories probably impacted soil productivity and, by extension, economic performance. 
Gourou was a scholar interested in the rural economy of Tonkin and his fieldwork on the 
region remains one of the most influential books written on the subject.52 Gourou also 
saw the need to understand Indochina as a whole and he gathered evidence amassed by 
other scholars and researchers for the French authorities for the other four component 
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regions of French Indochina. Conversely, Henry’s role was more one of compiling 
statistics. Indeed, Yves Henry was a researcher for the colonial authorities in the 1920s 
and 1930s and, in part because of this, argued that his 1932 publication "would have 
gained from not being strictly documentary; critical analysis and hints on the principal 
problems of the economy and agricultural policy would have given it more life".53 
Nonetheless, these two researchers were the only contemporary scholars to provide a 
suggestion as to the origin of the economic gap, even if neither further expanded on the 
subject. 
Gourou’s writing is considered more objective than Henry’s, in part because he was 
an academic not associated with the government and was therefore considered more of an 
impartial observer, and in part because he analysed his data to a greater extent. For 
example, he briefly compared the regions to one another, mainly with respect to land 
distribution. Despite the difference in the scale of their analysis, both scholars believed 
that because the South was much less populated, it had not yet achieved its full 
production potential.54 To both Gourou and Henry, this consequence of demographic 
differences alone explained the fact that the South could produce more per capita. Gourou 
stated that western and central Cochinchina “produce[d] a large surplus of rice which 
supplie[d] a large export trade [greater than] those carried on by the peasants of Annam 
and of Tongking”.55 Henry and Gourou both reached similar conclusions: regional 
differences between North and South originated from the fact that the man to land ratio 
was much higher in the North than in the South. For example, Cochinchina not only had 
more alluvial plains than Tonkin, but these were also less populated.56 In other words, per 
hectare, there were many more labourers in Tonkin than there were in Cochinchina. 
Moreover, Henry believed that apart from its mining industries, Tonkin had no 
dominant high value output.57 Because of this significant difference in the value potential 
of production between North and South, Henry explained that “the study of crops shows 
South-Indochina as the true centre of great colonisation, be it by size, variety and quality 
of the land [and production]”.58 Surprisingly, although it is clear that Cochinchina was the 
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rice basket of Indochina, research during this time period tended to focus on Tonkinese 
agricultural methods. Indeed, both R. Dumont and Pierre Gourou investigated the 
Tonkinese delta, while research on Cochinchinese rice production was scarcer.59 To 
Gourou, demographics were the source of all other economic differences between the two 
regions. He compared the soil fertility of Tonkin and Cochinchina, and argued that the 
latter’s lands “[we]re immature soils that ha[d] not had time to become exhausted”, 
because the area was populated much later than Tonkin.60 It seems to have been an agreed 
belief considering the significant effort that the colonial government of Indochina placed 
on trying to establish some type of balance in the population densities of the Union 
through labour movement. However, although that is suggested, it remains that no further 
evaluation was done. Was the gap really only due to the man-to-land ratio difference and 
their impact on soil productivity? Can we really simply use the agricultural sector to 
understand how this gap was formed? Finally, did this gap have an impact on the 
standard of living of the population? French researchers during the colonial time period 
did not address these questions.  
 
2.3) Works on Indochina by foreign scholars during colonial rule 
Research on Indochina was also undertaken during the colonial time period by non-
French scholars. At times this was as part of wider research on French colonialism, whilst 
at other times it tended to be as part of the wider Southeast Asian context. This is 
particularly true of the works that were done under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations (IPR). 
 
French colonialism 
Although the previous section suggests that the French were rather proud of the evolution 
of their colonial ideology and used it as the basis for any evaluation of economic progress, 
foreign scholars were rather less enthusiastic. An evaluation of the role of French policy 
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in terms of economic development in Indochina was attempted by Thomas Ennis.61 Ennis' 
work is a qualitative analysis of the political situation and its impact on education and 
health. Ennis did not look into variations within the territories, rather he compared 
Indochina to Dutch and English colonial territories, to the detriment of the French. While 
this work presents interesting arguments, it does not address the North-South gap and it 
remains unclear how colonialism would have affected, or been affected by, a GDP gap 
between Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
A much more significant contribution to the literature on the economic history of 
Indochina is Virginia Thompson’s French Indochina.62 This work provides an incredibly 
broad overview of Indochina under colonial rule. Thompson included a history of the 
Vietnamese empire and discussed various aspects of the colonial period from political 
organisation to native representation and responses to colonialism. Her work was an 
attempt to put, in English, “a background for the general problems in French Indo-China 
to day” 63  and she stressed many of the economic, administrative and geographic 
differences that existed within Indochina. However, she did not evaluate why these 
differences existed or how they would have affected economic performance. 
Stephen Roberts wrote a detailed history of the origins of French colonialism and 
highlighted its many problems.64 Interestingly, Roberts argued that “it could almost be 
said that Indo-China saw the emergence of a rich country, despite everything that the 
French could do to hinder it”.65 Roberts did not provide an evaluation of why that would 
be, but if he was right and the colonial administration was, at best, a neutral influence on 
economic development, could it be that Henry and Gourou were right and the man-to-
land ratio alone was the reason behind the economic gap? Such questions have not been 
satisfactorily addressed and it seems clear that further work on the link between the 
colonial administration and the perceived economic gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina is required. 
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Southeast Asian comparative studies 
Many of the works written by non-French scholars on Indochina were part of wider 
Southeast Asian research, generally under the auspices of the IPR. The Institute was 
created in 1929 and grouped members from various countries, mainly government 
officials and scholars interested in Pacific affairs. Its many conferences and publications 
provide a large resource for current academic work on the economic history Pacific 
countries. Authors such as John Furnivall, Philip Wright, Virginia Thompson, Kate 
Mitchell and Jack Shepherd were some of the key contributors to English language 
scholarly research on Indochina and Southeast Asia. Some of the work done by the IPR 
on Southeast Asian economic history often includes sections on Indochina that were 
eerily similar to French research. For example, Thompson's book on labour problems in 
Southeast Asia includes a section on Indochina that appears very similar to Goudal’s 
work for the ILO, although she added the responses of the labour market to the Great 
Depression. 66 In this respect, some of these works are useful to provide comparable 
context on other Southeast Asian economies, but not necessarily to improve the available 
literature on colonial Indochina. 
Furnivall, a scholar of the Dutch Indies and Burma predominantly, researched 
colonial policy, welfare and education in Southeast Asia. Some of his works were 
ground-breaking at the time and remain some of the best sources for understanding many 
under-studied aspects of colonial rule.67 Furnivall’s research allowed him to contrast 
Dutch, English and French colonial governance. Colonial governments, regardless of 
policies, very often did what they wanted, rather than what the population might have 
needed and so differences in culture and ideology of colonial power might have affected 
the evolution of economic performance.68 For example, Furnivall's research on the role of 
education, whilst much of it targets pre-1900 educational patterns, is a useful tool in 
evaluating how living standards might have changed during colonial rule. These types of 
comparative studies help refine our analysis of the extent to which differing economic 
performances had an impact on living standards. Likewise, Wright’s evaluation of the 
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trade barriers of Southeast Asia allows a better understanding of the ways in which 
colonial policies might have had an impact on the economic growth of the different 
regions and thus allow a better evaluation of the origin of the GDP gap.69  
The works of Kate Mitchell and Jack Shepherd on industrialisation in Southeast 
Asia are almost the only works that assess the rise of industrial movements in Southeast 
Asia.70 Generally, research on these countries focused on agriculture. This is particularly 
true for Indochina: as we saw, the French almost exclusively wrote on colonial ideology 
or agricultural developments. Mitchell and Shepherd’s works provide an independent 
survey of industrial growth. However, these two works say essentially the same things, to 
the extent that the wording is the same at some point. This is probably because both 
worked together for the IPR. Shepherd’s book advances the theory that industrialisation 
in the region was partly a response to the depression and to the advance of Japanese 
manufacturing. 71  The key finding from these works, however, is that Indochinese 
industrial growth was predominantly associated with Tonkin, not Cochinchina. This is 
very significant for our research: the French researchers at the time associated the 
economic gap with agriculture and with the man to land ratio, all this in favour of 
Cochinchina. If Tonkinese industry was much more significant, how can we reconcile it 
to the existence of a gap and how does it affect the role of the man-to-land ratio?  
 
2.4) Post-1950 studies on various aspects of French Indochina by French and 
Vietnamese scholars 
Following in the footsteps of previous research on Indochina, post-1950 French and 
Vietnamese research has focused on much the same topics as pre-1950 research. There 
has been a particularly large focus in this literature on the nature of French colonialism. 
For example, Raoul Girardet’s work provides an interesting analysis of colonialism 
throughout its history, from 1871 to 1962.72 Specifically, he looked at the evolution of the 
ideology of colonialism for the government and the population. His work stressed how 
                                                
69 Philip G. Wright, Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1935). 
70 Kate L. Mitchell, Industrialization of the Western Pacific, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1942 (2)) & Jack Shepherd, Industry in Southeast Asia, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941). 
71 Shepherd 1941, op.cit., p.4-5. 
72 Girardet, op.cit. 
 
 
48 
ideology varied over time within the mind-set of France itself. What he did not provide 
however, is evidence of what that meant in the colonies. Moreover, he assumed that 
because ideology was uniform, its impact on various colonial economies might have been 
homogenous. 
Others scholars have considered the impact of colonialism in colonial economies. 
For example, Jacques Marseille’s influential work is key in examining the relationship of 
the colonies to France, with respect to capitalism, through trade and capital flows.73 He 
looked into the impact of the Depression on the French empire and compared it, in some 
ways, to what happened in other empires. He suggested that “whilst elsewhere it was 
agrarian products that were the first victims of the depression, in the case of the French 
empire, it was raw materials necessary to industry”. 74  His research provided new 
arguments for how to look at the impact of the Depression and how to separate it by 
sectors. 
Other writers have focused on evaluating colonialism specifically in Indochina. 
Most notably, Daniel Hémery, Pierre Brocheux and Jean Chesneaux are preeminent 
scholars of French colonialism in Indochina. In one of his more historical works, 
Chesneaux focused on evaluating how the French put the ‘mise-en-valeur’ policies to 
work and he argued that their implementation was detrimental to the economic activities 
of the country.75 However, he did not explain how and seems to have assumed this to 
have been equally true for all parts of Vietnam. This is in part due to Chesneaux’ time 
period, his initial writings came in the immediate aftermath of Dien Bien Phu and his 
research has generally been oriented toward the rise of nationalism in the economy. 
Conversely, Brocheux and Hémery’s joint work provides a more nuanced evaluation of 
French colonialism, in part because it was written much later. They suggested “the 
relative uniformity of the pre-colonial systems of production and exchange ceded the 
place to a distinct differentiation in economic and social spaces that were unequally 
distributed”.76 Their work evaluated various aspects of colonialism and focused on some 
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of the contradictions and problems associated with colonialism. Perhaps because they are 
historians, their work does not analyse the economic gap. Instead, their arguments 
emphasised the historical developments of colonialism rather than the relative economic 
development of Indochina.  
Other writers have looked at even more specific aspects of government organisation 
during French rule in Indochina. Nguyen The Anh studied the Vietnamese monarchy 
during the period 1884-1945.77 He concluded that there was a clear dispossession of the 
emperor’s power, but that this was not replaced by a unified governing approach on the 
part of the French. There were clear differences in the organisation of the colonial 
government depending on the nature of the territory, whether protectorate or colony. 
Other research focused on understanding the personality of the French governors. 
Amaury Lorin’s work on Paul Doumer’s term as governor general of Indochina also 
shows this.78 Because his work is a biography of Doumer, the main argument of this work 
rests on a description the way in which Doumer instituted his reforms in Indochina. No 
evidence is provided of the ways in which the colonial mechanisms differed between the 
territories of the Union. In fact, it seems that the social, rather than economic, aspects or 
impacts of colonialism have been the main concern of recent research on Indochina's 
colonial legacies. 
Even more specific aspects of French colonialism such as property rights have also 
strayed away from economic evaluations. For example, Alexandre Deroche’s recent 
research looked at the legislative aspect of the concessionary system. He focused 
exclusively on concessions and how they were allocated. In part because this was a 
reworked PhD thesis in law, this work does not explain what concession allocation meant 
for economic activity and growth.79  
Research on financial flows such as Alain Mantex and Fall Mamadou’s PhD theses 
did investigate how private investments impacted the economic development of 
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Indochina.80 However, the data problems associated with their research limited the scope 
of their analysis. In particular, Mamadou’s thesis made very few distinctions between the 
communes of Tonkin and of Cochinchina in his analysis of investment. Likewise, other 
works tend to steer clear of evaluating the impact of variations in financial context. For 
example, Jacques Despuech's work on the evolution of the government’s regulation of 
currency in Indochina,81 tends to be self-contained and does not provide any indication of 
the impact of finances on regional development divergence. This is also true of Marc 
Meuleau and Yasuo Gonjo’s works on the Indochinese Bank.82 Both works investigated 
the roles and actions of the Bank of Indochina. Meuleau’s work was more extensive than 
Gonjo’s in term of historical reach, whilst Gonjo’s was broader in its analysis of the 
many roles of the Indochinese bank. These works showed that the financial context of 
Indochina was regulated in some ways by the role of the Indochinese Bank and by the 
colonial government, but neither showed if there were differences in the financial 
contexts of Tonkin and Cochinchina. Their focus was on defining roles, rather than 
linking financial evolution to economic development. However, obtaining data on 
financial flows has not been fully satisfactory, so our contribution on this will be quite 
minimal, focusing instead on providing evidence to suggest how the gap might have been 
formed and what it meant for sector-specific growth.  
Sector specific research on agriculture or industry by French authors was rather 
scarcer in this time period than in the previous, or than such research by non-French 
speaking authors. The main relevant work on agriculture is André Angladette’s work on 
rice production.83 Angladette provided some analysis and comparison between Vietnam 
and other Southeast Asian rice growers, mainly Burma and Thailand, but the work is a 
technical ecological study and once again fails to engage with the role of rice production 
in the economic performance of Indochina. Moreover, it focused on South Vietnam, 
preventing any comparison within Indochina. With respect to research on the commercial 
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sector, Kham Vorapheth’s work is central to understanding the organisation of 
commercial activity in the European side of Indochina's commercial sector during 
colonial rule.84 Although Vorapheth did highlight some of the key differences between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina, it is rather unclear what these differences meant, how they 
arose or what their economic influence was, because Vorapheth's orientation was on 
understanding the development of French trading houses, not their role in the economic 
performance of Indochina. 
 
Re-orientation of the research agenda: Welfare concerns 
Two new research agendas became important after the end of colonial rule: living 
conditions and the rise of nationalism, suggesting a clear re-orientation in the ways in 
which research on the colonial time period was undertaken. Much new research has been 
driven by welfare concerns and evaluations of the morality of colonialism. For example, 
Trinh Van Thao’s work on Indochinese education provides a very clear evaluation of the 
various ways in which each governor approached the education question.85 The bulk of 
his research is on the intellectual classes in support of Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist 
movements and on the sociological processes involved.86 His interest is very much 
guided by a nationalistic response to colonial rule, in addition to very strong research on 
the sociological impact of colonialism and nationalism. Trinh Van Thao's 1995 book 
evaluated the pervasive influence of colonial rule on the welfare of the native population. 
Although he acknowledged there were differences between the southern and northern 
approaches to French versus native education, it was not the predominant focus on his 
work. Despite the re-orientation of the research agenda towards better evaluations in the 
welfare of the colonial populations, no real analysis that differentiates between the two 
regions’ colonial educational systems and achievements has been done.  
Instead, research has focused on evaluating the living conditions of minorities and 
peasants, either as homogenous groups in Indochina in the case of Ngo Vinh Long or 
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Chesneaux, or specifically in Cochinchina, in the case of Brocheux’s numerous works on 
the Mekong Delta. 87  These works are very useful insofar as they provide clear 
descriptions of, and arguments about, how specific parts of the Indochinese peasantry 
lived. However, they do not permit comparisons between the regions and leave 
significant space for new contributions to be made. Brocheux suggests that “history has 
provided Southern Vietnam with economic, social and cultural peculiarities that have 
since not ceased to influence the evolution of the Vietnamese nation”.88 Unfortunately, he 
does not explain why or how, and does not compare the region to Tonkin, thus limiting 
the reliability of his argument. In Ngo Vinh Long’s case, we see a much more 
nationalistic evaluation, an attempt at disproving some of the generally held beliefs of the 
life of the peasantry under French rule. Whilst interesting and new, this book glosses over 
the fact that Vietnam was too fragmented to take these case-studies as representative of 
the entire territory. 
Long’s work is representative of a significant increase in research on the economic 
and historical realities of Vietnam. As French colonial rule over Indochina came to an 
end in 1954, a few studies looked into the history of Vietnam as a way of understanding 
the rise of communism and nationalism. For Long, this meant questioning the realities of 
living conditions and showing how dreadful they were. For Chesneaux, this was an 
attempt at explaining that unity during the colonial period was generally not achievable.89 
For Le Thanh Khoi and Nguyen Khac Vien, two Vietnamese scholars, it was a much 
broader attempt at documenting the history of Vietnam and in understanding the origins 
of the country and its civilisation.90 Le Thanh Khoi, as Henry and Gourou before him, 
argued that the North was populated under an organised government much earlier than 
the South, and its land was therefore used more intensively, and over a longer period of 
                                                
87 Pierre Brocheux, “Vietnamiens et minorités en Cochinchine pendant la période coloniale”, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 6, No.4, 1972, p.443-457; Pierre Brocheux, “Moral Economy of Political Economy? The 
Peasants are Always Rational”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No.4, August 1983, p.791-803; 
Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860-1960, (Madison: Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995), Jean Chesneaux, “Stages in the 
Development of the Vietnam National Movement 1862-1940”, Past and Present, No.7, 1955(1) & Ngo 
Vinh Long, Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants under the French, (London: The M.I.T. Press, 
1973). 
88 Brocheux 1972, op.cit., p.443. 
89 Jean Chesneaux, Contribution à l’Histoire de la nation Vietnamienne, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955(2)). 
90 Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam histoire et civilisation, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1955) & Nguyen 
Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History, (Hanoi: Thế Giới Publishers, 2002). 
 
 
53 
time, than Southern Vietnam’s land.91 Apart from some brief allusions to the economic 
impact of historical circumstances, much of the recent literature deals with social 
concerns. When an economic analysis is included, it tends to be based on secondary 
sources, rather than on extensive statistical research. This further reinforces our belief 
that research needs to be done on evaluating the origins of the economic gap between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina, its nature and its economic impact on the populations of the two 
regions.  
 
2.5) Post-1950 studies on various aspects of French Indochina by other scholars  
The involvement of the United States in the Indochinese conflict after 1954, as well as 
the more recent growth performance of post-Doi Moi Vietnam has resulted in a much 
richer literature on Indochina than was previously available. This being said, the work has 
been very much guided by the approach of the scholars involved. For example, similarly 
to what was happening with French or Vietnamese authors, a large body of work was 
done on the social realities of French colonial rule, which was guided by the realisation 
that colonialism was, in many ways, immoral. These works often look at some of the 
same topics that were studied during colonial rule but take a different analytical approach. 
Other works have been influenced by the growing Marxist academic perspective and thus 
focused on evaluating class struggle and the problems of colonialism. Yet another strand 
of the literature has researched the origins of the rise of nationalism and used their 
perspective on the nature of the national movements to better understand the past. More 
recent works have focused on understanding the sources of research for economic history, 
in order to obtain conclusions that are backed by solid data and well-constructed 
estimates. In addition, works on understanding Vietnamese economic history in light of 
the Southeast Asian region have also resurfaced.  
 
Evaluations of French colonialism 
Some non-French writers looked at the general ideology behind French colonial policies. 
For example, Raymond Betts’ work looked into how the colonial policy came to change 
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during the period 1890-1914 from assimilation to association.92  His research used French 
political discourse to examine the whole French empire. Betts highlighted the tendency of 
the French administration to compare itself to other colonial regimes, like the British and 
the Dutch, as was already exemplified in the BEI. He specifically showed what the 
French believed to be useful lessons they could draw from looking at the British 
Empire.93 French colonial rule in Indochina was often decided by the views of prominent 
members of the colonial elite and some research on this has been done. At times this was 
the governor general, as we saw with Lorin’s work on Doumer and as we see with 
Thomas Martin’s work on Albert Sarraut.94 Other times, research focused on other 
influential persons, such as Andrew Hardy’s work on Paul Bernard, a financier and 
economic advisor in Indochina.95 Martin suggested that much of the way in which 
Indochina was ruled during Sarraut’s long tenure was based on his fear of the rise of 
communism. As such, Martin’s evaluation of the evolution of economic policies is very 
much based on the way in which ideology impacted the colonial discourse. Interestingly, 
this is very similar to some of the ways in which colonial contemporaries wrote about 
French rule: focusing on surrounding ideology rather than economic realities. Hardy’s 
work, despite its title suggesting that the analysis would focus on economics, remains 
grounded in the perspective that individual influences on the colonial policy were the 
main mover in the development of the economy. Indeed, Hardy argued that it was 
Bernard’s ability to convince the colonial government of the need for industrialisation 
that led to the beginnings of an industrial policy in Indochina. While this may well be 
partly true, the fact that industrialisation had started much earlier than 1938, especially in 
Tonkin, is not discussed in Hardy's work. These types of writing, while very useful for 
evaluations of the colonial policy and its evolution, do not address why there were 
differences between Tonkin and Cochinchina or how these were reflected in the sectoral 
development and living standards of the Indochinese economy.  
It is difficult to reconcile these grand writings on colonial ideology with some of 
the more specific writings on aspects of the colonial policy. For example, Erica Peters’ 
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evaluation of the rice alcohol excise board in Tonkin highlighted the problems that 
resulted from the establishment of this excise board. Peters' research also hinted at 
differences in the regulation of the excise board between Tonkin and Cochinchina,96 but 
she did not use this to refine her analysis of the excise board's impact. Similarly, Irene 
Nørlund's work on the textile industry in Indochina between 1880-1940 is a very clear 
evaluation of the evolution of this sector and of investments into the wider Indochinese 
economy. Though she presents a substantially improved understanding of the interaction 
of political and economic processes in the colonial economy of Indochina,97 at no point 
did she evaluate the impact of differences in the evolution of industrial development 
between the various parts of Indochina. Her work is therefore a great source for 
understanding the development of the textile industry, but does not address what 
industrial development might have meant for the economic gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. Nørlund’s work hinted at differences in the realities of French rule 
depending on which territory one was in, but because her work was specifically on the 
textile industry, which was primarily located in Tonkin, her conclusions cannot 
necessarily be extrapolated to the entire Indochinese economy. She suggested that Tonkin 
was more autarkic in its attitude than the rest of Indochina, and certainly than 
Cochinchina,98 but more research is needed to establish this. Indeed, if despite being in 
the ‘Indochinese Union’ and thus under the oft researched French colonial policy, 
attitudes to trade differed, then was the gap between the two regions based on these 
differing attitudes to production and consumption? Even if the answer is no, or only to 
some extent, it would help make sense of the generally ignored gap between the two 
regions and would help evaluate Henry and Gourou's suggestion that the gap was due to 
population density differences.  
Other researchers than Nørlund have argued that North Vietnam was a subsistence 
economy, while South Vietnam was a commercial economy.99  For example, Samuel 
Popkin argued that there was an important “distinction between commercial agriculture in 
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Cochin-China and subsistence agriculture in Tonkin and Annam”, but he did not analyse 
these two types of agriculture in his research.100 This may partly have been due to this 
point being secondary to his research agenda, which was to focus on the political 
differences of North and South Vietnam. Popkin’s basic suggestion of an economic 
difference mirrors his political economy arguments, which show significant differences in 
the authority of village-level institutions between regions. In fact, Popkin’s research 
seems to indicate that: “the village level public sector was a much more important part of 
local economic life in Annam and Tonkin than in Cochin-China”.101 Popkin’s research 
showed that “there was very little communal land and almost no communal irrigation or 
flood control in Cochin-china”.102 Despite his suggestion of an economic gap, Popkin 
provided no evidence, seeming, instead, to take for granted that there was a gap between 
the economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina. This is strange considering that few writings 
had been done on the existence of a gap before his work. Consequently, more research is 
needed to conclusively agree with his suggestion that there were differences in the 
orientation of economic activity between the two regions and that these were linked with 
differing production preferences. Popkin's work is, in a way, typical of post-1950 
writings on colonial Vietnam: there is no evaluation of the North-South gap, just a 
recognition that it existed. Research instead focused on the socio-political concerns or 
case studies of specific issues. 
Melanie Beresford’s work on Vietnam is somewhat different. Although much of 
her work is on post-1940 Vietnam, she did provide an overview of the colonial economy 
in which she specifically addressed the fact that economic activity differed between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina.103 Also, she is part of the group of scholars suggesting that the 
colonial authorities may well have had an impact on the diverging economic paths of 
those two regions. She argued that a crucial difference between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
was that most of the land used for cultivation in Cochinchina “had been opened up only 
since the French occupation” and was in fact used primarily for export-crop production.104 
Her central argument was that, since the French hoped to encourage exports of primary 
commodities, their ability to open up more land to cultivation in Cochinchina permitted 
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higher value export-crops to be planted.105 Beresford argued that colonial intervention in 
Cochinchina fostered the development of a more market-based society: “in Cochin-china, 
market relations were more highly developed than in Annam and Tonkin”.106 Beresford 
often used theory, rather than extensive data, to argue that Cochinchina’s foreign trade 
and market relations were stronger than Tonkin’s. Therefore, although her analysis re-
emphasises some of the previously made point, it is less than fully satisfying or 
conclusive. 
The role of the colonial government in influencing diverging economic paths, 
particularly with respect to agricultural development, may not be incorrect. In fact, 
according to Michitake Aso, the French authorities encouraged agricultural projects such 
as rubber.107 Considering that the GDP gap was in favour of Cochinchina, and considering 
that industry was by all accounts more significant in Tonkin than Cochinchina, then a 
much stronger agricultural sector in Cochinchina would be needed to explain the 
diverging trends of Tonkin and Cochinchina during French rule. However, was this 
because of the French authorities or was it because of the man to land ratio as previous 
French scholars believed? This question has yet to be answered in the literature and is 
part of the general questions of this thesis.  
Although the specific issue of the wider impact of demographic differences on the 
diverging economic performances of Tonkin and Cochinchina has not been extensively 
studied, other aspects of the agricultural sector such as landownership have been. For 
example, Mark Cleary discussed once more the regulations surrounding concessions and 
their impact on investment decisions,108 while Edward Mitchell and Jeffery Paige’s 
response to Mitchell’s argument both suggest that communal land ownership was much 
more prevalent in Northern Vietnam than it was in Southern Vietnam.109 Although it is 
possible that cultivation patterns were similar across the Union of Indochina, ownership 
patterns were substantially different and these may well have also been part of the 
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diverging economic performances of the two regions. Cochinchina had a very low 
percentage of communal land: only 3% as opposed to over 40% of used land in Northern 
Annam.110  Paige argued that one of the main reasons agriculture in the South was more 
productive was that “it [was in the Mekong Delta] that proprietary interests [were] 
strongest, tenancy [and land ownership] most widespread”.111 This is different from 
Henry and Gourou's argument of population density and suggests the need for a more 
careful re-evaluation of the role of demographics in economic performance. 
Such literature on land ownership patterns fits into the wider debate on the 
economics of capitalism. As previously mentioned, this literature has been influenced by 
the rise of the Marxist perspective when looking at colonial territories. This literature is 
exemplified in Martin Murray’s work on colonial Indochina, which looked intently at 
class struggles and the obstacles to sustainable growth during the colonial time period.112 
Murray’s substantial work asserts that differences in the  
colonial state’s economic policies not only transformed the inner dynamics 
and processes of social differentiation among rural inhabitants […], but also 
produced a differential impact on the internal class structure and village 
organization within the two principal regions of Indochina: the northern Red 
River delta of Tonkin and the coastal lowlands of Annam, on the one hand, 
and the southern Mekong Delta on the other.113  
However, Murray provided no evidence for these different class structures. Although his 
work, like much other research, is biased by his ideology, it remains a clear contribution 
to the literature and further re-emphasises the need for a better understanding of how the 
regions differed and why they did.  
The literature that more closely looks into the living standards of the Vietnamese 
population during French colonial rule is also rather quiet on issues of regional 
differences. For example, both Webby Silupya Kalikiti’s PhD thesis and Murray’s other 
research on rubber plantations focus on the rise of the rubber industry, whilst Geoffrey 
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Gunn looks specifically at the 1944-1945 famine.114 However, Charles Fisher’s work on 
the Vietnamese economy is much more aware of the geographical context, as the title of 
his article suggests.115 Fisher provides one of the few geographical reviews of the 
variations within Vietnam and of how colonial rule led to an intensification of the 
differences between the two regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina. Fisher argued that the 
conflict “[was] deeply rooted in major geographical and historical differences between 
the northern and the southern halves of the country” and that these differences were 
merely ‘intensified’ by French rule.116 He further argued that “living standards [in the 
South] were markedly above those of the North, as was shown by both a skilled wage 
level and a per capita rice consumption approximately double those of Tonkin”.117 The 
interesting part of this work however, is that Fisher does not prove that this was the case, 
nor does he explain why French rule would have had such an effect. In fact, Fisher’s 
assumptions are representative of much of the research on Indochinese history that has 
been done post-1950. Documentation on the existence of an economic gap is scarce and 
yet scholars still make such statements without establishing their veracity. For example, 
some scholars argued that the North depended on the South’s surplus production. G. 
Nguyen Tien Hung and Jean Lacouture both believed that the differences in the type of 
agriculture practiced in the different regions of Vietnam reflected the ‘economic 
complementarities’ of the North and the South.118 Indeed, they argued that there was, 
primarily, a dependency of the North on the South, as seen by rice exports. However, the 
data does not necessarily substantiate these claims. Some of these issues we hope to 
rectify in this thesis, both by evaluating whether French rule really had an impact on the 
economic gap or if it was more a story of the man-to-land ratio differences as the French 
scholars believed; whether the differences in economic activity led to some 
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complementarities between regions; and whether the economic gap really did mean that 
living standards were that much higher in the South.  
 
The study of nationalism 
Because of Vietnam’s struggle for independence and its unique circumstances, many of 
the post-colonial writings, particularly from American scholars such as William Duiker, 
Alexander Woodside and Thomas Hodgkin, have focused on the rise of nationalism and 
communism. These works, while not necessarily directly relevant to this thesis, are 
crucial to the literature on Vietnam. In fact, these works tend to better highlight the need 
for our particular research. Many of these writers tended to use economic rationales in 
explaining the rise of nationalism. While this is certainly logical, it seems strange to build 
such a narrative when it has been demonstrated that the economic history of Vietnam, 
particularly with respect to regional disparities, has not been extensively studied.  
Nonetheless, some of these works, particularly those of Duiker, a former American 
foreign service officer, have acknowledged the regional differences between North and 
South.119 Duiker postulated that North and South formed two “separate and mutually 
antagonistic regions” due to historical political rivalries.120 His observation was not purely 
political, it was also linked to economic and cultural differences. Indeed, he made the 
case that “there [we]re indications that rural standards of living, at least in Cochin-china, 
may have risen between 1900 and 1930 but then declined during and after the World 
Depression in the 1930s”.121 Just as Fisher before him, Duiker’s research did not explain 
why this occurred, how extensive it was or what it meant in a wider regional comparison. 
Hodgkin, also writing on the rise of nationalism, recognised the significance of the 
variations within the Vietnamese economy.122 According to Hodgkin, the Vietnamese 
economy suffered tremendous turmoil because of climactic conditions, but many of the 
problems were localised, because of Vietnam’s varied geography.123 Hodgkin also argued 
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that there were certain continuing themes in the country’s history, predominantly the role 
of the Vietnamese commune.124 While some aspects of life were certainly widespread 
themes throughout Vietnam, Hodgkin provided limited evidence to prove his point. It is 
equally possible that there were substantial differences in the spread of such themes 
across the country during colonial rule, especially considering that the country was split 
in three administrative regions. In fact, Paige and Mitchell’s previously cited works 
provided some evidence to suggest that the commune was not as prevalent in the South as 
it was in the North.125 It is thus clear that a better understanding of the variations in the 
economic circumstances of Indochina would improve existing research on the origins of 
nationalism.  
The few studies that use regional variation in evaluations of the rise of nationalism 
justify this. For example, Robert Sansom’s work on the Mekong Delta provided a review 
of Cochinchina's colonisation and how institutional development is key to understanding 
the cost benefit analysis of the peasant reality.126 Similarly, R. B. Smith’s extensive study 
of opposition to French rule in Southern Vietnam has highlighted the variety of conflicts 
that existed during French rule.127 The fact that nationalism in the south was so powerful 
suggests the need to better understand the economic realities of French rule: if despite a 
higher GDP, Cochinchinese peasants and elite members alike were in opposition to 
French rule, was the gap truly reflected in living standard? Such a literature suggests that 
previous assumptions in the literature on the rise of nationalism may in fact be based on 
inadequate representations of the economic conditions of colonial Vietnam. 
 
New quantitative work  
One of the more recent developments in the economic history of colonial Vietnam is 
work done to improve the quality and quantity of statistical data. A significant resource 
that provides both raw data and estimated data to complement the available archives is 
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the Hitotsubashi Project Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990. The work 
was done as part of a conference on the economic history of Vietnam at Hitotsubashi 
University in 2000. This project has resulted in a large number of topics crucial to the 
economic history of Vietnam being surveyed. In addition, where possible, new estimates 
were derived from varied official and non-official sources. This project included research 
on population, public finances, agrarian development, the role of the Chinese minorities, 
wages and prices, etc. As well as offering more readily available data to the literature, it 
opened up the debate on the available analytical sources and offered a number of clues on 
what type of research can be done, based on the available data. An associated work, 
Constructing a Historical Macroeconomic Database for Trans-Asian Regions, provides 
scholars with some estimates of Vietnamese GDP, broken down into regions and sectors 
when possible. This work was the first to quantify the GDP gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina during French colonial rule.128 Based on these estimates, and based on the 
previously highlighted literature, it seems clear that much more research needs to be done 
to understand the what, why and how of the economic gap, as well as its implications on 
living standards. Despite the wealth of information in the more recent Hitotsubashi 
Project, these questions remain largely unanswered.   
Although many of the articles and estimates in the Hitotsubashi project are used in 
this thesis, we will highlight some of the key works that contextualise this thesis' 
contribution. Jean-Pascal Bassino’s and Jean-Dominique Giacometti’s works on various 
aspects of the colonial economy are key in understanding what has been done, what needs 
more work and what evidence can be used. Bassino’s other work on rice cultivation in 
Southern Vietnam and his joint publication with Bui Thi Lan Huong on trade provide 
some interesting quantitative points to keep in mind. For example, Bassino highlights the 
problems associated with the colonial government’s estimation of rice yields in Southern 
Vietnam.129 On a more analytical side, Bassino’s work on the budgets of Indochina shed 
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light on significant trends in the ways in which local budgets worked.130 Moreover, his 
joint work with Severine Blaise evaluated the long-term economic performance of north 
and south Vietnam during and after colonisation. They suggested that  
the North-South gap remained a structural feature between the 1930s and the 
1970s although political and military conditions between 1945 and 1954 may 
have resulted in a relative convergence in terms of per capita income.131  
It seems clear that for Bassino much of the economic gap was a structural feature of the 
economy, based on a number of factors that were not necessarily associated with the 
colonial policies of the French administration.132 This remains to be evaluated. Indeed, for 
some scholars such as Fisher, this is not so clear. Moreover, these works do not provide a 
link between the performance of the regional economies and the works of the colonial 
authorities, via an evaluation of the local budgets. As such, the purpose of this thesis is to 
better understand the origin of the economic gap, by evaluating the role of the colonial 
government, but also by exploring the belief of French scholars on the responsibility of 
varying man-to-land ratio in explaining diverging economic patterns.  
Giacometti’s research has also been quite varied, exploring various aspects of 
Vietnamese economic history: from the rural sector to the general situation of wages and 
prices in colonial Vietnam. His research is particularly relevant to the current study with 
respect to his analysis of agricultural development:133 Giacometti showed that even within 
a region, Annam for example, differences in soil, due to extensive mountainous terrains, 
adversely affected the economic development of particular areas, with a noted difference 
between north and south Annam.134 If this was true for Annam, then some similar aspects 
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must be true for Tonkin and Cochinchina. Moreover, his belief that much of the 
economic gap was due to geographical differences suggests a refined perception of 
Gourou and Henry’s argument that population densities explain economic differences, 
perhaps geography in general did. Giacometti's work on estimation of prices and wages in 
Tonkin and Cochinchina helps further the resources available for evaluations of the 
standards of living.135 Whilst Giacometti included some hint of what these data meant in 
the living standard of the population, he did not extend his analysis to understanding the 
gap between the two regions’ living standards. The new estimates and suggestions from 
the Hitotsubashi Project and associated works allow a more nuanced and informed 
analysis of the North-South gap then what has previously been done. 
 
2.6) Studies on colonial Southeast Asia 
As section 2.3 showed, many of the works written under the auspices of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations included Indochina in larger research projects on Southeast Asia. More 
recent works also do this and we consider it helpful to provide some of this wider 
Southeast Asian context to our analysis, to better support the conclusions and to add 
nuances to our analysis. Some of the more recent research on Southeast Asia help show 
that research on colonial Vietnam has, at times, suffered from scarcity compared to other 
countries in the region and suggest new ways of comparing the regions within Indochina.  
 
Southeast Asia histories 
The aftermath of decolonisation, or at least of the escalation of active nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia, gave rise to a separate type of Southeast Asian scholarship, 
specifically on the changes in these economies. Indeed, Virginia Thompson and Richard 
Adolff’s joint works on the changes in this time period seek to interpret the rise of 
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nationalism across the region.136 Although their work treated each colony separately, the 
response to the end of the war and the subsequent clash between colonial and native 
authorities was seen as homogenous. For other writers, the main concept to evaluate was 
communism and its impact on Southeast Asia as a whole. Writings on understanding the 
variations within each colonies were abandoned for broader studies on the region, 
whether they be research on pre-modern times, colonial times or post-colonial times.137  
Some influential books have been written about pre-modern Southeast Asia, 
foremost of these is Anthony Reid’s work on Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce.138 
Other works specifically focused on the relations between China, as the historical 
regional superpower, and Southeast Asia.139 Yet more works evaluate both the pre-
modern era and the colonial period. For example, D.R. SarDesai described the Southeast 
Asian colonies and Thailand in both time periods.140 These varied works provide some 
good evidence of the various circumstances these countries faced in this time period. 
However, they remain almost purely historical and offer little by way of comparisons 
between the economies of the region.141 Some of the later studies done for conferences of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations post-WW2 looked in more detail at ways to compare 
both the colonial policies of the various colonies and their economic development.142 
More recent works, such as David Steinberg’s and Harry Benda’s, also provide some 
ways of comparing various aspects of colonial rule in different colonies.143 For example, 
Benda suggests ways of looking at direct and indirect rule in Southeast Asia, specifically 
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through evaluating the nature of the political elites in the colonial societies.144 Throughout 
this literature, evidence from Vietnam seems uncertain and scattered. This thesis will help 
increase awareness of the variations within Vietnam's economic development during 
colonialism.  
Many scholars of Southeast Asian history have looked at various aspects of living 
conditions during the colonial period, rather than looking at the colonial system. These 
writings provide some good suggestions on how to interpret the economic gap between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. For example, Peter Boomgaard’s suggested explanation for low 
levels of development in the region point to institutional problems and factor market 
obstacles.145 Similarly, James Scott’s influential work on the peasant economy suggested 
the need to look into the differences in production capacity.146 These suggestions hint at 
potentially different explanations on the origins of the North South gap: institutional 
differences on the one hand and geographical differences on the other. Furthermore, 
Bruno Lasker’s work on living conditions in the Far East suggests that to understand the 
GDP gap, more needs to be done on understanding the distributional aspects of income,147 
while Ian Brown’s work suggests more attention be spent on understanding the effect of 
the Great Depression on rural income.148 These works further stress the contribution of 
this paper, not only with respect to colonial Vietnam’s economic history, but also with 
respect to general understandings of the colonial history of Southeast Asia. Certainly, this 
thesis cannot address all of these concerns, but it will provide specific comparisons 
between various aspects of the Tonkinese and Cochinchinese economies. 
A significant body of literature has looked into the economic growth of Southeast 
Asia. Although much of this literature has focused on the post-war record of agricultural 
and industrial growth, like Francesca Bray's seminal work on the rice economies of Asia, 
Harry Oshima’s work on monsoon Asia and Randolph Barker, Robert Herdt and Beth 
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Rose’s work on rice economies,149 others have looked at general trends in agricultural 
developments. Vernon Wickizer’s many works on the agricultural developments of 
Southeast Asia in the post-war context offer good understandings of the institutional 
aspect of rice production, as well as the position of rice in the economies of Southeast 
Asia.150 Lucien Hanks’ work shows the general problems of labour in the development of 
Southeast Asian economies. 151  These works propose links between agricultural 
developments and institutional constraints and highlight the need to look at the 
relationship between the origin of the gap and its nature.152 Indeed, Yujiro Hayami and 
Vernon Ruttan’s work suggests that agricultural output explains economic 
development. 153  Since French authors argued the impact of demographics on the 
agricultural sector was the main explanations for differences in economic development, it 
makes sense to use this literature to further evaluate Indochina's economy.  
The lack of literature on the evolution of the economic gap in French colonial 
Vietnam is strange, but at times representative of the emphasis that some scholars have 
placed on establishing a path of development that is specific to East Asian development. 
For example, Kaoru Sugihara’s work on such a path favours looking at labour intensity 
and ‘Asian’ style industrialisation.154 This perspective has come under attack, often 
because of the need to understand how different parts of Asia are from one another. This 
is specifically argued in Anne Booth’s many works on Southeast Asian development. For 
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example, she looks into the idea of land reforms and agricultural policies and how these 
have differed in post-war Southeast Asia.155  
Although this specific work looked at the post-colonial period, Booth has published 
various works on the countries of Southeast Asia during colonial rule, investigating how 
aspects of economic history should be better understood in Southeast Asia. For example, 
she researched and documented the different ways in which globalisation in the colonial 
era affected the economies of Southeast Asia compared to those of the Western 
developed world.156 The crux of Booth’s work has focused on analysing and evaluating 
the lasting impact colonial policies have had on the development of the region. She has 
not only studied the varied responses of the region to the Great Depression, but she has 
also produced some of the more helpful evaluations of colonial public policies.157 In her 
analysis of the Southeast Asian response to the Depression, Booth has highlighted that it 
affected parts of Southeast Asia differently, depending on the colonial power (Indochina 
under French rule suffered differently from Burma under British rule).158 This argument is 
pushed further in her book on colonial legacies, which explained more rigorously why 
countries with seemingly similar endowments performed so differently. Although she 
warns against historical determinism, she provided some significant evidence that suggest 
the need to better understand colonial policies to evaluate performance differences.159 In 
addition, her work has shown how traditional understandings of the role of the colonial 
governments may well be flawed.160 If this is true for the Southeast Asian region, then it is 
worth looking into potential differences in the colonial administration’s influence in the 
economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina. If we find that colonial rule differed significantly 
between the two and can theoretically explain some of the economic gap during the 
period, then this might allow a better evaluation of previous claims on the origin of the 
North-South colonial gap. Moreover, Booth highlighted the fact that “it is widely 
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recognized that trends in per capita GDP are not reliable guides to changes in living 
standard”, 161 suggesting the need for a better evaluation of how the newly measured 
economic gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina was reflected in the living standards of 
these regions. 
 
Country specific analyses 
Research on specific countries within Southeast Asia also emphasise some of the ways in 
which analyses of Indochinese economic history can be improved. The type of evaluation 
proposed in this thesis has been done for Indonesia, and Burma to a lesser extent, 
specifically in Clifford Geertz’ and J.S. Furnivall’s many works. For example, work on 
Burmese economic history, in addition to Furnivall’s previously mentioned work, 
highlighted the historic divide between Lower and Upper Burma during the colonial 
period, as well as its transition from a subsistence economy to a market-oriented 
economy.162 Other sources allow us to better evaluate the ways in which colonial policies 
were decided and provide data for comparisons to Indochina and evaluations of the role 
colonial policy may have had on the regional divergence in economic performance 
between Tonkin and Cochinchina.163 
Foremost in the study of the Dutch Indies is Geertz’ works on agricultural 
involution.164 This book presents a conscientious study of the relationship between man 
and his ecosystem: it is “a social-economic history of Java, that goes far to explain the 
difficulties that independent Indonesia is experiencing in launching a take-off”. 165 
Although Geertz’ evaluation is not free of criticism,166 it does provide a good example of 
how to interpret colonial developments in a primarily agrarian society. His other works 
on the Javanese economy further supply researchers with ways in which to evaluate 
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developments in other Southeast Asian regions.167 In addition to Geertz and Furnivall, 
numerous studies provide similar grounds for comparisons: Alex ter Braake’s study on 
the mining industry of the Dutch Indies, Jan Luiten van Zanden’s work on the colonial 
policies of the Dutch Indies, John Coast’s work on Thailand, as well as Rupert Emerson’s 
controversial work on direct and indirect colonial rule in Malaysia.168  
More recent work on the Dutch Indies’ economy can be found in Pierre van der 
Eng’s work. Specifically, van der Eng’s work has looked into long-term standard of 
living evaluations in Indonesia and suggested links between living standards and crop 
diversification.169 His work also looked at changes in agricultural productivity and its link 
to colonial policies with regards to labour markets.170 Van der Eng has also provided 
some comparative work on the Southeast Asian rice agriculture sector with a clear 
evaluation of the ways in which various regions within Southeast Asia were affected by 
different circumstances and contexts.171 This type of research has not been done for 
Indochina. 
Van der Eng’s more recent joint working papers with Jean-Pascal Bassino are even 
more helpful in illustrating why the economic history of Indochina needs more research, 
not just in light of what has been written on the Dutch Indies, but also because of 
differences between the Dutch Indies, Indochina and other countries in the region. Indeed, 
in two working papers, Bassino and van der Eng show that when comparing wages, 
welfare and economic growth for countries within Asia, or within Asia and Europe, the 
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performance of South and North Vietnam were very different.172 Although both remained 
rather poor countries, their performance was not similar, especially not during colonial 
rule. Bassino and van der Eng suggested that it is “likely [South Vietnam’s] success in 
export-oriented development at that time” was partly responsible for its better 
performance, but they warned against the possibility of adequately proving this.173 
Nonetheless, their papers suggest the need to look into the reasons for this diverging 
economic gap, as well as the need for a better evaluation of how this gap was in fact 
represented in the various sectors of the economy, not to mention in the living standards 
of the population. At this time, no works such as Geertz’ have been done on colonial 
Indochina. Furnivall’s many comparative works on the Dutch Indies and Burma provide 
further tools for evaluating a colonial economy, as well as useful data and analysis, which 
can be used to compare our findings on colonial Vietnam to these other two colonial 
economies in the future. Furthermore, Furnivall’s descriptions of colonial policies and tax 
systems suggest ways in which to compare not only Indochina to Burma and the Dutch 
Indies, but Tonkin to Cochinchina.174 
Although Japan's economic development is very different from development in 
Southeast Asia, it has often been used as a yardstick by which Asian economic 
performance has been measured. Kate Mitchell’s work on the industrialisation of Japan 
suggests the importance of understanding the development of that economy to better 
understand developments in the region.175 This is made even more relevant considering 
other works into Japan’s trade and living standards, suggesting reasons for its 
industrialisation.176 Moreover, research on Japan’s growth performance and ability to join 
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the ‘convergence club’ suggest the need to better understand the endogenous 
developments within an economy. For this, Osamu Saito’s work on Japan provides a 
good way of evaluating why certain aspects of Tonkinese and Cochinchinese 
development may have resulted in different economic performances.177 This type of 
research is different from what has been done on Chinese economic history, and a better 
use of China as a comparative can help shed light on other aspects of the Indochinese 
economy, particularly with respect to land distribution. Here, the vast literature on the 
organisation of property rights and standard of living provide some interesting ways in 
which to compare Tonkin and Cochinchina.178 The literature on the variations within 
colonial Vietnam's economic history seems weak compared to that of neighbouring 
economies.  
 
2.7) Studies on post-colonial Vietnam 
Not only does research on colonial Vietnam seem scarce compared to that on other 
neighbouring colonial economies, it also pales in comparison to research on post-
unification Vietnamese economic history. In this larger literature, two main aspects have 
been investigated: the unification itself and the post-Doi Moi era of Vietnamese success 
and these at times suggest the need for a better knowledge of the past.  
For example, the link between the Vietnam war and the feeling of unity in the 
country was investigated in Philippe Devillers’s work. Although he acknowledged the 
fact that even before the war there had been cleavages within the society,179 he did not use 
this to further quantify his argument. The lack of such contextualisation and qualification 
is a problem: Dennis Duncanson argued that the Vietnam War was a civil war:  “what the 
fighting has been about is whether the North should in future dominate the South”.180 
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Without a clear knowledge of historical differences, the argument is weak. In other words, 
Duncanson hints at a major misunderstanding of Vietnamese history without clarifying it: 
North and South were not torn apart simply by foreign powers, they were divided because 
of their own internal problems pre-dating the war.181 These authors saw the significance 
of political cleavage both before the war and during it. 
Another aspect of the recent literature of Vietnam that could benefit from a better 
historical knowledge is research on the current North-South gap. One of the only works 
to specifically investigate the economic cleavages in post-war Vietnam is Van Thi Hong 
Pham in a PhD dissertation specifically evaluating regional growth differences, albeit 
during the period 1996-2003.182 Interestingly, research on the current economic gap 
between the north and the south suggests that it mirrors the regional variation of ideology, 
with a much more market-friendly south and a more communist oriented north.183 The 
literature on Vietnam's current economic performance has either focused on particular 
regions in explaining the recent economic growth,184 or discussed Vietnam as a whole 
whilst using evidence from only one region, just as much of the literature on the 
economic performance of colonial Vietnam. For example, Adam Fforde’s discussion of 
Vietnam’s post war economic success is based on information solely from North 
Vietnam.185  He did not isolate where economic success originated, despite hinting that 
most of the boom was in the South. Most writers recognise the significance of the 
movement towards market friendly policy in the recent growth of the Vietnamese 
economy, 186  as well as recognising the importance of institutional changes. 187  The 
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existence of a current north-south gap is acknowledged and many attribute it to differing 
attitudes to economic growth. This research does raise a question over whether or not 
there is path dependence in the economic development of Vietnam. Was the gap during 
the colonial era the same as the gap that is currently present in Vietnam? We cannot 
address this before understanding what the colonial gap was about and therein lies our 
contribution to this more recent literature. Such a contribution would help contextualise 
some of the research on the success of Vietnam’s economy following the 1986 Doi Moi 
reforms. 
 
2.8) Bringing it all together: Highlighting the contribution 
Although there is a large amount of research on colonial Vietnam, many aspects of its 
economic history remain obscure. In this thesis, we will look into the economic gap that 
existed between Tonkin and Cochinchina between 1900 and 1940. We will specifically 
tackle the questions of why a gap between the economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina 
existed, what its nature was, as well as what it meant for the populations of these regions. 
The literature on colonial Indochina published during colonial rule suggests that scholars 
of Indochinese matters evaluated economic development in light of ideology, almost as if 
colonialism was the central mover of economic progress. Even those who acknowledged 
that other factors might have influenced economic differences, such as Gourou, Henry, 
Le Thanh Khoi... did not go into any detail as to how each factor played a role, or even 
fully acknowledged that Tonkin and Cochinchina were experiencing different 
circumstances. Some scholars, both during the colonial era and after, have suggested that 
the gap was due to differing man-to-land ratios in the two regions. Others have suggested 
it was possibly to do with colonial policies. This literature review has shown that 
although a gap was always acknowledged, it was rarely investigated and these theories 
have not been evaluated and weighed one against another. 
In fact, the literature consistently recognised the existence of the gap, despite the 
fact that no studies that we are aware of exist that explain why there was a GDP gap or 
the way in which this gap manifested itself in the agricultural, industrial and commercial 
sectors of Tonkin and Cochinchina. Furthermore, although GDP per capita was higher in 
Cochinchina than in Tonkin throughout this period, no evaluation of regional standard of 
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living have been done to see if this is an accurate representation of the population's 
income. We will re-evaluate the role of population densities and colonial policy in 
explaining the colonial North-South gap; explore in what ways Tonkin and Cochinchina’s 
economic activities diverged during the colonial period; and assess if the GDP per capita 
gap presents an accurate reflection of living standard differences between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. 
Recent research shows that the economic performance of the Vietnamese economy 
post-Doi Moi has also resulted in a gap between north and south. Because little research 
on the historical aspect of such a gap exists, it is not possible to say whether or not this is 
a continuous factor in the Vietnamese economy or a new phenomenon. This research 
makes a start in helping historians to evaluate this. In addition, it might help make more 
sense of the development of nationalism in a regional perspective, although these ideas 
are outside the scope of the present research.  
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Chapter 3: Demography 
 
3.1) Introduction 
French colonial researchers noticed that there were significant demographic differences 
between Tonkin and Cochinchina. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Yves Henry and 
Pierre Gourou documented that Cochinchina was much less populous than Tonkin 
between 1900 and 1940. They also stated that more intensive cultivation of 
Cochinchinese land only dated back to the 17th century. From these two facts, they 
conjectured that Cochinchina had not yet achieved its full production potential and that 
the Northern lands were increasingly losing their fertility due to over usage.188 Moreover, 
the fact that the total cultivable land area was still growing in Cochinchina during the 
period meant that potential agricultural production was larger there than in Tonkin. They 
believed that the result of these density differences explained potential economic 
differences between the regions. Population pressures have generally been recognised as 
a major reason for the 'impoverishment' of some areas of Southeast Asia: Bruno Lasker 
argued this was particularly significant for colonial Java and northern Vietnam. 189 
However, it seems unrealistic to assume this was the only impact of demographics.  
Topics related to demographic characteristics such as land or labour utilisation need 
to be better understood, as evidence showed a certain degree of variations in these 
characteristics within Indochina. As suggested in Chapter 2, research on this has not yet 
been extensively done. In this chapter, we ask in what ways demographic 
characteristics could have influenced different economic performances in Tonkin 
and Cochinchina. We intend to go beyond previously made points of the impact of 
population pressure on land productivity. Indeed, we look at the ways in which 
demographic characteristics affected both land and labour utilisation in the economies of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. This chapter does not prove that demographics are the key to 
understanding the North-South gap, or indeed that they were the only reason for its 
existence. No one reason can explain this gap. Instead, we suggest various ways in which 
                                                
188 Yves Henry, Economie agricole de l’Indochine, (Paris: Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine, 1932), 
p.8. 
189 Bruno Lasker, Standards and Planes of Living in the Far East, Preliminary draft for the use of the 12th 
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), p. 29. 
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demographics contributed to the continued gap between the two regions during this time 
period.  
This chapter first evaluates the differences in the man to land ratios of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina over the time period 1900-1940. We include a brief overview of land 
productivity in order to question Gourou and Henry's conjecture that the stronger 
population pressures in Tonkin meant its soil were over-used and that Cochinchina could 
thus be more economically successful. We then evaluate how population differences and 
institutional context affected the landholding patterns in the two economies and how 
these landholding patterns helped shaped the labour markets of Indochina. This section 
allows us to show that both existing demographic differences and the colonial 
administration's land policy shaped the way land and labour were utilised in Indochina. 
Finally, we will explore migratory flows and urbanisation. This section helps demonstrate 
why the gap persisted throughout this period and provides grounds for re-evaluating how 
variations in population pressures affected the relative economic performances of Tonkin 
and Cochinchina. This re-evaluation highlights the need to look at the various sectors of 
the Indochinese economy to understand the nature of the gap.  
 
3.2) Population growth & densities  
Censuses in Indochina occurred in 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931 and 1936. Data for other years 
are estimates, calculated by Maks Banens as part of the Hitotsubashi project. Since the 
local authorities that compiled the census data were also the authorities responsible for 
the levy of taxes and since the tax burden of any locality depended on the cooperation of 
the population, villages tended to under-report population. The authorities were aware of 
this problem and census data were modified using death and birth rate estimates from the 
French authorities. For his estimates Banens used mortality rates, fertility rates, 
population censuses, estimated population growth rates… Then, he started from the most 
reliable data (1989) and worked his way back by estimating population growth rates and 
placing bands using fertility and mortality rates. He estimated a population growth of 
around 43% for the period 1911-1943.190 Since Banens’ estimates were corrected for 
                                                
190 Maks Banens, “Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century Population History” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, 
Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-
1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000), p.18. 
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biases, they offer more convincing population statistics than the population censuses of 
the French authorities. He warned however, that his method is least reliable for 
population estimates before the Second World War, so in this thesis, we use both his 
estimates and the census data. 
 
Figure 3.1 
As we can see from Figure 3.1, regardless of the data used, Tonkin was about twice 
as populous as Cochinchina throughout the period 1909-1939. Between those dates, 
Tonkin’s population went from just under 7 million to about 10.5 million, while 
Cochinchina’s went from 4.5 million to about 6 million, showing both a lower absolute 
number and a lower growth over this time period.  
As indicated in Chapter 2, Gourou, Henry and other scholars believed that one of 
the key reasons there were economic differences between North and South Vietnam was 
because of differences in the man to land ratio. 191 Tonkin’s surface area was 115 800 km2, 
while Cochinchina’s was 64 000 km2, approximately.192 These data cannot necessarily be 
used to estimate population density: when looking at the potential impact of population 
densities on economic performance, total land area is not as significant as cultivable land, 
                                                
191 Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), 
p.257. 
192 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, "Territoire et 
Population", Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine Vol.I, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extrème-Orient, 1927), p.32. 
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especially in a mainly agrarian economy. The ASI provide some information on the area 
under rice cultivation for some years, however they did not provide information on the 
total cultivable land in each region. The only statistics available on cultivable land come 
from Gourou’s work on land utilisation, which mainly included statistics for the early 
1930s.  
The cultivable land in Tonkin was, and remains, in a specific region: the Red River 
Delta. Indeed, only the area around the Red River was appropriate for agriculture, as the 
remainder of the Tonkinese territory consisted of mountainous areas not conducive to 
growing crops. This area accounted for about 15 000 km2. Because the Tonkinese used 
some of this territory for double cropping, cultivable land can be adjusted upwards to 18 
500 km2, according to Gourou's calculations. Gourou further estimated that about 7 
million people inhabited Tonkin's cultivable area in 1931, which was equivalent to 85.36% 
of what he estimated was Tonkin's population at the time. The mountainous area covered 
the remainder of the territory, about 100 000 km2, and hosted 1.2 million people.193 Table 
3.1 draws on a number of sources to show the evolution of Tonkin's man-to-cultivable 
land, if we assume that increases in cultivable land were minimal (cultivable land 
assumed to remain 18 500 km2) and that the proportion of population inhabiting 
cultivable land (85.36% as suggested by Gourou) did not change between 1900 and 1940.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
193 Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.93.  
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Table 3.1: Estimates of the Evolution of Tonkin's Population Density, 1909-
1939 
 
Population 
Estimate 
Estimate of Population 
on Cultivable Land 
Man-to-Cultivable Land 
Ratio 
1000s 1000s Inhabitants per km2 
1909 e 6 943 5 927 320 
1911 c 6 100 5 207 281 
1914 e 7 413 6 328 342 
1919 e 7 817 6 673 361 
1921 c 6 854 5 851 316 
1924 e 8 370 7 145 386 
1926 e 7 400 6 317 341 
1929 e 9 036 7 714 417 
1931 c 8 075 6 893 373 
1934 e 9 801 8 367 452 
1936 c 8 680 7 410 401 
1939 e 10 389 8 869 479 
Method: 85.36% * Population Estimate = Population on Cultivable Land; Population on Cultivable 
Land / 18 500 =  Man to Cultivable Land Ratio 
c : census data; e : estimated data. 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l'Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939 & Maks Banens, 
“Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century Population History”, Quantitative Economic History 
of Vietnam 1900-1990, Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000. 
Table 3.1 suggests an increasing population pressure on cultivable land in Tonkin. 
In Cochinchina, virgin land was put in cultivation and public works enabled previously 
unsuitable land to become cultivable so that we cannot assume an unchanging cultivable 
land size in this region. Fortunately, Gourou recorded an estimate of the increase in 
Cochinchinese cultivated land over the colonial time period, which is likely to be a lower 
bound estimate for cultivable land. Double cropping was a significant feature of Tonkin's 
agricultural sector but not of Cochinchina's, presumably because there was ample land 
available. Consequently, these data do not need to be further adjusted. Table 3.2 shows 
the evolution of the size of the cultivated land in Cochinchina, according to Gourou. 
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Table 3.2: Gourou’s Estimates of Cochinchinese 
Cultivated Land, 1900-1936, (Km2) 
 Area 
1900 11 740 
1910 15 280 
1920 17 490 
1925 18 810 
1929 21 640 
1936 21 630 
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, New York: Institute 
of Pacific Relations, 1945, p.331. 
While we do not know what proportion of the Cochinchinese population lived on 
cultivated land; assuming that the entire population did so gives us a higher bound man-
to-land ratio for Cochinchina. Table 3.3 shows the evolution of the Cochinchinese man-
to-cultivated land ratio. Comparing this information to Table 3.1, we can see that there 
was indeed a significant difference between the population densities of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. Although this is certainly an over-estimate, this does not negatively bias our 
conclusion, as it would simply imply the real difference was even wider than these 
calculations suggest. 
Table 3.3: Estimates of the Evolution of Cochinchina's Population 
Density, 1910-1936 
 
Population 
Estimate 
Estimated Cultivated 
Land 
Man-to-Cultivated Land 
Ratio 
 
1000s km2 Inhabitant per km2 
1910 3 800 15 280 249 
1920 3 797 17 490 217 
1925 5 139 18 810 273 
1929 5 471 21 640 253 
1936 4 616 21 630 213 
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, New York: Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1945, p.331; Census data (1911, 1921, 1931, 1936) from LSE 59 (R4): 
Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939 & other 
Population Estimates from: Maks Banens, “Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century 
Population History”, Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, Hitotsubashi: 
Institute of Economic Research, 2000. 
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After 1925, if Gourou’s records are correct, the absolute cultivated area was larger 
in Cochinchina than the cultivable land available in Tonkin, even allowing for double 
cropping in Tonkin. The man to land ratio difference was probably wider than that 
suggested by comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.3. The population densities of both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina were relatively high, compared to those of neighbouring economies. Hanks 
has suggested that population density in Burma during this time period was only around 
79 people per square kilometre and up to 200 people per square kilometre in Thailand.194 
These two countries were the world's top two exporters of rice during colonial rule, 
followed closely by Cochinchina. Comparing these numbers, Tonkin's clear 
overpopulation of cultivable land and significantly lower per capita production of rice (as 
we will see in Chapter 5) suggests that there was probably a correlation between 
population densities and productivity.  
Surprisingly, between 1919-1922, the official French record show that Tonkin's 
yield in rice fields was higher than, or on par to, Cochinchina's: 14-13 quintal per hectare 
in Tonkin and 14-12 quintal per hectare in Cochinchina.195 Certainly, some have criticised 
these data. Some scholars suggest the French severely underestimated yields in some 
regions of Cochinchina. Bassino argued the underestimate could be by as large as 34% in 
some regions.196 Yields will be further discussed in Chapter 5, but it seems that there is 
little doubt that the official data was not based on accurate measurement of land 
productivity. There is also no reason to dismiss scholars' belief that land productivity was 
likely higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. However, there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that soil productivity differences alone explain the GDP gap. Indeed, 
Cochinchina's estimated GDP over this period was, on average, more than 34% higher 
than Tonkin. Even assuming a directly proportional, one to one, relationship between 
land yields and GDP, a difference in land yields alone cannot fully explain the GDP gap. 
We believe that population pressures affected economic performance in other ways and 
                                                
194 Lucien M. Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia, (Chicago: Aldine Atherton 
Inc, 1972), p.5. 
195 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l'Indochine, 
"Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts", Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extrème-Orient, 
1927-1931). 
196 Jean-Pascal Bassino, “Rice Cultivation in Southern Vietnam (1880-1954): A Re-evaluation of Land 
Productivity in Asian Perspective” Festschrift Volume in Honor of Professor Konosuke Odaka, special 
issue of Keizai Shirin Hosei University Economic Review, Vol.73, No.1(4), 2006, p.29. 
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that there were also other differences between these two economies that could explain the 
GDP gap. 
 
3.3) Labour utilisation & landholding patterns 
Population densities no doubt played a role in labour utilisation and land productivity. 
However, a better understanding of the labour market is necessary to assess whether 
population densities themselves were likely to have further influences on the economic 
performance of each region. Goudal suggested that out of the 23 million people living in 
Indochina in the late 1930s, 18 million were peasants.197 Even though this figure did not 
represent the active labour force, there is no doubt that the agrarian sector was the main 
employer of labour. The strong tie of the workforce to the agricultural sector was clearly 
seen in the aftermath of the Depression: “the dismissed native workers apparently 
adapted themselves to [losing employment as a result of the situation] by returning to 
agricultural and other types of family work in their native villages, and unemployment 
affected Europeans far more acutely”.198 Consequently, it is important to understand 
labour utilisation in the agrarian sector to adequately assess their role in the economic 
performance of the regions. 
The majority of the population remained engaged to agricultural production, if only 
on a part-time basis. Banens estimated the likely size of the active labour force, aged 
between 15 and 64, in both Tonkin and Cochinchina, as well as Vietnam as a whole. 
Banens' estimates show that the active labour force in both Tonkin and Cochinchina was 
about 58% of each region's respective population, throughout this period. If we compare 
these labour force data to those from other countries in the area in the 1930s, we find that 
42% of the Indian population was active, 37% of Indonesia's and 47% of Thailand,199 
suggesting that colonial Vietnam's labour force was unusually high, in both regions.  
During this time period, there was a rather dramatic increase in the role of wage 
labour: between 1906 and 1931, the number of wage earners on monthly or yearly 
                                                
197 Jean Goudal, Labour Conditions in Indo-China, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1938), p.186. 
198 Virginia Thompson, Labor Problems in Southeast Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.199. 
199 Members of the IPR International Secretariat, A Brief Political and Economic Handbook of Eastern and 
Southern Asia, 12th Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, Kyoto, Japan, September-October 1954, p.17. 
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contracts in European undertakings increased from 55 000 to over 220 000.200  In 1929, 
Goudal suggested 36.8% of these contracted wage-earners were engaged in agriculture, 
39.2% were in commercial or industrial ventures and 24% were engaged in the mining 
industry.201  
Table 3.4: Wage-Earners in the Indochinese Economy, by Sector and 
Region, 1929 
  
Number of 
Wage-Earners 
% of Regional 
Active Labour 
Force 
Agricultural 
Wage Earners 
Tonkinese 58 069 1.09 
Cochinchinese 15 972 0.49 
Commercial or 
Industrial Wage 
Earners 
Tonkinese 46 317 0.87 
Cochinchinese 23 248 0.72 
Mining Wage 
Earners 
Tonkinese 45 475 0.86 
Cochinchinese 0 0 
Jean Goudal, Labour Conditions in Indo-China, Geneva: International Labour Office, 
1938, p.294. 
Goudal further explained that the wage labour sector of the Cochinchinese 
economy was mainly agricultural, whereas in Tonkin, it was mainly industrial. 202 
Delamarre suggested that although in 1928-1929 there were 220 000 contracted labourers 
in Indochinese enterprises, only 38 000 of these workers were under yearly contracts.203 
The remainder of the agrarian labour force was employed on a daily wage in both regions. 
It is clear that contracted labour was not a significant part of the labour force: peasants 
either owned their land or worked as daily labour. This will be better demonstrated in 
Chapters 5 and 6, but we suggest that labour utilisation may have been influenced by 
landholding patterns. For example, smaller plots generally mean households can work 
their own land (whether as owner or tenant), whereas larger estates required wage labour. 
Landholding patterns can thus influence the way in which labour is used, as well as the 
                                                
200 Goudal, op.cit., footnote 1, p.21. 
201 ibid, p.273. 
202 ibid, p.17. 
203 E. Delamarre, L’émigration et l’immigration ouvrière en Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-
Orient, 1931), p.17. 
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way in which land itself is used. Population pressures certainy affected the development 
of landholding patterns. We thus argue that this was another way in which different 
demographic characteristics led to different economic performances: by affecting land 
and labour utilisation patterns, not just soil productivity. 
Table 3.5 is an illustration of land utilisation patterns, but also hints at differences 
in the way the labour force was employed. Some research shows that various types of 
tenancy agreements (fermiers, metayers...) were more common in Tonkin than in 
Cochinchina,204 thus reducing the demand for wage labour in that region's agrarian sector. 
We suggest this was due to characteristics of land utilisation and that these were in part 
influenced by existing demographic characteristics.  
Table 3.5: Share of Total Regional Population, by Size of  
Landholding Worked, 1933, (%) 
 0-5 hectares 5 to 50 hectares 
More than 
50 hectares Communal 
Tonkin 40 20 20 20 
Cochinchina 15 37 45 3 
Paul Bernard, Le problème économique Indochinois, Paris: Nouvelles Éditions 
Latina, 1934, p.7. 
Communal land was worked by the poorest peasants: those with very small 
landholdings or with insufficient employment as wage labour. 15% of the Cochinchinese 
population worked on landholdings that were between 0 and 5 hectares, compared to 40% 
in Tonkin. Generally, these people either owned the land they were working or rented it. 
Either way, this section of the population was unlikely to have been employed as wage 
labourers. Instead, their income was based on the use of their land plot. For landholdings 
between 5 and 50 hectares, the peasants were often larger tenant/farmers and the bigger 
the plot, the greater the demand for daily wage labour, especially during the harvest. 
Landholdings of more than 50 hectares employed only wage labour, on daily, monthly or 
yearly contracts.  
The larger proportion of workforce employed in large landholdings in Cochinchina 
not only suggests a greater demand for daily wage labour, but also that a larger 
proportion of cultivable land in Cochinchina would have been large estates. It seems 
                                                
204 Henry, op.cit. 
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likely that population density differences helped shape such institutional differences with 
respect to land utilisation. Indeed, a lower population density allows for more land per 
landowner, thus larger estates are formed. The interaction of population differences and 
of property rights is likely to have had an impact on the way in which economic activity 
occurred. Differences in landholding patterns, influenced by the way in which property 
rights were organised, would have impacted production patterns.   
The large proportion of people using communal land in Tonkin suggests that there 
remained institutional factors that permitted peasants to cultivate some land for 
themselves. The relative absence of such communal land in Cochinchina suggests that 
labour was expected to either rent out plots or work as wage labour. This may have been 
accentuated by the loss of the traditional village institutions in Cochinchina during 
French colonial rule. 'Reliable' village authorities were deteriorating in Cochinchina 
during colonial rule, something highlighted numerous times in La Tribune Indigène, a 
Cochinchinese newspaper.205 Throughout the year 1921, for example, the newspapers 
were highlighting that the risk of losing property rights was increasing because village 
relationships in Cochinchina were breaking down. This may well have further allowed 
large estates to develop: traditional institutions were not in place to keep some of the land 
for communal use. 
Bernard's estimates may be questioned. For example, Dumont believed that in the 
Red River delta, 90% of landowners owned less than 5 mau,206 roughly 7 hectares,207 as 
opposed to Bernard's suggestion that at least 20% of the population worked large estates. 
Dumont's estimates show that small plots were even more prevalent in Tonkin than 
Bernard suggested. Even when questioning the estimates, it is clear that both land and 
labour were unlikely to have been utilised in the same way in Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
Differences therein could help explain the economic gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. The way in which land was owned impacted the way in which it could be 
worked. Landholding patterns, not just land productivity, are likely to have influenced the 
total output of the agrarian sector.  
                                                
205 ANOM: BIB AOM/30609/1921, La Tribune Indigène, Saigon: June 9th 1921, June 18th 1921, July 19th 
1921, September 1st 1921. 
206 R. Dumont, La culture du riz dans le delta du Tonkin, (Paris: Société d’éditions géographiques, 
maritimes et coloniales, 1935), p.43-44. 
207 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1930, Section B, (Hanoi: 1931), p.249. 
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Considering that the population density of Cochinchina was so much lower than 
Tonkin's, it does seem to make sense that more of Cochinchina's population would have 
been engaged in working larger fields. In 1931, Tonkin had nearly 7000 communes while 
Cochinchina had 1284.208 These communes' surrounding landplots were divided in small 
plots. The tradition of dividing the family plot into shares for each male offspring would 
have resulted in more numerous and smaller parcels in Tonkin than in Cochinchina 
merely because of differing demographic characteristics. There is no doubt that there was 
more potential for larger estates to be had when the land was divided into fewer parcels 
and between fewer people, as it was in Cochinchina. Colonial policy may have 
perpetuated the possibility for formation of larger estates in Cochinchina:  the large 
public works undertaken in the Mekong delta to expand the canal system, improve 
infrastructure and reclaim land were likely to have increased the land available for the 
establishment of large estates. In addition, the regulation of the property rights made it 
easier for larger landholdings to be established in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, thus 
further distancing the land and labour utilisation patterns of the two regions from one 
another.  
Prior to French rule, the imperial 'dia-bo' had recorded landholdings and acted as a 
type of cadastral register. However, it had not always been updated since its 
establishment and the French authorities decided to draw up a more precise and accurate 
land register. This proved too difficult and tedious for the French authorities and it was 
never completed. Property rights, in the early decades of the Indochinese Union, were 
difficult to uphold.209 This was accentuated by the colonial government's belief that they 
should provide large plots of land to agrarian entrepreneurs as concessions. The 
concession regime is the best illustration we have to understand how property rights 
functioned in colonial Indochina and it helps explain how landholdings patterns 
continued to differ between the two regions throughout this time period. 
The colonial state used the concession regime to bring about economic 
development. In the beginning of French rule (the late 1800s) concessions of lands that 
were deemed as having been vacated by their previous owners, could be granted 
                                                
208 Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.336. 
209 LSE 59(4): A. Boudillon, Rapport Présenté à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies, Le régime de la 
propriété foncière en Indochine: ce qui a été fait – ce qu’il faudra faire, (Paris: Emile Larose, libraire-
éditeur, 1915), p.30 & p.93. 
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anywhere in Indochina. The colonial administration's ambition was to develop ‘rich’ 
cultures, through these concessions, to produce goods such as rice, coffee, tea, cotton, 
rubber or silk worms.210 These concessions were given away freely until 1913, after 
which they were sold at auctions. In addition to discounted land prices, tax concessions 
were also given for entrepreneurs to develop crops that took some years before becoming 
lucrative such as rubber.211 Initially, concessions were given out extensively throughout 
the Union. Despite a larger population, much of Tonkinese land was deemed ‘abandoned’ 
in the early 1900s: because of the French’s progressive control of the region many 
peasants temporary hid in the mountains to avoid fighting. As people returned to their 
land once the fighting had died out, serious problems resulted from some of it having 
been given out as concessions to Europeans.212 The difficulty in proving ownership, since 
the traditional ‘dia-bo’ was not always accurate or up to date, resulted in a number of 
lawsuits between new 'owners' and indigenous farmers.213 To avoid further uprisings in 
Tonkin, much fewer concessions ended up being given out in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. 
Furthermore, more land was available for concessions in Cochinchina, where the 
population was lower and much of the land still virgin. Concessions were generally 
granted as large plots, which would have perpetuated the land and labour utilisation 
patterns previously noted. Indeed, more concessions in Cochinchina meant more large 
landholdings, employing more wage labour, as suggested by Table 3.5. 
By 1918, Cochinchina’s land register was more extensive than Tonkin’s.214 Even 
despite more lawsuits over concessions, Tonkin’s property rights were less well 
established with the colonial authorities than Cochinchina’s. This does not mean property 
rights did not exist in Tonkin. Tonkin and Cochinchina, whilst both belonging to the 
Indochinese Union, were not the same type of colonial territory: the former was indirectly 
ruled and the latter directly ruled (this will be further explained in Chapter 4). In Tonkin, 
traditional elites were separate from the colonial government and maintained some 
autonomy from the colonial administration. Partly because Tonkin was indirectly ruled 
and because its villages remained important institutions, property rights between 
                                                
210 ibid, p.173. 
211 ibid, p.175. 
212 ibid, p.97-99. 
213 ibid, p.101-119. 
214 SOAS: “La situation économique de l’Indochine pendant l’année 1918”, French Indochina, Service de la 
Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1920, (Hanoi: 1921), 
p.293-357. 
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indigenous owners were respected within the village bounds. However, Tonkinese 
property rights were not necessarily recognised by the colonial authorities, because they 
were outside of their control. The greater reliance on village network in Tonkin may 
explain the greater significance of communal land and might have allowed the 
subdivision of family parcels into ever-smaller plots. Goudal suggested that although 
large landholdings appeared very few in Tonkin, they were in fact hidden by the 
difficulty of understanding the property rights system in Tonkin.215 For example, he 
suggested that placing various plots under different names would hide large holdings. 
There is no real way to verify this claim, even though it may well be true. Even if it was 
true however, it would not necessarily change cultivation patterns, these unofficial large 
land plots were divided in smaller plots, rather than farmed as estates. 
Cochinchina’s political organisation was entirely part of the colonial government. 
For this reason, by 1925, a land code was instituted in Cochinchina, whereby any land 
that was without owner or vacant belonged to the state domain and any of its products 
belonged to the colony.216 Cochinchina's larger reliance on the colonial administration's 
land policy would, however, have permitted for large landholdings to become 
increasingly important players in its agrarian economy. Indeed, between 1921 and 1932, 
942 163 hectares of land were conceded in Indochina to French colonists, of which 638 
600 hectares were in Cochinchina and only 138 000 in Tonkin.217 Although this was a 
large proportion of Cochinchina's cultivated land, almost a third, much of this land was 
not necessarily actively cultivated. Touzet argued only half of the conceded that area was 
put under cultivation.218 These numbers were for concessions given out to French 
colonists. However, according to a number of sources, European ownership was not as 
high as expected and many concessions were given out to native Indochinese citizens, 
especially in Cochinchina.219 Consequently, even more of Cochinchina's cultivated land 
may have been large estates employing wage labour than what the above data suggested.  
                                                
215 Goudal, op.cit., p.191. 
216 Alexandre Deroche, France coloniale et droit de propriété: Les concessions en Indochine, (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2004), p.61. 
217 André Touzet, L’économie Indochinoise et la grande crise universelle, (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1934), p.2-
3. 
218 ibid, p.3. 
219 Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860-1960, (Madison: Centre 
for Southeast Asian Studies University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995), p.210 & Robert L. Sansom, The 
Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, (London: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p.51. 
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Judicial differences could also have had an impact in landholding patterns. The 
difference in direct and indirect rule resulted in a different judicial organisation between 
the two regions. In Indochina, when an individual was French or foreign, he was tried 
under the French civil code; when the individual was part of the indigenous population, 
he was tried under the old Annamite legislation.220  In Tonkin, all indigenous inhabitants 
were under indigenous law and only Europeans were tried under French jurisdiction. In 
Cochinchina, however, the distinction was blurred and indigenous people, depending on 
their association with European colonists, could either be tried under French jurisdiction 
or indigenous jurisdiction: some indigenous people were considered French ‘protégés’. 
Full naturalisation was not common, but most of the indigenous population could resort 
to the French courts.221 Moreover, if a dispute was between a French or European person 
(including ethnic Vietnamese who had been granted French citizenship, as mentionned 
above) and an indigenous person, the French courts oversaw the case. In Tonkin, 
mandarins, who upheld Annamite laws, oversaw indigenous trials.222 These were not 
necessarily contradictory to French law, but the trials did not follow the same procedures 
and their rulings were not considered to be interchangeable with French rulings. This is 
likely to have proven a difficult obstacle for indigenous owners of small property: if they 
could not prove ownership, their land could be taken away and given as part of a 
concession, or absorved into a larger landholding. However, the records show this was 
not often done after the initial start of the concession systems: much fewer concessions 
(and smaller) were given out in Tonkin than in Cochinchina, as seen above. 
Steinberg suggested that Thailand's frontier land was opened through peasant 
expansion, dictated by population pressure, but that both Burma and Cochinchina's land 
patterns were largely dictated by concession policy.223 We disagree, arguing instead that 
the concession policy merely accentuated an already existing trend in landholding 
patterns. Just as in Burma, many of Cochinchina's large landholdings were owned by 
'absentee landlords', particularly after 1930.224 SarDesai suggests that one of the impacts 
in Burma of such landholding patterns meant that there was little benefit for the wider 
                                                
220  ANOM: BIB SOM C//7529, p.8. 
221 Virginia Thompson, French Indochina, (London: Unwin Brothers LTD, 1937), p.84. 
222 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
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Hawaii Press, 1987), p.236. 
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population, since these estates were producing for export and profits went to absentee 
landlords.225 It stands to reason that this may also have been the case for Cochinchina and 
we believe this would have an impact not just on productivity patterns, but also on 
standard of living and wealth accumulation. This will be further evaluated in Chapters 5 
and 8 respectively. 
 
3.4) Population movements 
Migration between regions 
The difference in densities and landholding patterns shown earlier implied that there was 
relatively more demand for wage labour in the South than in the North. This would 
suggest that migration from the over-populated region to the under-populated region 
should have ensued. Certainly the cash crop plantations of Cochinchina, such as rubber, 
often used contracted labour from Tonkin to supplement local labour. Booth suggests that 
the French authorities encouraged movement from North to South. 226  Indeed, the 
government facilitated such movement by setting wages for contractual labour higher 
than for local coolies.227 Although data are not available in great detail, some researchers, 
at the time, suggested this was because migration had not occurred in significant numbers, 
especially prior to such government encouragement.228  
Banens' estimates held that Cochinchina's labour force, included both men and 
women, was 25% of Vietnam's total labour force throughout the period, while Tonkin's 
evolved from 39% in 1909 to 42% in 1939.229 These estimates show that the labour force, 
as one would expect from general population information, was much larger in Tonkin 
than in Cochinchina. But in addition, it also suggests that it did not vary much with time, 
particularly not in Cochinchina. That is surprising: despite differing population densities 
and government schemes, there was a continuous disequilibrium in available labour force. 
The government keenly felt this disequilibrium. As early as 1907, the French colonial 
                                                
225 D.R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia Past & Present, 5th edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), p.176.  
226 Anne E. Booth, “The Economic Development of Southeast Asia in the Colonial Era: c.1870-1942”, 
History Compass, 6/11 2008. 
227 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
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authorities felt the need to encourage population transfers from Tonkin to Cochinchina. 
Indeed, a group of 84 Tonkinese families were settled as a new village in Cochinchina.230 
This attempt, and other subsequent ones, was unsuccessful and a different approach was 
taken, mainly focusing on importing single male workers. For example, Goudal suggests 
that as a result of the growth of the plantation economy in Cochinchina, “recruiting on a 
large scale began in 1919” and that between 1919 and 1922, over 9 000 coolies went 
from Tonkin to work in the plantations. The colonial administration believed that at least 
25 000 immigrants were needed annually to staff Cochinchina's plantations.231 Table 3.6 
shows the migration of contracted workers from Tonkin to Cochinchina and we see that 
net migration from north to south was minimal and not on the scale they hoped. 
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Table 3.6: Migration from Tonkin to Cochinchinese Plantations, 1926-1938 
  Migration Net migration 
Immigration* Net Immigration* 
as a % of Cochinchinese population 
1926 13 500 13 500 0.33 0.33 
1927 15 000 13 000 0.37 0.32 
1928 10 270 6 930 0.19 0.13 
1929 21 840 -1 940 0.4 -0.04 
1930 7 500 1 450 0.14 0.03 
1931 1 650 -6 250 0.03 -0.11 
1932 170 -9 830 0 -0.18 
1933 3 110 -140 0.05 0 
1934 3 850 2 100 0.07 0.04 
1935 2 240 1 020 0.04 0.02 
1937 3 770 810 0.06 0.01 
1938 5 670 3 200 0.09 0.05 
* flow to stock ratio 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques. 
“Territoire et Population”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1939.  
Official records do not provide any information on migration of non-contracted 
migrants from Tonkin moving freely to Cochinchina’s rural or urban areas. The French 
authorities recorded that it was not until 1925 that there was a substantial movement from 
the overpopulated North to the South,232 as it was during that year that wage controls for 
migrant workers were established. It is unlikely that migration had not occurred before 
government schemes, but it also seems unlikely that migration to the agrarian sector of 
Cochinchina would have been much higher than the numbers shown in Table 3.6. If it 
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p.93. 
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had, the government would probably not have had to design encouragement schemes to 
attract labour southwards and it would have affected population growth in a more 
noticeable way.  
There are many possible explanations for the limited migration southwards. 
According to Goudal, there were three main reasons: the difficulty of communication; the 
variation in the climate, customs and ethnicity; and the 'Annamite mentality'.233 Although 
these are hard to measure, there are a number of ways in which 'mentality' could have 
influenced migration choices. The peasant attachment to farming as a way of life was 
regarded by Gourou as limiting the desire for urbanisation as well as for change of setting. 
Gourou explained that, in Tonkin, “villages [we]re highly coherent social groups, 
autonomous political organisms”.234 Their populations felt a strong moral tie to the entity, 
so that leaving was a very unappealing option. Secondly, the peasant attachment to his 
village, and the high risks and costs associated with migrating, might have reduced the 
incentive to move. The distance was large and travelling over the mountainous Annamese 
region was difficult, particularly as the transport infrastructure was only progressively 
developed during French rule.235 We suggest that there was another, more pragmatic, 
reason for not wanting to move and that it was a consequence of the land and labour 
utilisation patterns described above. The land conditions of Cochinchina favoured the 
European entrepreneur, or the rich indigenous owner: the land, although initially cheap, 
would take time to provide an income and thus moving south as a landowner was only 
possible for those with the required capital.236 The alternative was to migrate south as a 
contractual worker. Peasants in rural Tonkin were often homeowners or tenants of small 
land plots. Moving to the South on a contract would have meant them becoming wage 
labourers, which they would have considered neither an attractive prospect nor a long-
term plan. Thus not only did landholding patterns influence land and labour utilisation, 
but they also helped perpetuate the economic consequences of such different utilisation 
by limiting migratory flows. 
                                                
233 Goudal, op.cit., p.7-8. 
234  Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.100; James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and 
Subsistence in Southeast Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p.58. 
235 ANOM: BIB SOM A//3437; E. Henry-Biabaud, Deux Ans d’Indochine Notes de Voyage, (Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient: 1939). 
236 Mark Cleary, “Land Codes and the State in French Cochinchina, c.1900-1940”, Journal of Historical 
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The contractual workforce was provided with lodging and a daily amount of 700 
grams of rice, as well as a daily wage rate slightly higher than that of daily labourers from 
Cochinchina and substantially higher than that of daily labourer in Tonkin.237 The 
necessity for such a higher wage confirms that there were no substantial push factors for 
peasants in Tonkin. Pull factors had to be created. Moreover, as Giacometti explained, the 
conditions and the amount of labour expected from these contracted workers implied that, 
by the end of their contract, they were reluctant to extend it and tended to return to their 
home villages in the North.238 The reports of the conditions workers were subjected to 
acted as a counter-incentive for further migration south. Indeed, in Table 3.6, we saw that 
the first few years’ migratory movements were stronger than the latter years. This 
suggests a limited integration of the agricultural labour markets of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. Weakly integrated labour markets suggest distinct economic performances. 
Low migration between the two regions implies that initial demographic differences and 
their indirect impact on agrarian production remained significant in the development of 
the two economies throughout French rule. 
As Table 3.6 showed, even after what the French considered the beginning of 
migration from north to south, the relative importance of the movement was minimal. 
Usually, the migrants working in plantations represented less than 1 per cent of 
Cochinchina’s total population. We used total population rather than labour force to 
calculate these flow to stock ratios, because the number of migrants included family 
members without indication of whether they were active or inactive. Of course, it is 
possible that not all migrant workers were recorded in these data. There might have been 
a black market for contracted labour and there may have been movement of non-
contractual labour. Nonetheless, this information does suggest that the perceived surplus 
agricultural population of Tonkin was reluctant to capitalise on the ‘work’ or 'land' 
available in Cochinchina. Work was certainly available, but it was not necessarily seen as 
desirable, in large part because of the landholding patterns differences that prevailed 
between the two regions. 
                                                
237 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1934, (Hanoi: 1935), p.175. 
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Other migratory movements may shed light on the differences in the perceived 
opportunities of migration. Sources at the time suggested that the migrants to 
Cochinchina from other Asian economies were more likely to engage in more lucrative 
commercial activities than those immigrating to Tonkin. This characteristic may help 
make sense of the relatively small movement of Tonkinese labourer to Cochinchinese 
land. Table 3.7 contains a summary of the available data on the ethnic breakdown of 
minorities in each region.  
Table 3.7: Population, per Ethnicity, 1921-1936, (1000s) 
 
Tonkin 
Muong Thai Man Meo Other239 Chinese Indians 
1921 94 483 67 60 36 32 
 
1931 82 63 19 8 3 6 
 
1936 112 672.5 89 77 48 35 0.5 
 
Cochinchina 
Muong Thai Man Meo Other226 Chinese Indians 
1921 
    
385 156 4 
1931 
    
875 53 2 
1936 
 
0.1 
  
448 171 2 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Territoire et Population”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie 
d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
The first four categories are ethnicities that have historically been established in 
Indochina. The other three categories could represent more recent immigrants. From 
these, we can suggest that more immigrants went to Cochinchina. This is particularly true 
for Chinese and Indian immigrants. More precise data solely on Chinese migration is 
available in Table 3.8.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
239 ‘Other’ includes Indonesians, Cambodians, Sino-Cambodians, Minh-Huang, Malay-Cham, and various 
other small ethnicities. 
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Table 3.8: Migration of Chinese Population, 1923-1937 
 
Net Migration of 
Chinese to Cochinchina 
Net Migration of 
Chinese to Tonkin 
1923 13 400 400 
1924 8 600 1 500 
1925 7 500 2 500 
1926 11 500 800 
1927 20 300 9 500 
1928 21 900 4 500 
1929 26 300 3 400 
1930 13 000 4 500 
1931 -6 200 1 600 
1932 -15 000 -100 
1933 -8 700 1 000 
1934 5 000 0 
1935 12 500 3 200 
1936 15 100 700 
1937 33 600 -100 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des 
Affaires Economiques. “Territoire et Population”, Annuaire Statistique 
de l'Indochina, 1922-1931: Vol.III p.249 & 1931-1937: Vol.VIII, p.251. 
These numbers were still quite small compared to the receiving territory (again, we 
compare to total population rather than labour force because of the inclusion of families 
in these numbers), accounting for almost 0% in Tonkin and a maximum of 0.7% in 
Cochinchina. Other research corroborates that the Chinese population in Indochina was 
one of the smallest of Southeast Asia.240  Despite the small-scale, Cochinchina was a more 
attractive destination than Tonkin and the flow to stock ratio of Chinese migrants to 
Cochinchina was much higher than the flow to stock ratio of Tonkinese workers to 
Cochinchina. 
Whereas in Tonkin, the few Chinese migrants tended to settle as farmers or were 
employed in the mining industry, in Cochinchina they held positions of power and 
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controlled most of the rice commerce.241 Chinese immigrants were generally recognised 
as significant assets to the Cochinchinese economy, particularly because they were 
mainly going to the urban centres and participated in the commercial opening of the 
region and because they were a significant source of revenue for the colonial 
government.242 
It was also the case that more European colonists were migrating to Cochinchina 
than to Tonkin. Between 1923 and 1927, of the 9 000 Europeans migrating to Indochina 
about 6 000 went to Cochinchina compared to only 2 000 to Tonkin and the remainder to 
the other member states. Considering that the majority of these colonists were engaged in 
commercial ventures, these migrants too were considered an asset to the economic 
growth of the region.243  
From these other migratory movements, two trends emerge. Firstly, there was 
limited migration to Tonkin, especially compared to migration to Cochinchina. Secondly, 
the migrants to Cochinchina were potentially more economically promising agents than 
simple wage-labourers. Migration from Tonkin to Cochinchina was weak because those 
who may have qualified as 'surplus' labour would not have benefited from a substantially 
improved position in the economy. Migratory movement show therefore that there were 
opportunities available in Cochinchina for migrants with the required capital, but that the 
limited flows between Cochinchina and Tonkin were representative of choices based on 
pre-existing differences in the economic behaviour of their respective populations. 
 
Urbanisation 
Since the man to land ratio was higher in the agrarian sector of Tonkin than it was in 
Cochinchina and the dependency ratio was the same in both regions, as suggested by 
Banens,244 Tonkin was more likely to experience pressure on its agricultural production 
than Cochinchina. Although we saw that migration to Cochinchina from Tonkin was 
weak, this pressure on agricultural production in Tonkin, ceteris paribus, could have acted 
as an incentive for alternative options such as movement towards cities; and/or the 
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development of rural manufacturing, mining or manufacturing. This last option will be 
evaluated in Chapter 6 and in this section we only look at urbanisation. 
Data support that rban populations differed between Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
Although precise data on urbanisation were not recorded, there are statistics for the 
population in the main urban centres. The main cities of Tonkin were Hanoi, the capital 
of the region, and Haiphong, the main port. The main cities of Cochinchina were Saigon, 
the capital of the colony and its port, and the neighbouring port city of Cholon. Obtaining 
more data on the level of urbanisation in the rest of both provinces would allow a better 
comparison, but so far this has not been possible. Nonetheless, statistics for the two main 
centres of both regions provide a sound basis for an analysis of urbanisation. Both Hanoi-
Haiphong and Saigon-Cholon were the main arteries of economic activity, as they held 
the political and commercial powers of their respective region. The data used to derive 
the relative size of each city come from the censuses. These data are limited and provide, 
at best, a lower bound estimate of urbanisation rates. However, it is assumed that the bias 
in data gathering was similar for both Tonkin and Cochinchina. Making use of the census 
data, we can evaluate the urban population of the four main cities. These are shown in 
Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9: Estimates of Population in the Main Cities, Using Census Data, 1921-1936 
 
Population of the Region 
(1000s) Urban population 
Tonkin Cochinchina Hanoi Haiphong Saigon Cholon 
1921 6 854 3 797 75 000 118 000 83 000 94 000 
1931 8 075 4 484 124 000 122 000 122 000 134 000 
1936 8 680 4 616 149 000 70 000 111 000 145 000 
Urban Population (% of region) 
 
Hanoi Haiphong Saigon Cholon 
1921 1.09 1.72 2.19 2.48 
1931 1.54 1.51 2.72 2.99 
1936 1.72 0.81 2.4 3.14 
Urban Population = (number of people in the city / number of people in the region) * 100 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, “Territoire et 
Populations”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939.  
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To compare the urban population, we calculated a ratio of the city’s population to 
the region’s population. In Tonkin, although Hanoi's population grew much faster than 
Tonkin's regional population, Haiphong's population decreased. This suggests increased 
migration to Hanoi and a de-urbanisation of Haiphong. Some of Haiphong’s departing 
population may have gone to Hanoi, meaning that the increase in Hanoi's size is not 
necessarily representative of movement from the rural sector to the urban centre. In fact, 
movement from rural Tonkin to urban Tonkin could not have been significant as the 
growth of Hanoi and Haiphong together was slower than that of the region's overall 
population. It is possible that rural to urban migration within Tonkin was temporary and 
thus not reflected in these data. During the slack season in farming, some workers could 
have migrated to local urban centres. According to Thompson’s estimates, in Tonkin at 
least two thirds of the population worked for daily wages and thus had the liberty (and 
often the need) to circulate within the territory for additional sources of income.245 This 
potential migration was not necessarily directed to the cities, but either to different 
provinces within the region that had different harvest times or to alternative employment 
in the mining sector. Because modern manufacturing was mostly located in the cities, 
those working in this sector would be included in the urban data. In the case of 
Cochinchina, there was unambiguous growth in both the city centres. Both Saigon and 
Cholon grew faster than Cochinchina's regional population, suggesting that the growth in 
the cities was fuelled by more than natural increase, the movement was likely from rural 
to urban, although some was undoubtedly due to migration of European and Chinese 
workers, as previously discussed.  
Table 3.9 also shows that the size of the urban centres, relative to the regional 
population, was significantly larger in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, even if in both cases 
urban population remained small. Haiphong's declining size is not enough to suggest that 
urbanisation was less important in Tonkin. Other northern ‘towns’, for which we have no 
information, could have been growing and the same came be said for Cochinchina. 
According to Gourou, Cochinchina was the most urbanised part of the Union, with 14% 
of its population living in urban centres, as opposed to Tonkin’s urban population of 
about 4.3%.246 Gourou identified ‘urban centres’ by the presence of ‘commercial activity’, 
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rather than purely by population size.247  A village ceased to be classified as rural when 
there was a significant market for goods produced outside the village boundaries; when 
many inhabitants were not engaged in agricultural production; and when there were 
‘foreigners’ living within the village bounds. Gourou’s research on urbanisation was 
more precise for Tonkinese urban centres than for Cochinchinese ones and it is difficult 
to evaluate his claims because he does not explain his method. However, this gap in 
urbanisation seems to align itself with our calculations. 
Indeed, if we compare the combined share of Hanoi-Haiphong and Saigon-Cholon 
to their respective region throughout the time period, we find that the northern city-
centres were about half the size of the Southern city-centres, relative to their regional 
population. Although by no means were urban centres that significant in either region, it 
is evident that Saigon-Cholon was a much bigger urban agglomeration than both main 
Northern cities put together. In addition, the proximity of Saigon to Cholon made it a 
much bigger urban agglomeration than either Hanoi or Haiphong. Hanoi and Haiphong 
are quite far from one another: over 100 kilometres. Conversely, Cholon is now part of 
today’s Ho Chi Minh City. For all intents and purposes, Saigon-Cholon can be considered 
one entity, whereas Hanoi and Haiphong were two distinct centres, both in geography and 
in economic significance: the former being the political capital of Tonkin and the latter its 
trading centre.  
A rather large urban centre, encompassing about 5.5% of Cochinchina’s population, 
therefore supported its economic performance. The main urban centres of Tonkin each 
accounted for only about 1.5% of its population. This finding fits with Gourou’s 
estimates that urban population in Cochinchina was more significant than in Tonkin. 
Gourou argued that these low urbanisation rates showed “the overwhelming 
predominance of rural activities, and above all agricultural activities, over all other forms 
of economic life in French Indochina”.248 Together, Gourou and our estimates based on 
census data suggest that the urbanisation rate in Cochinchina was between twice and 
three times the urbanisation rate in Tonkin. Considering Cochinchina's smaller labour 
force, the larger importance of cities suggests differences in the economic activities of the 
two regions. This is particularly true considering the Chinese and European migration 
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differences highlighted in the previous section. As such, population densities in the 
agrarian sector were not the only demographic differences between these two regions and 
it is likely that the economic activity of the urban centres had a large role in explaining 
the economic gap that existed, or at least the way in which wealth was distributed.  
 
3.5) Conclusion 
French officials were correct in looking at population differences as a source of the 
economic gap based on their impact on land productivity. Nonetheless, our re-
evaluation of the evidence suggests that demographic characteristics had other impacts on 
relative economic performance. We have argued that demographics also had an 
impact on landholding patterns and urban activity. Furthermore, land and labour 
utilisation patterns help explain the limited integration of the labour market of the 
two regions. The limited integration of the two regions in this time period may in turn 
explain why the economic gap between those two regions remained significant 
throughout.  
Population density differences may have affected the potential yields of the land 
and this, in turn, may have led to some differences in the output produced in the agrarian 
sector. However, there is also reason to believe that population differences, in addition to 
certain aspects of the colonial administration's land policy, had an impact on the way in 
which land and labour were utilised. Both of these impacts of demographic differences on 
the agrarian sector are likely to explain much of the economic gap between the two 
regions, which were after all almost exclusively agrarian. In addition, the larger urban 
sector of Cochinchina may have further fuelled differing economic performance.  
Landholding patterns are institutions, which help guide the development of 
economic activity in the agrarian sector. Although data are limited and we have not been 
able to quantify their effect on economic activity, it is this chapter's hypothesis that they 
had an impact on the output potential of both regions. This will be further argued in 
Chapter 5's discussion of labour productivity. The hypothesis of the role of landholding 
patterns fits with the rise in importance of institutional approaches to explaining 
economic growth differences. For example, Rodrik et al suggest that “the quality of 
institutions trumps everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, integration has no 
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direct effect on incomes, while geography has at best weak direct effects”.249 In other 
words, although we do not discard Gourou and Henry's (amongst others) view that 
population differences had a direct impact on land productivity and thus economic 
performance, this chapter concludes that demographic differences' indirect impact on the 
institutional development of landholding patterns also played a large role. 
This seems to be supported by the limited integration of the two economies' 
labour market. Surprisingly, despite a significantly higher population density in Tonkin 
than in Cochinchina, migration from one region to the other did not occur on a large scale, 
even when government policy sought to encourage it. There is limited doubt that such a 
lack of integration in the two regions' labour market resulted in the continuing 
importance of the effect of population differences on economic growth, in the 
agrarian sector at least. In addition, limited migration may have been due to the 
prevalence of large landholding in Cochinchina, which meant that the demand for 
migrant labour was mostly for unskilled wage labour. Wage labour was relatively 
unattractive to the predominantly landowning peasants of Tonkin. The limited migration 
may also have in part reflected that despite a larger GDP in Cochinchina, the standard of 
living a Tonkinese migrant could expect from relocating was not high enough to 
overcome initial barriers to migration, even with the colonial administration's help. This 
hypothesis is in part supported by the more significant migration of Chinese and 
European entrepreneurs to Cochinchina. 
The larger significance of urban centres in Cochinchina, as well as the larger role 
of absentee landlordism with larger landholdings, suggests that much of the wealth that 
may have been extracted from the Cochinchinese economy may have been concentrated 
in the cities. The limited growth of cities in Tonkin, considering the larger apparent 
population pressure, may further suggest that peasants found alternative 
employment in the domestic economy that did not require movement to the cities. In 
Chapter 6, we will show that both mining and manufacturing activities were more 
significant in Tonkin and we believe the more limited urbanisation as well as the limited 
integration with Cochinchina shows that the perceived population pressures were not 
necessarily felt as an obstacle to economic development because of this growth. 
                                                
249 Dani Rodrik; Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
over Integration and Geography in Economic Development”, International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
2002, No.189, p.6. 
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Furthermore, Cochinchina's larger urban sector may have been another reason for its 
more dynamic economy. Urbanisation rates differences are yet another overlooked role of 
demographics in explaining the origin of the economic gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. 
The existing debate in the literature over the role of colonial policy in explaining 
the North-South gap and this chapter's suggestion that some aspects of the 
administration's land policy resulted in the continuance of disparate landholding patterns 
suggests the need for a better evaluation of colonial policy in general. This will be 
addressed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the possible impact of population pressures on land 
and labour productivity, the limited migration between the two regions, the differing 
urbanisation patterns and the apparent differences in the labour utilisation of the two 
regions suggest the need to better evaluate the performance of Tonkin and Cochinchina's 
agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors. These will be addressed in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7, respectively. These same ideas lead to a questioning of the extent to which the 
GDP gap truly reflected differences in the standards of living of the populations in both 
regions and will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 4: Colonial Policy 
 
4.1) Introduction 
Initially, French colonial extension was fuelled by politicians' rhetoric that it would 
encourage industrial growth in France. They saw colonies as new markets for French 
industrial goods. Chapter 2 has shown that throughout the last century many works have 
been written on French colonial policy. Some of these works suggested that colonial 
policy might be responsible for the economic evolution of Indochina and may be partly 
responsible for the way in which Tonkin and Cochinchina diverged during this time 
period, although this was never demonstrated. In this chapter, we ask to what extent did 
the colonial administration's actions reflect or encourage the economic divide 
between Tonkin and Cochinchina. We will suggest that colonial policy, specifically 
with respect to taxation, reflected existing differences, but that it allowed for the 
endurance of the gap throughout this period. For example, we argued in Chapter 3 that 
the concession system helped perpetuate pre-existing differences in landholding patterns, 
although it itself was not responsible for the initial differences in land utilisation.  
This chapter looks at the evolution of colonial thought, firstly in general terms and 
secondly specifically with respect to Indochina. We will look at some of the lasting 
legacies of the main Governors General and the structure of the Union. We also lay out 
the differing circumstances that helped shape the evolution of colonial action in Tonkin 
and Cochinchina. Then we look at the Indochinese government's finances and how these 
reflected the general rhetoric of French colonialism while still being adapted to the 
differing environment of the two regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina. We evaluate both 
the tax system and its application with respect to revenue and expenditure to show that 
colonial policy was derived from independent differences between the two regions, rather 
than being their cause. 
 
4.2) Evolution of colonial thought 
One of the aims of colonial policies was to encourage ‘economic development’, albeit to 
the benefit of the metropolis. Prior to WW1, the doctrine of 'assimilation' was central to 
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French colonial policy. This meant that colonial territories were fully adapted to French 
ways, with respect to institutions and mind-set.250 Purcell suggests that, in this, the French 
were quite different from other colonial powers: they believed in more than just economic 
assimilation, cultural assimilation was also crucial to their plans. 251  This was an 
ideological concept and there were no clear rules on how each territory was governed. 
Consequently, differences were wont to exist between territories. Some authors have 
suggested that France had no colonial policy until the eve of WW1: “the policy, such as it 
did exist, was one of hesitancies and variations and contradictions”.252 For Indochina, the 
inexact nature of the assimilation doctrine had meant that the various territories could be 
governed following different patterns. Despite the rise of the more concrete mise-en-
valeur strategy, these patterns remained different throughout French rule. Tonkin was 
subjected to indirect rule, as a protectorate. Cochinchina was subjected to direct rule, as a 
colony. Nonetheless, in 1887, both became part of the greater Indochinese Union. The 
result was that affairs regarding the Union as a whole were decided through direct rules, 
just as in Cochinchina, but not so for matters pertaining specifically to Tonkin. There, 
indigenous authorities remained central to administrative decisions.253 
After WW1, the colonial policy was concretised and became known as the 'mise-
en-valeur'. This traditionally implied encouraging infrastructural projects, as well as 
foreign investment, French imports, exports of cheap primary products and foodstuffs and 
the development of plantations of cash crops such as rubber, tea and coffee. Apart from 
supposedly stimulating economic development in the Indochinese Union, mise-en-valeur 
also sought to ensure stable state revenue to the Union.  
At the same time as Albert Sarraut, a governor general of Indochina and prominent 
politician during this era, was arguing for the necessity of mise-en-valeur, or “state-
controlled colonial development”,254 the doctrine of 'association' rather than 'assimilation' 
became the new paradigm of colonial policy. This allowed the rise of indirect approaches 
to colonial rule, mainly through a “loosening of ties between the ruling power and its 
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dependencies”.255 Thomas believed that one of the main reasons for the perceived 
necessity of the association doctrine was found in Sarraut's fear of the rise of communism 
in French colonies, particularly in Indochina, where he was governor.256 Scholars after 
WW1, such as Thompson and Duboc, argued that colonial authorities should practice 
association policies because assimilation was felt to have brought fewer benefits, having 
instead resulted in resentment from the local population.257  
Many authors have argued that French colonial policy was quite different from that 
of other regions: “French policy in Indo-China had little in common with that of the other 
powers”.258 Furnivall presents the difference rather clearly: the British were more laissez-
faire in their approach to governance, the Dutch more engaged in promoting growth and 
the French were markedly more “centralised”. 259  However, this is probably an 
exaggerated assessment. Although there were many differences in styles, the ever-greater 
emphasis towards the benefits of indirect colonial rule in both Dutch and British Asian 
colonies match the movement toward association policies in French Indochina, as does 
government involvement in economic works, albeit at different degrees.260 Even the 
assessment of British rule as being more laissez-faire has often been questioned, 
especially at the turn of the 20th century.261 The evolution of colonial thought in Indochina 
was in line with that of other colonies in the region.  
This is not surprising considering that the French were avidly studying colonial 
policy in other Southeast Asian colonies. The perceived success of the Dutch's 
governance in the Indies was seen as resting on “the maintenance of native 
institutions”.262 The French were also impressed by Britain's unequivocal drive towards 
'colonial prosperity'.263 These assessments of other colonial power resulted in France's 
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move towards a more associationist approach to colonial rule, as well as a larger 
emphasis on public work expenditure and encouragement of capitalist ventures.  
 
Designing Indochina 
Ideology might have evolved over the years, but initial differences in the way the colonial 
governments of Indochina were organised remained in existence throughout this time 
period, as seen in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: Structure of the Indochinese Colonial Government264 
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Despite Tonkin's nominally indirect rule, the traditional elite did not remain 
unaltered. Rather, some of its members were replaced by others working more openly for 
the colonial bureaucracy. To a certain extent, this was also true for Cochinchina: the 
French were too few to administer all services and had to rely on the native population to 
do so. Nonetheless, the staff in Tonkin remained more engrained in Confucian values 
than those in Cochinchina. Despite these similarities, the extent to which French ways 
were imposed on the territories differed. 265  In Cochinchina, the provinces were 
administered by native functionaries, but were also overseen by French residents in each 
province.266 In Tonkin, the role of native functionaries was much more significant: there 
were French residents in each province, but there were also indigenous governors at the 
head of administrative groupings of provinces. These directly oversaw the mandarins in 
charge of various provinces, cantons, as well as communal and village councils.267 This 
was different than in Cochinchina, where the “early colonial administrators […practiced 
policies by which] the ruling elites were solicited to create the necessary conditions for 
efficient exploitation of the economic resources”.268 This had consequences for the 
development of the colonial administrative apparatus. When Doumer organised the 
administrative apparatus of Indochina, although he reinstated many of the mandarins and 
original organisations in Tonkinese villages, he could not do so in Cochinchina, where 
the native institutions had been destroyed.269 This was partly to do with the French having 
been established in Cochinchina long before they gained formal control of Tonkin. 
Regardless of the ideology's evolution, association could not be practiced in the same 
way in both regions. Although in both cases we see that 'association policies' were put to 
some use through an association between French and natives,270 it was not done in the 
same manner. Tonkin kept a more significant reliance on native institutions.  
The structure of the Tonkinese protectorate's administration, due to its indirect rule, 
in part resulted in split interests between the French and the indigenous populations, as 
well as in a separation of authorities. There remained a disconnect between ‘colonial’ 
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interests and indigenous interests in Tonkin. In Cochinchina, direct rule resulted in a 
simpler structure of colonial administration.  
According to Geertz, the way in which the colonial system evolved in the Dutch 
Indies resulted in a dual system where the native subsistence sector was separate from the 
Dutch, or European, controlled export sector.271 He argued this led to the impoverishment 
of the native population, although more recent writers have placed doubts on this 
conclusion.272 It is possible that the greater degree of indirect rule in Tonkin resulted in a 
dual system similar to that of the Dutch Indies. However, as the GDP gap trends suggests, 
it is not that Tonkin was getting any poorer over time, but rather than Cochinchina grew 
much faster comparatively.  
Indigenous representation in part reflects the possibilities for differing applications 
of colonial policy and may explain why many scholars thought colonial policy could 
explain diverging economic performance. As of 1880, Cochinchina had a ‘Conseil 
Supérieur’, or Colonial Council, made up of 12 Europeans and 6 indigenous members. 
By 1922, the number of indigenous members was increased to 10 and to 12 by 1932.273 In 
Tonkin, there existed an ‘Assemblée du Pays’, the Tonkinese Protectorate Council, which 
was made up of elected indigenous representatives. However, it was more consultative 
than Cochinchina’s Colonial Council. The latter was given some responsibility in 
decisions on public works, land administration and budgetary concerns. The former did 
not have an active role in policy design.274 The bargaining position of the indigenous 
assembly in Tonkin was further diminished by the presence of a ‘Conseil des intérêts 
français’, exclusively made up of French nationals, which held more sway with the 
colonial government. In both regions, the indigenous representation through these 
councils was minimal. Although it was stronger in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, it is 
unlikely these differences were significant enough to lead to huge differences in policies, 
especially as Cochinchina's colonial council did not often exercise its right to affect 
policies. Such forms of indigenous representation were common to Southeast Asian 
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colonies. In the Dutch Indies, the Volksraad had similar powers to the councils of 
Indochina and assured some limited representation to the indigenous population.275 In 
Burma, indigenous representation was instituted earlier than in the Dutch Indies, but later 
than in Cochinchina. There, indigenous representation was much larger than in either 
Indochina or the Dutch Indies, second only to the Philippine Commission instituted by 
the Americans.276 The wide variety of ways in which indigenous representation was 
included in colonial administrations suggests that differences seen between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina with regards to this issue were very small and unlikely to be significant: 
decisions were made by the colonists. 
In addition, steps were taken to address potential problems resulting from variations 
in administrative structures, mainly through the creation of the Indochinese Union. 
Eugène Etienne (Governor General between 1888-1891), a former politician in the 
‘Chambre des Députés’ in France, was put in charge of creating a general government. 
Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchina and Cambodia were united as French Indochina in 1887, 
joined later by Laos in 1893. At the time, however, each region maintained its autonomy, 
budget and its own administration.277 Later, under Governor General Paul Doumer (1897-
1902), the budgets themselves were joined into a General Budget. Cochinchina, as the 
richest territory, saw this unification as a burden on its revenues and analyses suggest that 
Cochinchinese revenue was at times ‘squandered’ by the colonial authorities.278 The 
territories' unification meant not only that budgets were to be joined, but also that 
common policies would be applied throughout the Union. The gradual unification in the 
colonial policies of the two territories came about partly from the nature of the 
Indochinese Union and partly from the unification of their budgets. Indeed, Touzet 
suggests that although the 1887 decision to create an administrative union marked the 
beginning of the Indochinese Union, it was not until 1911 that Indochina truly became a 
federation of countries and even at that point only finances were truly federalised.279 
Although many would agree that the main commonality for the territories of Indochina 
was that they were controlled by French interests, others would suggest that  
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the distinction between direct and indirect rule in Indo-China is more legal 
than actual [...:] the powers of the French administrative officers are much the 
same whether they are exercised in the colony of Cochinchina or in one of the 
protectorates.280  
In other words, colonial policy did differ between Tonkin and Cochinchina, but 
only marginally and often only in theory. Moreover, policy seems to have depended 
considerably on the Governor General's ideology and was thus unlikely to vary much 
between members of the Union. Most new Governor General varied the approaches of 
the government in order to deal with specific issues they considered of particular 
importance in their service.281 Table 4.1 documents these governors and highlights their 
orientation in government policy.  
Table 4.1: The Governors General of French Indochina and the Orientation 
of their Administration, 1900-1940  
1897-1902 Paul Doumer Viability of Indochinese finances 
1902-1908 Jean Baptiste Paul Beau 
Early movement toward associationism, 
but constrained by poor harvests 
1908-1911 Antony Klobukowski 
Returned to assimilation due to political 
problems in the North and budgetary 
constraints 
1911-1914 
Albert Sarraut 
Promoted mise-en-valeur and the 
containment of anti-French and 
communist movements 1916-1919 
1919-1922 Maurice Long 
Continued mise-en-valeur 
1922-1925 Martial Henri Merlin 
1925-1928 Alexandre Varenne Encouraged association policies 
1928-1934 Pierre Pasquier 
Attempted to reduce the bureaucracy 
while dealing with the Depression 1934-1936 Eugène Jean Louis René Robin 
1936-1939 Joseph Jules Brévié Encouraged the industrialisation of Indochina 
Pierre Brocheux & Daniel Hémery, Indochine La colonisation ambiguë 1858-1954, Paris: 
Editions La Découverte, 2001, p.84, 114, 215, 313; Virginia Thompson, French Indochina, 
London: Unwin Brothers LTD, 1937, p.81-82 & George Maspero, Un empire colonial français 
l’Indochine, Tome II, Paris: Les Editions G. Van Oest, 1930, p.17-28. 
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Mills has argued that because the French Governor Generals tended to be in power 
for short periods of time, their orientation may not have mattered much for the country. 
Indeed, he suggested that this was in stark contrast to the British colonial system where 
governors were in power for much longer.282 Although this was true of some of these 
governors, Table 4.1 shows that the key players were in power for at least five years, 
providing some stability of policy and probably unity throughout the Union. 
Of these governors, the most important was Paul Doumer. He organised the 
structure of the government, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, and designed the fiscal regime of 
Indochina. Both remained relatively untouched until the end of French rule in 1954.283 
Doumer was sent to Indochina to redress its financial problems. The metropolis no longer 
wanted to keep sending money. His programme for Indochina consisted of seven parts:284 
• To organise a general government for the Union and local administration 
for each province; 
• To address the financial problems of the colony and build sustainable 
fiscal resources; 
• To improve the physical infrastructure of the Union; 
• To encourage production and commerce; 
• To improve Indochina’s defences; 
• To finish pacifying Tonkin; 
• To expand French influence in the Far East. 
Doumer built the Indochinese general government with its many centralised organs 
and established the quintessential revenue machines of the Indochinese state: the excise 
boards of salt (1897), opium (1899) and rice alcohol (1902).285 On average, the revenue 
from these three excise boards accounted for a quarter of total revenue for the general 
budget.286 According to Thompson, Doumer managed to “free the colony from Parisian 
supervision by making it economically self-sufficient”.287  This came at a cost: the tax 
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burden on the local population nearly doubled in the five years he was in charge.288 
Despite his theoretical success in increasing the financial autonomy of the Union, recent 
research has shown that loans from the metropolis remained an important contribution to 
the budget.289 Doumer's fiscal reforms cut Cochinchina’s local budget by three quarters,290 
but this allowed for some unification in colonial administration.  
The heavy centralisation of the Indochinese Union proved difficult for Doumer’s 
successors. Paul Beau and Antony Klobukowski tried to decentralise the government and 
to reduce the tax burden of the population by providing more education and health 
facilities, while reducing the excise boards’ power.291 However, the way in which Doumer 
had regulated the system proved to be too difficult to change and the organisation of the 
government remained as he had designed it throughout the Union. One of the main results 
of Doumer's organisation was consequently that the distinction in systems of rule, 
between directly and indirectly controlled regions, lessened. Although there were some 
differences between the two region's administrative mechanisms, it seems unlikely that 
the differences were so stark as to encourage major differences in the economic realities 
of the two regions,292 suggesting a more limited role of colonial policy in explaining the 
economic divide.  
 
Significant circumstances 
The Residents of each province wrote regular reports (generally bi-monthly) to the 
Governors General of Indochina. They were expected to evaluate how easily taxes had 
been collected and if there had been any political trouble or economic difficulties. Any 
positive or negative circumstances had to be acknowledged. 
Between 1900 and 1940, the Tonkinese Superior Residents’ reports emphasised a 
number of recurring themes: 
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• When the crops were bountiful, the region was politically quiet; when 
crops were not as successful as expected, political trouble was seen to 
occur,293 
• Rebellion against the main excise boards and black market were recurring 
themes that seemed to link Chinese merchants and indigenous public 
officials,294 
• Weather related crop failure led to growing expenditure on public 
works,295 
• Because of exchange rate difficulties (silver standard) and the Great 
Depression, agricultural production tended to focus on production for 
domestic use within Tonkin.296 
The Cochinchinese Consuls reported some similar trends, such as resistance against 
the excise boards, but there were some significant differences: 
• When international commercial circumstances were difficult, political 
resistance would occur,297 
• The main difficulty of tax collection tended to come from European 
settlers, or from the expansion of cultivable land, resulting in floating 
agrarian workers that could avoid paying taxes,298  
• Local market places were expanded as part of public works because of 
high demand,299 
• Economic crises resulted in a diversification of crops.300 
As we can see, in Cochinchina good international commercial conditions were a 
prerequisite for political stability. In Tonkin, however, political stability depended on 
domestic factors, such as crop success. This aligns with the conclusions of Brocheux’ 
research. Revolts in Cochinchina were about markets; in Tonkin, revolts were about 
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subsistence.301 The two regions had clear differences in what was considered most 
important. For Tonkin, domestic circumstances were guided by domestic realities. In 
Cochinchina, domestic circumstances were dependent on international realities. In both 
cases, this was a reflection of their varying integration to the world economy as an outlet 
for goods. Indeed, the Superior Resident of Tonkin himself, in 1919 acknowledged: 
The Cochinchinese, who a few years ago, were fearful of commerce, are 
now understanding its importance. But in Tonkin, the indigenous peoples 
believe that the administration should help them in their attempt to 
boycott Chinese commerce.302 
Priorities were different between the territories because of such differing circumstances. 
As a result, colonial policy was adapted to the differing needs of the two regions. 
One of the ways by which the colonial government ensured the success of its 
economic policies was through its influence on the Bank of Indochina. Before its 
establishment, English banks had provided most of the financial services required.303 At 
first, the Bank of Indochina was formed because the Government felt the need for an 
entity to regulate capital for investment. This capital mainly came from France and other 
European sources. There was a need for a big bank that could engage in operations with 
foreign correspondents in London, Hong Kong and France.304 The colonial government 
hoped to achieve mise-en-valeur through the use of French capital. This would allow the 
metropolis to maximise the gains of economic growth. 
Another key reason for the creation of the Bank was for currency issuance. The 
Bank was not under the direct control of the government, but it was nonetheless strictly 
regulated. For example, the total number of bank notes in circulation could not exceed 
three times the total specie holdings of the Bank.305 The Bank also had more liberty than 
other banks, as it was expected to provide short-term loans, mainly for commerce, large 
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305 Marc Meuleau, Des pionniers en extrème-orient: Histoire de la banque de l’Indochine, 1875-1975, 
(Paris: Fayard, 1990), p.56. 
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agrarian projects and public infrastructural works. 306  The Bank of Indochina was 
considered a key player in the mise-en-valeur of the Indochinese Union and was given a 
wide range of responsibilities.307 The colonial policy of mise-en-valeur had an indirect 
influence on the Bank's actions. The returns from foreign investment in Cochinchinese 
ventures were partly redirected towards the other regions of the Indochinese Union to 
encourage further mise-en-valeur throughout the Union and thus reduce the gap between 
regions. As we can see from Table 4.2, despite this directive, capital flows favoured 
Cochinchina over Tonkin. 
Table 4.2: Invested Capital from Individuals, Civil & Commercial 
Societies, 1924-1928, (Million of Francs) 
 
Cochinchina Tonkin Total Indochina 
1924 138 70 248 
1925 179 55 277 
1926 323 101 599 
1927 319 43 572 
1928 404 135 821 
SOAS: T. Smolski, “Les investissements de capitaux privés et les émissions de 
valeurs mobilières en Indochine, au cours de la période quinquennale 1924-1925”, 
in French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine Année 1929, Hanoi: 1930, p.808. 
Although the Bank's investment actions were loosely guided through government 
policy, the initial investment decisions were independent of the colonial policy. The 
discrepancy in investment between Tonkin and Cochinchina during the boom years of 
1924-1928 suggests that investors were cognisant that better returns could be expected 
from Cochinchina. Colonial policy tried to boost investment throughout Indochina, in an 
effort to encourage convergence between the regions. This effort suggests the colonial 
administration was responding to an existing gap. Once more, the colonial 
administration's actions were a response to existing differences. It seems increasingly 
unlikely for colonial policies to have been a reason the initial gap between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, especially as their influence on the Bank shows their intent of balancing the 
gap in investment between the two regions. 
 
                                                
306 ibid. 
307 Gonjo, op.cit., p.240. 
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4.3) Government finances 
Budgetary information provides clear evidence of the ways in which colonial 
governments administered their colonies. Indeed, it was by evaluating public finances 
that Booth highlighted the previous misconception of colonial governments as 'night 
watchman' and suggested their significant involvement in the economic sphere.308  
However, some problems arise when comparing two regions within the Indochinese 
Union. Indeed as a result of Doumer's reforms, by October 1911, there was a general 
budget. The general budget was set up for expenditure on works and services common to 
all Indochinese regions, expenditure for the general government, debt service, 
contribution to the metropolis, colonial inspection, the administration of customs and 
excise boards, and the post and telegraph services. The budget’s revenue came from 
customs taxes, excise boards and some indirect contributions. 309  Unfortunately, the 
general budget's revenue and expenditure was not recorded by region. Consequently, our 
comparison of public finances in Tonkin and Cochinchina cannot use data for the general 
budget. Moreover, municipal budgets provide a limited basis for comparison between the 
two regions because they were not always in existence. The majority of this analysis 
consequently rests on local budgets. Local budgets obtained their funds from direct 
taxation and were used exclusively for local services.310 However, we believe this is not a 
significant source of bias, as local budget would best highlight potential differences in the 
application of colonial policy between regions. Indeed, funds from the general budgets 
were spent on projects considered of significance for the whole of the Union.  
 
a. Tax system 
Many scholars currently look at tax policy in light of its impact on growth and welfare. 
For example, Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa and Stephen J. Turnovsky argued that the post-tax 
impact should be the most important factor in designing tax systems.311 However, colonial 
                                                
308 Booth 2007(2), op.cit., p.242. 
309 ANOM: TH462, Fall Mamadou, Investissements publics et politique économique en Indochine 1898-
1930 (La commune vietnamienne dans la mise en valeur de l’Indochine), UER Géographie Histoire 
Sciences de la Société, Paris 1984-1985, p.74. 
310 ibid, p.75. 
311 Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa & Stephen J. Turnovsky, “Growth, Income Inequality, and Fiscal Policy: What 
Are the Relevant Trade-Offs?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.39, No.2-3, March-April 2007, 
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tax policy cannot be analysed through these modern theories. Redistribution of wealth 
was not central to the colonial administration, unless it was done through concession 
granting and/or in favour of the colonial elite. Rather, the idea was to ensure that the 
colony could pay for the services the colonial authorities considered important. In this 
section, we will consider individual tax rates to understand the differences between the 
rules regulating the tax systems of Tonkin and of Cochinchina. We use official tax rates 
to illustrate how the colonial government evaluated the tax potential of the two regions. 
This allows us to establish what differences might have been present in the two regions 
during this time period. Such an evaluation illustrates that colonial revenue was guided 
by existing differences between the two regions. The tax system in Indochina was similar 
for all members of the Indochinese Union. Both in Tonkin and in Cochinchina, the 
‘mandarins’, that is the traditional indigenous elite, were in charge of collecting the 
expected taxes.312 Although the tax system was the same, the tax rates were not always 
the same. This suggests the limited role of colonial policies in explaining the economic 
divide, although they may have helped to perpetuate it. 
 
Taxes common to both regions 
Doumer established the three excise boards on opium, salt and rice alcohol, to cover the 
Union’s general expenses. Opium trade was a monopoly and was taxed on imports, 
production, transport and sale. This was done throughout the Union, through the 
intermediary of Chinese middlemen.313  In the case of salt, the entire commerce was 
regulated directly by the central government, insofar as all production was taken to a 
government entrepot and the government acted as a monopsonist for the salt trade.314 The 
excise board on rice alcohol was again different: the monopoly was granted to one 
company in particular, the Société Française des Distilleries de l’Indochine. They were 
the only ones allowed to produce the alcohol, but this was very bitterly resented by the 
local population, as the alcohol produced by this Société did not taste good to the native 
                                                                                                                                            
p.369-394 & Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, “Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth”, International Monetary 
Fund Staff Papers, Vol.44, No.2, June 1997, p.184. 
312 Tanzi & Zee, op.cit., p.114. 
313 Guermeur, op.cit., p.170. 
314 ibid, p.249-250. 
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population.315 Peters suggested that, although the theory behind the official system was 
the same, the excise board was stricter in the North than in the South. This could have 
been because, in the South, a similar regulation pre-dated French rule: Chinese distillers 
were the traditional producers of rice alcohol.316 The impact of those taxes would have 
been decided by personal choices in consumption, but these were unlikely to have 
differed markedly by region. 
Taxes on international commerce were also identical in both regions: these were 
import taxes, export taxes, transit taxes, entrepot taxes, docking taxes, lighthouse taxes 
and navigation taxes. The revenue from these made up a large part of the general budget. 
France was exempt from the majority of these taxes, but all other countries had to pay 
various custom taxes. Commercial taxes even included export taxes: in the 1930s, to 
export rice to a foreign country, traders had to pay 0.13 piastres per every 100 kilograms 
of cargo rice containing more than 33% of unhusked rice.317 These important taxes were 
taxed at the same rate throughout the Union because of the federal structure of Indochina 
and it is clear that in this respect there were no differences in the two regions. 
 
Taxes that varied between regions 
Despite this federal structure, some tax rates did differ between the two regions. We 
argue that variations in these rates were indicative of the colonial administration's 
responsiveness to existing differences between the regions. Table 4.3 outlines the main 
indigenous taxes for cultivated land and shows the variation of tax rates between the two 
regions. Table 4.4 shows rates for other tax categories. As we can see, the difference 
between the two regions was stark. No documents have yet been found to provide a clear 
explanation of why tax rates differed so much between the two regions. We argue that it 
was meant to act as incentive for investment in Cochinchina's productive agrarian sector, 
as well as a recognition of differences in economic activity.  
 
                                                
315 Erica J. Peters, “Taste, Taxes, and Technologies: Industrializing Rice Alcohol in Northern Vietnam”, 
French Historical Studies, Vol.27, No.3, Summer 2004, p.569. 
316 ibid, p.568. 
317 Guermeur, op.cit., p.296. 
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Table 4.3: Cultivable Land Tax Rates, 1900-1940, ($ per hectare) 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Rice fields From 2.4 to 4.5 From 0.1 to 2 
Other crops From 0.3 to 6 
Before 1921 After 1921 
From 0.48 to 2.76 From 0.6 to 3 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine 1913-1922, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927, p.205-208 & Henri 
Guermeur, Le régime fiscal de l’ Indochine, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990, p.90-91. 
 
Table 4.4: Some Rates of Direct Taxes, 1900-1940 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Licenses 
One-time fee Yearly rate on profits One-time fee 
Yearly rate on 
profits 
0.24 to 1 500$ 1/30th 1 to 4 000$ 1/30th to 1/12th 
Indigenous 
peoples 
Before 1920 After 1920 
1$ per year Registered 
Non-
registered 
2.5$ per year 
2.5$ per 
year 
0.3$ per 
year 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, Annuaire Statistique de 
l’Indochine, 1913-1922, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927, p.205-208 & Henri Guermeur, Le régime 
fiscal de l’ Indochine, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990, p.103-107, p.108 & p.128-130. 
Such large differences in tax rates for both the indigenous population and the land 
they cultivated is puzzling: why were the authorities less inclined to tax the 
Cochinchinese peasants as much as their Tonkinese counterparts? As we will show in 
Section b, despite lower tax rates, the tax burden per capita for local budgets was higher 
in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. This suggests that the authorities did not tax the peasant 
population as much through some taxes, but relied on other types of taxes to maximise 
revenue, such as the rice export tax. 
Land use for rice cultivation was taxed at different rates depending on the 
expected yield of the land. In practice, the authorities estimated most of these yields, 
rather than measuring actual yields. Although government officials recorded slightly 
higher yields in Tonkin than in Cochinchina: 14 as opposed to 12 quintal per hectare 
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throughout this period,318 the tax rates difference is not proportional to this estimated 
difference, suggesting that another motive was behind the variation in the tax rates.  
The presence of both land taxes and capitation tax in Indochina is similar to what 
was happening in both Thailand and Burma. In the Dutch Indies, however, land taxes and 
some income tax instead were applied. Furnivall argued that differences in tax system 
were partly a response to the colonial administration's perspective on the type of 
agriculture practiced, whether commercial or domestic.319 It must be understood that taxes 
on commercial income were generally collected through custom duties, circulation and 
consumption taxes, rather than through income tax or even land taxes. Tonkin and 
Cochinchina had a system similar to Burma on paper (land and capitation taxes), but 
variations in tax rates meant that the application of the tax system varied between Tonkin 
and Cochinchina: in the former, land and capitation were highly taxed at high rates, while 
in the latter, other taxes compensated for the low land and capitation tax rates. We argue 
that these types of taxes were higher in Tonkin because the government realised it was 
taxing domestic agriculture. In Cochinchina, because agriculture was more commercial, 
these tax rates were lower. 
That some tax rates were decided based on such differences is clearly shown in 
the tax rates for field of other crops than rice: the tax rates were decided by the potential 
retail value of the crop, rather than by yield. For example in Tonkin in the 1900s, tobacco 
and nuts were taxed at 6 piastres per hectare per year, whereas cotton, tea and jute were 
only taxed at 1.5 piastres per hectare per year. Many of these crops were considered cash 
crops and were also given tax exemption. For example, coffee plantations were exempt 
from taxes for six years as of the time of planting.320 Less easily cultivable land given out 
as concession in the higher regions of Tonkin was exempt from taxes for a minimum of 
five years and discounted tax rates were applied for the 21 subsequent years. For example, 
still in the 1900s, tea plantations in Tonkin's mountainous regions were taxed at 0.4 
piastres per hectare per year, rather than 1.5 piastres. The tax rates reflected the colonial 
                                                
318 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1931). 
319 J.S. Furnivall, “The Land Revenue System” in Studies in the Economic and Social Development of the 
Netherlands East Indies, (Rangoon, Burma Book Club. 1933(2)), p.4. 
320 Guermeur, op.cit., p.90-91; ANOM: BIB AOM U. 161.02, Henri Brenier, Essai d'atlas statistique de 
l'Indochine française: Indochine physique, population, administration, finances, agriculture, commerce, 
industrie, Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine, p.74. 
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policy of mise-en-valeur and favoured cash crops over more traditional crops, as well as 
the use of land previously left uncultivated. Although these tax rates were taken from the 
1900s, the rates remained mostly unchanged until the 1940s.  
In Cochinchina, tax rates on cash crops also varied based on the expected retail 
value of the final crop produced. Similarly as in Tonkin, discounts and exemption applied 
to Cochinchinese cash crops. Many plantations of rubber, coffee... were exempt from 
taxes for extended periods of time.321 For example, in the 1900s, tobacco and nuts were 
taxed at about 2.76 piastres per hectare per year, which was just over a third of the tax 
rate for the same crops in Tonkin.322 In the case of mulberry, the tax rate was even lower: 
0.48 piastres per hectare per year, this time less than a third of the tax rate in Tonkin. In 
Cochinchina, taxes were lower on standard alternate crops such as nuts than they were in 
Tonkin. Possibly, this was designed as a further incentive to invest in alternate crops. As 
seen in Chapter 3, large landholdings with potential for cash crop plantation were more 
common in Cochinchina.  
Land plots in Tonkin were generally smaller than they were in Cochinchina due to 
population pressures, as seen in the previous chapter. Tax rates might have been higher in 
Tonkin because of double cropping: traditionally the Red River Delta was the home of 
the Vietnamese population, its people had to make increasingly better use of their 
resources, and double cropping was initiated there. In Cochinchina, double cropping was 
only minimally used.323 Lower taxes per hectare encouraged more large-scale production. 
Although for both regions tax exemptions, or discounts, encouraged commercial 
agriculture, household ownership patterns, rather than plantation, remained more 
common in Tonkin. This suggests that the tax rates were established in light of existing 
patterns of landholding and production. Moreover, considering that these rates remained 
so drastically different suggests the limited way in which colonial policy could (or 
wanted to) affect the landholding patterns. Cochinchina’s tax rates reflected, and 
probably stimulated, the predominance of large cash crops, but Tonkin’s tax rates 
reflected the predominance of household production of traditional crops. It is likely that 
Tonkin was more prone to intensive agriculture, as a result of its population pressure, 
                                                
321 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, 1913-1922, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927), p.205-207. 
322 Guermeur, op.cit., p.94-95. 
323 Henry, op.cit., p.337 & Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.257. 
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while Cochinchina was engaged in more extensive agricultural production. This will be 
better shown in Chapter 5. The establishment of the tax system reflected existing 
differences, as it aimed in maximising potential revenue. Overtime, the system would 
have accentuated the initial differences (such as landholding patterns or commercial 
versus domestic agriculture), thus resulting in a widening gap between the two regions. 
The personal tax rates on the indigenous populations were also different between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. Income tax seems to have been a phenomenon slow in coming 
to Indochina: personal taxes on European incomes were only started in 1921 and despite 
some talks as early as 1928, it was only in 1937 that a consistent progressive income tax 
on the indigenous population was instituted, first in Cochinchina and then in Tonkin. 
Instead, personal head taxes were in use throughout this time period.324 All men, between 
18 and 60 years of age, were expected to pay a personal tax. Until 1920, there were two 
flat tax rates in Tonkin: 2.5 piastres for registered men and 0.3 piastres per non-registered 
men. All men could be asked to present proof that they had paid their personal tax. The 
mandarins, and by extension the village authorities, were responsible for the collection of 
taxes in their communes. If men failed to provide adequate proof that they had paid a 
personal tax, the mandarin was fined for obstructing the fiscal system. It was partly to 
avoid political uprisings that the authorities initially had the two types of personal taxes: 
land owners were mainly registered tax payers, but coolies, and other such men who did 
not have adequate resources to pay the full personal tax, were ‘non-registered’ tax payers 
and were taxed at a lower rate. This distinction was abolished in 1920, when the personal 
tax rate in Tonkin was standardised at 2.5$ per year for all men.325  
In the case of Cochinchina, the personal tax rate was set at 1 piastre per man. The 
tax rate in Cochinchina was less than the registered taxpayer’s fee in Tonkin, but there 
was no ‘non-registered’ tax rate. It is possible that the tax rate was homogenous and 
lower because of Cochinchina's greater reliance on wage labour.326 Considering the mean 
daily wage for an agricultural worker was around 0.22 piastres in Cochinchina, these 
taxes seem quite low.327 However, this was but one of the taxes peasants were subjected 
                                                
324 Guermeur, op.cit. 
325 Pierre Brocheux & Daniel Hémery, Indochine: La colonisation ambiguë 1858-1954, (Paris: Editions La 
Découverte, 2001), p.102. 
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to and the total tax burden was still heavy. This is equally, if not more, true in Tonkin, 
where the personal tax rates was much higher and wages much lower than in Cochinchina, 
as will be shown in Chapter 8.  
Although there was a common tax system, it is likely that tax rates differed between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina to enable public revenue maximisation based on existing 
differences. The lower taxes in Cochinchina may in part have reflected its greater 
potential and engagement with commercial activity. The government expected that 
encouraging this would result in more tax revenue from other sources. This would fit with 
Cochinchina's recorded tendency to contribute more to the public revenue of the general 
budget than Tonkin, through trade related tax collection. 
The government's responsiveness to differing circumstances in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina is clearly reflected in their tax rates on professional licenses. Information on 
license fees was given in Table 4.4. A first fixed fee was paid for the initial license. 
Professionals in the countryside only paid this fixed rate. For professionals in the cities, a 
further yearly tax was imposed in proportion to the profits made. In Tonkin, there were 
12 classes of licenses and these were taxed depending on the zone in which they were 
established: from 0.24 piastres in the outer provinces, up to 1 500 piastres in the urban 
centres. In addition to this initial fixed fee, the proportional tax was fixed at 1/30th of the 
total annual profits made under the license. In Cochinchina, there were only 10 different 
license classes and, although these were also taxed an initial fixed fee based on the 
location of the license, the tax rate was overall lower in the early years of French rule: 
from 1 piastre in the outer regions up to 1 000 piastres in the urban centres. Nonetheless, 
by 1921, this fixed fee was increased to up to 4 000 piastres in the urban centres. Prior to 
1921 in Cochinchina, city licenses were also subjected to a proportional right amounting 
to 1/30th of profits.328 After 1921, the proportional tax varied between 1/30th and 1/12th of 
the annual profits. Although initial tax rates may have been higher in Tonkin, an increase 
in the tax rates of Cochinchina suggests an increasingly important level of activity there. 
This complements the image of growing urban centres shown in Chapter 3 and suggests 
increasing economic activity, independent of colonial policy. Again, we see the 
administration responding to the growing economic differences between the two regions. 
                                                
328 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, 1913-1922, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927), p.206-208. 
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b. Revenue 
General budget 
The way the data were collected for the general budget makes it impossible for us to 
identify regional variations in revenue collection or expenditure. All revenue gathered 
was recorded as one value, not separated by region. Nonetheless, we will outline the two 
main categories of taxes that fuelled the general budget to provide an overview of the 
entire tax system both Tonkin and Cochinchina were facing. Table 4.5 displays the 
average annual revenue and share of revenue from specific categories of the general 
budget over the years 1929-1936.329  
Table 4.5: General Budget Revenue, 1923-1936 
 
Average Annual Revenue 
(1000 $) 
Share of Total 
Revenue (%) 
Total Revenue 71 229 100 
Excise Boards 17 774 25 
Customs revenue 17 032 24 
Consumption & Circulation 
Taxes 12 748 18 
General Import Taxes 3 321 5 
Other Revenue from Imports or 
Exports 1 505 2 
Mining Extraction Taxes 132 0 
Mining Duties 117 0 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Finances 
Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939.  
More detailed information from Appendix 1. 
A quarter of the general budget's total revenue came from customs duties; revenue 
from excise boards accounted for another quarter. Other significant revenue came from 
other taxes related to international commerce. Appendix 1 shows that the revenue over 
this time period peaked in 1930 and decreased thereafter. This reflects that the majority of 
revenue came from customs, excise boards and consumption/circulation taxes, all of 
which would have been negatively affected by the Great Depression. Although the 
                                                
329 These years provide the most similar categories of revenues: over the years some of the categories were 
renamed and their composition changed. We can only compare the ones we are certain have remained 
constant over time. 
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revenue is not available per region, Bernard estimated that, on average, Cochinchina 
contributed about 40 per cent of total tax revenue of the General Budget, between 1900 
and 1935.330 Chapter 7 will show that Cochinchina dominated Indochina’s international 
commercial revenue. Table 4.5 thus could vindicate Bernard’s claim that Cochinchina 
was the predominant funder of the general budget. Cochinchina's likely larger 
contribution to the general budget fits with our previous hypothesis that tax rates on 
Cochinchinese cultivated land were lower than in Tonkin because of the difference in the 
commercial orientation of their output.  
 
Local budgets 
Table 4.6: Annual per Capita Tax Burden, 1920-1936, (US$331 per inhabitant) 
 Tonkin Cochinchina  
Dutch 
Indies Thailand Burma 
1921 1 1.79 1920 5 3 5 
1931 0.61 1.27 1929 5 4 6 
1936 0.78 1.46 1934 4 3 6 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Territoire et Population”&“Finances Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939; Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and 
Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1), 
p.73 & Anne E. Booth, “Night Watchman, Extractive, or Developmental States? Some Evidence 
from Late Colonial South-East Asia”, Economic History Review, Vol.60, No.2, 2007(2), p.248. 
Table 4.6 suggests that the tax burden from taxes that went towards the local budgets was 
significantly higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin during this time period. When 
comparing these data, we see that the tax burden, at least from local budget taxes, was 
much lower in Indochina than in the other countries of Southeast Asia. Although 
estimates of the per capita tax burden including tax collection for the general budget are 
not available per region, Brocheux suggested that the overall tax burden in Indochina was 
between 1.71 US$ and 2.38US$ on average per person between 1913 and 1924,332 still 
significantly lower than in the other colonies, though not dissimilar to Thailand's. 
Tonkin's per capita tax burden was even smaller than Cochinchina's and thus much lower 
than Burma's or the Dutch Indies'. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
                                                
330 Paul Bernard, Le problème économique indochinois, (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latina, 1934), p.49. 
331 Conversion done based on SOAS: French Indochina. Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. 
“Changes – cours moyen mensuel”, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine. (Hanoi: 1924-1938). 
332 Brocheux 1983, op.cit., p.800. 
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explain such a difference in the region (they are further discussed in Booth 2007(1) & 
(2)), it seems important to understand how and why the tax burden differed between the 
two Indochinese regions. 
Table 4.7: Comparing Local Budget Revenue, 1913-1936, (Annual Averages) 
Total Revenue 
 
1913-
1918 
1919-
1924 
1925-
1930 
1931- 
1936 
Annual Average 
(1000 $) 
Tonkin 9 321 13 750 18 275 11 747 
Cochinchina 8 226 11 454 18 144 11 910 
Ratio Tonkin/Cochinchina 113 120 101 99 
Share of Total Revenue (%)* 
  
1913-
1918 
1919-
1924 
1925-
1930 
1931- 
1936 
Personal tax  
Tonkin 31 29 26 37 
Cochinchina 9 7 5 8 
Land tax 
Tonkin 18 17 14 20 
Cochinchina 10 9 6 6 
Capitation tax on 
immigrants 
Tonkin 1 1 1 1 
Cochinchina 15 18 13 13 
Licenses 
Tonkin 2 3 4 4 
Cochinchina 5 11 10 12 
* Only selected categories are shown.  
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Finances 
Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939.  
Appendix 3a & 3b provide detailed local budget revenue. 
Table 4.6 shows the per capita tax burden in US$, in order to allow a comparison to 
other countries in the region. However, this conversion hides the fact that, measured in 
Indochinese piastres, the per capita tax burden from direct taxes decreased over time and 
particularly so in the aftermath of the Depression: falling from 1.54$ to 1.31$ per annum 
in Tonkin and 3.69$ to 2.47$ per annum in Cochinchina.333 Tax rates during this time did 
not decrease, but as we can see in Table 4.7, the total revenue did decrease after the 
Depression. A decreasing burden, despite stable tax rates, suggests that tax revenue was 
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not growing as fast as population. Based on the description of the taxation system, there 
are few surprises from the key categories of revenue of the local budgets of Cochinchina 
and Tonkin. Tonkin’s main revenue was in the form of personal tax levied from the 
indigenous population, whereas Cochinchina’s was spread over a number of other smaller 
categories, in each of which it far eclipsed Tonkin. One can question the wisdom of the 
tax system in Tonkin: high personal taxes on the indigenous population were unlikely to 
appease a population already known to be against French rule: the Superior Resident 
warned that there needed to be peace and stability in the region, as seen in Section 4.2. 
Table 4.7 seems to confirm that commercially oriented sources of tax revenue were more 
significant in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. Because this was clearly shown in the tax rates 
that were chosen by the colonial authorities, this does seem to confirm the suggestion that 
colonial policy reflected, rather than initially caused, economic differences.  
The share of the revenue coming from taxes on the indigenous population 
decreased until the Great Depression and then rose again significantly. It is unsurprising 
that the share of the tax revenue from personal head tax did increase after the Depression: 
the global downturn had negative impacts on economic performance so the relative 
importance of taxes unrelated to changes in economic conditions (such as personal head 
tax) would have increased. Revenue from personal tax on the indigenous population was 
higher in Tonkin. In a way this is unsurprising considering both that Tonkin's personal 
tax rate was over twice that of Cochinchina and that its population was about twice that 
of Cochinchina's. However it is surprising that this was also the case before 1920 when a 
lower 'unregistered' tax rate was available. This suggests that few residents would have 
paid this lower tax. This may be because non-registered men were expected to give more 
time to public works and corvée work and had limited access to some of the public 
resources of the village, such as the communal land.334  
Likewise, the share of revenue originating from taxes on land in Cochinchina was 
around 40 to 67% lower than the equivalent revenue share in Tonkin. These figures 
suggest that the tax burden from taxes on land was larger for Tonkinese landowners than 
it was for Cochinchinese landowners. Since more Tonkinese owned land than 
Cochinchinese, this further supports our suggestion that the tax burden affected poor 
                                                
334 Guermeur, op.cit., p.103-107 & R. Dumont, La culture du riz dans le detla du Tonkin, (Paris: Société 
d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1935), p.76. 
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Tonkinese peasants more than poor Cochinchinese peasants: their personal tax was higher 
and small households also faced higher tax rates on land. Furthermore, this supports our 
hypothesis that revenue maximising strategies differed, most likely because of differences 
in the initial conditions of the two regions. In this case, landholding patterns guided tax 
policy. Indeed, more revenue from taxing large landholdings' production could be 
gathered in Cochinchina, through taxing their larger marketable surplus. Tax rates were 
thus lower on land, to encourage production. In Tonkin, less surplus production, due to 
production for household needs, may have led to the colonial administration's belief that 
revenue would be maximised by taxing land ownership rather than production. 
Tax revenue in Cochinchina could be further maximised by taxing immigrants. 
Chapter 3 showed that immigration to Cochinchina was larger than immigration to 
Tonkin and that the immigrants to Cochinchina were generally wealthier than those going 
to Tonkin. License fees were another way in which tax revenue was maximised in 
Cochinchina. They brought in an increasingly large share of the local budget's total 
revenue in Cochinchina. This share was substantially higher than Tonkin’s, almost 
consistently by a factor of three. Licenses were more expensive in Cochinchina, but such 
a large difference in revenue suggests that there were more licensed professionals in 
Cochinchina than in Tonkin and/or that their profits were larger. A possible implication is 
that demand for these types of professions was higher and growing in Cochinchina. This 
would explain why the tax rates on licenses were increased in 1921: the colonial 
authorities seem to have responded to differences in circumstances between the two 
regions. 
Although the aggregated per capita tax burden in Cochinchina was higher than in 
Tonkin, the gap between various shares of revenue shows that the tax burden from 
personal tax was much lower for Cochinchina than for Tonkin. Instead, taxes on licenses 
and immigration of potential entrepreneurs were more significant. This is significant in 
understanding the potential distribution effect of the tax system. It suggests that direct 
taxes affected the average cultivator in Cochinchina less than in Tonkin. Instead, in 
Cochinchina direct taxes on other professionals or on immigrants with significant 
economic power were the more significant sources of revenue. This is in line with our 
suggestion that the colonial authorities' tax maximising strategies were responsive to 
existing differences in the circumstances of the two regions. 
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c. Expenditure 
General budget 
Table 4.8 displays the average annual expenditure and share of expenditure of the main 
categories of the general budget, over the period 1929-1936.  
Table 4.8: General Budget Expenditures, 1929-1936 
 
Average Annual Expenditure 
(1000 $) 
Share of Total 
Expenditure (%)335 
Total Expenditure 77 800 100 
Financial Services 16 440 21 
Public Works 10 649 14 
Contributions to the 
Metropolis 8 361 11 
Economic Interests 4 906 6 
Social Interests 2 978 4 
General Government 1 632 2 
Justice 1 828 2 
Political & General 
Administration 505 1 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Finances 
Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939.  
More detailed information from Appendix 2. 
The general budget covered the expenditure of the Governor Generals and of the 
administrative bodies of the Union of Indochina. It also covered expenditures on financial 
services (such as the cost of issuing money) and on general infrastructural work (such as 
the post and telegraph services). Finally, the general budget provided subsidies to some 
key industrial ventures (such as silk producers and rubber plantation owners). These 
expenditures provided the core economic infrastructure of the Indochinese Union. The 
majority of the general budget expenditures seems to have gone towards financial 
services, public works and contributions to debt servicing. Clearly, this was 
representative of the government's focus on the mise-en-valeur policy and the metropolis' 
pressure on Indochina to achieve financial autonomy.  
 
                                                
335 Some minor categories are not included in this list for brevity's sake. 
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Local budgets 
Table 4.9 shows that just as per capita revenue in Indochina was low compared to other 
countries in the region, per capita expenditure was also lower than in other countries, 
particularly the Dutch Indies.  
Table 4.9: Per Capita Government Expenditure, 1920-1936, (US$ per 
inhabitant) 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
 
Dutch Indies Thailand Burma 
1921 1.03 1.65 1920 7 4 4 
1931 0.60 1.42 1929 5 4 4 
1936 0.78 1.47 1934 5 3 3 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Territoire et Population”&“Finances Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939 ; Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and 
Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1), 
p.75 & Anne E. Booth, “Night Watchman, Extractive, or Developmental States? Some Evidence 
from Late Colonial South-East Asia”, Economic History Review, Vol.60, No.2, 2007(2), p.249. 
Again, part of the sizeable difference between Vietnam and other economies is 
based on the fact that general budget expenditure is not included in these calculations. 
However, Booth suggested that, between 1928 and 1934, per capita annual government 
expenditure was 3US$ in Vietnam as a whole.336 Considering the gap between Tonkin's 
and Cochinchina's local budget per capita expenditure, if Booth's 3US$ was an average 
between the three colonial regions of Vietnam, then Tonkin's per capita expenditure 
would have been low even compared with other economies in the region, while 
Cochinchina's would have been closer to that of the other countries. It is notable that the 
Dutch Indies had a higher level of government per capita expenditure than other countries 
in the region and that, at times, its per capita tax burden was lower than its per capita 
government expenditure. In Tonkin and Cochinchina, per capita government revenue and 
expenditure (based on local budgets) were roughly identical, aligning with the colonial 
administration's attempt at financial autonomy.  
The local budgets were split in five main categories of expenses: political and 
administrative services, financial services (that largest subset of which was land register 
services), economic interests (the largest subset of which was public works), social 
interests and subsidies & reimbursements (not shown in Table 4.10).  
                                                
336 Booth 2007(2), op.cit., p.249. 
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Table 4.10: Comparing Local Budget Expenditure, 1913-1936, (Annual Averages) 
Total Expenditure 
 
1913-
1918 
1919-
1924 
1925-
1930 
1931-
1936 
Annual Average 
(1000$) 
Tonkin 8 933 13 302 18 191 11 096 
Cochinchina 7 516 11 475 18 390 12 313 
Ratio Tonkin/Cochinchina 119 116 99 90 
Share of Total Expenditure (%) 
  
1913-
1918 
1919-
1924 
1925-
1930 
1931-
1936 
Political and 
Administrative 
Tonkin 52 51 46 54 
Cochinchina 35 35 34 42 
Financial Services 
Tonkin 5 4 3 1 
Cochinchina 6 6 6 5 
Land Register 
Tonkin 1 1 1 0 
Cochinchina 2 2 2 2 
Economic Interest 
Tonkin 29 25 26 19 
Cochinchina 36 34 36 22 
Public Works 
Tonkin 8 7 7 4 
Cochinchina 10 9 10 5 
Social Interest 
Tonkin 12 17 21 17 
Cochinchina 11 17 19 27 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Finances 
Publiques”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939.  
Appendix 4a has detailed information for Cochinchina’s local budget; Appendix 4b has detailed information 
for Tonkin’s local budget. 
As seen in Table 4.10, total expenditure followed a similar pattern as total revenue. 
That revenue and expenditure should follow a similar trend is rational: with higher 
revenue, more expenditure can be made and vice versa. Overall, total expenditure 
increased until 1930, and then decreased. This is unsurprising: both regions had to tighten 
their finances as revenues decreased during the Great Depression and its aftermath. The 
tax system and revenue sources discussed above may have reflected the economic divide, 
but it is possible that the colonial government's expenditure patterns had an impact on 
relative economic performance. 
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Social Interest 
Expenditures in the category of social interests ranged from education endeavours to 
health provisions. This category is unlikely to have had a significant role in explaining 
the economic divide between the two regions, mainly because total expenditure in this 
category was low and only truly increased after the Depression. However, expenditure for 
these services may well have had some impact of the gap in standard of living between 
the populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina. This will be further examined in Chapter 8. 
The share of total expenditure used for these services was marginally higher in Tonkin 
than in Cochinchina up until the Depression. However, during the period 1931-1936, we 
see a significantly higher share of expenditure on these services in Cochinchina compared 
to Tonkin. Possibly, this was the result of the difficult social conditions in an 
economically trying time and again shows the responsiveness of colonial policy to local 
circumstances.  
Financial services 
The services included in this category were treasury, land register services, property 
services and direct contributions to other budgets. Although in the case of both regions 
the share of this category was rather small, Cochinchina’s expenditures in this category 
were consistently more substantial than those of Tonkin. Cochinchina’s local authorities 
used twice as much of its revenue on developing a land register as Tonkin's.337 As seen in 
Chapter 3, the erosion of traditional village authority, as well as Cochinchina’s status as a 
colony meant a land register was considered more necessary than in Tonkin, where the 
majority of the population still relied on the ‘dia-bo’. Expenses on land register services 
were consequently lower in Tonkin. It is possible that the stronger emphasis on ensuring 
property rights in Cochinchina, as seen by larger government expenditure on the land 
register, may have had a direct impact on economic differences. However, there is an 
endogeneity problem in this relationship and the potential impact of this difference is 
unclear.  
Economic Interest 
For the most part, Cochinchina’s expenditure on economic services was higher than 
Tonkin’s, despite a smaller population. This may indicate that there was a greater 
                                                
337 Appendices 5a and 5b. 
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emphasis on the mise-en-valeur of Cochinchina than of Tonkin and, in this, it is possible 
that colonial public finances did encourage differing patterns of economic performance. 
In Cochinchina, the average share of the total revenue of the local budget spent on 
economic services such as public works, agricultural expenditure, forest services and 
veterinary services, was over 30%; in Tonkin, the average share was 24%. These shares 
are in the upper average for countries in the region, reflecting the mise-en-valeur 
emphasis of colonial policies. For example, in 1920, the share of government expenditure 
towards public works was around 20% in Burma.338 After the Depression, expenditure on 
public works decreased. This was common to the region: most colonial powers reduced 
expenditure on public works, some shifting towards military expenditure.339 Although the 
Indochinese government did not spend large sums on military investments, it did decrease 
spending on public works and general economic interests projects. The spending itself 
was redirected towards social interests and administrative projects, probably in an effort 
to safeguard political stability. 
One reason the 'economic interest' expenses may have been higher in Cochinchina 
than they were in Tonkin was that the former benefited from services the latter did not. 
For example, in Cochinchina there were special services for irrigation and industrial 
development. These types of services were aimed at improving infrastructure for 
economic development: they could stimulate existing production and were reliable 
sources of investment. Tonkin's status as a protectorate might have meant its indigenous 
authorities were responsible for such expenses, but it also could be that this was in 
response to Cochinchina's significant circumstances defined in Section 4.2, whereby 
more expenditure on these services was necessary to ensure political stability. 
The way in which the public funds were spent also differed. Indochina had the most 
considerable network of roads of all French colonies, thanks to a ‘road’ policy, dating 
from 1911 and further encouraged post-WW1.340 Few of the new roads were considered 
to be replacing the use of commercial sea routes, which had traditionally been the main 
source of transport for merchandise.341 This suggests then that the building of roads had 
                                                
338 Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1)), p.245. 
339 ibid, p.79. 
340 Albert Sarraut, Grandeur et servitude coloniales (Paris: Editions du Sagittaire, 1931), p.327. 
341 ANOM: BIB SOM D//1702, Serge De Labrusse, "Politique du cabotage en Indochine", Economie 
maritime indochinoise, (Saigon: Imprimerie Française d'Outre-mer, 1950), p.29. 
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an alternative aim: not replacing waterways, but widening the transport network of 
Indochina. By 1922, there was an extensive network of both colonial and local roads in 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. This extensive road network can be seen in maps 2a and 2b. 
Table 4.11: Length of Colonial and Local Roads, by Region, 1922-1936, (Km) 
 
Colonial Roads*  Local Roads** 
Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina 
1922 2 127 834 5 406 4 149 
1929 1 561 974 5 154 5 092 
1930 1 739 676 5 488 4 142 
1931 1 705 653 5 595 5 814 
1932 1 720 649 4 117 5 514 
1934 1 720 649 6 306 5 857 
1935 1 792 650 2 994 5 866 
1936 1 697 650 4 005 6 583 
* Colonial roads maintained by the general budget; ** Local roads maintained by the local budgets. 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Moyens de 
Transport et de Communication”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1939. 
The data in Table 4.11 are not obvious in interpretation: the total length of roads 
seems to decrease over time in Tonkin, but not in Cochinchina. It is unlikely roads were 
destroyed, but it is possible that these roads changed denomination over time. In 
Cochinchina, some provincial roads under provincial budgets also existed. In Tonkin, 
although provincial budgets were not a permanent feature, local village authorities were. 
Possibly, some of the roads may have fallen under communal authority. It is unclear what 
the reasons for these fluctuations were. However, assuming this information is still 
reliable, we can say that there were far more colonial roads in Tonkin than there were in 
Cochinchina, throughout this time period.  
The limited growth of local roads in Tonkin suggests that commercial activity 
may not have increased demand for new roads, relying instead either on alternate 
transportation methods or traditional village networks. This suggests that few changes in 
the patterns of exchange within the territory occurred in this period. Possibly, the road 
policy was an attempt on the part of the colonial administration to encourage better 
economic performance. In the case of Cochinchina, the length of local roads was far more 
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extensive than it was in Tonkin, suggesting a greater need for the local authorities to 
develop their own network of roads in order to facilitate transport and trade and open up 
new areas within the territory to the rest of the region. The extensive local roads network 
might suggest increased communications between localities, as well as increased 
commercial relationships. The total length of colonial roads in Cochinchina decreased 
and levelled off to less than half of the total length of Tonkin’s. Tonkin had a larger 
population and a larger territory, so more colonial roads were needed to connect it to the 
rest of the Indochinese Union. It seems that in this respect, the public finances of 
Indochina might have had a direct influence in some of the region's performance, 
although it is hard to quantify. 
The railroad was probably the main public project of the French Indochinese 
government. Indeed, the project had been on the table since before Doumer’s time. It was 
also the only mode of transportation that recorded its internal transport of merchandise. 
The French hoped it would facilitate the movement of workers from the North to the 
South, as well as allow for faster movement of goods between regions.342 The Trans-
Indochinese railway was only completed in 1937-1938, but the Northern and Southern 
rail networks were in operation earlier. The Northern and Southern networks refer to the 
lines operating within Tonkin and the lines operating within Cochinchina, respectively.343 
These networks did not necessarily correspond uniquely to Tonkin and Cochinchina: the 
North network included northern Annam and connections to China; the South network 
included southern Annam. However, the main transit points in the North were Hanoi and 
Haiphong (both Tonkinese centres), while Saigon and Mytho (both Cochinchinese 
centres) were the main hubs of the Southern network. 
Table 4.12: Railway Network Information, 1913-1935 
 
Length Constructed (km) Number of Stations 
North  South  North  South  
1913 493 497 
  
1935 1 314 583 299 94 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Moyens 
de Transport et de Communication”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie 
d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
                                                
342 ANOM: BIB AOM 21235/1930, p.113. 
343 The railways are the black lines on Maps 2a and 2b. 
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The information in Table 4.12 suggests the French hoped to encourage economic 
growth and industrialisation through new means of transportation, as indeed their road 
policy suggested. The Northern network was far more extensively developed than the 
Southern network on the eve of the opening of the Trans-Indochinese network. This 
larger development was mainly due to the North being a larger territory than the South 
and the only connection to inland China. The greater number of stations in the North 
suggests a greater potential for commercial links between localities and a greater demand 
for integration between the provinces of Tonkin. It could also be that there were more 
stations because the longer distances required more stops to load more coal. Either way, it 
seems that, in this, the colonial policy had the potential to impact relative economic 
performance. 
Table 4.13: Railway Usage, Passenger and Freight, 1932-1937 
 
Passengers (100s) Freight (1000 tonnes) 
North South North South 
1932 4 187 1 544 277 117 
1933 4 015 1 855 251 122 
1934 4 804 2 433 309 120 
1935 4 751 2 480 274 135 
1936 5 886 2 607 344 157 
1937 7 475 3 281 428 191 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Statistiques de chemins de fer”, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 
1933-1938. 
The economic impact of the railroad would have been dependent on the usage of 
this new means of transport. Table 4.13 shows that passenger travel was much more 
significant in the North than in the South, by a factor of about two. This ratio is not 
surprising considering the population difference between the two regions was also two to 
one. Nonetheless, actual usage was quite low: it does not appear that a large share of the 
population used these networks in either region. Even in Tonkin, by 1935, only 6% of the 
population used the railroads, assuming each passenger only used it once in the year. 
With respect to transported merchandise, we also see more use being made of the 
Northern network than of the Southern network. By the end of the period, Cochinchina’s 
railways only transported 40% of the weight of freight transported in Tonkin. However, 
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despite the increase in the size of the network, the use of railways for freight showed only 
a small increase over time, in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. Moreover, freight 
transported via the railway was insignificant compared to international trade volumes. 
For example, in 1937, Tonkin’s international exports alone weighed 1.98 million tonnes, 
while only 428 000 tonnes were carried by rail. In Cochinchina, the difference was even 
more significant: in 1937, compared to 2.07 million tonnes exported internationally, only 
191 000 tonnes of merchandise were shipped by rail.344 Either freight rates were too high 
to make this transportation option competitive, or there was only limited demand.345 This 
is valid for both Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
What these data show is that the extensive public investment in the building of 
railroad had a rather limited impact on the movement of merchandise and people. Despite 
the large sums invested in these infrastructural works, there is limited evidence that they 
significantly changed the economic performance of either region.  
Political and Administrative 
These expenditures ranged from pensions for government employees to provision of 
justice and defence. Expenditure on political and administrative services was consistently 
lower in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, following generally the same trends of increase 
until 1930, then a steady decrease. There was a noticeable gap between the shares of 
these expenditures in Cochinchina and in Tonkin. As seen in Figure 4.1, the Tonkinese 
Superior Resident had to oversee the indigenous services, which were at least nominally 
provided through traditional mechanisms. Because of Cochinchina’s status as a colony, 
there was no need for an indigenous court of justice to be funded. Tonkin's higher share 
of expenditure in these services might have, ironically, been due to its nature as a 
protectorate, requiring more oversight.  
It is also likely that Tonkin consistently spent more on political and administrative 
services because the region was more susceptible to political troubles and the government 
had to ensure some degree of political placidity to achieve its mise-en-valeur agenda. 
Furthermore, it is not surprising that Tonkin spent a larger share of its revenue on these 
services. Its population was much larger than Cochinchina’s, suggesting a greater need 
                                                
344 data based on Chapter 7. 
345 ANOM: BIB SOM D//1702, De Labrusse, op.cit., p.27-29. 
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for security services. On the other hand, expenditure on police and immigration services 
tended to be increasingly higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, by at least 50%. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, immigration was more significant in Cochinchina, suggesting more 
need for immigration officers in that region.  
These figures suggest that expenditures in Tonkin were in line with a more rigid 
attempt at controlling the political climate of the region. In Cochinchina, the growing 
importance of these services reflected the greater demand for such services, as the 
economy grew. This suggests that again government expenditure in these services was 
guided by factors that were independent of government policy. Once more, it seems that 
the small variations in the colonial policies of Cochinchina and Tonkin reflected rather 
than caused differences between the two regions, although they may have helped 
perpetuate them.  
 
4.4) Conclusion 
The argument in this chapter is that despite differences in the way the administration 
governed the territories of Tonkin and Cochinchina, there is only limited evidence 
that colonial policy caused the economic divide seen in GDP estimates between 1900 
and 1940. Instead, we have argued that colonial policy differences reflected the 
economic differences between Tonkin and Cochinchina. Although there were a few 
ways in which the colonial administration could have had a strong influence on economic 
performances (such as with the development of the railway), the evidence suggests that 
the economic impact of these projects was quite low and insufficient to significantly 
impact relative economic performance between Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
The general colonial policy of French Indochina was that of mise-en-valeur. The 
main reason for the colonial administration’s emphasis on economic progress was that it 
guaranteed stable fiscal revenue and helped achieve political stability. The French 
government meant for Indochina to be financially autonomous. To this end, Governor 
General Doumer set up the general Indochinese budget, excise boards and high customs 
duties to provide enough funds for the maintenance of the entire Union. Unfortunately, 
the response to these reforms was unfavourable from Cochinchina, which felt it 
contributed more than it received. Nonetheless, the apparatus set in place by Doumer was 
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used until the end of French rule in Indochina. Even through the economic crisis of the 
1930s, the aim of the Indochinese administration remained ensuring stable revenue.  
Although this aim of the colonial government was common throughout the French 
empire, the approach of the government differed between Tonkin and Cochinchina, 
because these regions were facing different political circumstances. Reports by the 
Superior Residents of Tonkin clearly showed that the political instability of Tonkin 
threatened the steady intake of fiscal revenue, while adverse commercial circumstances 
affected that of Cochinchina. Such differing circumstances affected the approach of the 
colonial authorities, once more showing the responsive nature of colonial policy. 
The clearest example of differences in colonial policy is associated with the tax 
system, both in theory and practice. Our analysis of public finances showed that the per 
capita tax burden was heavier in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, even though many of the 
key tax rates were lower in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. We have argued that the main 
reason for this apparent mismatch was that the differing circumstances in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina called for different strategies of revenue maximisation on the part of the 
colonial administration. In Tonkin, personal head tax rates on the indigenous population 
and land tax rates were high. In Cochinchina, license fees and capitation tax rates on 
foreign immigrants were higher than personal head tax and land tax rates. Neither system 
was necessarily ideal, but the two systems were different ways of achieving optimal 
conditions for successful collection of tax revenue. One result of this difference is that the 
resulting tax burden on the poorer classes of the indigenous population appears to have 
been heavier in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. Both the way in which the regions were 
taxed and the revenue derived from these taxes indicate that colonial tax policy reflected 
rather than caused economic differences between the two regions, contrary to what 
previous scholars had suggested, although our analysis does not rule out the fact that 
some of the policy choices helped perpetuate the differences that existed between Tonkin 
and Cochinchina. For example, lower tax rates on cultivated land helped lower the costs 
of investing in plantations, which likely perpetuated the dominance of large landholdings 
in Cochinchina's agrarian sector relative to Tonkin's. 
We show this was also the case with respect to public expenditure. Most 
expenditure was relatively similar between the two regions. The few differences that were 
found, such as various expenditures in administrative services, reflected the differences in 
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the colonial identity of the two regions (whether protectorate or colony). The key 
difference that should have had an impact on the economic development of the 
Indochinese Union, considering the mise-en-valeur policy, was that of public works 
expenditure. Although it is true that more was spent in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, the 
use of these infrastructural developments seem to have been rather scarce in both regions. 
Consequently, it is unclear whether or not these expenditure choices had any differential 
impact on economic performance. This vindicated our assessment that colonial policy 
was unlikely to have been a cause of the economic divide between the two regions.  
In Tonkin, revenue came from stable and reliable sources based, not on activity, 
but on endowments. Public expenditure in Tonkin focused more on keeping the peace 
than on stimulating the economy. It seems that mise-en-valeur in Tonkin meant allowing 
for stability in crops and political circumstances, while mise-en-valeur in Cochinchina 
meant encouraging dynamic economic activities. This chapter has suggested that colonial 
policy was developed based on existing differences between the two regions, which 
favoured economic development in Cochinchina rather than in Tonkin. The implications 
of this chapter suggests that production patterns in agriculture and industry would have 
differed strongly between the two regions, encouraging differing commercial activities, 
and resulting in diverging standards of living. These will be further evaluated in Chapters 
5, 6, 7 & 8 respectively. 
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PART 2: UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE GAP 
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Chapter 5: Agriculture 
 
5.1) Introduction 
Because colonies were considered markets for industrial goods produced in the 
metropolis, there was little incentive for a movement towards industrialisation, at least 
until the Depression. It is therefore no surprise that the population of French Indochina 
remained predominantly engaged in agrarian production. The sectoral breakdown of the 
population is not precisely known, but economists and historians have provided some 
estimates: Hung suggested that 90% of the population was engaged in agrarian 
production and that the sector accounted for an average of 65% of Indochina's GNP;346 
Gourou estimated that the urban populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina were 14% and 4% 
of the total populations respectively and although there was of course some non-
agricultural work in the rural areas, his suggestion lends weight to Le Thanh Khoi's 
estimate that 70% of Indochina’s labour force was agrarian during French rule.347 
Considering that this sector was probably the most significant, at least in terms of 
employment if not output, this chapter aims to explain how the economic divide that 
existed between Tonkin and Cochinchina manifested itself in the output and 
productivity of this sector. 
Using both official colonial records and reworked estimates, we evaluate output, 
land and labour productivity in rice cultivation. We use the cultivation of rice as the 
standard for evaluations of the sector's activity. To broaden this evaluation, we also 
analyse secondary crop production and cattle raising to find trends and patterns in the 
agrarian sectors of these regions. Aspects of the colonial administration's efforts are 
discussed within these sections, specifically with respect to credit institutions and public 
works, so as to better explain the evolution of patterns of production throughout this time 
period. Finally, industrial crops such as rubber will be examined to provide a rounded 
analysis of the sector. 
Chapter 3 suggested that differing demographic and institutional characteristics 
                                                
346 G. Nguyen Tien Hung, Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, 1955-1980, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1977), p.3. 
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would have affected agricultural productivity and output. Chapter 4 suggested that 
colonial policy differences between Tonkin and Cochinchina were, in many respects, 
rather limited, but that specific expenditures of the government budgets, mainly in terms 
of public works expenditure, did differ and could have affected the 
development/evolution of the agrarian sector's activity. This chapter will further evaluate 
these claims. Did productivity really differ between the regions? Did the colonial 
administration's activity in credit and public work affect the evolution of the agricultural 
sector? Of course, other factors such as geography could have influenced agricultural 
production. For example, French scholars at the time documented that the Cochinchinese 
climate was more favourable than Tonkin's: “the rainy season is long and regular [in 
Cochinchina], without extreme temperatures because the daily rain comes to refresh the 
atmosphere [...while Tonkin's rainy season is very irregular]”. 348  Apart from the 
significant impact of rain on agricultural productivity, geography can have an “indirect 
effect through its impact on distance from markets and the extent of integration or its 
impact on the quality of domestic institutions”.349 This chapter does not attempt to 
evaluate geographical differences, rather we show that the agrarian populations of the two 
regions had different approaches to production. Tonkin had a much more diverse 
agricultural sector and much of it was small-scale production, whereas Cochinchina was 
mainly engaged in rice cultivation, but had a significant industrial crop sector, mainly 
rubber. We believe these differing approaches were due to some of the factors discussed 
in the previous chapters and that they helped define the economic gap between Tonkin 
and Cochinchina. 
 
5.2) Rice 
Gourou suggested that, in the early 1930s, almost 90% of Cochinchina’s agricultural 
production was rice.350 Indochina was the third largest exporter of rice in the world during 
colonial rule, behind Burma and Thailand. In 1934-1938, Thailand's average annual 
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output of unhusked rice was over 4 million tonnes.351 Cochinchina's output alone was 
over half of Thailand's and significantly higher than Tonkin's. Table 5.1 shows official 
statistical information on rice production in both regions. This information is the result of 
French enquiries and is thus vulnerable to biases, as highlighted in Chapter 1. Most likely 
these data are underestimates: French enquiries typically were associated with taxes and a 
tendency to underreport was prevalent. This bias may have been limited considering that 
the government in part used these studies to try to improve rice yields. They represent the 
administration’s estimates of an ‘average’ year and were corroborated by Henry's 
research in later years. According to Henry, in the 1930s, the yield of a single harvest rice 
field in Tonkin was 12 quintals per hectare and a double harvest field’s yield was around 
20, providing an overall average yield between 14.7 and 13.3 quintals per hectare. In 
Cochinchina, he argued that the general average for yield was around 13.4 quintals per 
hectare.352 To understand the implications of this table and rice cultivation as a whole, we 
will look at land and labour productivity and output in turn. 
Table 5.1: Average Yearly Statistics on Rice Cultivation in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, 1919-1930 
 
Area under rice 
cultivation (1000 
hectares) 
Output (1000s 
quintals353) Yield (q/ha) 
Period Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina 
1919-
1922 1 540 2 000 21 000 27 000 14 14 
1925-
1929 1 250 2 300 17 000 28 000 14 12 
1926-
1930 1 200 2 300 16 000 27 000 13 12 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1931. 
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p.250-272. 
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Land productivity  
The French records did not explain how they generated their information on yields. It is 
therefore best to be cautious when evaluating them: the yields were estimates based on 
scattered measurements. Rice field land tax in both Tonkin and Cochinchina was based 
on hypothetical yields. As such it is very likely that these yields were similar due to fiscal 
reasons, rather than as a result of natural causes.354  In Table 5.1, the land yields in both 
areas appear to have been stable and very similar throughout this time period. Generally, 
each square kilometre under cultivation produced around 140 kilograms of rice. Over 
time the yields seem to diminish very slightly, but throughout this time period, they were 
lower in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. This is very surprising. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
scholars believed a main cause of the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
was that the higher man to land ratio in Tonkin had impoverished soils. One would 
therefore have expected yields to be higher in Cochinchina as a result.  
The yields shown in Table 5.1 are relatively low. Low yields were common in rice 
growing Southeast Asia.355 Booth explained that this was largely due to the limited 
attempts at improving technology in the main rice-exporting region of Southeast Asia, in 
contrast to what the Japanese achieved in both Korea and Taiwan.356 Van der Eng 
estimated that yields in Thailand were about 8.8 quintal per hectare between 1930 and 
1934, compared to 9.7 quintal per hectare in Burma in 1932. His calculations suggest that 
Tonkin's yield in the 1930s was around 13.5 quintal per hectare, compared to only 8.7 in 
Cochinchina in that same decade.357  These yields are even lower than the ones suggested 
in Table 5.1 and suggest that Tonkinese land had some of the highest yields in the region. 
Considering man to land ratio as part of the incentive structure, higher yields in Tonkin 
might have been due to growing population pressure. Tonkin’s cultivable land was 
densely populated and it was therefore particularly necessary to maximise the return on 
land, in an effort to ensure sufficient production for the population. In the case of 
Cochinchina, there was not such an extensive pressure on land and there may have been 
                                                
354 The hypothetical yields were most likely used to compute the output data.  
355 Lucien M.. Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia, (Chicago: Aldine Atherton 
Inc, 1972), p.54. 
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comparatively less pressure on farmers to increase yields. This was certainly a reason 
behind the greater preponderance of double cropping in Tonkin than in Cochinchina.358 
Man to land ratios might have had an impact on productivity that was opposite to what 
Henry and Gourou thought, although these records show only a small difference in land 
productivity. This is in direct contradiction to the literature's suggestion that soils in 
Tonkin were exhausted. Unsurprisingly, other scholars such as Bassino have reasonably 
argued that these yield data were implausibly low.359 
According to Bassino, “initial conditions [in Southern Vietnam] were not only 
characterised by high land/labour ratios, but also by comparatively high land 
productivity”.360 This would mean that the yield data for Cochinchina suffer from a 
serious underestimation. He suggested that this underestimation could be around 34% in 
some of the Southern provinces, or even higher in others.361 Although it is possible that 
fields on newly reclaimed land had abnormally low yields during this period, Bassino 
argued that the official data are demonstrably flawed.362 Yields may also have been higher 
in some of the larger landholdings that were used to produce exportable surplus, if only 
because technology might have been better. Large landholdings fields were more 
prevalent in Cochinchina than Tonkin, as we saw in Chapter 3 so that it is very likely that 
Cochinchina's rice sector was much more productive than Tonkin's.  
As suggested in Chapter 4, land registering efforts in Indochina were mostly 
unsucessful. It is likely that these yield estimates were based on few fields and that their 
yield was similar because they used a similar technology. Similar technology in both 
regions may explain similar yields. Brocheux suggested that peasants throughout 
Indochina “made use of a simple device: a basket (cai bo) mounted on a sled (cai co)” 
when collecting the rice harvest.363 The French did bring with them new machinery, such 
as ploughs and threshers, but these tended to be expensive and Vietnamese peasants did 
not adopt these practices en masse. According to Booth, “technological change was 
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mainly limited to export crops grown on large estates [during the colonial period]”.364 The 
French recognised that water buffalo tillage was the most efficient method of cultivation 
for the average peasant household.365 Buffaloes could be used to help plough the field and 
when the buffalo was no longer able to work, it could be sold to a butcher for a profitable 
price. Available data show the rather limited importance of cattle raising in Indochina. 
Gourou argued that “the meagreness of cattle raising in Indochina” was due more to 
cultural reasons, although he does not expand on what those might have been. 366 Table 
5.2 provides the official statistics for stock in Tonkin and Cochinchina, over the period 
1922-1938.  
Table 5.2: Plough Animals by Region, 1922-1938, (Annual Average)  
 
Buffaloes Horses 
Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina 
1922-1938 (1000) 596 293 25 14 
Per capita, 1929 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1939. 
From Table 5.2, we notice that in both regions the per capita number of plough 
animals was very low. Dumont stated that most people could not afford a buffalo or cow, 
the majority of peasants rented the use of these animals. Many people would have used 
the same animal, hence the low per capita figures.367 It seems that the use of field animals 
in agricultural production was relatively similar, and minimal, in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. This suggests that capital-intensive methods of farming, in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, were nearly absent: neither area relied extensively on much other than 
human labour. The cost of the inputs needed for higher yields may have been too high.368 
Similarities in technology for rice cultivation would point to similar yield trends. 
Nonetheless, because it is likely that technology would have been better in larger estates, 
and because larger estates were more common in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, it is likely 
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that yields may in fact have been higher in Cochinchina's plantations, where better 
technology and techniques may have been predominant, than in Cochinchina's smaller 
fields. This would suggest that the previous table did not account for such differences, 
further justifying Bassino's suggestion. It is thus possible that the story of yield 
differences was not one of overpopulation per se, but rather of landholding pattern 
differences, as suggested in Chapter 3. 
 
Labour productivity 
Rice cultivation is very labour intensive and many authors have explained low yields in 
Southeast Asia in terms of the non-availability of labour. Van der Eng calculated that one 
hectare of rice field required 213 days of work in Tonkin in the 1930s, compared to only 
65 days in Cochinchina and even less in Thailand and Burma, hinting that Cochinchinese 
labour was more productive than Tonkinese labour.369  
According to Barker, Herdt and Rose, “there are three levels of technical conditions 
[... that] determine the level of per hectare labor input in rice production in any area at 
any time”.370 These are related to technological differences (either with respect to soil and 
seeds, or with respect to mechanical improvements) and institutional differences (with 
respect to the labour market). The previous section suggested that yields were likely to 
have been higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin and that technology in rice cultivation in 
both regions was likely similar for the average peasants. However, it was suggested that 
only the larger landholdings would have had more access to new technologies, as only 
they could afford them. Considering that larger landholdings were more important in 
Cochinchina, it is likely that per hectare labour input would have been higher than in 
Tonkin, if only in these fields.  
Differences in labour requirements might thus have been the result of differences 
landholding patterns: “per hectare labour input is larger the smaller is the size of 
holding”,371 as can be seen in evidence from Japan. In 1933, a small landholding of less 
than 1 hectare required 34.1 work days per tenth of a hectare, whereas a larger 
                                                
369 Van der Eng 2004, op.cit., p.355-356. 
370 Randolph Barker, Robert W. Herdt & Beth Rose, The Rice Economy of Asia, (Washington D.C.: 
Resources for the Future, 1985), p. 124. 
371 Asian Employment Programme - Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion, Labour Absorption 
in Agriculture: The East Asian Experience, (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1980), p.255. 
 
 
152 
landholding would only have required 21.6 work days per tenth of a hectare.372 We saw 
that Cochinchina's landholding were generally larger than Tonkin's. It is thus possible 
that the prevalence of larger landholdings explains the larger labour productivity of 
Cochinchinese peasants, principally because large landholdings had better access to 
technology. 
Labour requirements in rice farming included preparing the soil for cultivation and 
transplanting, a process common across Indochina and requiring much work. After the 
harvest was collected, the various processing stages to obtain the final rice product were 
also highly labour intensive. 373 These activities were common to both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, which leads us to question why one hectare of rice field required a smaller 
number of workdays in Cochinchina compared to Tonkin, if not because of technology. 
Dumont suggested that more workdays in Tonkin were due not to more work, but rather 
to the oversupply of labour.374 The higher level of labour 'requirement' in Tonkin was 
indicative of disguised unemployment, not of lower labour productivity per se. An 
analysis labour productivity in Japan's rice cultivating sector confirms this assertion: in 
1924 an average of 265 man-days were required per hectare in rice production, but many 
of the people working the fields in this manner were under-employed.375 The higher 
population pressures in Tonkin resulted in many of its peasants being underemployed, 
thus artificially increasing labour requirements estimates.  
 
Output 
Although there is still some debate over whether or not land and labour productivities 
were higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, it remains that the key difference between 
these two regions was in the scale of rice cultivation and the output of rice they produced. 
A large part of this difference is due to the area that was dedicated to rice production. The 
‘area under cultivation’ trends differed: Tonkin’s decreased over time from 1.54 million 
hectares to 1.2 million hectares, while Cochinchina’s increased from 2 million to 2.3 
million hectares. Giacometti calculated estimates for rice cultivation in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. These estimates, based on the same information used in Table 5.1, with 
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some modifications to allow for biases in the gathering of information, provide us with a 
longer-term perspective of the trends in both size of cultivation and rice output. 
Giacometti's estimates for rice output are presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Giacometti's estimates suggests that Tonkin's decreasing area under rice cultivation 
noted in Table 5.1 is likely incorrect. In Tonkin, he suggested that the area under 
cultivation, between 1900 and 1940, grew by a factor of 1.23, while output grew by a 
factor of 1.18.376  For Cochinchina, he argued that both the area under rice cultivation and 
rice output doubled in the same time period. His estimates for Cochinchina show a much 
more significant growth in output than suggested in Table 5.1. If, as suggested above, 
yields were higher in Cochinchina than those reported in Table 5.1, the growth of the rice 
output shown in Figure 5.1 is likely an underestimation, considering that land under rice 
cultivation was also growing. Nonetheless, these estimates confirm that the importance of 
rice cultivation was stronger in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. The apparently slower rate 
of growth in rice production in Tonkin suggests a growing divergence between the two 
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regions, with Cochinchina clearly becoming the stronger player in rice production and 
dedicating more and more of its cultivable land to its cultivation. 
Although Giacometti's estimates deny that Tonkin's area under rice cultivation was 
decreasing, the region's output growth was slower than the growth of the area under 
cultivation. Touzet suggested that this phenomenon could be attributed to a decrease in 
the price of the crop relative to the cost of producing it.377 However, if we look at Figure 
5.2, we can see that the evolution of the retail prices for rice in the capitals of both 
regions was rather similar and the price was often lower in Saigon than in Hanoi. 
 
Figure 5.2 
Considering these prices followed almost identical trends, this cannot be used for 
explaining the difference in the output trends seen in Figure 5.1. Studies indicate that 
fields for rice cultivation were at times used for other crops.378 Consequently, it is sensible 
for the growth in rice output to be slower than growth in the size of the fields on which 
rice was cultivated, because these same fields were also used to grow other crops. 
Differing trends in the agrarian sector may thus not be only a question of land or labour 
productivity, but rather of choices in production patterns. 
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These differences in the output patterns were reflected in government-sponsored 
public works. In Tonkin, the consensus of the Indochinese government was that the 
colonial administration should do work to prevent flooding and increase irrigation to help 
minimise the negative consequences of poor weather in the region.379 One of the main 
problems with the Tonkinese landscape was the different levels of the countryside, which 
made it hard to irrigate crops. 380 For example, the Red River itself is located in a valley, 
while the adjoining fields, at times, are higher up on the plateau. Irrigation to these fields 
was thus costly and difficult. Numerous records show the constant need for more money 
to complete particular projects: for example, a dam welding in Tonkin in 1929 required 
12 000 piastres, in addition to the initial sum of 20 000 piastres, to be completed.381 These 
public works in Tonkin were very costly and it often took very long before direct benefits 
could actually be reaped. Peasants in Tonkin would thus have cultivated various crops on 
the same fields, depending on the weather. For example, potatoes need less water than 
rice. Pending better irrigation methods, the peasants did not have a choice but to adapt 
their cultivation patterns, based on the circumstances they faced. In Cochinchina, because 
of the extensive network of canals, flooding also occurred, but overall irrigation was less 
problematic. Instead, Cochinchina's relatively sizeable virgin land meant public works 
mainly focused on hydraulic works that allowed for the regaining of marshlands and 
clearing of areas that were not yet fit for cultivation.382 As such, different conditions, 
other than just population pressure, affected choices in production patterns. 
This supports our hypothesis that yield differences may not have been the main 
reason explaining the differences in the relative performance of the agrarian sectors of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. Research suggests that despite the population pressures, 
particularly significant in Tonkin, “attempts to further rice yields in order to maintain per 
capita production became relevant [in 1950 in North Vietnam, much later] than in 
Japan”.383 Indeed, the government's creation of the Office Indochinois du Riz in 1930 
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achieved very little in terms of increasing yields.384 One of the main reason yield 
improvement was not a priority until much later is because, at least in Southern Vietnam, 
“the comparative advantage of rice farmers lay in the fact that they could expand their 
farms and continue rice production with traditional low-input labor-extensive 
techniques”.385 Indeed over time, Cochinchina’s production of rice became much more 
significant than Tonkin’s, not because of land productivity so much as because of 
differences in choice of production. 
Tonkin's recorded use of rice fields for other crops is in line with both Henry's and 
Goudal's suggestions that production of rice in Tonkin was insufficient to adequately 
provide for the complete diet of its producers.386 In Tonkin, land use was possibly 
maximised by planting other crops during the fallow period, in addition to double 
cropping. This aligns with its growing population pressures. In Cochinchina, growth of 
available land resulted in more of the land being used for cultivation of this particular 
crop and suggests that its commercial sector and consumption patterns probably differed 
from Tonkin's. Indeed, according to these data, per capita rice production by the 1930s 
was nearly four times higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. Either Cochinchinese 
peasants were only eating rice or the surplus production of rice in Cochinchina was used 
to trade for other items necessary to peasant life. It is likely that rice consumption was 
higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, but this would not be sufficient to explain such a 
large gap; instead, trade and the commercialisation of the surplus must have played a 
large role.387 Output trends in rice cultivation not only reflected the economic gap 
between the two reasons, they also confirm the relevance of local circumstances in 
explaining differences in production choices. Furthermore, these differing production 
patterns hint at important consequences on the commercial activity of both regions. 
 
5.3) Crop diversification 
Acreage figures strongly suggested that much of Tonkinese land was not used exclusively 
for rice cultivation. In Cochinchina an overwhelming proportion of available land was 
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used solely for that crop. It was more common in Tonkin to engage in crop diversification 
within the same fields. 388  For example, dry crops such as cassava and maize were planted 
on the rice fields between harvests,389 thus reducing the annual average output of rice 
fields, as seen in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. Table 5.3 gives some estimates indicating the 
extent of crop diversification in the two regions. We argue this represents different 
production choices based on responses to the environment peasants were living in. 
Table 5.3: Estimates of Yearly Output of Secondary Crops, 
1900 & 1940, (Tonnes) 
 
Maize 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
1900 22 500 4 800 
1940 112 500 34 440 
 
Potatoes & Cassava Haricot Beans 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
1900 138 000 750 
1940 150 000 1 750 
Jean-Dominique Giacometti, “Sources and Estimations for Rural History of 
Vietnam in the First Half of the 20th Century” in Quantitative Economic 
History of Vietnam 1900-1990, Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic History, 
2000, p.41-80. 
These estimates do not give information on yields, as these formed the basis of the 
estimation methodology and were assumed to be similar in both regions. Table 5.3 shows 
only a selection of the secondary crops produced in both areas. These crops were the 
secondary crops of most importance according to Gourou and Henry, as well as the main 
crops, other than rice, mentioned in the ASI. We are therefore confident they provide a 
good illustration of cultivation choices. Often these other crops were not necessarily 
grown for marketable reasons, but for dietary complements or substitutes.390 The dry field 
crops such as maize, potatoes and cassava formed the basis of the diet of Tonkinese 
peasants, particularly when rice was not in season. 391  It is very likely that crop 
diversification's larger role in the Tonkinese agrarian sector than in the Cochinchinese 
agrarian sector was representative of the larger population pressures that existed. Gourou 
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argued that “the secondary crops [were] valued because they contribute[d] appreciably to 
the peasant’s food supply”.392 Although these crops were considered important, this table 
illustrates how insignificant these crops were compared to rice. Cochinchina produced an 
annual average of 2.7 million tonnes of rice, between 1919 and 1930, but only a 
maximum of 4 440 tonnes of maize. For Tonkin, the average was around 1.7 million 
tonnes of rice annually and even output of potatoes and cassava, by far the most 
significant secondary crops, was only of 150 000 tonnes. That being said, rice is a heavy 
crop and it remains clear from this table that diversification was more significant in 
Tonkin than in Cochinchina. It is possible that in Cochinchina rice substitutes were not 
necessary, since there was a clear surplus of rice produced. The surplus rice produced 
could be traded for the other goods they might have needed, reducing the need for such 
alternative cultures. Tonkin seems to have had started diversification prior to the start of 
French rule, with output of these alternative crops already relatively high in 1900. It is 
unsurprising to see growth in these alternative crops: population pressure in both regions 
were growing, as seen in Chapter 3. 
Another form of diversification is seen in cattle raising data. Peasants could 
supplement their diet with meat. Table 5.4 presents official figures of stock raising of 
domestic animals used to supplement diets.  
Table 5.4: Annual Average Number of Domesticated Animals, 1922-1928, (1000s) 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Pigs 1 334 610 
Sheep 4 5 
Goats 16 4 
Cows 195 165 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1927-1939. 
These animals were generally kept uniquely for food reasons, whether for their 
meat or their milk, and sheep were also used for wool. Although the overall numbers 
remained quite low in both regions, Tonkinese peasants kept more of these animals. This 
is consistent with population pressure and their existing tendency to diversify agricultural 
production. Tonkin appears to have been engaging in diversification of agrarian 
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production both with respect to crops and cattle. It seems that Cochinchinese peasants 
were either unable or unwilling to produce all these various goods.  
Cochinchina's obviously larger output of rice, both in absolute and per capita terms, 
versus Tonkin's perceived inability to produce enough rice to feed its population, 
according to some scholars,393 suggests the need for movement of rice from South to 
North. The literature suggests that Cochinchina may have exported some rice to Tonkin, 
but no data can be found for this. We can attempt to estimate the movement of rice for the 
year 1930. On average Cochinchina produced 27 million quintals of rice per year 
between 1926 and 1930. In Tonkin, average yearly rice production in the same period 
was 16 million quintals.394 The population of Cochinchina in 1930 was 5.471 million; in 
Tonkin it was 9.036 million.395 A high estimate for rice consumption in Cochinchina was 
700 grams per person per day. 396 In Tonkin, it was 400 grams.397  Exports of rice from 
Cochinchina amounted to 955 118 tonnes and 70 008 tonnes in Tonkin.398 This would 
suggest a surplus of rice (produced but not eaten locally or traded internationally) of 
about 346 084 tonnes in Cochinchina (2.7 million tonnes - 955 118 tonnes - 0.0007 
tonnes * 5.471 million people) and a surplus of 209 832 tonnes in Tonkin (1.6 million 
tonnes - 70 0008 tonnes - 0.0004 * 9.036 million). If this estimation were representative 
of rice consumption and trade, then there would have been very little movement of rice 
from Cochinchina to Tonkin, even with minor adjustments for cattle feed and seeding.  
One reason for such limited movements of rice may be that Tonkin's crop/cattle 
diversification completed its diet, suggesting their strategy was to ensure a degree of self-
sufficiency. Tonkin’s tendency towards diversification of crops, on a small scale, was 
potentially a form of agricultural private insurance, a means of ensuring self-reliance. 
Cochinchina’s continued emphasis on specialisation in high-demand crops suggests 
reliance on commerce. A related reason may be that Tonkinese peasants could not afford 
                                                
393 Henry, op.cit., p.334-336 & Goudal, op.cit., p.7. 
394 Rice output information comes from Table 5.1. 
395 Maks Banens, “Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century Population History”, in Jean-Pascal 
Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds), Quantitative Economic History of 
Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitosubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000). 
396 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1934, (Hanoi: 1935), p.175; Henry estimated average rice consumption in Cochinchina 
was only 534 grams: Henry, op.cit., p.534. 
397 Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.551; Henry estimated average rice consumption in Tonkin was only 264 grams: 
Henry, op.cit., p.334. 
398 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932). 
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to buy more rice and had to rely on what they produced. Gourou’s research led him to 
conclude that, in 1934, Tonkinese peasants “had no more than 50 francs a year to trade 
with the world outside of the Tonkin Delta”.399 This sum was worth about 5 piastres at the 
time. According to Figure 5.2, this could fetch over 50 kg of rice in Hanoi, a rather 
insignificant amount for a household. He also argued, although without quantitative 
evidence, that Cochinchina “had much more important trade relations with the outside 
than those carried on by the peasants of Tonkin”.400 Specialisation in Cochinchina was 
probably encouraged by the differing patterns in size of landholding, specifically the 
relatively higher proportion of large estates: wealthy landlords want profit, not sustenance. 
Tonkinese peasants may have diversified out of necessity. Tonkinese peasants diversified 
to ensure subsistence for a growing population. Chances are, however, that Tonkinese 
peasants needed less 'trade money' because they could mostly subsist on their own 
production. 
Such a difference in production patterns is not unique. It is similar to what was 
occurring in upper and lower Burma at the time: lower Burma being more commercially 
oriented and upper Burma more autarchic.401  In Java, the increasing movement towards 
diversification was representative of what Geertz termed 'agricultural involution'. He 
argued that because the native population was generally restricted in its ability to engage 
with the European/Dutch dominated capitalist sector of the economy, the native 
population had little choice but to turn to diversification.402 If we look at Tonkin and 
Cochinchina through this wider Southeast Asian perspective, one would suggest that 
Cochinchina's ability to produce a large surplus of rice was similar to lower Burma's and 
guided its specialisation. In Tonkin population pressure may have prompted peasants 
towards diversification and self-insurance. The more extensive role of crop 
diversification in Tonkin than in Cochinchina, combined with the large divide that existed 
in rice production between the two regions suggests that the economic divide manifested 
itself through differing patterns of agricultural production in the two regions. It is not 
necessarily possible to say that differing patterns caused the economic divide, but it is 
                                                
399 Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.257. 
400 ibid, p.258. 
401 Aye Hlaing, “Trends of economic growth and income distribution in Burma, 1870-1940”, Journal of the 
Burma Research Society, June 1964, Vol.47, p.99. 
402 Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), p.16. 
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possible to suggest that institutional and geographical factors (including demography) 
had an impact on production patterns, which were reflected in the overall performance of 
these two regions.  
 We argue that production choices and patterns in both Tonkin and Cochinchina, at 
least with respect to traditional crops, were independent of the colonial authorities' so-
called 'efforts' at easing access to credit for average peasants in the aim of improving 
production figures. In 1913, the administration created agrarian credit institutions in 
Cochinchina. Their perceived success prompted their establishment in the rest of the 
Union and, in 1926, some were opened in Tonkin.403 Table 5.5 summarises the available 
information on these institutions. 
Table 5.5: Agrarian Credit Information, 1923-1937 
 
Agricultural Credit In Cochinchina Popular Credit in Tonkin 
Number of 
Societies 
Number of 
Members 
Total Amount of 
Loans  (1000 $) 
Total amount of 
loans (1000 $) 
1923 8 3 347 643 
 
1924 9 3 939 844 
 
1925 12 4 743 1 142 
 
1926 15 7 420 1 314 
 
1927 17 8 016 1 759 
 
1928 19 10 244 2 348 109 
1929 20 12 833 3 444 916 
1929 20 12 833 6 195 2 115 
1930 20 14 398 3 154 3 569 
1931 
   
13 
1932 20 15 517 12 077 24 
1933 20 15 604 11 475 24 
1935 20 15 148 10 498 
 
1937 20 15 152 8 531 
 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Agriculture, 
Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
                                                
403 ANOM: BIB AOM TH//583, Sabes, op.cit., p.116. 
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It seems clear that these institutions were not particularly far-reaching, not even in 
Cochinchina were they had been considered successful. The number of members was not 
very high, a maximum of 15 604 members in Cochinchina in 1933, out of a population of 
over 4 million. The limited reach of this institution in both regions meant that for the 
average cultivator, whether owner or tenant of small landholding, informal money 
lending was endemic and so were prohibitively high interest rates. According to the 
newspapers in Tonkin, agrarian credit was still only going to rich villagers and the 
average Tonkinese had to resort to non-stop borrowing at usury rates to survive.404 
Dumont suggested that the indebtedness of the Tonkinese peasants resulted in the 
establishment of large landlords, through default of large properties: owners in debt 
would have to relinquish their hold on their land.405 Although this may be camouflaged in 
the data on landholding,406 it does not seem to have had an impact on production patterns 
between 1900-1940: diversification in Tonkin increased and Cochinchina continued 
specialising. Consequently, it appears that pre-existing conditions controlled the 
development of the agricultural sector in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
 
5.4) Industrial crops 
Touzet explained that, until 1900, the French administration relied mostly on rice 
cultivation and only after did they start to encourage more 'industrial' cash crops.407 For 
example, in 1909, experimental agrarian stations were organised in Tonkin.408 These 
stations aimed to increase the profitability of the agrarian sector by either improving 
existing crops or introducing new ones. Although the stations were abandoned by 1913, 
the French administration continued to encourage the development of new exportable 
crops in Indochina: cotton, coffee and, most importantly, rubber.409 In the wake of the 
Depression, both rubber and coffee growers received subventions from the authorities. 
                                                
404 ANOM: BIB AOM /30995, H. Cucherousset, “La Situation Financière du Tonkin”, Eveil Economique, 
Hanoi: Sunday July 5th 1931. 
405 Dumont, op.cit., p.66. 
406 Goudal, op.cit., p.191. 
407 Touzet 1934, op.cit.,p.2. 
408 SOAS: Ch. Lemarie, “Travaux executés en 1909 dans les stations de cultures experimentales du Tonkin”, 
in French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine 
Année 1910, (Hanoi: 1911), p.307. 
409 ANOM: BIB AOM A/39, Annuaire général administratif, commercial et industriel de l’Indochine, 
Tome 1: Partie commercialle et industrielle, l’année 1910, p.34. 
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Other industrial crops were not as successful,410 although Touzet does suggest that there 
was “a veritable rush of tea and coffee planters” after 1928.411  
The greater perceived profitability of Cochinchina's agrarian sector is 
demonstrated in financial capital movement. Table 5.6 provides some data on investment 
in the agrarian sector in the late 1920s, from both domestic and international investors. 
Table 5.6: Investment in Agriculture and Forestry, 1924-1929, (1000$) 
 
Investment from Domestic 
Sources 
Investment from International 
Sources  
 
Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1924 
  
4 162 
 
1925 286 226 3 674 751 
1926 2 158 2 4 410 882 
1927 5 779 12 6 326 
 
1928 1 915 349 6 186 861 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1929, Hanoi: 1930, p.808. 
 There was much more investment going to Cochinchina's agricultural sector than 
to that of Tonkin. This is true for investment from both domestic and international 
sources. Of course, some of the investment may not have been directed towards the 
'industrial crop' sector, but to other profitable traditional crops such as rice or mulberry, 
but either way, this shows the greater attractiveness of Cochinchina's agricultural sector 
for investment. The greater attraction of capital towards Cochinchina may be 
representative of comparatively better returns, but may also be representative of the 
differing landholding patterns: large landholdings engaged in commercial farming may 
have required more investment than small-scale subsistence agriculture. We believe this 
further illustrates the significance of institutional differences in explaining the difference 
in the agricultural sector and that it provides evidence to say that Cochinchina's agrarian 
sector's production patterns, both in traditional and industrial crops, partly explains its 
economic divide from Tonkin.  
Although in the beginning of French rule plantations were developed in Tonkin in 
the hopes of establishing valuable crops such as tea, as of 1910 the majority of European 
                                                
410 Dumont, op.cit., p.133. 
411 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.2. 
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plantations had shifted to Cochinchina.412 The trend of establishing plantations in the 
South continued throughout French control of Indochina. European plantations were 
generally the by-products of concessions: the government would declare itself owner of 
particular expanses of land in the Indochinese territory and would ‘concede’ these to 
privileged European settlers,413 at a certain price. As explained in Chapter 3, between 
1921 and 1932, 942 163 hectares of land were awarded as concessions, of which 638 600 
were in Cochinchina. Only 138 000 hectares were conceded in Tonkin,414 and many of 
these were mining concessions rather than agricultural ones.  
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide information on the growth of the rubber industry.  
Table 5.7: Average Area Cultivated, Output of Rubber in Cochinchina, and 
Exports of Rubber in Indochina, 1927-1937 
 
Area (km2) Output (tonnes) Exports (tonnes) 
1927 500 8 381 9 600 
1928 680 8 119 9 800 
1929 840 9 296 10 300 
1933 960 14 370 18 700 
1935 970 23 300 29 300 
1937 982 36 700 45 100 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939; Gouvernement Général de 
l'Indochine, Direction des Services Economiques, Résumé statistique relatif aux années 1913-1940, 
Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extrème-Orient, 1941, p.7-45. 
The development of the rubber industry was common to many Southeast Asian 
countries, such as the Dutch East Indies’ Java and the Malaysian peninsula. 
Cochinchina's rubber sector was dominated by large estates, as opposed to Malaya's, 
where smaller holdings were not only numerous, but often fared better in the wake of the 
Depression.415 Takada suggested that the cost of establishing a rubber plantation in 
Cochinchina was quite high: in the mid-1920s it would have cost between 500 and 1 200 
                                                
412 Charles Robequain, L’Evolution économique de l’Indochine française, (Paris: Typographie Firmin-
Didot, 1939), p.207. 
413 Some concessions, especially for rice fields, were also given out to indigenous cultivators. 
414 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.3. 
415 P.T. Bauer, The Rubber Industry: A Study in Competition and Monopoly, (London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1948), p.3 & p.33-35; Webby Silupya Kalitiki, Plantation 
labour: rubber planters and the colonial state in French Indochina, 1890-1939, PhD University of London, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 2000, p.49 & Helmut G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia, 
(New York: Arno Press, 1976), p.80. 
 
 
165 
piastres per hectare.416 This need for initial capital explains the larger size of holdings for 
this production and its growth in Cochinchina. For example, Michelin, the tyre company, 
in 1927 had requested 60 000 hectares of land to start a rubber plantation.417 Such land 
would not have been available in Tonkin, nor would the latter's climate have been 
appropriate for extensive cultivation. 
Between 1907418 and 1927, the area used for rubber cultivation grew to 500 km2. 
Within another ten years, this area had nearly doubled in size. The output from this 
culture saw even more growth: Table 5.7 shows that within ten years, output increased 
more than four fold, while the area under cultivation only doubled. The growth can be 
attributed to a number of reasons: more trees being planted or coming to maturity over 
time in the same area; more labourers being employed thus maximising the collection of 
the latex; or more productive techniques of extraction.  
Despite the nominally large size of plantations, the total size of the area under 
rubber cultivation was very small, relative to that of the area under rice cultivation. 
Nonetheless, rubber output growth was far more significant than growth of either rice 
output or secondary crops output. Rubber was a very significant economic activity. By 
the late 1930s, rubber was Indochina’s “second most valuable export, behind rice”419 and 
Murray shows that 18% of total export revenue came from rubber.420 Although some 
rubber plantations existed in Southern Annam and in Cambodia, they were insignificant 
compared to Cochinchina’s. Throughout the time period, total rubber exports from 
Indochina were just above total output figures from Cochinchina, suggesting that 
Cochinchina's rubber production was almost exclusively exported. This further suggests 
that Cochinchina's agrarian production was influenced by trade possibilities: the demand 
for this product was not domestic but international. 
                                                
416 Yoko Takada, “Historical Agrarian Economy of Cochinchina” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique 
Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, 
(Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000), p.130. 
417 Martin J. Murray, “ ‘White Gold’ or ‘White Blood’? The Rubber Plantations of Colonial Indochina, 
1910-1940”, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.19, No.3-4, 1992, p.62. 
418 1907 is the suggested start of date of plantations of 'hevea brasilienis'; before lower quality rubber was 
produced from local oleaginous plants. Michitake Aso, “The Scientist, the Governor, and the Planter: The 
Political Economy of Agricultural Knowledge in Indochina During the Creation of a Science of Rubber, 
1900-1940”, East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, Vol 3, 2009, p.231-
256; Murray 1992, op.cit., p.46. 
419 Murray 1992, op.cit., p.62. 
420 ibid, endnote 20. 
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Table 5.8:  Annual Average of Indochinese Rubber Exports, 1907-1940, (Tonnes) 
 Export 
1907-1926 2 363 
1927-1937 20 145 
1940 64 900 
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine, Direction des Services Economiques, Résumé statistique relatif 
aux années 1913-1940, Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extrème-Orient, 1941, p.7-45. 
As we can see in Table 5.8, exports of rubber increased significantly after 1927. By 
1940, despite the Great Depression and despite the drop in rubber prices, total exports of 
rubber were more than six times the exports in 1927. This shows the large growth of the 
rubber industry in Cochinchina. The total production in Cochinchina was insignificant 
compared with two large neighbouring exporters: comparatively, Malaysia in 1938 
exported a monthly average of 44 600 tonnes and Java exported a monthly average of 24 
600 tonnes.421 Nonetheless, by the late 1930s, Indochina was the 5th largest producer of 
rubber by acreage, 4th largest in total rubber output and the 1st by land productivity.422  
Although rubber was the most significant industrial crop in Indochina, it is clear it 
was not a large part of the agricultural sector. Its contribution to the economic divide 
presumably rested on its commercial revenue. Because the agricultural sector in 
Indochina was so significant, any difference in the output of the sectors between Tonkin 
and Cochinchina would be closely associated with diverging economic performances. 
Since it appears that the main distinction between the two regions' agrarian sector rests on 
the extent to which specialisation existed, it seems that the role of commerce was central 
to explaining the economic divide between the two regions.  
 
5.5) Conclusion  
The economic divide that is acknowledged in the literature between the two regions 
manifested itself in the agricultural sector in the much larger output of rice cultivation in 
Cochinchina and in its larger industrial crop sector. We have shown that Cochinchina's 
agrarian sector was characterised by specialisation, while Tonkin's was 
                                                
421 SOAS: “Supplément de la Statistique”, French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de 
l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine, Année 1940, (Hanoi: 1941), p.14. 
422 Murray 1992, op.cit., p.48. 
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characterised by diversification. It is likely that the land tenure differences and 
population pressures outlined in Chapter 3 had differing impacts on Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, further encouraging differing patterns of agricultural production. We have 
argued that the specialisation that occurred in Cochinchina and the diversification that 
occurred in Tonkin reflected choices made based on the differing environment these 
regions were facing and potentially choices based on commercial orientation. 
Although the debate on productivity differences (for both land and labour) is not 
yet resolved, this chapter has argued that the main difference in this sector's performance 
was due to the choices in production patterns, as they affected acreage and output figures. 
Output differences resulting from these differing production patterns mirrored the 
economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina. These differing patterns were clear in 
both the evolution of the traditional crops such as rice or cassava and in the rise of 
industrial crops such as rubber. More varied crops existed in Tonkin, but Cochinchina's 
development of the rubber industry was in line with its tendency to specialise in specific 
crops and its orientation towards international commerce. The indication is that 
Cochinchina's agricultural sector was more geared towards production for markets, 
while Tonkin's was engaged in more self-sufficient production. Goudal believed that 
the three main problems the peasant faced in Indochina were land tenure, soil 
productivity and the need for agricultural credit.423 This chapter has shown that these 
problems were much starker in populous Tonkin and that they had an influence on the 
way in which the agrarian sector was organised.  
Tonkin’s tendency to self-insure and diversify resembles more an “industrious 
revolution path, due to natural resource constraints such as land scarcity”.424 This would 
suggest that Tonkin’s long-term economic performance revolved around its continued 
reliance on village authorities and full absorption of labour within the village bounds. 
Cochinchina's specialisation, however, was more likely to encourage integration to the 
world economy through trade. These two different paths reflect different choices, in 
many ways independent of colonial policy, as highlighted in Chapter 4. In Tonkin, 
diversification and double harvesting were clearly aimed at accommodating a growing 
                                                
423 Goudal, op.cit., p.195-209. 
424 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian path of economic development: a long-term perspective” in Giovanni 
Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita & Mark Selden (eds), The Resurgence of East Asia 500, 150 and 50 year 
perspectives, (London: Routledge, 2003), p 82. 
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population with more limited connections to trade, as will be further shown in Chapter 7. 
Collaboration between the government, in light of their colonial economic policy of mise-
en-valeur, and the Bank resulted in big property owners, plantations owners and large 
commercial ventures obtaining the largest share of credit. This favoured Cochinchina’s 
economy where more of these ventures existed. Tonkin’s share of credits from the 
Indochinese Bank was therefore lower in its impact and reach,425 which meant that the 
impact of population pressure remained significant. Indeed, Booth argued that  
in both Vietnam and Java, it has been argued that the benefits of 
government expenditures on irrigation, and other infrastructure such as 
roads and railways, accrued mainly to the better-off minority of farmers that 
owned, or had use rights over productive land, especially irrigated rice 
land.426  
It is suggested that the production patterns highlighted in this sector were not 
necessarily a deliberate strategy, but were in part driven by demographic characteristics 
and their influences in landholding patterns. In other words, this chapter supports van der 
Eng's suggestion that “production trends were the result of choices made by producers on 
the basis of the aim to optimise the use of their productive resources (labour, land, 
irrigation facilities and capital), given the market information available to them”.427  
These patterns had an impact on productivity, both of land and labour, and on the 
output possibilities of the regions. It has been argued that Cochinchina's specialisation 
in rice as opposed to Tonkin's diversification explain much of the economic divide 
between the two regions during colonial time. Even in 1931 when prices had started to 
drop, Goudal estimated that the value of agricultural production in Cochinchina was 58 
piastres per head, as opposed to only 40 in the rest of Indochina,428 prompting an 
economic divide between that region and others within the Indochinese Union. It is likely 
these patterns would have had an impact on both the commercial orientation of the 
                                                
425 Yasuo Gonjo, Banque coloniale ou banque d'affaires. La banque de l'Indochine sous la IIIe République, 
(ParisL Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière, Ministère de l'Economie, 1993), p.359. 
426 Anne E. Booth, “Night Watchman, Extractive, or Developmental States? Some Evidence from Late 
Colonial South-East Asia”, Economic History Review, Vol.60, No.2, 2007(2), p.256. 
427 Pierre van der Eng, Agricultural Growth in Indonesia: Productivity Change and Policy Impact since 
1880, (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), p.165. 
428 Goudal, op.cit., p.14. 
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regions and on the living standards of the peasant populations, which will be evaluated in 
Chapters 7 and 8 respectively.  
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Chapter 6: Industry 
 
6.1) Introduction 
Organised industrial production, as a distinct sector, was not a significant part of the 
Indochinese economy. Authors have argued that the political movement for the 
development of modern industrial activity in Indochina did not start until the time of 
Jules Brévié who was Governor General of Indochina in 1936-1939.429 According to 
Robequain, by the late 1930s, a maximum of 120 000 people were engaged in modern 
industrial employment.430 Considering that in 1929 Vietnam's population was over 14 
million, the industrial labour force was very small indeed, accounting for just under 
1%.431 Despite this small sector, this was larger than in other neighbouring economies: 
Mitchell recorded that in the Dutch East Indies there were also 120 000 workers engaged 
in modern industrial work in 1936,432 but this only accounted for less than 0.2% of the 
country's population.433 Hlaing likewise recorded a smaller modern manufacturing sector 
in Burma,434 although in Korea, 3.8% of the population were already engaged in the 
industrial sector by 1938.435 Both handicraft production and mining pre-dated the rise of 
modern industrial development. In this chapter, we continue to evaluate how the 
economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina manifested itself in the industrial 
sector.  
In the previous chapter, it seemed clear that conditions favoured Cochinchina's 
agrarian sector. In this chapter, we find that industrial growth was more significant in 
Tonkin than it was in Cochinchina. In some ways, one might wonder why, if this was so, 
Cochinchina's GDP appears to have been so much higher in absolute terms than Tonkin's 
                                                
429 Andrew Hardy, “The Economics of French Rule in Indochina: A Biography of Paul Bernard (1892-
1960)”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol.32, No.4, October 1998, p.807-848 & Jack Shepherd, Industry in 
Southeast Asia. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p.29. 
430 Charles Robequain, L’évolution économique de l’Indochine française, (Paris: Typographie Firmin-Didot, 
1939), p.303. 
431 Maks Banens, “Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century Population History” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, 
Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-
1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000). 
432 Kate L. Mitchell, Industrialization of the Western Pacific, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1942 (2)), p.214. 
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Southern Asia, 12th Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, Kyoto, Japan, September-October 1954, p.17. 
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more stable GDP. In this chapter, we provide a two-part explanation to this: the 
industrial sector remained small during the period 1900-1940, but its growth in 
Tonkin acted as a restraint for labour movements from North to South; 
consequently the gap in per capita output in the agrarian sector remained 
significant throughout this period. In addition, the production patterns identified in 
the agrarian sector were replicated in the industrial sector. We will evaluate these 
arguments through an analysis of the traditional handicraft sector, the mining sector and 
the more modern industrial sector.  
 
6.2) Handicraft industries 
The rise of traditional industry producing various handicraft goods has been a common 
feature of most agrarian economies. This type of activity is generally associated with 
population growth, as well as the need for goods that require some processing, such as 
clothing, baskets, etc. In this particular sector, prior research has suggested that Tonkin 
was more active than the rest of Indochina.436 Indeed, Jack Shepherd, one of the few 
scholars of Southeast Asian industrialisation during colonial rule, estimated that “the 
proportion of persons dependent primarily on the traditional industries for living in 
Tonkin was about 7%, and probably 4% in the rest of Indochina”.437 Since previous data 
suggested only 1% of Vietnam's population was engaged in the modern manufacturing 
sector, traditional industry seems to have been a more significant activity. Moreover, 
these data suggest the sector was larger than that of the Dutch Indies, where Mitchell 
suggested only 2.5% of the population was engaged in handicraft production.438 In 
addition, many more peasants would have used employment in the sector as an addition 
to agrarian employment: Virginia Thompson argued that while 200 000 peasants 
"devoted the greater part of their time" to these traditional industries, at least “800 000 
engaged in such activities for at least a few weeks of every year”.439 Furthermore, 
Mitchell argued that Indochina's handicraft industries persisted more than those of other 
Southeast Asian colonies.440  
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439 Virginia Thompson, Labor Problems in Southeast Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.178. 
440 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.153. 
 
 
172 
In Chapter 3, we suggested that population pressures in Tonkin's agricultural sector 
resulted neither in en masse migration nor in urbanisation. We suggested that peasants, 
instead of migrating, might have taken an alternative option: engaging in manufacturing. 
According to Gourou’s research on Tonkin, before the French colonised Vietnam, rural 
manufacturing was an integral part of village life. Very often there was “specialisation by 
village” and such specialisation was maintained across generations.441 These villages 
remained rural because handicraft employment could be a seasonal activity. Peasants' 
ability to work in this handicraft sector would have helped alleviate perceived population 
pressures and this may explain the lack of integration between the two regions' labour 
markets. 
Table 6.1: Rural Handicraft Industries, 1939 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Type of 
Handicraft 
Number of 
Artisans 
Number of 
Licensed 
Artisans 
Number of 
Artisans 
Number of 
Licensed 
Artisans 
Fibre work* 15 521 66 357 59 
Woodwork 1 426 244 4 347 1 146 
Textile 56 850 77 303 137 
Embroidery 2 315 116 81 42 
Lace 2 833 2 0 0 
Tannery 1 057 225 277 129 
Metallurgy 1 143 414 1 554 1 075 
Jewellery 471 171 843 465 
Pottery 522 100 145 20 
Paper 2 771 101 97 58 
Nacre 232 15 0 0 
Food 1 004 186 193 134 
Diverse 9 525 1 156 10 837 3 583 
Total 95 670 2 873 19 034 6 848 
* fibre work can be done with rattan, rushes, etc. and include baskets, rugs, and various artefacts. 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1939, Hanoi: 1940, p.14. 
                                                
441 Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), 
p.397. 
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Gourou argued that the development of rural manufacturing was a significant 
component of the Tonkinese economy, even before the French took control of the country: 
“there is no doubt that the Tonkin delta is the most active centre of artisan industries in 
Indochina”.442 These artisan industries ranged from textile production (such as silk) to 
food processing (including alcohol and sweets) and wood industries, paper industries, 
metallurgy, etc. As Table 6.1 shows, by the end of the time period 1900-1940, five times 
as many people were involved in rural handicraft industries in Tonkin than in 
Cochinchina. Unfortunately data has not been found for these same activities before 1939. 
Although it is consequently not possible to evaluate the changes in the scale of that 
industry, Gourou's and Mitchell's work suggest the relationship we see in Table 6.1 was 
consistent in this time period. 
Gourou suggested that all these industries were not for the purposes of creating 
market demand or exporting goods so much as to supply the domestic demand for these 
goods. Often the industries were localised in particular villages: a “monopoly of one 
village in one craft”.443 The situation was different in Cochinchina where handicraft 
production was minimal, even for the purpose of satisfying domestic needs. One official 
Annuaire Général Administratif presented the argument that in 1910 “local industry [wa]s 
not important [in Cochinchina]”.444 Table 6.1 shows that even at the end of the period it 
remained an unimportant activity, relative to Tonkin's. This diverging pattern is 
reminiscent of the differing production patterns of the agrarian sector. Tonkin’s industrial 
production was more diversified, whereas Cochinchina did not engage in such a domestic 
industrial effort. Presumably, agrarian specialisation was considered more important than 
even minimal industrialisation and peasants may have obtained these 'industrial' goods 
through international trade rather than domestic production. 
Table 6.1's overview of the number of licensed professionals provides further 
evidence to make sense of the organisation of the handicraft sector. Traditional industries 
were more numerous in Tonkin, but proportionately far more of Cochinchina’s artisans 
were licensed professionals. The difference between licensed and unlicensed artisan is 
                                                
442 ibid, p.395. 
443 ibid, p.397; this specialisation is still present in today’s Tonkin: villages surrounding Hanoi form a 
network where each village specialised either in pottery, lacquer, textiles, weaving, etc. 
444 ANOM: BIB AOM A/39 Annuaire Général Administratif, Commercial et Industriel de l’Indochine, 
Tome 1, Partie Commercialle et Industrielle, l’Année 1910, p.34. 
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based on whether or not the artisan had to pay the government's license fees. If they did 
not, it was generally due to the temporary nature of their work (using it to complementary 
source income to agricultural work). In Chapter 4, we saw that much of Cochinchina’s 
local budget revenue came from license fees. According to Table 6.1's information, it is 
very possible that the small share of license fee revenue in Tonkin was the result of many 
of these professionals being only temporarily employed in this sector, using it to reduce 
the population pressure on the agrarian sector.  
The greater significance of licensed professionals in Cochinchina seems to 
suggest that the development of these industries differed between the two regions. The 
traditional sector in Tonkin remained based on historical village networks and temporary 
occupation in the slack season or by underemployed household members, whereas in 
Cochinchina it became a trade, a specific occupation, dependent on market demand. 
Mitchell argued that the strength of the traditional industries in Indochina was based on 
the fact that the “economic development that might have raised the purchasing power of 
the native population” did not happen.445 Rural manufacturing in Tonkin was a side-
occupation necessary because population pressures meant that income earned from 
working on the field was insufficient to guarantee adequate purchasing power. The 
greater presence of licensed professionals in Cochinchina suggests that the role of rural 
manufacturing there was not the same: fewer peasants engaged in it but when they did, 
they specialised in their trade. 
Detailed evidence on rural manufacturing activity is limited, but the case of 
sericulture can be somewhat analysed. According to Table 6.1, half of those involved in 
Tonkin’s rural industries were engaged in textile production, such as sericulture, so that 
this industry can act as an illustration of this sector. Table 6.2 gives a brief indication of 
the scale of the silk industry, an industry in which production required many value-
adding processes before obtaining the final product of silk fabric, or even simply of silk 
thread. The government controlled part of the silk industry in French Indochina and 
records exist of the distribution of silkworm eggs. These data cannot account for 
sericulture using non-controlled silk worms, but this table shows the way in which the 
colonial administration tried to influence trends in a traditional industrial activity. 
Sponsored sericulture was a much more prevalent activity in Tonkin than it was in 
                                                
445 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.153. 
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Cochinchina, hinting at the prior establishment of sericulture through non-sponsored 
means. The rate of growth in the government-sponsored part of this industry was 
predictably much higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, but Cochinchina remained a 
small player. 
Table 6.2: Silkworm Egg Distribution in Tonkin and Cochinchina, 1921-
1936, (1000s) 
 Tonkin Cochinchina 
1921 5 023 245 
1922 5 365 425 
1923 6 429 496 
1924 2 814 644 
1925 5 468 1 170 
1926 4 046 1 335 
1927 6 046 1 367 
1928 5 944 1 221 
1929 6 753 1 942 
1930 9 657 1 834 
1931 5 250 1 970 
1932 4 746 1 829 
1933 3 134 1 878 
1934 4 365 1 756 
1935 5 125 1 932 
1936 4 498 1 448 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de 
l’Indochine, “Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1922-1939. 
In 1921, it is evident that the distribution of eggs was for a small-scale attempt at 
sericulture in Cochinchina. This suggests that sericulture in Cochinchina, unlike in 
Tonkin, was probably not a traditional activity. By 1936, although the number of eggs 
distributed had increased six fold, it remained low especially relative to what was 
distributed in Tonkin. It seems that although there was some interest in this industry, it 
reflected Cochinchina's more limited engagement in rural manufacturing activities. 
Growth in government-sponsored distribution of eggs in Cochinchina may also fit with 
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the larger number of licensed professionals: more would have been eligible for the 
scheme. The stability of supply in Tonkin, where sericulture had been established for 
longer, could reflect stability in demand or a failed attempt by the government to replace 
an existing sector. We are tempted to reject the second hypothesis because the 
distribution would have decreased more significantly if local producers had decided to 
discontinue their use of government-sponsored eggs. This reinforces Chapter 4's 
argument that colonial policy presumably had a limited impact on the economic 
performance of the two regions, as policy generally followed/responded to pre-existing 
patterns. 
Henry provided some further information on silk production. He noted that in 1930, 
the area occupied by mulberry trees in Tonkin covered 150 km2 and average annual total 
output from sericulture yielded about 115 000 kilograms of silk thread. In Cochinchina 
there was only 4.5 km2 of mulberry trees in 1920. By 1930, this had grown to 12 km2 and 
the annual output was 12 000 kilograms of silk thread,446 but this remained much less than 
was produced in Tonkin. Considering that silk thread was a high value good and that 
prices were rising through the 1920s,447 Tonkin's sericulture production could have been a 
significant industry, both for the domestic and the international markets. Despite the 
growth in the industry and rising foreign demand, Tonkin’s most likely markets for the 
product of sericulture were either the domestic market, or the Chinese market. In 1931, 
only 8 000 kilograms of threads were exported from Tonkin-Annam and this included 
exports of threads other than silk.448 Considering the output of Tonkin's industry alone, 
only a very small fraction was exported. Once more, Tonkin's diversified production was 
generally oriented towards satisfying domestic demand.  
According to Sugihara, a large rural manufacturing sector suggests “labour 
absorption at the peasant household level” and is in line with an industrious path of 
development in Tonkin.449 According to Nørlund, however, it can also suggest a more 
                                                
446 Yves Henry, Economie agricole de l’Indochine, (Hanoi: Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine, Publié à 
l’occasion de l’Exposition Coloniale Internationale de Paris, 1932) p.397-399. 
447 Federico Giovanni, An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 1830-1930, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Universtity Press, 1997), p.32. 
448 Appendix 6. 
449 Kaoru Sugihara, “Labour-Intensive Industrialisation in Global History”, Kyoto Working Papers on Area 
Studies, No. 1, 2007, p.6. 
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“autarkic colonial system”.450 It is possible that the handicraft production in Tonkin 
allowed full labour absorption and further encouraged diversification for self-sustenance. 
Unlike Mitchell who argued that Tonkin's handicraft sector had resisted the colonial era, 
Chesneaux argued that handicraft production declined during the colonial era “because of 
the gradual impoverishment of the peasantry” and the decreased importance of trade with 
China, due to high customs taxes.451  If such a decline happened, then the figures in Table 
6.1 represent a smaller gap than may have existed in the 1910s. However, because the 
gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina remained significant, it is clear that production 
pattern divergence persisted, at least until 1939.  
 
6.3) Modern industries 
The ASI did not record any data for modern industrial production until 1931, apart from 
the activities of the mining sector and the production of cement and salt. Although it is 
clear from these official records that industrial activity was not considered significant 
until the 1930s, other records show that many of the industries were set up in the 
immediate aftermath of WW1. Other industries were developed even earlier. The 
government did not openly encourage these ventures, but the need to develop some self-
sufficiency in case of conflict meant their development was not prohibited.452 Records 
show that as early as 1907, there were “85 enterprises in Tonkin, representing an 
investment of 41.7 million francs”. 453These industries were mainly 'transformation 
industries', transforming agricultural products into processed agricultural goods. 
Modern industries were set up around the main urban centres, mainly Saigon-
Cholon and Hanoi-Haiphong. 454 According to contemporary French authors, the most 
important industrial ventures of the time were concentrated in agro-industries, 
                                                
450 Irene Nørlund, “The French Empire, the Colonial State in Vietnam and Economic Policy: 1885-1940”, 
Australian Economic History Review, Vol.31, No.1, March 1991, p.72. 
451 Jean Chesneaux, “L’implantation géographique des intérêts coloniaux au Vietnam et ses rapports avec 
l’économie traditionnelle” in Jean Chesneaux, Georges Boudarel & Daniel Hémery’s Tradition et 
révolution au Vietnam, (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1971), p.83-84. 
452 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.199. 
453 Pierre Brocheux & Daniel Hémery, Indochine: La colonisation ambiguë 1858-1954, (Paris: Editions La 
Découverte, 2001), p.124. 
454 Robequain, op.cit., p.169. 
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particularly the processing of foodstuffs in rice and saw mills.455 Since Indochina was a 
predominantly agrarian economy, the potential for industry rested mainly on adding value 
to these agricultural goods, for example through distilleries.456 Both regions were engaged 
in roughly similar modern industrial activities: distilleries, textile, glass, paper and 
matches factories, as well as shipbuilding workshops. Non-official research shows that 
the development of modern industrial ventures was generally more important in Tonkin 
than in Cochinchina. While Indochinese industrialisation in this time period may have 
been minor compared to that of Western economies or Japan,457 it was much more 
substantial than in neighbouring Southeast Asian economies, as highlighted in this 
chapter's introduction.458  
 
a. Mining sector 
Most colonial industrial endeavours in these other economies were oriented towards the 
domestic market and were dependent on the resources available.459 For example, because 
tin was one of Malaya's most significant exportable products, tin smelting was the main 
industrial undertaking of the Malay economy by the late 1920s.460 Mitchell commented 
that there was “virtually no modern industries other than the extractive and processing 
enterprises required to exploit the country’s resources and prepare them for marketing”.461 
Such industrial development is exemplified in Indochina's mining industry.462 Although 
mines had been exploited prior to the colonial period, Goudal, Mitchell and Shepherd all 
argued that scientific mining operations only dated back to French involvement in the 
sector.463 There is no doubt that the booming mining industry was a significant trade-
oriented sector. By 1939, Indochina was the 10th largest exporter of coal in the world; it 
exported over two thirds of its coal output and its entire production of metallic 
                                                
455 Jean Chesneaux, Contribution à l’histoire de la nation Vietnamienne, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955(2)), 
p.172. 
456 ANOM: BIB AOM A/39, op.cit. 
457 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.160-161. 
458 ibid, p.173. 
459 ibid, p.173. 
460 ibid, p.182-185. 
461 ibid, p.191. 
462 Chesneaux 1955(2), op.cit., p.171. 
463 Jean Goudal, Labour Conditions in Indo-China, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1938), p.108; 
Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.154 & Shepherd, op.cit., p.14. 
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minerals.464 In fact, in 1928, most of total mining output was exported.465 Chesneaux 
argued that the mining sector's focus on exports was detrimental to Indochina as a whole: 
although coal was extracted from Northern mining concessions, trains in Cochinchina 
had to rely on wood since the coal was exported to European and other Asian nations 
first.466 
Table 6.3: Mining Concessions in Indochina, 1925 
Type of Mine Number of Concessions Area (km
2) 
Coal 88 1321 
Zinc & Lead 92 533 
Lead & Silver 14 90 
Tin & Tungsten 32 95 
Tin 14 65 
Gold 28 177 
Copper 11 75 
Iron 14 84 
Antimony 4 18 
Mercury 4 28 
Phosphates 9 40 
Graphite 1 1 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine Année 1926, Hanoi: 1927, p.652. 
Table 6.3 illustrates the number and scale of Indochinese mineral concessions in 
1925. Out of 1 863 permits for mining concessions given out in 1925, 1 478 were for 
areas in Tonkin.467 These data show that there were a great many types of minerals 
available in Tonkinese soil, as seen in Map 3a. The majority of the mines were 
concessions from the colonial government to European, mainly French, companies 
around the mid 1920s.  For example, 60% of coal production in Indochina was controlled 
                                                
464 E. Willard Miller, “Mineral Resources of Indochina”, Economic Geography, Vol.22, No.4, October 
1946, p.278. 
465 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1929, (Hanoi: 1930), p.828. 
466 Chesneaux 1955(2) op.cit., p.179. 
467 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine, Année 1926, (Hanoi: 1927), p.651. 
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by the Société Française des Charbonnages du Tonkin in 1929.468 The mines of Tonkin 
were generally located in the mountainous areas of the province. The French's extensive 
building of railroads (documented in Chapter 4) in Tonkin in part facilitated the 
movement of goods out of the mines. These mines were then developed and production 
increased rapidly. Table 6.4 shows this growth for the three main mined resources.  
Table 6.4: Value of the 3 Main Mined Resources, 1913-1933, (1000$) 
 
Combustible* Zinc & Lead Tin & Tungsten 
1913 2 400 1 321 134 
1914 3 120 1 300 310 
1915 3 250 2 500 600 
1916 3 190 4 400 600 
1917 3 220 2 700 890 
1918 3 470 1 300 700 
1919 3 590 730 240 
1920 3 900 210 290 
1921 6 580 290 370 
1922 6 906 670 550 
1923 7 571 1 239 659 
1924 8 705 1 668 894 
1925 9 823 2 520 1 206 
1926 9 478 3 718 1 435 
1927 11 410 2 924 1 804 
1928 14 202 2 082 1 843 
1929 14 371 1 790 1 950 
1930 13 900 575 1 673 
1931 11 650 162 1 067 
1932 10 400 225 1 135 
1933 8 214 172 1 624 
* combustible material was mostly coal. 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Industrie”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine,  Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 
1927 -1939. 
                                                
468 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine, Année 1929, (Hanoi: 1930), p.830. 
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the evolution of the annual output of mined combustible 
material, the majority of which was coal. Coal was the main mineral resource, accounting 
for three quarters of the total mining output in Indochina.469 These values are for all mines 
in Indochina, but the vast majority of these mines were located in Tonkin. In fact, on 
average, between 1913 and 1922, only 1.2% of mined combustible materials came from 
sources outside of Tonkin.470 
 
Figure 6.1 
Coal production in Indochina grew at an average annual growth rate of just over 
7%. This average growth is also seen in the value of this output. From Table 6.4, the 
value of combustible minerals grew at an average annual growth rate of just over 7.5%. 
However, in particular in the years after 1930, value decreased more than output, 
showing that prices were falling faster than production. Figure 6.1 shows it took almost 6 
years to recover from the decline in coal output of 1930. Touzet argued that the 
                                                
469 Miller, op.cit., p.270. 
470 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine 1913-1922, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927). 
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Depression set the mining sector back by ten years.471 Not only were prices falling (value 
was falling faster than output), but demand from Japan, which had previously been a 
significant importer, also decreased. Nonetheless, Figure 6.1 shows a recovery in coal, 
and Figure 6.4 shows that value of mined tin and tungsten was steadily increasing despite 
the Depression: the value of production of tin and tungsten grew at an annual average 
growth rate of 21%. Although data are not available for the output of these minerals, we 
assume the faster growth in the value of the production was due to increasing production 
rather than rising prices. Initial production of these minerals was very low and tin mines 
were subsequently discovered in Laos, although Indochina was a small player, especially 
compared to Malaya.472  From these data, it is clear that the mining sector was significant 
and growing during the colonial era. It is also clear that this sector was almost uniquely 
Tonkinese: “Tonkin’s mineral production [was] about 82.6% of Indochina's”.473  
The growth of this sector throughout this time period, and its recovery after 1934, 
are clearly shown in the evolution of the number of staff employed in the industry, as 
seen in Table 6.5. We argue that the growth in this industrial sector, both in output and 
employment, may have reduced the pressure of high population densities in Tonkin, by 
providing alternative work to the underemployed peasant population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
471 André Touzet, L'économie Indochinoise et la grande crise universelle, (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1934), p.68. 
472 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.154 & Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.74. 
473 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1938, (Hanoi: 1939), p.1251. 
 
 
183 
Table 6.5: European and Indigenous Workers in the Mining Sector, 1924-1937 
 
European Staff Indigenous Staff 
1924 314 28 340 
1925 335 36 000 
1926 341 34 000 
1927 375 40 670 
1928 437 54 955 
1930 370 45 700 
1931 350 36 000 
1932 250 33 500 
1933 220 35 400 
1934 200 34 800 
1935 201 39 000 
1936 212 43 850 
1937 271 49 200 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine: Année 1929, p.907 & Année 1938, p.1292. 
The use of the mining sector as a complement to farming was acknowledged by 
colonial researchers474 and Giacometti noted that almost “75% of the workforce [in the 
Tonkinese mines] were half time workers, and one third at least of the workers had strong 
links with the rural world of their original village”.475  In other words, population 
pressures could be alleviated by the ability to engage in temporary work. Although, 
admittedly, the mining sector was rather small, employing only 1% of the active labour 
force, its fast growth provided an outlet for mounting population pressure in an economy 
that maintained strong ties to its agrarian sector. This seems to have been the case in other 
neighbouring economies. The Dutch Indies' policies with regards to mining were similar 
to those in Indochina, insofar as mining rights only existed when granted via a specific 
concession,476 but the dualism of the Dutch system meant that this policy did not apply to 
                                                
474 Goudal, op.cit., p.112. 
475 Jean-Dominique Giacometti, “Wages and Consumer Price for Urban and Industrial Workers in Vietnam 
under French Rule (1910-1954)” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka 
(eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 
2000), p.186. 
476 Alex L. Ter Braake, “Mining in the Netherlands East Indies”, Bulletin 4 of the Netherlands and 
Netherlands Indies Council, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), p.22. 
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the native population, which could carry out mining on their land, as long as it remained 
small scale.477 Therefore in the Dutch Indies too, mining activity could be used to 
supplement income from the agrarian sector.  
The significance of the mining sector is also shown in the limited data available on 
investment. As we can see from Table 6.6, investment in the mines was very substantial 
in Tonkin but almost non-existent in Cochinchina, as might be expected considering the 
evidence showing it was almost uniquely a Tonkinese sector.  
Table 6.6: Investment in the Mining Sector, 1924-1928, (1000$) 
 
Investment from Domestic Sources  
 
Mineral Products Processing Mines 
 
Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1924 10 36 
 
33 
1925 350 
  
74 
1926 70 264 
 
750 
1927 120 26 
 
6 
1928 1 040 
 
18 436 
 Investment from International Sources 
 Mineral Products Processing Mines 
 Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1924  149  2 576 
1925 1 419   919 
1926  588  2 293 
1927  117  2 734 
1928 78 141  40 481 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1929, Hanoi: 1930, p.808. 
The sector was dominated by a few very large French firms, mainly the Société 
Française des Charbonnages du Tonkin, which employed almost 26 000 workers and the 
Société des Charbonnages du Dong-Trieu, which employed almost 11 500 workers by the 
end of 1938.478 Both of these companies were Tonkinese and neither of them employed 
                                                
477 ibid, p.27. 
478 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1938, (Hanoi: 1939), p.1262-1264. 
 
 
185 
any workers in Cochinchina, since no such mineral resources were found there. It is 
therefore unsurprising that large sums from international investors went to Tonkin.  
Surprisingly, perhaps, there was a significant share of investment going to 
Cochinchina for the processing of mineral products. This implies that despite resources 
being mined in Tonkin, mining resources were imported to Cochinchina (either from 
Tonkin or abroad) for further processing. The data suggest that Cochinchina's industrial 
sector may have been active in other types of modern manufacturing, using mining inputs 
from Tonkin or other sources.479 In fact, according to Appendix 6, between 1930 and 
1933, Cochinchina exported almost the same value of metallurgic goods as Tonkin, 
supporting the presence of a processing industry in the region. It is not possible to know 
whether or not these data fail to include information on existing processing ventures in 
Tonkin, but it seems there were significant flows to such processing ventures there too, 
especially from international sources. Tonkin's mining sector might have helped alleviate 
the pressure of high population densities, but its growth could not close the economic gap 
with Cochinchina. Firstly, it remained a small sector and secondly, Cochinchina's 
potential industry to add value to imported mining products would have at least partly 
counteracted Tonkin's growing industrial sector's ability to close the economic gap. 
 
b. Other modern industries 
In other modern industries, Tonkin was still a more significant player than Cochinchina, 
although again the sector's performance and size was insufficient to close the economic 
divide between the two regions. Rice mills, saw mills, match factories and distilleries 
were key industrial ventures,480 and these were also significant in Cochinchina. This type 
of industrial activity was common to other Southeast Asian economies. In Burma, until 
1930, 90% of “industrial establishments” were rice mills, accounting for almost 70% of 
industrial employment.481 Hlaing argued that the development of these industries was a 
natural consequence of the country's dependence on rice production. Table 6.7 shows 
investments in these types of modern industrial ventures in Indochina, from both 
domestic and international sources for the period 1924-1928. 
                                                
479 Appendix 7 shows that Cochinchina imported far more combustibles and metals than Tonkin. 
480 Colonel Albert Alfred Leon Duboc, L’Indochine contemporaine, (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie, 
1932), p.54. 
481 Hlaing, op.cit., p.106. 
 
 
186 
Compared to investment in mining seen in Table 6.6, most of these industrial 
activities seem to have received rather small sums of investment, explaining why these 
data were presented in categories that encompassed so many varied activities. In food and 
processing of oleaginous substances, Cochinchina seems to have had the upper hand, as 
one would expect, since it produced most of the rice and rubber of Indochina. However, 
in processing of animal products and in production of water and electricity, investment 
was more equal between the two regions.  
Table 6.7: Investment in Modern Industries, 1924-1928, (1000$) 
 
Investment from Domestic Sources 
Food Industries 
Processing of 
Oleaginous 
Substances, 
Textile & Other 
Processing of 
Products from 
Animal Origin 
Water and 
Electricity 
 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
1924 930 
       
1925 206 
    
256 250 
 
1926 170 
 
950 
 
255 250 
  
1927 
  
90 
 
200 
   
1928 
  
25 1 450 
    
 
Investment from International Sources 
Food Industries 
Processing of 
Oleaginous 
Substances, 
Textile & Other 
Processing of 
Products from 
Animal Origin 
Water and 
Electricity 
 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
1924 1 685 2 279 595 99 
  
496 743 
1925 0 
 
501 
   
418 309 
1926 764 
   
47 
 
59 412 
1927 219 
 
1 172 
 
62 
   
1928 
    
31 
   
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1929, Hanoi: 1930, p.808. 
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The short time period of these data do not allow us to capture the evolution of the 
industrial sector. Instead, we will look at specific industries in more detail to get a better 
picture. We will show that the patterns of production highlighted in the agrarian sector 
and handicraft production continued in the modern industrial sector. Industrial activity in 
Cochinchina was in fact an extension of its specialisation in rice production. In Tonkin, 
industry produced a number of goods that seem to have been mainly oriented towards 
satisfying the needs of the domestic market, suggesting an extension of its diversification 
production pattern. This phenomenon reinforces our hypothesis that industrial 
developments helped reduce the perceived population pressures in Tonkin.  
 
Processing industries 
Cochinchina's large surplus of rice made Indochina the third largest exporter of rice 
during this period, as we saw in Chapter 5. As with Burma, this large production of rice 
resulted in a large supply of rice mills. Significant growth in the number of mills in this 
region's industry occurred between 1900 and 1930, mainly to do with the expansion of 
Chinese-owned mills.482 In Tonkin, small-scale mills were on operation in Haiphong, 
Hanoi, Dam-Dinh and Hai-Duong, but there were fewer mills than in Cochinchina and 
they were smaller.483 Dumont argued that the Tonkinese peasants generally processed rice 
for self-consumption themselves, unlike in Cochinchina, where milling was part of the 
process required for the export of rice.484 This aligns with the landholding patterns and 
labour use previously discussed: the majority of Cochinchinese peasants were day 
labourers. They did not need to (or were not allowed to) process their own rice; they 
obtained it as part of their wage or were made to purchase it from their employers. In 
Tonkin the greater prevalence of tenant farmers or owners would have reduced this 
tendency and increased self-milling. Consequently, the large-scale rice mill industry was 
stronger and more widespread in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. 
Because Cochinchina was engaged in such extensive specialisation of rice 
production and the processing industry was linked to its tradable surplus output, rice 
milling was affected by the Depression. Touzet argued that mills reduced the quantities of 
                                                
482 George Maspero, Un empire colonial français l’Indochine, Tome II Indochine française – l’Indochine 
économique l’Indochine pittoresque, (Paris: Les Editions G. Van Oest, 1930), p.194-195. 
483 R. Dumont, La culture du riz dans le detla du Tonkin, (Paris: Société d’éditions géographiques, 
maritimes et coloniales, 1935), p.383. 
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rice the mills processed because of the economic turmoil.485 He also argued that the 
industries least affected by the crisis were the ones producing for self-consumption or 
domestic consumption.486 This would have favoured Tonkin's milling activity. However, 
Table 6.8 shows that the recovery of this sector in Cochinchina may have been swift. 
Cholon was Cochinchina's main rice processing area. The Chinese owned and operated a 
large part of the rice market and most mills were located in Cholon. Cholon's rice mills' 
operations increased rapidly between 1931 and 1936. This suggests a fast recovery in the 
rice-milling industry and shows the link between production and processing of rice for 
trade. 
Table 6.8: Rice Mills, Monthly Average of Working Mills & of Working 
Days in Cholon, 1931-1936 
 
Monthly Average of Number of 
Rice Mills Monthly Average of Days in Use 
1931 22 383 
1932 21 411 
1933 23 434 
1934 25 548 
1935 26 517 
1936 27 534 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de 
l’Indochine, “Industrie”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-
Orient, 1922-1939. 
This link between specialisation and processing can also be seen in the production 
of rice alcohol in Indochina, which was the output of another processing industry. The 
alcohol industry had historically been important in Indochina, hence Doumer's 
establishment of the alcohol excise board to maximise public revenue. For example, in 
1912, there were already 3 alcohol distilleries in Hanoi, Nam-Dinh and Ha-Duong, which 
together employed almost 500 workers and were funded by investment of nearly 8 
million francs. 487  Unfortunately, information on the number of these distilleries in 
Cochinchina has not been found. Nonetheless, Table 6.9 provides some information on 
the activity of distilleries, in both Tonkin and Cochinchina in the 1930s. The authorities 
                                                
485 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.84. 
486 ibid, p.84-85. 
487 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1913, (Hanoi: 1914), p.119. 
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do not appear to have recorded that information for previous years and we cannot 
evaluate the evolution of this industry. Some authors have suggested that the main 
distilleries of French capital were located in Tonkin,488 but we must remember that this 
may have been due to the differing organisation of the rice alcohol excise board, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Indeed, in Tonkin the excise boards had granted a monopoly of 
production to French firms, whereas in Cochinchina, rice alcohol was mainly under the 
dominion of the Chinese, who had historically been the main players in the processing of 
rice. It is unlikely that Cochinchina would have had a less significant alcohol industry, 
considering Table 6.9, which shows that both Tonkin and Cochinchina's alcohol industry 
used a relatively similar quantity of rice in the mid-1930s. 
Table 6.9: Annual Average Amount of Primary Products 
Used in Distilleries, 1934-1936, (Tonnes) 
 
Rice and Derived Molasses Sugar 
Tonkin Cochinchina Cochinchina 
1934 -
1936 25 266 29 056 6 465 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des 
Affaires Economiques, “Agriculture, Elevage et Forêts”, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1937. 
This suggests that the industrial output from these distilleries would have been 
similar in the two regions. In addition to rice, Cochinchina used molasses sugar for rum 
production. It is unlikely that the authorities failed to record the use of such products in 
the Tonkinese distilleries. Certainly, the amounts used were still relatively small, but their 
presence is of interest. Firstly, it demonstrates that Cochinchina’s distilleries had flexible 
production possibilities. More than just rice alcohol was produced in the Cochinchinese 
distilleries. Secondly, it suggests that on the whole, the distillery industry in Cochinchina 
might have been more significant than it was in Tonkin. The distilleries could thus 
service a greater market. If we adjust this for the difference in the populations of the two 
regions, we can see that distilleries in Cochinchina used more than twice the raw material 
per capita than Tonkin’s. It seems that rice-processing industries were more significant in 
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Cochinchina than in Tonkin. This is not surprising: it was a result of Cochinchina's 
specialisation in rice cultivation.  
Other examples of processing industries were the salt and sugar industries and an 
analysis of these industries add nuance to our previous conclusions. The salt industry was 
significant in both regions, even before the French conquest: salt was traditionally needed 
for dietary reasons. For example, it is a key ingredient in the production of nuoc nam 
(Vietnamese fish sauce) crucial to the Indochinese diet. Figure 6.2 shows the evolution of 
this industry in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
 
Figure 6.2 
As we can see, this industry's output was very variable, but there is no clear 
dominance of one region over the other, nor do the regions seem to have different trade 
orientation for the output of this industry. Between 1930-1933, Cochinchina exported no 
salt.489 Tonkin-Annam exported salt, but since Annam produced more than half the total 
salt output of Indochina, most of the exported salt was likely to have originated there.490 
We argue that it is likely that salt output was mainly aimed at both regions' domestic 
                                                
489 Appendix 6. 
490 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques,"Industrie", 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine Vol.2, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1931), p.163. 
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markets. In other words, Cochinchina's processing industries were stronger than Tonkin's 
when they were associated with its specialisation in rice.  
The sugar industry, contrary to the salt industry, was only started in the interwar era. 
In 1930, there were three sugar-refining plants in Saigon, the largest of which employed 
about 700 employees.491 It was a rather small source of employment and output was low, 
especially compared to the Dutch East Indies' large output of sugar. This industry was 
predominantly located in Cochinchina, although a small amount of sugar was produced in 
Southern Annam. The industry did grow rather fast: starting with production of just over 
3 000 tonnes of sugar in 1930 and growing to nearly 9 000 tonnes in 1936,492 an average 
annual growth rate of almost 20%. We suggest that this industry was an not-so succesfull 
attempt by the government to expand Cochinchina's exportable basket of goods. 
Table 6.10: Exported Quantity of Raw and Refined Sugar, 1931-1937, (Tonnes) 
 Raw Refined 
1931 19 3 
1932 1 5 
1933 5 13 
1934 3 203 
1935 795 7 
1936 1 682 32 
1937 4 821 4 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1930-1938. 
Although an increasingly large share of output was exported, this industry was 
almost uniquely oriented towards the domestic market, as Table 6.10 shows: in 1936 9 
000 tonnes of sugar were produced but only 1 682 were exported. It also seems clear that 
this industry's output was either severely affected by the Depression, or was rather small 
until 1934. 1934's tentative at exporting refined sugar was apparently unsuccessful and 
exports of raw sugar remained much more significant until the end of the time period. 
Cochinchina's sugar industry might have been an attempt at finding a new exportable 
good, but it is not an example that lends credence to Cochinchina's industrial strength. In 
                                                
491 Shepherd, op.cit., p.19-20. 
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general, it seems that processing industries in Cochinchina, with the exception of salt, 
were generally aligned with its production pattern of specialisation. In Tonkin, 
households did their own processing or when processing industries on a larger scale 
existed, like salt, output was aimed at the domestic market. In both cases, this aligns itself 
with Tonkinese patterns of reaching for self-sufficiency in production. 
 
Cement 
The construction industry and the production of associated construction materials was 
also important in Indochina, even before the need for some degree of self-sufficiency in 
the aftermath of WW1 and the Depression was felt. For example, as early as 1913, six 
workshops produced construction materials and these employed 900 workers.493 This 
small-scale industry soon experienced substantial growth. As an indicator of this growing 
sector, we use the cement industry, which was one of the most important construction 
industries in Indochina. Cement was “largely monopolized by the Société des Ciments 
Portland Artificiels de l'Indochine”.494 This industry is quite old: it was initially founded 
in 1899 in Tonkin.495 By 1938, the company employed 4 000 workers and supplied “the 
bulk of domestic requirements”, in addition to significant exports.496 The initial reason for 
such an industry was to meet the needs of the substantial public works undertaken, which 
required large numbers of products derived from cement.497 Figure 6.3 shows the growth 
of the cement output in Indochina in the period 1913-1936. 
                                                
493 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1913, (Hanoi: 1914), p.119. 
494 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.157. 
495 Shepherd, op.cit., p.21. 
496 Mitchell 1942(2), op.cit., p.157. 
497 Shepherd, op.cit., p.20 & Maspero Tome II, op.cit., p.193. 
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Figure 6.3 
This industry grew rather rapidly, although predictably a decrease was experienced 
in the aftermath of the Depression. Over the whole period, there was an average annual 
growth rate of 6%. Although this industry was not as significant a source of employment 
as the mining sector, in terms of weight, its growth record was quite high and on par with 
that of other colonies in Southeast Asia. In 1938, Thailand produced 92 000 tonnes of 
cement, while Taiwan produced 148 800 and the Philippines 167 000.498 Indochina, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.3, was thus one of the largest producer in the region. This industry 
was based in Tonkin: Portland cement was uniquely located in Haiphong.499 Touzet 
argued that most of the output of this industry was directed at the domestic market.500  
As we can see from Table 6.11, this seems to have been the case, at least during the 
period 1931-1936. If we relate this to data in Figure 6.3, we find that less than a third of 
total cement output was exported. This may have been a result of the Depression and 
subsequent decline in trade activity. However, Touzet believed that in fact, in the 
aftermath of the Depression exports increased (as seen in Table 6.11) and it was domestic 
production that decreased, suggesting that a low share of exported cement reflects the 
                                                
498 Members of the IPR International Secretariat, op.cit., p.22. 
499 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
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general trend of this industry.501 This industry's apparent orientation towards domestic 
production is in line with the pattern of production in Tonkin established in the agrarian 
sector and in its processing ventures: production was foremost for domestic needs. 
Table 6.11: Cement Trade Data, 1931-1936, (1000 tonnes) 
 Export Import 
1931 52.3  
1932 90.8 7.4 
1933 37.5 3.3 
1934 38.2 11.1 
1935 32.4 10. 
1936 59.2 11.6 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires 
Economiques, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie 
d’Extrème-Orient, 1930-1938. 
 
Textile 
Tonkin's tendency to produce for its domestic market and Cochinchina's relatively more 
modest industrial efforts are also clear when looking at the textile industry in colonial 
Indochina. Nørlund argued that the main industrial development in Indochina was that of 
the textile industry and she showed it was located in Tonkin.502 Section 6.2 argued that 
sericulture was a more significant traditional industry in Tonkin. We find that silk 
processing and cotton processing were also more significant in the modern industrial 
sector of Tonkin than in Cochinchina. According to scholars in this field, the production 
patterns in this industry show a tendency towards self-sufficiency of the domestic market, 
rather than an opening to the export market.503 In terms of employment figures, available 
data suggest that this sector seems to have been larger than the cement industry, but still 
smaller than the mining sector. For example, by 1938, the Société Cotonnière was 
employing about 10 000 workers, more than twice the number in the cement industry, but 
less than a fifth of staff employed in mines.504 Nonetheless, the industry was similar to the 
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mining sector, insofar as many of its employees worked only part time.505 Nørlund's 
substantial work on the development of the textile industry in Indochina during this 
period suggests that in the 1930s, the number of weavers in Indochina was probably 43 
000, based on the amount of yarn imported into the Indochinese economy.506 Certainly 
not all of these would have been employed in the modern industries, but it is likely this 
indicates that many primarily agrarian households engaged in handicraft textile 
production, again as a means to supplement income from farming. This industry was 
certainly substantial compared to that of Burma, where textiles factories only employed 
about 7 000 workers.507 It is thus no surprise that Nørlund considered this industry as very 
significant. 
The cotton mills in operation were very large, with some of the larger weaving 
industries having between 30 000 and 54 000 looms.508 These data are hard to justify 
considering the debate over the number of employees in the industry and considering that 
China had only three times those numbers in the same time period,509 despite a much 
larger industry producing nearly 3% of total world output of cotton piece goods in 
1935.510 Nørlund's work suggests that in 1918, there were 270 functioning looms,511 but 
that in 1930 there were as many as 21 000 looms and by 1940 this had grown to 65 
000.512 Notwithstanding the concerns over the size of the industry, all sources agree on the 
much larger presence of a textile industry in Tonkin than in the rest of Indochina. 
The growth of textile factories is surprising because the industry was in direct 
competition with French textiles exports to Indochina. Despite the French colonial 
policy's belief that the colonies should remain markets for French industrial goods, the 
administration did not actively limit the growth of this industry. Worried by the large 
imports of non-French yarn, in addition to domestically produced cloth competing with 
French products, the colonial administration facilitated the industry's growth by 
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establishing spinning factories in Tonkin.513 Although official records do not provide data 
on the evolution of the output of the textile industry, some information on textile exports 
is available for the years 1931-1937 and is shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12: Exports of the Textile Industry, 1931-1937, (Tonnes) 
 
Beige 
Cotton 
Fabric 
Cotton 
Lace 
Cotton 
Blankets 
Wool 
Rugs Lace 
Silk 
Fabric Embroidery Clothes 
1931 
 
9 17.5 8 7.5 21 7 5 
1932 
 
14 5 6 3.7 8 4 10 
1933 41 23 51 13.5 1.3 13 7 43 
1934 190 19 38 7.5 0.1 9.5 4.3 34 
1935 234 12 100 3.2 0 5.8 3.3 28 
1936 669 27 148 9.6 
 
9 4.2 38 
1937 852 30 263 17 0 9 7.5 62 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Economiques, Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1930-1938. 
Although it is surprising to see such large exports of cloth as opposed to yarn, this 
reflects the history of the sector, which had traditionally used imported yarn. Furthermore, 
locally produced yarn might have been used in the production of domestically consumed 
cloth and would thus not have been included in these data. Nørlund clearly shows that 
this sector was primarily aimed at domestic consumption.514 If this is true, then the 
quantities shown in Table 6.12 are only a small part of total production. Cotton fabric and 
blankets were the most significant exported goods of this industry, by weight. These 
goods had a lower value added than lace, silk fabrics or embroidery. Nonetheless, the 
consistent growth in exports of both high- and low-value added output is indicative of the 
growth of this sector. 
It is clear from other evidence that the majority of this activity was undertaken in 
Tonkin: only in 1926 was a cotton factory opened in Saigon,515 whereas in 1913 there 
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were already 3 factories in Tonkin, employing almost 2 000 workers.516 Nørlund's 
research likewise repeatedly highlights that attempts at establishing a textile industry in 
Cochinchina were unsuccessful.517 If Nørlund, Mitchell and Shepherd were all correct in 
their assessment of the market for Tonkinese textiles, then this industry once more 
illustrates that Tonkin's production patterns were diversified and geared towards domestic 
needs. Furthermore, the fact that it was possible for much of this production to have come 
from agrarian households or temporary workers suggests that industrial developments 
acted as an alternative/supplementary sources of employment for Tonkin's 
underemployed agrarian population. Chapter 7 shows that textile imports were the most 
significant of all Indochinese imports. Although much of these imports were directed at 
Cochinchina, some did go to Tonkin. This confirms that despite Tonkin's industrial sector 
being sizeable, it remained insufficiently large to satisfy local demand, let alone to close 
the economic divide with Cochinchina.  
 
Energy 
Given the difficulty of gathering data on the evolution of industrial activity in Indochina, 
some authors have used proxy measures (such as measures of electrical power) to 
evaluate trends. During the 1930s, it was estimated that 85% of all electric power 
generated in Japan was used for industrial production,518 partly justifying this tendency. 
Shepherd, one of the few writers on industrialisation in colonial Southeast Asia, used 
electricity to evaluate industrial activity in the region.519 Although electricity production 
has been used as an indicator of industrial developments in parts of Southeast Asia and 
Japan, it may not be appropriate for Indochina. Touzet suggested that the majority of 
electricity was for domestic usage,520 while other authors argue that it may have been used 
for public lighting and tramways, rather than for industrial ventures.521 In addition, any 
discrepancy between Tonkin and Cochinchina's use of electricity for industrial use may, 
in fact, have hidden Tonkin's easier access to coal. Mitchell suggested that almost two 
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thirds of Indochina's domestic coal consumption was used in industrial production.522 
Although coal's domestic consumption is not recorded by region, it would make sense to 
argue that it was mainly consumed in Tonkin, as it was mainly produced there. According 
to the BEI, 85 000 tonnes of coal were used for industrial purposes in Indochina in 1928, 
30 000 of these for textile works alone. Although they do not show how much was used 
in each region for these purposes, they say that of the 615 000 tonnes of coal used in 
Indochina for all purposes in 1928, 490 000 was used in Tonkin as opposed to only 120 
000 in Cochinchina.523 We believe this may have helped fuel the greater significance of 
industrial development already demonstrated in Tonkin. For all these reasons, it is 
unlikely that electricity production can be used as a clear proxy of modern industrial 
activity. 
However, electricity production certainly can be seen as an industrial venture in 
itself. In terms of electricity production, Indochina was a rather small player even 
compared to Malaya. Malaya's generating capacity was 432 million kilowatts compared 
to only 96 in Vietnam and 12 in Cambodia.524 Even though it was a small industry, it did 
display a clear difference between the regions of Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
Table 6.13: Electricity Production, by Province, 1929-
1936, (1000 kw/hr) 
 Cochinchina Tonkin 
1929 34 292 17 450 
1930 41 409 19 184 
1931 36 580 19 593 
1932 34 487 17 630 
1933 33 276 17 014 
1934 31 953 16 448 
1935 34 285 18 135 
1936 35 588 20 219 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des 
Affaires Economiques, “Industrie” Annuaire Statistique de 
l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1931-1938. 
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Table 6.13 shows the relative difference in the production of electricity of these 
regions in the first half of the 1930s. Such a low generation of electrical power in relative 
terms, as well as the rather slow growth of the industry, suggests there may have been 
rather low demand for the product. Cochinchina's demand for this form of energy was 
stronger, but it was likely for domestic use rather than industrial use. Cochinchina’s 
production of electricity was nearly twice that of Tonkin’s. Therefore, using electricity 
production as a proxy for industrial development would have biased our evaluation and 
resulted in questioning the previous findings, which clearly showed the superiority of 
Tonkin's industrial development during this time period.  
 
6.4) Conclusion 
Handicraft industries, mining and modern industrial ventures were more significant 
in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. We have argued that this was a result of both the larger 
population in Tonkin (resulting in pressure in the agrarian sector and acting as an 
incentive for development of alternative employment) and the region's traditional 
tendency to reach for self-sustenance (prompting domestic production of a variety of 
goods), as noted in Chapter 5. The relatively small size of that sector in Cochinchina, 
apart from its engagement in rice processing ventures, further emphasises that region's 
reliance on specialisation in the agrarian sector. However, the gap between the two 
regions' industrial performance was not large enough to close the economic divide in this 
time period. The industrial sector reflected the production patterns found in the agrarian 
sector (diversification in Tonkin; specialisation in Cochinchina). Tonkin's more 
substantial industrial sector was a source of employment to Tonkinese peasants that 
reduced the negative effects of population pressure on its agrarian sector and thus 
maintained the demographic imbalances between Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
There was some handicraft production in Cochinchina and although the scale was 
much smaller than the handicraft industries of Tonkin, there were indications to suggest 
that handicraft producers were professionals, using this activity as their sole occupation. 
In Tonkin, instead, handicraft production was used to increase/supplement income from 
agrarian activity. This difference suggests that industrial development in the traditional 
sector may have been a consequence of population pressure. The differences in the way 
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industrial activity evolved were also found in the mining and other modern industrial 
ventures. The mining sector indeed was one of the largest industrial employers and fastest 
growing industry in Indochina and the majority of this industry was located in Tonkin. 
Although this sector exported much of its production, it remained a significant source of 
temporary employment for Tonkin's underemployed/overpopulated agrarian sector. In the 
modern sector, there was evidence that in various processing industries Cochinchina was 
a more significant producer (especially with respect to rice-processing industries). In 
Tonkin, these industries were on a smaller scale and generally their product was for 
domestic consumption. In fact, industrial output in Tonkin was almost uniquely (apart 
from mining) directed at the domestic market, suggesting that industrial activity was a 
different aspect of Tonkin's production pattern of diversification. Cochinchina's industrial 
activity was generally an extension of its specialisation in rice production.  
Gourou argued that the presence of a successful handicraft sector in Tonkin became 
an obstacle to the diffusion of new manufacturing activity.525 This chapter has shown that 
Tonkin had a more significant modern industrial sector; therefore Gourou's argument 
seems an unfair assessment. Furthermore, some would say that Japan’s industrialisation 
was enabled by its strong tradition of such handicraft production. Saito explained that the 
expansion of rural industry was directly linked to Tokugawa Japan’s economic growth.526 
Just as with Tokugawa Japan, rural manufacturing was an important aspect of Tonkin’s 
rural economy and a large majority of the population of both regions was peasant families, 
rather than wage earners.527 However, other conditions within which the growth was made 
possible in Japan were not present in Tonkin. Indeed, there was no “increase in the level 
of land utilisation that enabled the ceiling of output to rise”.528 Moreover, although we 
will show that Tonkin was less engaged with the world economy than Cochinchina, we 
find no evidence to support that in Tonkin a ‘seclusion policy’ incentivised a new type of 
merchant, who engaged in specialisation in one commodity and had large firms.529 In fact, 
this economic behaviour was more in line with Cochinchina’s tendency to specialise 
during French colonial rule. In addition, Saito suggested that rural development in Japan 
                                                
525 Gourou 1945, op.cit., p.397. 
526 Osamu Saito, Pre-Modern Economic Growth Revisited: Japan and the West, Working Paper No.16/05, 
Department of Economic History, London School of Economics, June 2005, p.29. 
527 ibid, p.30. 
528 ibid, p.37. 
529 ibid, p.25. 
 
 
201 
led to the “emergence of a mature urban economy [of well over 10% of the 
population]”.530  Again, this is more in line with the Cochinchinese economy than the 
Tonkinese. Tonkin’s economic characteristics were very different from Japan’s and 
despite a larger manufacturing sector, conditions were not optimal to close the gap in 
output prompted by Cochinchina's profitable specialisation in rice and rubber, at 
least in this time period.  
Chapter 3's overview of contracted labour suggested that it was more significant in 
Tonkin than in Cochinchina. Indeed, it was clear that both in mining and in the industrial 
sector, more people in Tonkin were contracted workers. However, this remained a rather 
limited class of workers. Even within the mining sector of Tonkin, many of the workers 
tended to only work for a few months of the year, and then returned to the agrarian sector 
for the remainder of the year. The significance of this 'floating labour' meant that labour 
permanent movements were rare, especially seeing as labour unions were not allowed in 
Indochina.531 We have suggested that it was partly the growth of this sector and the 
possibility of temporary employment outside the agrarian sector that might have limited 
migration of Tonkinese peasants towards Cochinchina. In Chapter 3, we also argued that 
the limited integration of the labour markets between these two regions in this time 
period partly explained their economic divide, as demographic differences (and their 
effect on landholding patterns) were partly responsible for the differing output potential 
of the agrarian sector. Consequently, the stronger growth of the industrial sector in 
Tonkin may have helped perpetuate its economic divide from Cochinchina during 
this time period.   
                                                
530 ibid, p.26. 
531 Goudal, op.cit., p.268. 
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Chapter 7: Commerce 
 
7.1) Introduction 
This chapter addresses how the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
was reflected in the economy, in this case specifically in the commercial sector. 
Based on the conclusions from the previous chapters, this chapter allows us to suggest 
that the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina reflected existing 
patterns of production, which in turn resulted in differing international commercial 
engagement. Cochinchina's specialisation in the production of an exportable 
commodity is expected to have resulted in larger trade links than Tonkin's 
diversified production patterns, which were often aimed at the domestic market. 
Furthermore, because trade was expanding in both volume and value in this time period, 
differences in trading activity may help defend the continuing significance of 
Cochinchina's larger output in the agrarian sector in explaining the economic gap 
between its economy and Tonkin's. Trends in commercial activity might also have further 
encouraged these production patterns, thus explaining the persistence of the economic 
divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina. Although Chapter 2 showed that many authors 
have looked at the international trade relations of Indochina, analyses have not linked the 
economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina to differing commercial activities. 
This is surprising considering that many authors believe that more open economies tend 
to see more growth. Proving causality in the relationship between growth and trade is not 
the main argument of this chapter. Instead, we show how the differences in production 
patterns outlined in the previous chapters were mirrored in trading activity.  
We will first explain the tariff policy of Indochina, to highlight the costs of trade 
and therefore show why participation in the international economy through this medium 
was closely associated with existing patterns of production. Then, we will look at the way 
in which commerce was organised: both in terms of the actual means of transport and of 
the commercial houses in existence. This permits us to draw links between production 
patterns, institutional characteristics and subsequent trade relations. After this, we look at 
the balance of trade, the commercial partners and the nature of the traded goods. These 
sections show how Cochinchina used international commerce differently from Tonkin, as 
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an outlet for surplus production. In addition, it will help highlight that despite Tonkin's 
diversification, its domestic production was insufficient to fully isolate it from imports, 
suggesting a further reason for its inability to close the gap with Cochinchina, at least in 
this time period. 
 
7.2) Trade regulation 
Indochina's trade regulations were very prohibitive. Even Touzet, a senior government 
member, recognised that the customs regime was a source of difficulty for Indochina's 
ability to break into the world market.532 Chapter 4 showed the evolution of the ideology 
behind France's colonial policy and suggested that, after WW1, there was a progressive 
movement away from 'assimilation' towards 'association'. This was strangely not true of 
Indochina's trade policy, which remained very much assimilationist even after changes 
were effected in 1928.533 Ideologically, Touzet argued that this characteristic of the trade 
regime was supposed to create an 'economic solidarity' with the metropolis, but that 
instead it created high costs for Indochinese producers and consumers alike.534 
There were two main eras for trade policies in Indochina during the period 1900-
1940: the period of the Méline tariff (1892-1928) and the period after the 1928 Kircher 
reforms, in which Indochina obtained more tariff autonomy. The Méline tariff was 
uniform across the French colonial Empire and meant that French goods entered free of 
duties into Indochina, while the colony's products were still subjected to tariffs upon 
entering France.535 This version of protectionism was due, in part, to the difficulties of the 
French economy following 1882 and to the belief that France's industrial production 
required a closed domestic market and preferential entrance to foreign markets.536 In 
addition to the tariff policy between France and its colonies, the Méline tariff imposed 
some large tariffs on specific merchandise entering Indochina. For example, Chinese 
tobacco before 1928 was taxed at 350 francs per hundred kilograms entering Indochina 
                                                
532 André Touzet, L’économie Indochinoise et la grande crise universelle, (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1934). 
533 ibid, p.107-108. 
534 ibid, p.108. 
535 Virginia Thompson, French Indochina, (London: Unwin Brothers LTD, 1937), p.200. 
536 J.S. Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia: A Comparison of Colonial Policy and Practice, 
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p.40. 
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and cotton fabric was taxed at 680 francs per hundred kilograms.537 Apart from tariffs on 
goods entering the Indochinese union, various other taxes existed,538 such as transit taxes 
and export taxes, particularly on rice, which was subject to a 2% export tax.539 In other 
words, the tariff level between 1892 and 1928 was prohibitively high. As early as 1906, 
there was recognition that “local colonial industries” were harmed by this tariff policy.540  
Harmful consequences were further intensified after the Kircher reforms of 1928, 
whereby an Indochinese tariff policy was specially designed for the colony. The years 
leading to the Great Depression and its aftermath were marked by increased pressure for 
protectionism. For example, Sarraut believed that France and its colonies should engage 
in a more “autarkic strategy”.541 Such a strategy was an extension of existing protection 
for specific industries, for example cotton or cars. Despite the ideological rhetoric 
becoming more associationist, Touzet believed that the Kircher reforms resulted in the 
tariffs became increasingly prohibitive: a general increase between “100% and 5 
000%”.542 For example, the tax on imports increased from 350 to 1 000 francs per 
hundred kilograms for Chinese tobacco and from 680 to 1 600 francs for cotton fabrics.543 
Since French exports did not pay customs duties upon entering Indochina, increased 
tariffs on goods from other economies were perceived as necessary for budgetary reasons. 
The tariff policy was specifically designed to affect imports from Asian economies as 
opposed to European economies.544  
Although the increase was large for most goods, some concessions were made: 
“the Act of April 13 1928 granted reciprocal free entry of commodities between France 
and Indochina” and,545 through the most favoured nation clause, some Indochinese 
exports to neighbouring economies were not faced with the highest tariffs brackets.546 The 
growing number of specific bilateral trade agreements between Indochina and other 
countries in Asia also helped alleviate some of these tariff increases. For example, France 
                                                
537 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.124. 
538 Thompson 1937, op.cit., p.201. 
539 Philip G. Wright, Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific, (Honolulu, Hawaii: Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1935), p.419 & Arthur Girault, The Colonial Tariff Policy of France, (London: Humphrey 
Milford, 1916), p.104. 
540 Furnivall 1941, op.cit., p.40.  
541 Jacques Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), p.187-188. 
542 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.110. 
543 ibid, p.124. 
544 ibid, p.123. 
545 Wright, op.cit., p.418. 
546 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.145. 
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and China signed an agreement limiting both tariffs and transit taxes in December 
1928,547 and in 1932, a trade agreement with Japan likewise reduced tariffs on some 
Japanese goods.548 The reductions were rather minimal and were often compensated by 
increased quotas. In addition, they came at a point when Japan was undergoing a process 
of economic change, 549 reducing its imports from non-Japanese colonies and increasing 
its tariffs on imports of agricultural goods.550  As we will see below, the reduced 
significance of Japan as a trading partner limited the impact of this agreement. 
It seems that the French trade regulation for its colonies followed the general 
response by a number of powers as of the 1890s. There was a general movement to 
reduce the laisser-faire policies of previous decades,551 but even within the region, French 
Indochina's custom taxes were considered high, especially before the Depression when 
many economies started raising tariffs. For example, while tariffs were seen as necessary 
sources of fiscal revenue in the Dutch East Indies, there was no discrimination between 
the various trade partners, not even with regards to the Netherlands,552 until 1934 when 
“all duties were increased by an additional 50%”.553 Similarly, in British Malaya and in 
Burma, the general British perspective of free trade meant that tariffs were generally low 
and less prohibitive, although again they were raised following the Depression.554 Other 
colonies, mainly the Philippines, Taiwan and Korea, were assimilated into their mother 
countries' trade regimes,555 and their tariff regime was similar to Indochina's. The extent 
of protectionism in French Indochina seems to have come not so much because of the 
local circumstances, but because of the perceived strength or weakness of the French 
economy, as expected in a colonial setting. Tariff policies certainly did have an impact on 
producers and consumers, but the policies themselves did not differ between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. It seems unlikely that trade policies would have explained the initial 
                                                
547 ibid, p.146. 
548 Wright, op.cit., p.419. 
549 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.150-151. 
550 Wright, op.cit. 
551 Furnivall 1941, op.cit., p.21-24. 
552 Wright, op.cit., p.279. 
553 ibid, p.279. 
554 ibid, p.392 & Economic and Social Board, A Study of the Social and Economic History of Burma 
(British Burma), Part 8, (Rangoon: The National Planning Commission, 1959, 1960), p.84-90. 
555 Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1)), p.94-95 & D.R.SarDesai, Southeast Asia Past & Present, 
5th Edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), p.163-164. 
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divergence in commercial activity, although again they might have helped perpetuate the 
trend, because depending on the level of trade activity, their cost would have differed. 
 
7.3) Commercial organisation 
International commerce was done primarily through the use of ships, although some trade 
between Tonkin and China was done through the use of the Northern Indochinese railway 
(refer to Map 2a). During colonial rule, the ports were effectively the only trading outlets 
for international commerce in Indochina and the French encouraged their development in 
a bid to foster commerce.556 The ports of use in Tonkin and Cochinchina were Haiphong 
and Saigon, respectively. Cochinchina’s port of Saigon was a ‘deep-water’ port, whereas 
Tonkin’s port of Haiphong was shallower. Because of Tonkin’s rain patterns, mud tended 
to accumulate in the navigable areas thus reducing its depth. Haiphong was a practical 
port for cabotage of small and light boats, but because of its shallowness it was not 
practical for larger commercial vessels.557 Heavier and bigger boats would have had more 
difficulty exiting and entering Haiphong than Saigon. Apart from the Saigonese port's 
greater practicality, Cochinchina's existing canal networks and financial institutions 
further facilitated international commerce.558 In Haiphong however, in addition to the 
depth problem, it was reported that commerce was not as easily done because road access 
to the city needed to be improved to allow better movement of goods. Some people even 
argued that the neighbouring port of Hongay (Map 1) should replace Haiphong 
completely. 559 Infrastructural circumstances seem to have favoured Cochinchina’s 
participation in international commerce over Tonkin’s. Table 7.1 suggests that even in 
1926, the French continued to focus public expenditure towards Cochinchina's port to a 
much larger extent than towards Tonkin's or any other Indochinese port. 
 
 
                                                
556 Kham Vorapheth, Commerce et colonialisation en Indochine, 1860-1945, (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 
2004), Chapter 1. 
557 ANOM: BIB SOM D//1702, Serge De Labrusse, “Politique du cabotage en Indochine”, Economie 
maritime indochinoise, (Saigon: Imprimerie Française d’Outre-mer, 1950), p.38. 
558 ANOM: BIB SOM A//3437, E. Henry-Biabaud, Deux Ans d’Indochine Notes de Voyage, (Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1939), p.181. 
559 ANOM: BIB AOM /30995, H. Cuchebousset. ”Il ne faut pas sacrifier Haiphong”, L’Eveil Economique 
de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 27 décembre 1931. 
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Table 7.1: Public Works Expenditure on Ports, 1926 
 
Cochinchina Tonkin Indochina 
Expenditure on Sea Ports ($) 9 173 5 019 16 271 
Share of infrastructural public works 
(%) 8 5 5 
ANOM: BIB ECOL //12731, p.141. 
Haiphong's port had been established mainly for military reasons during the Sino-
French war of 1884-1885. The port needed to be made more practical for commercial, 
rather than military, use and its facilities needed to be renovated.560 Although Table 7.1 
only shows public work expenditure on ports for the year 1926, 1926 was representative 
of a period when trade was growing fast in both regions. Consequently we believe this 
year is also representative of how the administration allocated public work expenditure. 
Despite the more dire circumstances of Haiphong, more funds were provided for the 
improvement of sea ports in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. This suggests that the colonial 
authorities regarded the strength of Cochinchina’s commercial activity as more profitable, 
a perception reflected in the financial environment of the regions.  
Trade was considered a very profitable activity. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 4, the 
revenue from customs taxes accounted to a quarter of the total revenue of the general 
budget. Because of the significance of this activity, currency decisions were often 
dictated in part by trade concerns. Upon the establishment of the Indochinese Union, the 
Indochinese piastre was instituted as the currency, which allowed the French some 
control over the economy. The French chose to remain on silver to limit potential shocks 
in trade, at least until 1930 when it was tied to the French gold Franc. To help regulate 
the economy, the Bank of Indochina, also the sole issuer of the piastre, was established, 
and although the Bank eventually operated throughout Indochina, Cochinchina remained 
the centre for financial flows and trade. Table 7.2 illustrates this: in 1924-1928, years 
after the Bank started operating in Tonkin and during the peak of the Indochinese 
economic growth, Cochinchina was a larger recipient of investment than Tonkin. The 
early establishment of commercial activity and the importance of the international 
                                                
560 Albert Sarraut, Grandeur et servitude coloniales, (Paris: Editions du Sagittaire, 1931), p.467. 
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development of Saigon was to make the Cochinchinese capital the future economic 
capital of the entire Indochinese Union.561 
Table 7.2: Invested Capital in Commerce and Related Industries, 1924-1928, 
(1000$) 
From International Sources 
 
Commerce Credit Institutions  Insurance Societies 
 
Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1924 1 536 178 2 874 
  
  
  
1925 3 766 138 1 462   
1926 2 293 71 2 058 529 
1927 539 125 2 050   
1928 4 475 900 10 708   
From Domestic Sources  
1924 635         
  
1925 570 15   13   
1926 1 281 163   90 82 
1927  335 101.2 700   300 
1928 2 050 341.2 1 000 50 150 
SOAS: T.Smolski, “Les investissements de capitaux privés et les émissions de valeurs mobilières en 
Indochine, au cours de la période quinquennale 1924-1925” in French Indochina, Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 1929, p.814-820. 
Some of the reason for this larger investment in Cochinchinese commerce can be 
found in the way commerce was organised, although causation went both ways. Research 
on the commercial organisation of Indochina has been scarce. Vorapheth's work on 
French commercial houses is one of the only works that provides evidence and 
description of the commercial sector in Indochina. Although his work is a specific study 
of French trading houses, he provides contextual evidence that helps shed light on the 
overall system in Indochina. Furthermore, his evidence is generally divided by region, 
which allows comparisons in the way commerce was organised in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. These comparisons are not extensively found in Vorapheth's work, as he 
focused on explaining the role of the French in Indochinese commerce.  
                                                
561 ibid, p.41. 
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The domestic clients were represented through Chinese middlemen, who had 
traditionally been the trading elite in both Tonkin and Cochinchina.562 Despite the fact 
that Indochina was part of the French Colonial Empire, the majority of commercial 
agents were not French. This was particularly true of Cochinchina, where many English, 
German and Chinese traders had been settled for some time. Indeed, regular trading 
networks connected Saigon to Hong Kong and Singapore.563 As more and more French 
traders arrived, benefiting from preferential relationships with the government and the 
Bank of Indochina, many of the existing networks of Chinese commercial agents became 
partners to the French, out of necessity. The laws prevented the Chinese from obtaining 
concessions and they had difficult relations with the financial institutions of the Union. 
Because they could speak the Vietnamese language and had often been engaged in 
commerce within the Union for some time, many Chinese people acted as middlemen to 
European companies (comprador).564  
Table 7.3 shows the growth of the number of commercial enterprises settled in the 
two regions. From these data, it seems unclear that Cochinchina was a superior trading 
centre: overtime, Tonkin's share of Indochina's commercial houses became as large or 
larger than Cochinchina's. Considering Table 7.2's clear demonstration that Cochinchina 
was a larger recipient of investment, there must have been a large discrepancy in the size 
or significance of the trading houses that existed in these regions.  
Table 7.3: Number of Commercial Enterprises, 
1912-1939 
 1912 1921 1934 1939 
Cochinchina 66 106 117 105 
Tonkin 14 95 107 118 
Total 103 289 329 327 
Kham Vorapheth, Commerce et colonialisation en Indochine, 
1860-1945, Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2004, p.135. 
Tonkin started off with far fewer commercial enterprises than Cochinchina, but 
the fast growth in its numbers is deceptive: Vorapheth suggests that enterprises were 
                                                
562 Pierre Brocheux, “Moral Economy of Political Economy? The Peasants are Always Rational”, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No.4, August 1983, p.794. 
563 Vorapheth, op.cit, p.80-81. 
564 ibid, p.90.  
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generally smaller in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. 565  Indeed, large trading houses, 
primarily European or Chinese, had the largest share of the import-export activity in 
Indochina, most of these large trading houses were established in the ports and the 
majority of them were located in Saigon or Cholon. Entrepreneurs wanting to engage in 
large-scale commerce favoured Cochinchina.566 In the beginning, the commercial houses 
of Saigon had been developed by individuals and families. By the end of the 19th century, 
public limited companies started setting up headquarters in Indochina, predominantly in 
Saigon.567 There may have been more enterprises in Tonkin by the end of the time period, 
but they were less substantial, which would align itself with the investment data from 
Table 7.2. 
Commercial activity in both regions evolved in distinct ways from the onset of 
colonialism: big companies and commercial houses were in Saigon or Cochinchina in 
general, whereas small commercial and industrial enterprises were in Haiphong, Hanoi, 
or Tonkin more broadly.568 The distinction between the two regions was sensible: the 
economy of Tonkin was ‘primitive’ according to the authorities at the time. Production 
was for consumption, not exchange.569 In Cochinchina, however, the authorities described 
the economic development as following the ‘fundamental form of modern economics’: 
producing for exchange.570 The existence of larger scale enterprises in Cochinchina fits 
with previously identified patterns of production and organisation. 
 
7.4) Balance of trade 
Figure 7.1 displays the balance of trade of Tonkin and Cochinchina between 1900-1940, 
as well as the overall balance of trade of Indochina. 
                                                
565 ibid, p.65-66 & p.127. 
566 ibid, p.17-18. 
567 ibid, p.45. 
568 ibid, p.65-66 & p.127. 
569 ANOM: BIB ECOL//12939/11/, p.13. 
570 ibid, p.13. 
 
 
211 
 
Figure 7.1 
Indochina's balance of trade was positive almost throughout this period.571 The 
exception was in 1931, when the balance of trade of Indochina experienced a strong 
deficit. 1931 was not, of course, a very good year for international trade anywhere and it 
was particularly unfavourable for primary producing countries such as Indochina. The 
balance of trade data can be broken down in three stages: 1906-1926 period of growth, 
1927-1931 period of decline (in line with the falling prices of primary products 
throughout the 1920s) and 1931-1938 period of growth or recovery. Until 1918, the 
balance of trade reflected quite low volumes of trade for Indochina, but the subsequent 
strong growth was probably linked to the growth of the international economy. The 
Depression era and its forerunning price decrease explain the decline in the second stage, 
while the third stage is associated with the recovery period. 
 
                                                
571 SOAS: R. Cabanes, “L’effort agricole et la balance commerciale de l’Indochine au cours de la période 
1909-1938”, in French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique 
de l’Indochine Année 1940, (Hanoi: 1941), p.7-11. 
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Table 7.4: Value of Imports and Exports for Tonkin and Cochinchina, 1913-1938, 
(Million of Francs) 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1913 61 62 161 212 
1914 51 58 148 216 
1915 40 85 114 188 
1916 66 71 155 211 
1917 65 61 164 245 
1918 64 64 165 275 
1919 143 207 169 581 
1920 213 227 608 716 
1921 212 221 567 1 016 
1922 246 252 561 853 
1923 347 322 679 772 
1924 492 372 819 1 341 
1928 816 503 1 669 2 352 
1929 764 634 1 657 1 894 
1930 596 299 1 123 1 490 
1931 509 245 783 1 122 
1932 362 180 553 809 
1933 321 209 537 772 
1934 372 217 537 817 
1935 322 577 577 1 026 
1936 351 567 320 1 334 
1937 537 952 416 2 065 
1938 730 621 1 187 2 224 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine: Année 1914,p.85; Année 1915, p.789, 791, 825; Année 1918, p.6, 8, 9, 42; Année 1919, 
p.128, 130, 162; Année 1920, p.135, 136, 170, 719, 720, 752; Année 1921, p.671, 673, 710; Année 1922, 
p.211, 213, 256; Année 1923, p.260, 264, 307; Année 1931, p.A70; Année 1930 “Rapport sur les 
mouvements commerciaux”, p.23, 25, 104; Année 1931, p.A267, Section A4 p. 67, 188, 189; Année 
1932, p.A105; Année 1933, p.231; Année 1935, p.183; Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de 
l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, “Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de 
l’Indochine: 1933, p.189; 1935, p.158; 1936-1937, p.148. 
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Table 7.4 shows the value of imports and exports in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
As we can see, the growth in the trade surplus was due not to declining imports, but 
rather to increasing exports, particularly from Cochinchina. Bassino and Bui believed a 
large reason for the high value of imports to Indochina was due to the import of capital 
goods, especially with respect to Doumer's large infrastructural plans, such as the 
railway.572 As we saw in Chapter 4, expenditure on this decreased after the Depression, 
which may in part explain the decrease in imports seen in Table 7.4 for much of the 
period after 1930. Interestingly, we see a very strong trend of positive balance of trade in 
the case of Cochinchina throughout these three stages, but the figures suggest that 
Tonkinese trade was very limited even before the 1930s, after which sharp negative 
balances of trade were experienced. In other words, Indochina's positive balance of trade 
was due to Cochinchina's trade surplus, regardless of Tonkin's generally poor 
performance. 
We previously suggested that Tonkin's diversified production was primarily geared 
to its own domestic market. This appears justified in Table 7.4: Tonkin's exports were a 
fraction of Cochinchina's. Even in 1930-1934 when there was a noticeable decline in 
international trade, the balance of trade remained favourable in Cochinchina. Despite 
falling world prices of agricultural goods, the exports of Cochinchina were still able to 
generate enough revenue to maintain a positive balance of trade. The strong ‘recovery’ 
shown in Table 7.4 suggests that Cochinchina’s exported goods were competitive enough 
to remain strong on the volatile world market or that their production could be increased 
to compensate for the decline in prices. In the case of Tonkin, low levels of trade overall 
vindicate the hypothesis from Chapters 5 and 6 that the Northern region was less likely to 
extract revenue from international trade than the Southern region. Instead, the 
increasingly negative balance of trade for Tonkin suggests that, despite its diversification 
and lower risk production patterns, it was increasingly reliant on the international 
economy for some goods. These overall figures thus seem to support our hypotheses. The 
following sections look into more specific details of the commercial activities of the two 
regions, to further justify our hypothesis. 
                                                
572 Jean Pascal Bassino & Bui Thi Lan Huong. “Estimates of Indochina’s and Vietnam’s International 
Trade (1890-1946)” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) 
Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 
2000), p.299. 
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7.5) Trade partners 
When Western powers started to trade with Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese Emperor 
allowed them extensive commercial freedom: both France and Britain were given access 
to all ports of Vietnam, apart from those serving Tonkin.573 If only because of this 
historical decision, it was more likely for Cochinchina to have developed more extensive 
relationships with Western commercial partners than for isolated Tonkin. Tonkin's trade 
links would have remained limited to its traditional Asian partners, mainly China. 
However, we will show that despite this, both regions had similar partners, the only key 
difference resting on the scale of their partnership. 
The majority of the data available show figures for French Indochina as a single 
entity. However, for the years 1930 to 1933, some statistics were recorded for exports and 
imports by region of origin/destination within Indochina and separated in categories for 
its main trading partners. These can be found in Appendices 7 and 8 respectively, but the 
main findings from these data will be discussed below.  
Table 7.5: Freight Costs from Saigon, September 1929, ($ per tonne) 
 Rice Other goods 
Singapore 2.9 4.5 
Dutch Indies 4.5 7 
Europe 14.7 21.1 
Hong Kong 4.5 4.8 
Philippines 5.5 7 
Japan 7.1 12.7 
San Francisco 19.8 23.3 
New York 19.8 25.6 
Cuba 19.8 25.6 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine Année 1930, Hanoi: 1931, Section A, p.A19. 
In the BEI, freight rates between Saigon and some of the other main trading ports 
worldwide were published. These are replicated in Table 7.5. This information is not 
available for freight rates from Hanoi, but we consider it unlikely that they would have 
                                                
573 SOAS: R. Cabanes, “L’effort agricole et la balance commerciale de l’Indochine au cours de la période 
1909-1938”, in French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique 
de l’Indochine Année 1940, (Hanoi: 1941), p.339. 
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differed dramatically. The lower prices for transporting rice suggest the significance of 
this good in relation to others and the larger quantities of this good that were likely traded. 
Although other goods might have had higher weight to value ratios, rice was the most 
significantly traded good, reinforcing the economic significance of Cochinchina's 
specialisation in producing this crop.  
Evidently, transport to Asian economies was much cheaper than to Western nations. 
It seems likely that these listed destinations were Cochinchina’s most significant trade 
partners, but these rates were not ranked by order of significance. The following tables 
show that France was a significant trading partner of Indochina, while the Dutch Indies 
hardly appears on the recorded data. Nonetheless, one trading partner is significant in its 
absence: China, which, according to other tables, was probably the most significant trade 
partner of Indochina, apart from France. The absence of freight rates from Saigon to 
China also suggests that much of Indochina’s overseas trade with China may have gone 
via Hong Kong. It is also possible that other trade to China was done via Tonkin's rail 
network. However, we previously showed that the weight of transported merchandise via 
rail was insignificant compared to trade done via boat (Chapter 4, Section 4.3 c.) so that 
this is unlikely to bias our conclusions.  
Table 7.6: Share of Tonnage of Exports by Country of Destination, 1913-1935, (%) 
 
1913-1920 1921-1929 1930-1935 
France and colonies 16.2 19.2 17.7 
Hong-Kong 37.4 31.0 19.0 
China 10.2 18.4 17.6 
Japan 11.4 7.1 3.9 
Singapore 2.4 3.4 2.4 
The Kingdom of Siam 5.1 2.9 1.9 
The Philippines 7.6 7.5 14.3 
Dutch Indies 5.7 4.8 3.8 
United States of America 0.2 1.0 1.5 
India 1.3 1.6 1.4 
Other 3.3 3.2 5.0 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Table 7.6 shows the average share of total weight of Indochinese exports by 
country of destination; Table 7.7 shows the average share of total value of Indochinese 
exports by country of destination. The main trading partners, by weight and value, were 
thus exclusively East Asian countries, apart from France. Three quarters of the total value 
of exports went to only 5 trading partners: France, Hong-Kong, China, Japan and 
Singapore. Although the Philippines and the Dutch Indies imported some Indochinese 
goods, their share of total value was very low, suggesting the low value of the goods they 
imported. 
Table 7.7: Share of Value of Exports by Country of Destination, 1913-1935, (%)  
 
1913-1923 1924-1929 1930-1937 
France 22.2 22.4 39.9 
Hong Kong 39.1 30.0 19.1 
China 8.5 12.3 8.7 
Japan 4.5 8.9 4.5 
Singapore 9.6 9.0 8.7 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
France, as the colonial power, was unsurprisingly one of the main receivers of 
Indochinese exports. In the three stages of Indochinese trade (identified from Figure 7.1), 
France was receiving between 20-16% of total exports by weight and 20-40% of the 
value of total exports. The Indochinese goods exported to France were therefore 
relatively higher value goods: their value share is higher than their weight share. The data 
in Appendix 6 show that France was a keen importer of Indochinese foodstuffs, 
medicinal goods, handicraft products such as baskets and rugs, vegetable products, metals, 
silk thread (exclusively exported to France), textiles, furniture, mining products and 
metallurgical goods. The data specifying which goods were exported to France are only 
available for 1930-1933. It is therefore not possible to explain how the basket of goods 
changed over time. After the 1928 reforms it is likely France was increasingly importing 
higher value goods: although the share by weight declined slightly, the share by value 
increased sharply, suggesting France was increasingly importing higher value goods from 
Indochina. This may have been a reflection of the new tariff reciprocity between the 
colony and France whereby Indochinese exports were no longer paying customs duties in 
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France, making them more competitive and driving demand upwards. Because of the 
variety of the goods exported to France, it seems both Tonkin and Cochinchina had a 
relatively sizeable share of its commerce.  
Hong Kong imported between 20 and 37% of the total tonnage of Indochinese 
exports, by weight. Hong Kong, a British colony at the time, was not the sole consumer 
of these imports as it often acted as an entrepot port. Some of the merchandise shipped 
towards Hong Kong was then redistributed elsewhere, very often to China. China itself 
imported 10-20% of the total tonnage of Indochinese exports, in addition to what might 
have been redirected from Hong Kong. Their shares of exports by value closely matched 
that of their shares by weight, suggesting the basket of goods they imported remained 
relatively stable, although demand by both decreased after the Depression. Like France, 
both these destinations imported some of almost all Indochinese exports, suggsting again 
that both regions had the same trade partners, although the scale of their relationship 
would have differed based on their respective trade capacity. 
Singapore only commanded around 2 to 3% of Indochinese exports by weight and 
tended to re-export some of these goods to the rest of Malaya. Singapore was one of the 
main importers of Indochinese rubber and of other select goods. Singapore's role as an 
entrepot for goods was valid for imports of raw materials, however foodstuffs tended to 
be consumed locally.574 The majority of the exports going to Singapore came from 
Cochinchina, rather than Tonkin, presumably because of proximity and because of its 
demand of goods that were specifically produced in Cochinchina (rubber). Many of the 
exports originating from Tonkin, such as mining products, were very rarely exported to 
Singapore. In this instance, there seems to have been a clear difference in the trade link of 
Cochinchina and Tonkin.  
Indochina was a relatively small trading partner of Japan's, the larger ones being the 
United States and India.575 However, from Indochina's point of view, Japan was a sizeable 
partner, importing between 4 and 12% of the total tonnage of Indochinese exports, which 
accounted for a similar share of value in this time period. A significant part of Indochina's 
exports to Japan were raw materials produced from Tonkin's mining industry. Japan's rice 
                                                
574 Wright, op.cit., p.417. 
575 W.L.Holland & Kate L. Mitchell (eds), Problems of the Pacific, 1936, Proceedings of the 6th Conference 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p.61. 
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imports would have come from its own colonies: by 1928, Japan hoped that Taiwan and 
Korea would be “able to fully satisfy” its domestic demand for rice.576 Despite this change 
over time, Tonkin had a larger relationship with Japan than Cochinchina did.  
Most of these relationships remained the same over time, at least in weight term, 
apart from the fact that in the aftermath of the Depression export to the Philippines 
increased while exports to Hong Kong and Japan decreased. The first change may reflect 
the increasing importance of American commercial interests in the Pacific and the 
growing industrialisation push in small developing economies, while the second change 
may be reflective of the increasing tendency of some larger countries to rely on their own 
production possibilities. For example, Japan's declining share of Indochinese exports is in 
line with its post 1930s strategy of sourcing its imports from its own colonies. Trade with 
Asian neighbours suffered at the expense of trade with France, with the latter 
commanding more higher value goods in the aftermath of the Depression than it 
previously had. Much of this was probably due to the changes made to the tariff regime 
as discussed in Section 7.2. Indeed, more protectionism in neighbouring countries, 
together with the reduced tariffs on Indochinese goods entering France meant there was a 
greater push to sell on French markets. Apart from differences with respect to Japan and 
Singapore, it seems that the two regions generally traded with the same partners. 
Trade partners did not change when we look at imports, either with respect to the 
share of tonnage (Table 7.8) or the share of value (Table 7.9): the main trading importers 
of Indochinese goods were the main exporters of goods to Indochina. The same five 
partners together accounted for more than three quarters of imports throughout this time 
period.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
576 V.D. Wickizer & M.K. Bennett, The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1941), p.91. 
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Table 7.8: Share of Tonnage of Imports by Country of Origin, 1913-1935, (%) 
 
1913-1920 1921-1929 1930-1935 
France and colonies 12.5 16.3 11.3 
Hong-Kong 44.2 39.3 29.5 
China 10.0 17.8 16.7 
Japan 3.9 5.1 13.4 
Singapore 15.0 6.0 4.5 
The Kingdom of Siam 1.7 3.0 2.8 
The Philippines 6.0 4.2 2.9 
Dutch Indies 3.7 3.5 4.4 
United States of America 1.4 2.7 2.7 
India 1.0 1.4 0.7 
Other 0.8 0.9 3.9 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
 
Table 7.9: Share of Value of Imports by Country of Origin, 1913-1935, (%) 
 
1913-1923 1924-1929 1930-1937 
France 46.8 50.2 53.4 
Hong Kong 24.4 17.3 9.3 
China 8.1 8.6 5.4 
Japan 1.5 2.3 2.4 
Singapore 6.3 3.9 3.9 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
 In the case of imports, only 11-16% of the total tonnage of imports originated from 
France, although this accounted for around 50%, by value. It seems that France's exports 
to Indochina were also increasingly valuable relative to their weight: after 1930, per 
tonne, French exports to Indochina were worth more than France's imports from 
Indochina. As seen in Appendix 7, France was the dominant exporter to Indochina of oil 
and vegetable saps, drinks such as wine, metals, chemicals, dyestuffs, various chemical 
compounds, pottery, glass and glasswork, threads and textiles, as well as furniture, 
musical instruments and weapons. These goods went to both Tonkin and Cochinchina 
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and a strong commercial relationship between France and those two regions existed. 
Indochina's increasingly strong ties to France, especially in in the aftermath of the 
Depression, differed from the situation in other Southeast Asian economies. Even before 
the Depression, most colonies were growing more integrated to the Asian economy, at the 
expense of trade with their metropolis.577 For example, in Burma, trade was increasingly 
directed towards India: in 1913, 40% of exports by value went to India; by 1940, this 
share had increased to 60%.578 On the imports side, by 1937, Asian economies were 
importing nearly three quarters of all Burmese exports. 579  Indochina's contrasting 
experience from its neighbours was most likely due to the trade regulations highlighted in 
Section 7.2. 
Hong Kong's exports to Indochina decreased in this period, in both shares of weight 
and value, although as with its imports, they were generally lower value exports (share of 
weight larger than share of value). Japan’s position as an exporter became increasingly 
favourable. Not only were tariffs on Japanese goods reduced in this period, but Japan's 
rapid industrialising allowed it to export rather low value manufactured goods that were 
competitive on the Indochinese markets. 580  Consequently, Japan was increasingly 
benefiting from its trade with Indochina. Imports from 'other countries' to Indochina were 
significant with respect to animal products, minerals and combustibles. These products 
tended to go mostly towards Cochinchina. This confirms the preliminary suggestion that, 
in a number of respects, Cochinchina’s commercial relationship with the rest of the world 
would have been more significant than Tonkin’s, probably as a result of its lack of a 
mining industry (resulting in increased demand for mining imports) and its lesser 
developed handicraft and manufacturing sector. However, it remains that Tonkin 
generally had the same trade partners than Cochinchina, only to a smaller extent. 
Although there is no doubt that Cochinchina's trade was more important than 
Tonkin's, it is unclear that Tonkin's trade network was necessarily less wide. In fact, it 
seems that both economies had few key trade partners. The difference in their 
commercial activity was thus unlikely to be due to commercial partner differences, but 
                                                
577 Booth 2007(1), op.cit, p.91. 
578 Aye Hlaing, “Trends of economic growth and income distribution in Burma, 1870-1940”, Journal of the 
Burma Research Society, June 1964, Vol.47, p.113. 
579 J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p.188. 
580 Booth 2007(1), op.cit., p.102. 
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more likely to be guided by what the regions had available to trade. In other words, it was 
their production patterns and resulting output that explained their differing levels of 
engagement with trade. 
 
7.6) Specific trade data 
Exports 
 
Figure 7.2 
Figure 7.2 shows the merchandise exiting the ports of Saigon and Haiphong by weight, 
over the time period in question. The weight of the merchandise exiting Saigon was 
significantly higher than the weight of merchandise exiting Haiphong. The merchandise 
indicated in Figure 7.2 was loaded onto ships whose final destination was outside of the 
Indochinese Union, but some may have had stops at other ports within Indochina en route.  
Although this information does not provide us with an extensive understanding of the 
value, or nature, of the goods exported, it is certainly an indicator that the port of Saigon 
was far busier than the port of Haiphong. This is perhaps linked to the different 
geographic characteristics of the two ports: as noted earlier, Haiphong’s port was much 
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more difficult of access than Saigon's. Given a choice, heavier ships would have had 
more inclination to dock at Saigon than at Haiphong. Table 7.10 shows the share by 
weight of particular categories of goods exported out of Indochina.  
Table 7.10: Share of Main Exported Goods, 1913-1940, (% of Annual Average 
Tonnage of Exports) 
 
Foodstuffs Minerals 
Oils & 
Vegetable 
Saps 
Metals Annual Average Tonnage (tonnes) 
1913-1920 65 24 0 1 2 054 070 
1921-1925 57 33 0 1 2 609 309 
1926-1930 52 38 0 1 3 137 402 
1931-1940 49 45 1 0 3 278 549 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-
1939. 
More detailed raw data can be found in Appendix 8. 
Table 7.11 shows the share by value for these same goods. 
Table 7.11: Share of Main Exported Goods, 1933-1936, (% of Annual Average 
Value of Exports) 
 
Foodstuffs 
Oils & 
Vegetable 
Saps 
Minerals Metals Fishing Product 
Annual 
Average 
Value (1000 
Francs) 
1933-1936 62 9 6 4 5 1 270 365 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932-1937. 
Full dataset from Appendix 5. 
Two categories of goods were the most significant: foodstuffs on the one hand and 
minerals and combustible materials on the other. The foodstuffs category comprised: rice, 
corn, beans and other such exportable grains. The minerals and combustible materials 
category comprised coal, sand, cement, charcoal, petrol and other such goods. The 
significance of the categories changes slightly when one compares Table 7.10 and 7.11: 
the export of foodstuffs remained the most valuable category, but mining output provided 
a much smaller share of revenue than of total weight. 
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Export statistics showing the origin and nature of the exported goods were only 
collected for the years 1930 to 1933. Unfortunately, these were the three years most 
affected by the Great Depression.  Even then, detailed statistics are only weight statistics, 
not value statistics. However, because they were separated in specific categories of goods, 
and each category is the same for both regions, they provide a good snapshot of the 
differences in exports between Tonkin and Cochinchina at that point in time. Table 7.12 
provides a summary of the relevant categories of goods. 
Table 7.12: Annual Average Quantity of Main Exports, by Region of Origin, 
1930-1933, (1000 tonnes) 
 
Annam-Tonkin Cochinchina-Cambodia 
Fish Products 1 33 
Foodstuffs 83 1 215 
Oils and Vegetables Saps 2 14 
Minerals 1 411 0 
Metals 17 1 
Total Exports 1 616 1 311 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932-1937. 
Full dataset from Appendix 6. 
Table 7.12 unsurprisingly confirms that the exports of foodstuffs and oils and 
vegetable saps were primarily from Cochinchina, while minerals and metals such as tin 
and gold were mainly from Tonkin.  
Table 7.13: Annual Average Weight and Annual Average Value of 
Exports, by Region of Origin, 1934-1937 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Weight (1000 tonnes) 1 848 2 073 
Value (1000 Francs) 286 033 1 320 549 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 
1932-1938. 
In fact, both categories comprising the output of Cochinchina's specialisation (rice 
in foodstuffs; rubber in vegetable saps) were much more remunerable than those 
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comprising Tonkin's main export industry (minerals and metals). Rubber was a key 
industrial venture and, together with rice, was one of the most important traded items in 
terms of value. Tonkin's output of its main industrial venture, minerals and metals from 
its mining industry, accounted for only 10% of the value of exports, despite taking up 45% 
of total tonnage. Although metals did have a much higher value to weight ratio, they only 
accounted for a minor share of exports, whereas exported minerals were less valuable per 
tonne than white rice. Fishing products brought in a significant share of export income. 
Table 7.12 shows that, at least in 1930-1933, Cochinchina exported far more fishing 
products than Tonkin. If we refer to Maps 3a and 3b, we can see that there were ‘fishing’ 
locations in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. Both areas had substantial access to the 
seafront and navigable rivers and, presumably, both had similar access to supply, but 
Cochinchina clearly chose to export more of that supply than Tonkin. Again, this fits with 
the patterns of production of the two regions: Cochinchina seems to have produced for 
trade much more than Tonkin. In general, Cochinchina's exports were not only larger; 
they were also more valuable than Tonkin's. 
It is clear that the quantity of Tonkinese exports rose progressively over time and so 
did revenue. Despite this rise, the value of goods exported from Cochinchina was 
significantly higher than that of the goods exported out of Tonkin. In fact, although we 
believe Figure 7.2 exaggerated the difference in tonnage of exports, Figure 7.3 suggests 
an even starker picture with respect to value.  
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Figure 7.3 
These above tables and figures suggest that the most valuable exports of French 
Indochina were mainly from the Cochinchinese region. The relative importance of each 
category of exported good did not vary much with time. Throughout this time period, the 
main exports remained the same: foodstuffs and mining products. As total trade increased, 
the categories grew somewhat proportionately. Since the industrial sector was mainly 
developed in Tonkin and its output was generally geared to the domestic market, such 
stability in exports baskets is unsurprising. The economic divide between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina was vividly depicted in trade data and the regions' export baskets reflected 
their production patterns.  
The basket of goods exported out of Indochina is in line with those of other 
colonies: agrarian exploitation and the product of capitalist ventures in “forests, oilfields, 
mines and plantations”.581 As previously mentioned, Burma was recognised for its exports 
of rice. Before WW2, Burma exported over 3 million tonnes of rice per year.582 This is 
much more than Cochinchina did, as all exported foodstuffs between 1930-1933 weighed 
                                                
581 Furnivall 1948, op.cit., p.81. 
582 André Angladette, Le Riz, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p.89. 
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just over a million tonnes, some of this accounting for significant exports of maize. Even 
then, Indochina's growth as a rice exporter was strong, especially before 1930.583 Despite 
the strong growth of the rice industry in Indochinese exports both in terms of weight and 
revenue, its quality on the international market was often considered quite low. Indeed, 
consumers tended to prefer Thai or Burmese rice that often was more uniform in quality. 
High quality Thai rice, “white garden rice”, was worth 8.7 piastres per 100 kilograms in 
1931. By 1933, this had decreased to 5.1 piastres.584 By contrast, Cochinchina's white rice 
was sold at only 4.19 piastres in 1933.585 This price difference is very large considering 
that both Indochina and Thailand were such large exporters of rice. Despite a potentially 
low quality, there is no doubt that Cochinchina's specialisation allowed for higher trade 
revenue than Tonkin, even with the latter's more export-oriented mining sector.  
Overall, it appears that the value of exports was on average nearly three times 
higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. The value differences suggest and support the 
view that Tonkin’s basket of exportable goods did not increase significantly during 
colonial rule. The two regions show a very different level of engagement with the 
international economy. Cochinchina was much more engaged with the world economy 
than Tonkin because it 'chose' to produce for export. The latter's rather small engagement, 
until exports of minerals took off, confirms that its diverse production, particularly in its 
agrarian sector, was aimed at the domestic market rather than the international market. 
 
Imports 
Cochinchina's larger tendency to specialise and engage in mono-crop as opposed to 
Tonkin's more diversified agrarian and industrial productions would suggest differing 
degrees of import-reliance. Cochinchina's population would have had to be in part more 
dependent on the international market to supplement both its diet and the domestic 
demand for goods not produced within the region. 
                                                
583 Pierre van der Eng, “Productivity and Comparative Advantage in Rice Agriculture in South-East Asia 
since 1870”, Asian Economic Journal, 2004, Vol.18, No.4, p.347. 
584 Touzet 1934, op.cit., p.14. 
585 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, "Commerce", 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine Vol.VI, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1937), value of white 
rice exports divided by quantity. 
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Figure 7.4 
Figure 7.4 displays the weight of merchandise entering the ports of Haiphong and 
Saigon. The tonnage of imports entering those same ports seem to have been much more 
similar to one another than the tonnage of exports exiting those ports as seen in Figure 7.2. 
Pending analysis of the goods actually imported, this is surprising, as one would have 
expected Cochinchina to have imported far more than Tonkin. Table 7.14 displays the 
value to weight ratios for exports and imports by region. Per tonne, imports were much 
more valuable than exports entering both ports. It makes sense for a colony to have 
imported high value added goods, particularly an agrarian economy with a limited 
industrial sector such as Indochina. The value to weight ratios for imports tended to be 
quite similar between both regions, suggesting a similar basket of goods being imported. 
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Table 7.14: Value:Weight Ratio of Traded Goods, 1913-1935, (Ff per 
tonne) 
 
Import Value:Weight Ratio Export Value:Weight Ratio 
Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1913 952 619 133 152 
1914 832 554 131 141 
1915 767 524 133 171 
1921 2 306 1 947 633 507 
1922 1 857 1 247 608 649 
1923 2 726 2 430 613 674 
1924 2 248 3 446 1 103 687 
1928 3 785 4 061 1 315 839 
1929 3 694 3 674 1 349 948 
1930 2 580 2 851 1 162 667 
1931 2 550 3 410 1 013 509 
1932 2 109 2 018 584 329 
1933 2 213 2 271 552 395 
1934 2 005 2 443 414 408 
1935 2 139 2 027 491 875 
Calculation made with Data from Table 7.4, Figure 7.2 & Figure 7.4 
Table 7.15 displays the share of the main categories of imports as a per cent of the 
annual average weight of imports. The trend of total tonnage imported into Indochina, 
during this time period, was one of rapid increase until the onset of the Depression, after 
which import tonnage decreased. This confirms the trend seen in Figure 7.4 and may 
represent efforts to lessen dependence on imports, a normal response in times of 
economic difficulty. Unlike with exports, there is no clear dominance of any one import: 
Table 7.15 shows that imports of drinks, metals and textiles all seem to have been 
significant. As we previously suggested, the export data emphasised the significance of 
the specialisation of Cochinchina in production of rice. Imports, on the other hand, were 
for a variety of goods necessary for the economy as a whole and would have been, by 
default, more varied.  
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Table 7.15: Share of Main Imported Goods, 1913-1940, (% of Annual Average 
Tonnage of Imports) 
 
1913-1920 1921-1925 1926-1930 1931-1935 
Foodstuffs 5 6 6 8 
Fruit & Grains 3 3 2 3 
Perishable Colonial Goods 4 3 4 2 
Vegetable Products 4 3 3 5 
Drinks 25 22 23 9 
Minerals 22 22 27 34 
Metals 4 8 10 10 
Metallurgical Goods 2 6 6 7 
Textiles 9 4 3 6 
Annual Average Tonnage 
(tonnes) 277 334 452 150 635 107 400 999 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
Full dataset from Appendix 9. 
 
Table 7.16: Share of Main Imported Goods, 1933-1936, (% of 
Annual Average Value of Imports) 
 
1933-1936 
Foodstuffs 3 
Fruit & Grains 2 
Perishable Goods (pepper, sugar...) 5 
Vegetable Products 2 
Drinks 4 
Minerals 9 
Metals 7 
Textiles 26 
Metallurgical Goods 10 
Annual Average Value (1000 Francs) 925 266 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires 
Économiques, “Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie 
d’Extrème-Orient, 1932-1937. 
Full dataset in Appendix 10. 
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Table 7.16 shows that the most important categories of imported goods by value 
were textiles and metallurgical goods, including some machinery. Because modern 
industrialising efforts were late in coming to Indochina, imports of these goods are not 
surprising. French Indochina was in the process of modernising and industrialising, 
particularly towards the latter part of the French colonial period. Interestingly, the share 
of the various imported goods hardly changed over time. Moreover, the relative share of 
capital goods and raw material, as opposed to finished products, was quite low. This 
differs in some ways from the situation in Burma, where there was “a notable increase in 
the value of capital goods imported”.586 The stability in relative shares suggests limited 
developments and changes in the patterns of consumption of the colony and thus further 
emphasises the significance of previously highlighted patterns of production.  
The most significant imports were textiles. The textile category included ‘jute bags’, 
bags used to store foodstuffs. Jute bags were not produced within Indochina, but rather 
were imported, often from India. Moreover, cotton and silk were only small industries in 
Indochina, and therefore the import of such textiles was necessary. The import of 
foodstuffs and vegetable products in small amounts is also of interest. These goods were 
likely to have supplemented the domestic market. 
As with exports, some information on imports is available for the years 1930-
1937, by region of destination, and the key findings are summarised in Table 7.17 and 
Table 7.18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
586 Furnivall 1948, op.cit., p.101. 
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Table 7.17: Annual Average Quantity of Main Imports, by Region of 
Destination, 1930-1933, (1000 tonnes) * 
 
Annam-Tonkin Cochinchina-Cambodia 
Foodstuffs 10 25 
Fruit & Grains 2 9 
Perishables 4 9 
Vegetable Products 3 16 
Drinks 46 46 
Minerals & Combustibles 50 96 
Metals 21 25 
Textiles 4 11 
Metallurgical Goods 14 19 
Total Weight* 131 240 
*excluding drinks, which were recorded in 1000 hectolitres. 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, 
“Commerce”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932-
1937. 
Full dataset from electronic Appendix 7. 
 
Table 7.18: Annual Average Weight and Annual Average Value of Imports, by 
Region of Destination, 1934-1937 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina 
Weight (1000 tonnes) 133 261 
Value (1000 Francs) 371 287 651 640 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Commerce”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932-1938. 
Both regions imported textiles. Despite a growing textile industry, Tonkin was 
still dependent on imports for its domestic market, although it is possible some of this 
was yarn used for further processing. Cochinchina imported more foodstuffs, fruit and 
grains, perishable colonial goods (such as sugar) and vegetable products than Tonkin 
during this time period. These are all categories of goods that would have supplemented 
the population’s diet. Tonkin’s lower imports of such goods suggests that it was better 
able to satisfy local demands through its own domestic production, or that people 
purchased less, either because they were poorer or needed less. This further lends support 
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to our hypothesis that Tonkin was a more self-sufficient economy due to its 
diversification than Cochinchina, which relied on the international market through its 
specialisation.  
In other categories, both regions seem to have imported similar quantities of goods, 
for example minerals, metallurgical goods and metals. These goods would have been 
important for the economic development of both regions. Cochinchina imported more of 
these goods than Tonkin. Presumably, there was less demand for these goods in Tonkin 
than in Cochinchina because the region already produced some of those goods. As we 
suggested, it appears that the basket of imported goods for Cochinchina and Tonkin was 
composed in a similar manner but that, as expected, the quantities imported were higher 
in Cochinchina. This is even more significant considering the lower population in 
Cochinchina, meaning that per capita imports were quite high. This confirms that 
Cochinchina was more reliant on the international economy and conversely that Tonkin 
was more self-sufficient than Cochinchina. 
Because the basket of imports was similar in both regions and because the gap in 
the quantity they exported was not as high as the gap in what they exported, Figure 7.5 is 
unsurprising.  
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Figure 7.5 
These tables and figures show that both Tonkin and Cochinchina imported 
significant quantities of goods of relatively high value, compared to what they exported. 
These trends were in line with other colonial and developing economies. As expected, 
Cochinchina's share of imports was more substantial. Cochinchina's commercial patterns 
appear to have been aligned with its specialisation: more imports were necessary as fewer 
goods were produced domestically. Tonkin's share of import was perhaps surprisingly 
high considering it was a more diverse economy both in its agrarian and its industrial 
production. This suggests that its domestic production was insufficient, thus partly 
explaining why the region was unable to close the economic divide during colonial rule.  
 
7.7) Conclusion 
According to Nørlund, the Vietnamese “autarkic concept of self-sufficiency prevailed 
from the introduction of the Méline tariff system in 1892 up to the Second World 
War”.587 The Indochinese Union certainly had a high degree of tariffs and trading 
regulations but self-sufficiency is too strong a word to use to describe either of the two 
                                                
587 Irene Nørlund, “The French Empire, the Colonial State in Vietnam and Economic Policy: 1885-1940”, 
Australian Economic History Review, Vol.31, No.1, March 1991, p.73. 
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regions. Despite these Union-wide barriers, international trade was significant for both 
regions, although it was particularly so for Cochinchina. Cochinchina and Tonkin both 
engaged mostly with the East Asian world. Nonetheless, the trading network of Tonkin 
certainly appears to have been less extensive and dynamic than Cochinchina’s. 
Tonkin’s behaviour was more cautious with regards to international trade than 
Cochinchina’s, whose specialisation in key crops appears to have ensured the region 
maximised potential advantages from the international market.  
Both Tonkin and Cochinchina were subjected to the same general colonial tariff 
and various trade related taxes. The tariff regime of Indochina was considered more 
protectionist than most of its colonial neighbours. These trade barriers might have had a 
different impact on the two regions because they did not produce the same basket of 
exportable goods or import the same quantities. Although it is almost impossible to truly 
estimate the relative openness of the two regions,588 we have argued that the trade 
relations of Tonkin and Cochinchina were not necessarily influenced by these various 
taxes, but rather by their pre-existing patterns of production, which either provided 
output for trade or not. 
Cochinchina's access to large trading houses, numerous credit institutions and 
infrastructure for trade seems to have been superior than Tonkin's. In addition, there is no 
doubt that, in financial terms, the trade balance of Cochinchina was much more 
favourable than Tonkin's. In the Tonkinese case, trade overall implied an outflow of 
financial capital, whereas in the Cochinchinese case, there was a clear and large inflow. 
Furthermore, since the Cochinchinese surplus was the main reason for an Indochinese 
trade surplus, it is safe to suggest that Cochinchina was the primary exporting region of 
Indochina. As we suggested in Chapter 4, actions by the colonial government were 
generally a reflection of existing differences in the economic performances of the regions. 
We have argued this was also the case with respect to infrastructural investment. In 
addition, we believe that investors and trading agents' greater attraction to 
Cochinchina's commercial sector reflected the greater profitability of that region's 
commercial sector. 
                                                
588 Dani Rodrik, “Trade and Industrial Policy Reform in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent 
Theory and Evidence”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.4417, August 1993, 
p.14. 
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We have also argued that production patterns and the production possibility 
frontiers they resulted in were more significant in determining the strength of the 
commercial activity of Tonkin and Cochinchina than any differences in trading partners 
these regions had. Indeed, it seems that both regions were trading with the same countries. 
The only key differences in their trade relationships were in the composition of their 
trade baskets and the quantities traded. In total, the majority of the value from 
Indochinese exports came from Cochinchinese exports: around 75%. Tonkinese exports 
tended to bring in roughly 15% of total revenue. Crop specialisation was clearly 
demonstrated in the commercial statistics for Cochinchina as rice and rubber together 
accounted for the largest share of exports in both tonnage and value. In Tonkin, the 
mining industry was the most significant exportable activity but even exports from that 
sector were relatively insignificant, in revenue terms.  
With respect to imports, both regions seem to have been dependent on a large 
influx of high value goods. Surprisingly, it was found that Tonkin's imports were closer 
to Cochinchina's than their exports had been, insofar as both imported similar baskets and 
quantities. Cochinchina imported more, as one would expect from a more specialised 
economy. Tonkin's substantial share of the import market, however, may be 
representative of an economy that was struggling. Despite its diversification and 
seemingly varied domestic supply of goods, sizeable imports were brought into the region.  
Myint explained that “international trade overcomes the narrowness of the home 
market and provides an outlet for the surplus product” and allows for a general “rise in 
the level of productivity of the country”.589 This suggests that Cochinchina's production 
patterns might, in turn, have been affected by its greater reliance on international trade. 
The theory of the trade multiplier suggests that “exports stimulate production for export 
purposes and increase the national wealth”.590 It is outside the scope of this project to 
demonstrate that Cochinchina's greater integration to the world economy may, in part, 
have driven its superior economic performance. Instead, the initial causality was the 
scope of this chapter: the economic performance of Cochinchina was clearly driven 
                                                
589 H. Myint, “The ‘Classical Theory’ of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries”, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 68, No.270, 1958, p.318. 
590 Shigeru Fujii, “Japan’s trade and her level of living”, The Science Council of Japan Division of 
Economics & Commerce, Economic Series, No.6, March 1955, Preparatory paper for the 12th conference of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, p.9. 
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by its ability to produce more per capita and there is no doubt that this ability was 
central in explaining its larger role in the international market. 
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PART 3: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE GAP  
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Chapter 8: Standards of Living 
 
8.1) Introduction 
The first part of this thesis was a re-assessment of the two key explanations provided in 
the literature for the origins of the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
The second part established how this economic divide manifested itself in the agricultural, 
industrial and commercial sectors of the two regions. However, it is still unclear how far 
the economic divide was evident in the everyday life of the population. While GDP per 
capita estimates show a significant gap in favour of Cochinchina, this is hardly a 
sufficient indicator of the relative standards of living. This chapter addresses the question 
of how the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina was reflected in the 
standards of living of their population. Research on this subject has been limited and 
we use the available evidence to evaluate standard of living via health, education, wages 
and prices in both the urban and rural parts of Indochina. In addition, we calculate new 
quantitative evidence to show to what extent some people were clearly better off in 
Cochinchina's urban centres than in Tonkin's and to show that the majority of the 
rural population of both regions were living in bleak circumstances.  
This chapter is separated in three main sections: health and education evaluations, 
urban standard of living comparisons and rural standard of living comparisons. Some 
commonly used measures of standard of living such as the Human Development Index 
cannot be constructed given insufficient data on the regions' literacy and life expectancy. 
The information available for these aspects of the standard of living is weak, at best, 
because it did not include indigenous investment in these programs. The data mainly 
allow evaluations of 'inputs' rather than 'outputs', but some scattered data points to similar 
improvements in health and education indicators in both regions. Preliminary evaluations 
suggest that both the Tonkinese and Cochinchinese populations probably had access to 
similar resources in health and education.  
The majority of this chapter's evidence and arguments rests on data for wages and 
prices in the cities and income and expenditure in the countryside. Our analysis for urban 
standards of living focuses on comparing trends in wage and price differentials between 
the two regions' main city centres. Our analysis for rural standards of living specifically 
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compares landholding sizes, incomes and expenditure for various classes of peasants. We 
calculate a suggested breakdown of the rural society to help illustrate why rural standards 
of living for the majority of the population was similar in both regions. These 
comparisons allow us to say that the GDP per capita gap overestimates the actual 
differences in standard of living, which were much less extensive. 
 
8.2) Health & education 
Health and education are considered important indicators of standard of living: they are 
two of the three indicators included in the Human Development Index. Unfortunately, 
gathering comparable data for Tonkin and Cochinchina is not always easy. For example, 
although Maks Banens' work evaluates Indochina's demographic characteristics in 
general, his indicators for infant mortality are only for Tonkin. For Cochinchina, he 
calculates stillbirths in the Asian population, instead of general infant mortality.591 With 
respect to education, the issue with the available data is a general lack of clarity and 
consistency. Such data problems limit our ability to evaluate this aspect of living 
standards. 
The available data relevant to our study are mainly for the inputs the government 
was providing to improve these social conditions, rather than the outputs generated. 
Although some estimates have been produced to better understand the resulting output, 
they have generally focused on specific regions and are rarely comparable. My approach, 
given the data constraint, uses the indirect measure based on “input” rather than final 
outcomes such as life-expectancy or literacy rates. It is nonetheless possible to evaluate 
the colonial administration's impact on the two aspects, to a certain extent. The French 
colonial budget did have significant expenditure towards these two categories of public 
goods. Colonial projects may provide a good indication of conditions, although not 
necessarily of improvements, in health and education indicators. 
 
 
                                                
591 Maks Banens, “Vietnam: a Reconstitution of its 20th Century Population History” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, 
Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-
1990, Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 2000, p.1-40. 
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Health 
Some have suggested that improvements in hygiene and available medication during 
colonial rule had the negative result of growing population pressure without equivalent 
increases in employment opportunities.592 Booth highlighted that the efforts of colonial 
governments in Southeast Asia were increasingly developmental, but she argued that “the 
colonial governments did too little with the resources at their disposal, and that too many 
opportunities were missed”.593 The French colonial government became increasingly 
aware of the need for medical attendance and regulations emphasised the need for 
adequate living quarters for workers, although this was rarely enforced.594 Overtime, 
regulations were also extended to ensure contractual workers received appropriate daily 
rations “corresponding to at least 3 200 calories, and including a certain proportion of 
fresh foodstuffs”. 595  This is far higher than van der Eng's suggestion that calorie 
consumption in the Dutch Indies between 1880-1920 was 1 900,596 or of Tao's suggestion 
that Chinese urban workers' daily intake was between 2 600 and 2 900 calories in the late 
1920s,597 and there is no doubt these regulations were not enforced. However, this rhetoric 
highlight the growing importance of health in the discourse and implementation of 
French colonial policy, which was particularly clear with respect to regulations of 
contract employment in the aftermath of WW1. 
Table 8.1 shows that annual public expenditure for health was low in Tonkin: about 
0.1 piastres per person on average in selected interwar years, which was equivalent to a 
third of the daily wage of an unskilled male worker (Section 8.3). In Cochinchina, the 
annual expenditure was more than in Tonkin, but it remained a similarly small fraction of 
the unskilled worker's daily wage. Table 8.1 shows that expenditure on public works 
from local budgets alone was more substantial than expenditure on health and this does 
not include substantial investments made through funds from the general budget. This is 
                                                
592 Bruno Lasker, Standards and Planes of Living in the Far East, Preliminary draft for the use of the 12th 
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), p.29. 
593 Anne E. Booth, “Night Watchman, Extractive, or Developmental States? Some Evidence from Late 
Colonial South-East Asia”. Economic History Review, Vol.60, No.2, 2007(2), p.262. 
594 Jean Goudal, Labour Conditions in Indo-China, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1938), p.18 & 
p.51. 
595 ibid, p.142. 
596 Pierre van der Eng, “Food Consumption and the Standard of Living in Indonesia, 1880-1990”, 
Economic Division Working Papers Southeast Asia, 93/1, p.15.  
597 L.K.Tao, “The Standard of Living Among Chinese Workers”, Paper for the Fourth Biennial Conference 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Hangchow, October-November, 1931, (Shanghai: China Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1931), p.14. 
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clearly in line with the French colonial policy of mise-en-valeur, but shows that, for 
improvements on health, the colonial administration's actions were not as extensive as 
their rhetoric suggested. Nonetheless, between 1921 and 1936, the share of per capita 
expenditure on public health did increase relative to that of public works: from less than a 
fifth to over half, showing it was becoming a bigger priority even if both types of public 
expenditure decreased in the aftermath of the Depression. Table 8.1 suggests that public 
expenditure on health was more significant in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. This may be 
misleading: Tonkin, as a protectorate, might have relied on investment done through 
traditional authority structures; Cochinchina, as a colony, would not have relied on these 
as much. 
Table 8.1: Per Capita Expenditure in Public Health, Compared to Per Capita 
Expenditure on Public Works,598 1921-1936, ($ per inhabitant) 
 
Public Expenditure for Health Public Expenditure from Local Budgets for Public Works* 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina 
1921 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.99 
1931 0.12 0.40 0.22 0.68 
1936 0.10 0.27 0.16 0.41 
* actual expenditure on public works was much higher than what this table shows but it is not possible 
to show the share of the general budget's expenditure on public works per region. 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Population 
et Territoire”, “Finances Publiques”, “Santé Publique”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: 
Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
The information contained in Table 8.2 highlights expenditure for medical 
assistance, as well as the number of medical establishments in both provinces. Medical 
assistance was the financial resources given by the general government to publicly run 
establishments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
598 Public works were part of the ‘economic interest’ section of the public budgets and included the 
infrastructural projects discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Table 8.2: Medical Assistance and Establishments, 1913-1936 
 
Annual Average Medical 
Assistance (1000 $) Medical Establishments 
 
Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina 
1913-1920 600 876 
  
1921-1930 1 088 1 259 133 214 
1931-1936 1 113 1 586 208 236 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Santé 
Publique”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
These establishments included hospitals, rural infirmaries, maternity units… The 
expenditure on medical assistance was considerably higher in Cochinchina than in 
Tonkin, on average, and the trends are similar to those seen in Table 8.1. Initial 
differences in political status mean that we should expect a more significant investment 
of public funds in these programs in Cochinchina rather than in Tonkin. The latter region 
might have been expected to rely on traditional structures of assistance, which remained 
part of its institutional structure. In Cochinchina the colonial government had official 
control over such mechanisms. 
The official records used to construct Table 8.2 included some privately run 
establishments, but the majority were state-funded. For example, in Tonkin only 8 of the 
96 establishments were privately run in Tonkin: 7 care homes for the elderly and 1 
orphanage. During the same year in Cochinchina, 15 out of the 157 recorded 
establishments were private: 5 day care centres, 5 orphanages and 5 care homes for the 
elderly.599 These were included in the official list of establishments because they were run 
by European religious organisations, but private indigenous facilities were not included. 
These privately run establishments have been retained in Table 8.2 because they help 
provide a wider picture of available facilities.  
In terms of the number of medical establishments, we see that the initial higher 
public expenditure in Cochinchina might have contributed to an initially higher number 
of establishments, but despite the more limited public funds invested in Tonkin, a faster 
growth of medical establishments occurred in the later time period. In per capita terms, it 
                                                
599 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Santé 
Publique”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939). 
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is clear that Cochinchina seems to have had both more facilities and larger volumes of 
public investment.  
Table 8.3: Number of Medical Establishments, by Type, in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, 1929-1935 
 
1929 1930 1933 1935 
 
Tonkin Cochin-china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china Tonkin 
Cochin-
china 
Hospitals 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 
Special 
Institutes 1 3 1 3 3 4 1 4 
Provincial 
Hospitals 29 21 29 20 29 20 29 20 
Municipal 
Dispensaries   1 4 2 4 2 5 
Rural 
Infirmaries 82 186 91 179 98 172 104 165 
Specialist 
Maternity 
Units 11 25 12 29 9 29 10 27 
Orphanages 
& Care 
Homes 
(Private) 10 
 
12 
 
13 
 
13 1 
Asylum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Leprosy 
Units 5 1 6 1 6 1 1 1 
Quarantine 
Station 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Isolation 
Hospitals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Santé 
Publique”, Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
As Table 8.3 shows, it is also clear that both regions had the same types of facilities, 
further suggesting the various available 'inputs' for health facilities were likely similar. 
Although some of these facilities' services might also have been provided by traditional 
facilities, it seems unlikely that village level health establishments would have had the 
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necessary budgets to provide modern health facilities and medication. This would explain 
the large number of state-funded dispensaries.  
Worker regulations also required private medical centres in establishments 
employing large numbers of contracted workers such as mines and plantations. Similar 
health facilities on Malayan rubber estates show a large decrease in the death rates: from 
232 per 1 000 in 1911 to 1.1 in 1932.600 This information is not available for Cochinchina, 
but it does align with Banens' records, which show a decline in crude death rate after 
1920,601 in line with the colonial administration's growing discourse on the importance of 
health provisions for contracted workers. It is very likely that there were other informal 
caring networks, but this information is not available. The larger importance of village 
authorities in Tonkin would suggest that there would have been more of these informal 
caring networks there than in Cochinchina, but no data can be found. It is therefore hard 
to justify the view that health provisions were necessarily better in either region.  
Banens clearly states that no consistent conclusions can be drawn for mortality 
levels before 1975,602 however his indicators suggest that in Hanoi, infant mortality for 
children under the age of 1 was 440 per 1 000 in 1925; by 1938, this had decreased to 190 
per 1 000,603 a much more substantial decline than experienced in the Straits Settlement 
between 1901-1937 (from 230.86 to 155.80).604 This information is not available for 
Cochinchina, but it seems unlikely that improvements in health would have been less 
impressive in Cochinchina, considering the data in this section. Despite some 
improvements in health indicators, life expectancy at birth for Indochina as a whole 
shows little to no improvement between 1880-1940,605 confirming that it is unlikely for 
huge differential changes to have occurred in either region during this time period. 
 
Education 
Education in colonial Southeast Asia was extensively studied in Furnivall's 1943 
Educational Progress in Southeast Asia. In this work, he suggested that school 
                                                
600  Lenore Manderson, Sickness & the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya 1870-1940, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.146. 
601 Banens, op.cit., p.20. 
602 Banens, op.cit., p.9. 
603 ibid, p.36. 
604 Manderson, op.cit., p.44. 
605 Banens, op.cit., p.19. 
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enrolments in Indochina grew during French colonial rule, but that they were low in 
comparison to other countries in the region. This is also acknowledged in Virginia 
Thompson and Richard Adloff's 1948 Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy in 
Southeast Asia. Thompson and Adloff argued that secondary schools were few in 
numbers and universities were limited to very few students.606 Education above primary 
school was limited: in 1930-1931, only 145 students were reported as graduating with a 
French Baccalaureate in Tonkin and only 44 in Cochinchina. 607  These data seem 
incredibly low, but they are confirmed in the other studies mentioned.  
The primary school information available for Indochina is mainly for ‘first degree’ 
franco-indigenous education taught in French. There is some information available on 
‘free’ education, but as it is unclear what this refers to and how comprehensive the 
authorities’ survey was, the data are difficult to use. Before 1932, primary school was in 
French. Following 1932, primary education reverted back to being taught in Vietnamese. 
Secondary schooling was also taught in French and, to achieve higher education, students 
were expected either to go to France or to study at the University of Hanoi. Table 8.4 give 
some basic data for primary schooling in Tonkin and Cochinchina during French rule. 
Included in this data set are only schools that were recognised and followed the accepted 
curriculum. The key requirement to be 'recognised' was for these schools to provide 
degrees to their students. It is quite clear thus that there could be any number of other 
education facilities that did not fit this profile but still operated within Indochina 
independently of the colonial authorities.608 Trinh van Thao's work shows that the 
Confucian schools remained a significant part of traditional rural life, especially in 
Tonkin, at least until Sarraut's policies sought to eliminate them officially.609 This was 
common to other colonies. For example, Burma's monastic schools remained important 
throughout this period, even after reforms in 1921 'un-recognised' monastic schools from 
state records,610 as did Koranic schools in the Dutch Indies.611 
 
                                                
606 Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy in Southeast Asia, 
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p.57-60. 
607 LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Instruction”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1932), p.68. 
608 J.S. Furnivall, Educational Progress in Southeast Asia, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 
p.84. 
609 Trinh van Thao, L’école française en Indochine, (Paris: Karthala, 1995). 
610 Furnivall 1943, op.cit., p.55. 
611 ibid, p.76. 
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Table 8.4: Number of Public Franco-Indigenous Primary Schools and Number of 
Attending Students, 1918-1932 
 
Number of Schools Number of Students 
Cochinchina Tonkin Cochinchina Tonkin 
1918-1921 1 027 1 045 71 950 49 900 
1924-1930 1 550 2 221 135 657 109 673 
1930-1931 1 571 2 156 137 805 111 458 
1931-1932 1 521 2 085 131 985 108 425 
LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Direction des Affaires Économiques, “Instruction”, 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
Table 8.4 shows that there was a nearly equal number of schools awarding 
completion degrees in Cochinchina and Tonkin, before 1921. Considering population 
differences alone, this may be surprising: one would expect more schools in the more 
populated area of Tonkin. However, the French had been in Cochinchina longer and 
school establishment would have started earlier. As the autonomy of the Tonkinese 
protectorate was gradually eroded and after Sarraut's official termination of alternative 
schools, a greater activity from the French administration ensued. By 1934, the level of 
schools remained stable, with Tonkin having an average of 30% more school than 
Cochinchina. The number of students attending these schools remained quite small in 
both regions: in Cochinchina, between 2 and 3% of the total population was in public 
primary school; in Tonkin, only between 0.75 and 1.4% of the total population was in 
public primary school. The reach of the primary education was smaller in Tonkin than in 
Cochinchina, but it was weak in both. This is in line with students attending recognised 
public schools in Burma: in 1900, 1.72% of the population attended school and by 1940 
this had only increased to 3.64%.612 Access to education was thus weak in both regions, 
but in line with the situation in other neighbouring colonies. 
Despite a larger number of public schools in Tonkin than in Cochinchina, Furnivall 
argued that preference was for private education rather than attending public schools in 
Tonkin.613 Trinh Van Thao's research also showed that the strength of the Confucian 
school was significant, particularly in Tonkin. The presence of such non-state supervised 
schools would inevitably have had an impact on the educational output of both regions. 
                                                
612 ibid, p.56. 
613 ibid, p.83. 
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Trinh Van Thao argued that, there was over 15 000 Confucian schools in Tonkin and 
Annam as opposed to only 487 in Cochinchina, prior to 1918.614 Sarraut formally ended 
the Confucian schools in 1918, in what Thomas Martin would call his attempt to control 
the development of communist ideals.615 Despite their official end, the impact of the large 
body of educated students from these schools had an enduring legacy of literacy, 
specifically in Chinese and non-quoc ngu written Vietnamese.616 Tonkinese preference for 
such alternative schools might explain why a larger proportion of the Cochinchinese 
population was attending French public schools. Nonetheless, because only these schools 
were able to award recognised degrees, public education (in French) was necessary for 
employment in the government. Although this should have favoured Cochinchinese 
students' chance at social mobility, in reality academic evaluations of the education 
system in French Indochina suggest there were very high barriers to social progression. 
Chesneaux explained that, despite investment in primary education, only a few secondary 
institutions existed.617 Those that did exist tended to be difficult to enter, as they required 
“competitive examination in French”.618 In other words, despite an apparent favourable 
condition for input in Cochinchina, the economic output were likely to have been the 
same in both regions. The less than spectacular output of colonial education system was 
also seen in Malaya: by 1930, only 6.4% of the native population was considered 
literate,619 so that the situation in both regions was common to the experiences of other 
Southeast Asian colonies. 
 
8.3) Urban standard of living 
Specific data on prices and wages found in the administration’s ASI and BEI relate 
specifically to the urban centres: Saigon-Cholon in the South,620 and Hanoi-Haiphong in 
                                                
614 Trinh van Thao 1995, op.cit., p.33. 
615 ibid, p.35. 
616 ibid, p.38. 
617 Jean Chesneaux, Contribution à l’histoire de la nation vietnamienne, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955(2)), 
p.198. 
618 Thompson & Adloff 1948, op.cit., p.55. 
619 Furnivall 1943, op.cit., p.76. 
620 Saigon-Cholon is an agglomeration: Cholon being the mainly Chinese suburb of Saigon. Today both 
areas are part of Ho Chi Minh City, but at the time they were two distinct, if nearby, urban centres. 
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the North.621 Further information on the wages and cost of living in Indochina is available 
from Giacometti's research. His research extends the available data on wages for Tonkin: 
official sources only recorded data for 1925 or 1931 onwards whereas Giacometti's 
estimates go back to 1912 in Tonkin.622 For Cochinchina, no new estimates were possible: 
the earliest wage information for this region is 1925 and the bulk of it only starts in 1931. 
It is possible that the trend noticed for wages during the period 1925-1940 was consistent 
throughout the colonial era: as Booth highlights, “labor markets in several parts of 
Southeast Asia [showed apparent signs of] nominal wage rigidity: as employment 
declined in the early 1930s, money wages stayed constant or declined quite slowly in 
Java, Sumatra, Thailand and Vietnam”.623   
Retail price data for Hanoi exists from 1910-1922 and for Saigon from 1910-1925. 
Cost of living indices in both cities were constructed for Europeans as of 1910 and for the 
indigenous population in 1912. The weights used to design those cost of living indices 
were calculated based on responses to a questionnaire. The number of respondents was 
rather small, but the resulting indices are central to evaluations of price trends. 
Considering the available indices, it should have been possible to obtain retail prices for 
the goods included in the basket used for constructing the European cost of living indices 
from 1910-1937 in both Hanoi and Saigon and retail prices for the goods included in the 
basket used to construct the indigenous population's cost of living indices from 1912-
1937 in Hanoi and Saigon. However, retail price data recorded in available archives are: 
retail prices for the European basket of goods in Saigon and Hanoi between 1910-1922 
and retail prices for the indigenous basket of goods in Hanoi between 1912-1923.624 
Nonetheless, these various sources provide enough data and information to estimate 
conclusively the discrepancies between wages and prices in both Saigon and Hanoi. 
 
                                                
621 Hanoi and Haiphong are the two main urban centres of Tonkin. In the statistics, the French authorities 
recorded wage data under the category of “North Indochina”, but this essentially qualified as an average 
between Hanoi and Haiphong. 
622 Jean-Dominique Giacometti, “Wages and Consumer Price for Urban and Industrial Workers in Vietnam 
under French Rule (1910-1954)” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka 
(eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 
2000), p.163-214. 
623 Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1)), p.63. 
624 The list of retail prices for Saigon’s European basket of goods extends from 1910 to 1925; however 
Hanoi’s are only available from 1910-1922 because the index was constructed in 1923.  
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Wages 
Using wage data to evaluate income trends is difficult. There is no doubt that “real wages 
do not reveal information on hours worked or how many people were deprived of regular 
income from wage labour”. 625  However, the official data on wages are the most 
comparable indicators, as they were the result of actual enquiries in the economies of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. Wage analysis is a necessary step in evaluations of living 
conditions. Wage surveys were conducted for the years 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1936, 
in both Northern enterprises and Southern ones.  
Table 8.5: Number of Surveyed Enterprises, 1931-1936 
 Saigon Enterprises Northern Enterprises* 
1931 66 24 
1932 53 24 
1933 36 36 
1934 36 48 
1936 37 56 
* includes ‘other Tonkinese centres’ as well as centres from Annam but these responses were negligible 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1936. Hanoi: 1937. p.1034-1053. 
The variability of these numbers and our inability to know the total number of 
enterprises in either city makes it difficult to judge how representative a sample these 
respondents were. Counting the number of surveyed workers as a proportion of their 
respective city's population, the survey only covered about 3% of the urban population. 
Nonetheless, these are the only available data and they form the basis for new estimates 
such as Giacometti's.  
These surveys recorded the wages for six categories of indigenous (non-European) 
workers. Specialised workers were skilled workers, such as trained carpenters and 
metallurgical workers. Specialised coolies were also skilled workers: they were on fixed 
contracts with a guaranteed number of workdays but lower daily wages. Unskilled male 
and female workers were essentially manual workers hired for unskilled jobs on a daily 
basis. Managers supervised the various classes of workers, while apprentices were 
training to become specialised workers. Most of the workers examined in these surveys 
were engaged in industrial trades. There is no information on wages in the service sector, 
                                                
625 van der Eng 1993, op.cit., p.1. 
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such as those of doctors. Retail prices do show the cost of a house call, but there is no 
further information on how many house calls were made and what other sources of 
income would have made up an average doctor's wages. As we can see from Table 8.6, 
the average daily wages, for all categories, were nearly twice as high in Saigon-Cholon as 
they were in Hanoi-Haiphong. 
Table 8.6: Average Daily Wages of Surveyed Workers, 1931-1936, ($)* 
 
Hanoi-Haiphong Saigon-Cholon 
Specialised Workers 0.62 1.28 
Specialised Coolies 0.41 0.72 
Unskilled Male Workers 0.32 0.62 
Unskilled Female Workers 0.23 0.42 
Managers 1.01 1.94 
Apprentices 0.19 0.41 
* there is a bias in using averages (the wages did fall during this time period); since we are looking at the 
comparison between the two regions rather than the evolution at this point, this is not a problem, 
especially since the rate of decrease in both regions was similar. 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1936, Hanoi: 1937, p.1036, 1041. 
To further compare these wages, we turn to skill and gender premiums. Table 8.7 
shows the skill premium, calculated as the ratio of the daily wage of an unskilled male 
worker to that of a specialised worker and the gender premium, calculated as the ratio of 
the daily wage of an unskilled male worker to that of an unskilled female worker.  
Table 8.7: Skill and Gender Premiums, Average 1931-1936 
 
Hanoi-Haiphong Saigon-Cholon 
Skill Premium* 1.96 2.07 
Gender Premium** 1.41 1.45 
*Skill Premium: specialised worker daily wage/ unskilled male daily wage 
**Gender Premium: unskilled male daily wage/ unskilled female daily wage  
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1936, Hanoi: 1936, p.1036-1054. 
It is evident that women were discriminated against in both regions. Banens' 
estimates for the size of the labour force in Vietnam suggests that women in both Tonkin 
and Cochinchina were equally important to the active labour force.626 However, in the 
                                                
626 Banens, op.cit., p.33. 
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firms surveyed, very few women were employed: in Hanoi 6-7% of the surveyed 
workforce was female and in Saigon, although female workforce grew between 1931-
1936, it remained quite a small share of the surveyed workers (a maximum of 8%).627 It is 
likely that more men were employed in industrial employment than women and this 
preference would in part explain the gender premium seen in Table 8.7. 
The skill premium in Hanoi-Haiphong was consistently higher than in Saigon-
Cholon, although the difference was quite small. In both regions, skills were rewarded 
with nearly double the salary. Consequently, it seems that wage differences were 
consistent across categories of workers. According to research by Bassino and Van der 
Eng, Saigon and Hanoi both had skill premium higher than other cities in Asia in the 
aftermath of the Depression. 628  Interestingly, according to their research, the skill 
premiums in Hanoi and Saigon did not decrease as it did in other Asian cities during the 
Depression. This is in line with Booth's suggestion of wage rigidity as a phenomenon 
unique to a few Southeast Asian economies.  
The presence of such wage rigidity in the economies of Cochinchina and Tonkin 
provides a basis for extrapolating our conclusions from analyses of wage data collected 
during the Depression to the longer time period of this thesis. Furthermore, the gap in 
wages between the two cities can be confirmed in other data sources for a more extensive 
time period. As previously explained, Giacometti traced back wages for various types of 
workers to 1925 in Cochinchina and 1912 in Tonkin.629 Figure 8.1 clearly shows that the 
wage gap was apparent even before the years of the Depression, although it did increase 
slightly after 1929. Hanoi urban wages were between 41% and 64% lower than Saigonese 
urban wages between 1925 and 1940. The consistency of the wage gap between 1929 and 
1940 is a further indication of wage rigidity in both regions. Even though this gap in the 
wages of the two regions seems large, the gap between their GDP per capita was even 
larger: Figure 1.1 showed that GDP per capita in Tonkin was a mere 30% of GDP per 
capita in Cochinchina, on average between 1900-1940.  
                                                
627 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l'Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l'Indochine Année 1936, (Hanoi:1937), p.1036-1054. 
628 Jean-Pascal Bassino & Pierre van der Eng, “The First East Asian Economic Miracle: Wages and 
Welfare of Urban Workers in East Asia and Europe, 1880-1939”, Paper for XIV International Economic 
History Congress, Helsinki: 21-25 August 2006, p.5. 
629 Giacometti 2000 “Wages and Consumer Prices", op.cit., p.163-214. 
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Figure 8.1 
There was a consistent trend showing that workers in urban Cochinchina received 
twice the wages received by their counterparts in urban Tonkin. Using wages is tricky: 
although their nominal value may have been rather rigid, they were not necessarily 
representative of income levels in the urban centres. As the Depression reached their 
economies, there were lay-offs in most industries.630 The economic impact of the Great 
Depression on unemployment would certainly mean that regardless of wage differentials, 
both cities likely had a large part of their population experiencing difficult living 
conditions. Nonetheless, the previous data do confirm that a wage gap between Saigon 
and Hanoi for the employed share of the urban population was a constant feature of the 
Indochinese economy, at least between 1925 and 1940.  
Research by Bassino and van der Eng on wages in Asia helps evaluate wage trends 
in Saigon and Hanoi. Figure 8.2 shows the evolution of wages in 6 Asian cities, including 
Saigon and Hanoi. From this illustration of wage levels in other countries, we see that 
Hanoi's wages in money terms were low by any standards, but that Saigon's were not that 
                                                
630 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1936, (Hanoi: 1937), p.1054. 
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high. In fact, the wage gap between Saigon and Hanoi seems somewhat less significant 
when placed in a wider context.  
 
Figure 8.2 
Mitchell provides further information on similar wages in Japan in 1939. These 
were converted to piastres, as shown in Table 8.8, and allow a closer evaluation of the 
significance of the Hanoi/Saigon wage gap. The wages in urban Japan were far higher 
than the wages in either Tonkin or Cochinchina's urban centres, suggesting that the wage 
differential between Tonkin and Cochinchina may not have been that significant.  
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Table 8.8: Daily Wages in Urban Japan, Taiwan and Indochina, 1939, (Piastres)  
 Tokyo 
(Japan) 
Nagoya 
(Japan) 
Taihoku 
(Taiwan) 
Taichu 
(Taiwan) 
Tonkin Cochin-
china 
Cement 
workers 2.46 2.69 - 0.99 
0.62 1.33 Millers 3.06 2.56 1.20 0.73 
Dyers 3.20 1.86 1.14 - 
Printers 3.47 2.21 1.88 1.04 
Male 
Unskilled 2.19 2.29 0.89 0.77 0.37 0.67 
Female 
Unskilled 1.29 1.36 0.63 0.57 0.3 0.41 
Japan/Taiwan: Kate L. Mitchell, Japan’s Industrial Strength, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1942 (1)), 
p.72; Currency conversion SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1939, (Hanoi: 1940), p.1278; Indochina: Jean-Dominique 
Giacometti, “Wages and Consumer Price for Urban and Industrial Workers in Vietnam under French Rule 
(1910-1954)” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke Odaka (eds) 
Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic Research, 
2000), p.163-214. 
This is a precarious evaluation. Previous studies calculated that the higher wages in 
Cochinchina resulted in comparatively higher welfare ratios for Saigon than Hanoi in 
1935, as seen in Table 8.9.631  
Table 8.9: Welfare Ratios of Hanoi, Saigon and Tokyo, 1915-1938 
 Hanoi Saigon Tokyo 
1915 0.71 1.09 1.04 
1922 0.62 1.14 1.57 
1938 0.43 0.92 1.11 
Jean-Pascal Bassino & Pierre van der Eng, “The First East Asian Economic Miracle: Wages and Welfare of 
Urban Workers in East Asia and Europe, 1880-1939”, Paper for XIV International Economic History 
Congress, Helsinki: 21-25 August 2006, p.21. 
Welfare ratios are the ratio of daily wages to the price of a basket of commodities. 
Interestingly, despite Saigonese wages being far lower than Tokyo's or Nagoya's, the gap 
between the welfare ratios of those two cities was quite small:  in 1915, Saigon's welfare 
ratio was higher than Tokyo's although by 1938, Tokyo's were slightly higher. Thus 
prices in Japanese urban centres would have matched the gap in wages. This does not 
appear to have been the case with respect to Hanoi. Hanoi's welfare ratio was consistently 
                                                
631 Bassino & van der Eng 2006, op.cit., p.1. 
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lower than both Saigon's and Tokyo's, suggesting that the wage differential noticed in the 
previous paragraphs was quite significant throughout this time period.  
Calculations of welfare ratios showed that Hanoi was consistently one of the cities 
with the lowest welfare ratios in Asia between 1880-1940,632 meaning that the wages paid 
Hanoi urban workers did not provide them with as high an access to goods as those of 
other Asian urban workers. This indicates that more research needs to be done to better 
understand the impact of Saigon's higher wages on its population's standard of living, 
specifically with respect to prices. Indeed, the French authorities held that cost of living 
was higher in Saigon.633 The next section will test this claim, using retail price data, to 
better understand the implications of wage differences.  
 
Rice prices 
In Table 8.10, we calculated the value of the purchasing power of the daily wage of 
unskilled workers in Hanoi and Saigon, in terms of the price of second quality rice. This 
was the rice included in the basket of goods purchased by indigenous unskilled workers 
in both cities. The nominal wages used are for unskilled workers, for whom rice was the 
cornerstone of diet. When constructing the cost of living indices, the colonial authorities 
estimated that 32% of the income of an indigenous household was spent on rice alone.634 
For Hanoi the latest price of rice dated back to 1923 and to 1925 for Saigon. Using the 
cost of living indices calculated by the French authorities, the prices of rice for 1925-
1936 were calculated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
632 ibid, p.21. 
633 SOAS: F. Leurence, “Les variations du coût de la vie pour les Européens à Saigon de 1910 à 1925”, 
French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine 
Année 1925, (Hanoi: 1926), p.438. 
634 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1923, (Hanoi: 1924), p.551. 
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Table 8.10: Purchasing Power of Daily Wages, in Terms of Rice in Saigon and Hanoi, 
1925-1936 
 
Nominal Daily Wage ($) Price of 1 kg of Rice ($) Rice Wages* 
Saigon Hanoi Saigon Hanoi Saigon Hanoi 
1925 0.59 0.34 0.094 0.092 6.28 3.68 
1926 0.6 0.36 0.091 0.096 6.59 3.75 
1927 0.61 0.38 0.097 0.104 6.31 3.64 
1928 0.67 0.36 0.103 0.106 6.49 3.39 
1929 0.73 0.41 0.106 0.114 6.88 3.61 
1930 0.74 0.43 0.115 0.122 6.46 3.53 
1931 0.74 0.38 0.112 0.117 6.63 3.24 
1932 0.68 0.36 0.104 0.109 6.53 3.30 
1933 0.62 0.35 0.092 0.099 6.74 3.54 
1934 0.55 0.385 0.086 0.092 6.37 4.21 
1936 0.53 0.26 0.081 0.083 6.56 3.13 
*Method: Nominal Daily Wage of Unskilled Male Worker/Price of 1 kg Rice 
Wages from: Jean-Dominique Giacometti, “Wages and Consumer Price for Urban and Industrial Workers in 
Vietnam under French Rule (1910-1954)” in Jean-Pascal Bassino, Jean-Dominique Giacometti and Konosuke 
Odaka (eds) Quantitative Economic History of Vietnam 1900-1990, (Hitotsubashi: Institute of Economic 
Research, 2000), p.163-214; Prices from: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, 
Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1922: p.645-652; Année 1925: p.442-447, Hanoi: 1923, 1926. 
A striking aspect of this table is the stability of the purchasing power in both cities, 
at least in terms of rice, even during the years of the Depression. Of course, this was 
dependent on still having a source of employment. The previous section discussed the 
relative rigidity of wages throughout this time period and this rigidity seems to have 
extended to rice wages. Further evidence on prices of rice during this time period in Asia 
shows that other countries experienced much more volatility than Indochina.635 The lack 
of flexibility in wages, compounded with a less volatile market for rice, explains the 
stability for rice wages shown in Table 8.10. The stability in the price of rice may in part 
be explained by the stability in the output of rice in the two regions. Indeed, Chapter 5 
showed that despite the Depression, both the area in cultivation and the output of rice 
remained stable, especially in Cochinchina. When comparing these rice wages to those 
from other cities in Asia (Figure 8.3), it is clear that the North-South gap in purchasing 
power was quite significant, as Saigon's rice wage was on par with Bangkok's and the 
                                                
635 Bassino & van der Eng 2006, op.cit., p.6. 
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highest in this grouping of countries. This is largely dependent on the fact that both 
Bangkok and Saigon were cities located in two of the three largest exporters of rice 
during this time period, allowing for lower prices of rice. 
 
Figure 8.3 
Based on rice prices alone, it seems that a worker in Saigon was able to purchase 
twice as much rice with his daily wages as his counterpart in Hanoi. If this calculation is 
representative of price differences between the two cities, Saigon’s wages provided twice 
the purchasing power of Hanoi’s wages and really does show a significant North-South 
gap, in line with previous research on welfare ratios, although still lower than the gap 
suggested in GDP per capita estimates. Tonkinese wages did not provide as much access 
to rice as Cochinchina's: the price of rice was higher, further accentuating the impact of 
the wage differential on relative standards of living. 
 
Cost of living 
It is unclear if rice wages provide a representative illustration of price differences 
between the two cities. To get a clearer idea of the differences in actual cost of living 
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between the two cities, we must include other prices. It is clear that to understand the 
impact of Saigon's higher wages on its population's standards of living, we must 
investigate price differences in a basket of goods typical to the cities urban populations. 
The wages previously observed were for the working indigenous class. The 
French constructed cost of living indices for the indigenous middle-class of Hanoi and 
Saigon. Because we cannot find information for the breakdown of the basket of goods for 
Saigon's indigenous middle-class, we use that of Hanoi's as a common basket for both 
cities. It is unlikely that there would have been a great deal of difference in the weights 
associated with various categories of goods included in a typical basket in both cities. 
Table 8.11 shows the weights French authorities associated with various goods included 
in this basket. 
Table 8.11: Weights for Hanoi's Indigenous Middle-Class's Basket of Goods 
Fo
od
 
Rice 32.1 
Lo
dg
in
g 
ex
pe
ns
es
 Rent 8.3 
Fresh 
vegetables 6.4 Water 0.4 
Chinese 
vermicelli 1.4 Wood 1.3 
Bean paste 2.4 Petrol 2.6 
Eggs 0.8 
C
lo
th
in
g Calico 
fabric 7.5 
Beef 3.5 Silk 0.4 
Pork 2.8 
O
th
er
 
Soap 0.3 
Chicken 2 Train 1.4 
Grease 0.3 Rickshaw 0.6 
Various 
fishing 
products 
5.2 
Theatre 
1.5 
Brine 2.5 
 
Fresh fruit 4.9 
Tea 2 
Rice alcohol 9.4 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1923, (Hanoi: 1924), p.551. 
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Clearly rice was the most significant expense, but it seems rational to expect a 
more complete basket of goods to temper the conclusions we reached when looking 
solely at rice wages. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, matched prices are only 
available for the goods found in the European basket of goods. Table 8.12 shows, 
however, that the price differential between the same goods purchased in Hanoi by 
Europeans and indigenous people alike were rather similar. Price differential were likely 
the result of the greater bargaining power of the indigenous population, as well as the 
cheaper options of seats in either the theatre or the trains. 
Table 8.12: Annual Average of Retail Prices of Goods in Hanoi for Europeans 
and Indigenous People, 1912-1922, ($)  
 
Indigenous Hanoi European Hanoi 
Rice 2nd quality (100 kg) 7.18 7.59 
Eggs (100) 1.50 1.85 
Fish (kg) 0.31 0.59 
Railway (ticket) 0.64 3.09 
Rickshaw (ride) 0.05 0.10 
Theatre (ticket) 0.18 0.57 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1925: p.442-447; Année 1922: p.645-652; Année 1923, p.556, Hanoi: 1923-1926. 
Considering this, we will assume that the prices for goods included in the 
European basket of goods were representative of urban prices and that the differential 
between European and indigenous people in Saigon would have been rather similar to 
that in Hanoi. Consequently, the ratio of prices in Saigon and Hanoi were probably 
similar when using goods purchased by Europeans or by indigenous people. 
Problematically, not all the goods included in the indigenous basket of goods shown in 
Table 8.11 were included in the European basket of goods. We therefore need to use a 
smaller basket. Table 8.13 shows the goods that were included in the basket of goods of 
the indigenous populations for which we can find matched prices and the weights 
associated to these goods in our new basket. The weights provided are based on Table 
8.11's, with some modifications due to either unavailability of prices or incomparable 
units. 
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Table 8.13: Suggested Basket of Goods for the Indigenous 
Populations of Saigon and Hanoi 
 
Weight 
Rice (2nd quality) 52 
Egg 0.8 
Beef 3.5 
Pork 2.8 
Chicken 2 
Fish 5.2 
Beer 9.4 
Heating Wood 12.6 
Calico 7.9 
Soap 0.3 
Rickshaw 2 
Cinema Ticket 1.5 
Prices for these goods were recorded for the years 1910-1922 in Hanoi and 1910-
1925 in Saigon. Using the cost of living indices the French published, prices can be 
extrapolated until the end of the time period. Because we want to know how the price of 
this basket of goods evolved in Hanoi relative to in Saigon, we compiled a ratio of the 
price in Hanoi relative to the price in Saigon for each good. Table 8.14 shows an example 
year for this calculation.  
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Table 8.14: Prices in Saigon and Hanoi for Goods Included in Typical 
Basket of Goods, 1910* 
Good Quantity Saigon Prices ($) 
Hanoi Prices 
($) 
Hanoi/Saigon 
(ratio) 
Rice 100 kg 6.26 6.6 1.05 
Eggs 1 0.02 0.01 0.67 
Beef kg 0.26 0.25 0.96 
Pork kg 0.49 0.43 0.88 
Chicken couple 0.6 0.7 1.17 
Fish kg 0.26 0.55 2.12 
Beer 48 bottles 12 0.27 0.02 
Heating 
wood 100 kg 5 2.43 
0.49 
Calico meter 00.32 0.25 0.78 
Soap kg 0.3 2.12 7.07 
Rickshaw per ride 0.25 0.1 0.4 
Cinema seat 0.8 0.5 0.63 
*Extended Time Series in Appendices 12a & 12b. 
SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine Année 1925: p.442-447; Année 1922: p.645-652; Année 1923, 
p.556, Hanoi: 1923-1926.  
Using these ratios and the respective weights associated to each goods, it is now 
possible to track the movement of the price of this basket of goods in Hanoi relative to 
Saigon. Figure 8.4 displays this trend and includes the trend in relative wages displayed 
in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.4 
The previous section showed that Hanoi urban wages were between 41% and 64% 
lower than Saigonese urban wages between 1925 and 1940. On average, a basket of 
goods in Hanoi was only 8% lower than in Saigon. It seems clear that the lower wages in 
Hanoi were not compensated by proportionately lower prices. Figure 8.4 highlights this 
discrepancy. Although in 1936 the price of the basket of goods in Hanoi was almost 31% 
lower than in Saigon, this was the lowest differential. Furthermore, between 1928 and 
1932, the price of a basket of goods in Hanoi was higher than in Saigon, presumably due 
to the turmoil associated with the Depression. Figure 8.4 very clearly shows that Saigon's 
urban workers would have had a larger access to marketable goods than their counterparts 
in Hanoi. Bassino and Van der Eng have constructed baskets of goods for the urban 
households of Asia, including those in Hanoi and Saigon from 1915 to 1938. They 
concluded that Saigonese workers, either unskilled or skilled, were generally better off 
than others in the region, with the possible exception of those in Bangkok. Hanoi workers 
tended to be on a par with other cities that had lower welfare ratios, such as Singapore or 
Penang.636 Chapter 7 highlighted the greater integration of the Cochinchinese economy to 
the world economy via Saigon. It is possible that this integration resulted in competition 
in prices, driving the price of many commodities down. 
                                                
636 Bassino & van der Eng 2006, op.cit., p.15. 
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The basket of goods presented does not include data for rent. Although this 
category only accounted for 8.3% of the total basket, prices presents an interesting 
anomaly compared to the information in Figure 8.4. In both cities, monthly rental prices 
were separated in three potential levels of rent: a modest European rental price, an 
average rental price and a high-end rental. In 1910, the prices for these three levels of rent 
were 10$, 40$ and 50$, respectively in Saigon & 35$, 45$ and 60$ in Hanoi. In all three 
categories, rent was more expensive in Hanoi then it was in Saigon, clearly going against 
the trend of Figure 8.4. The anomaly may in part have been due to government 
intervention. The Loucheur Act of 1928 provided some Europeans with discounted prices 
for housing in Saigon.637 The original gradation of rent prices pre-dates the Loucheur Act, 
meaning that even without this government intervention rents tended to be higher in 
Hanoi. Chapter 3 showed that Hanoi was growing faster than Saigon, which could partly 
explain higher rent prices. In terms of rent for the indigenous population, it was certainly 
much lower than for Europeans: in Hanoi, top rental prices for the indigenous population 
were recorded as 7$ a month. There is no information for such prices in Saigon, but it is 
possible that rents would have been cheaper considering the trends in prices for European 
lodging. Consequently, even when looking at other retail price evidence, it does not seem 
that the higher wages of Saigonese workers were matched by a proportionately higher 
cost of living. Standards of living in the urban centres of Saigon and Hanoi clearly show 
that the better economic performance of Cochinchina was reflected in its urban 
population's standards of living.  
However, even accounting for cost of living differential, the wage gap between the 
two regions is not nearly as large as the GDP per capita gap between those regions. 
Wages in Hanoi were between 41% and 64% lower than those in Saigon. Prices in Hanoi 
were only 8% lower than those in Saigon, on average. GDP per capita in Tonkin was only 
30% of GDP per capita in Cochinchina. Clearly the economic divide suggested in GDP 
per capita data far over-estimates the actual differences between the standards of living of 
the urban populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
 
 
                                                
637 Goudal, op.cit., p.255. 
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8.4) Rural standard of living 
Analysis of the economic evolution of Indochina during French rule has said that “the 
French regime has had virtually no effect upon the peasant craftsmen, who have 
continued to build the same type of primitive house, weave the traditional cotton or silk 
clothing…”.638 Although changes in the economy during French rule did result in higher 
standards of living in urban Cochinchina than urban Tonkin, they may not have had any 
impact on the wider rural population. Scholars have argued that many of the benefits of 
economic works during the colonial era only accrued to the elites.639 In this section, we 
will therefore look into the standard of living of the average peasant in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina. Unfortunately, the data are very scarce on the subject, due to the difficulty 
of collecting accurate and extensive information at the time. For example, the Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine included some information on agrarian wages in Cochinchina 
for local and Tonkinese migrant workers, but only for the year 1933.  
Table 8.15: Cochinchina Agrarian Daily Wages, 1933, ($) 
 Mean Harvest time 
*Male 0.22 0.27 
*Female 0.16 0.2 
**Male migrant from the 
North 0.3 0.3 
**Female migrant from the 
North 0.1 - 0.23 0.1-0.23 
* Including 2 daily meals; ** including housing and 700 grams of rice  
SOAS:  French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin 
Economique de l’Indochine Année 1934, Hanoi: 1935, p.175. 
Table 8.15 shows available data on the wages for Cochinchinese labour in 
agricultural production. The French administration was responsible for deciding the 
wages immigrant labour received. Wages and benefits were set ‘high’, so as to induce 
movement towards Cochinchina.640 Furthermore, as of 1927, the French administration 
introduced 5% of retained earnings to be given to the workers upon the end of their 
                                                
638 Virginia Thompson, Labor Problems in Southeast Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.178. 
639 Booth 2007(2), op.cit., p.256. 
640 SOAS: French Indochina, Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine, Bulletin Economique de 
l’Indochine Année 1936, (Hanoi: 1937), p.1053. 
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contracts.641 Despite these apparent benefits, as we saw in Chapter 3, migration was short-
lived and limited. It seems therefore that the higher wages were not enough to draw in 
immigrants.  These workers were either coolies from the area or contracted migrants from 
Tonkin or Annam. Male contractual workers imported from the Northern provinces 
generally were paid higher wages than their local equivalents, although the difference 
shrunk during the peak harvest period. Surprisingly, female contractual labour at times 
received lower wages than those of their local counterparts. These lower wages may have 
been due to workers being encouraged to move in families, so that the higher wages for 
men were the main compensation. Like other contracted workers, these migrant workers 
received a daily allowance of 700 grams of rice and free lodging. More importantly, since 
these workers were hired on a 3 years contract guaranteeing work for at least 25 days of 
each month,642 the immigrant worker, in total, earned a more substantial income than the 
local labourer. This may have been mitigated by the non-contracted worker's ability to 
seek alternative employment during the slack season.  
Demand for agricultural labour was often only for seven out of twelve months. This 
would mean that for the other five months of the year, non-contracted workers were free 
to be employed in the cities or alternate activities. In Tonkin many rice fields had two 
harvests creating a longer demand for labour during the year. During the slack season, 
Tonkinese non-contracted workers also could engage in alternative employment in the 
agrarian sector (not all provinces had harvests at the same time) or rural manufacturing. 
Rural wages in both regions were therefore likely to underreport a peasant's total income. 
The presence of alternative employment may partly explain limited migration between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. Alternatively, peasants in Tonkin might have been reluctant to 
relocate because a higher cost of living may have reduced the perceived gains of the more 
attractive wages seen in Table 8.15.  
Gourou, through his own field research in Tonkin and with the help of the French 
colonial administration in Cochinchina recorded primary data on the rural income and 
expenses of peasant households. His data are only for Cochinchina in 1937 and Tonkin in 
1936-1938. From these scattered data, standard of living can be partly evaluated. In each 
region, Gourou recorded information on household income and expenditure. Households 
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were distinguished based on the size of their landholding. Table 8.16 shows the 
classifications he used.  
Table 8.16: Gourou's Categories of Household, by Size of Landholding, 1936-1938 
Cochinchina Coolies 
Small 
Tenants 
(< 5 
hectares) 
Middle 
Tenants (5-
10 hectares) 
Large 
Tenants 
(>10 
hectares) 
Middling 
Landowners  
(8 hectares) 
Tonkin Poor Peasants (few hundred square meters) 
Small 
Landowners 
(1 hectare) 
Well to do 
rural 
Landowners 
(1 - 5 
hectares) 
Wealthy 
Rural 
Landowners 
(>5 hectares) 
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945, 
p.531; p.538-543. 
The first noticeable difference in Gourou's classification is the prevalence of 
ownership in Tonkin as opposed to tenantship in Cochinchina. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, this was a clear difference in the agrarian sectors of both regions. However, it 
is also clear that the size of the land farmed by households, whether owners or tenants, 
was much higher in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. According to Gourou, adjusting for 
double cropping in Tonkin increased cultivable land area from 15 000 km2 to 18 500 km2, 
as seen in Chapter 5.643 This is an adjustment factor of 1.23 and is insufficient to fully 
explain the landholding size differences. Assuming a small landowner in Tonkin engaged 
in double cropping, his property size would have increased from 1 hectare to 1.23 
hectares, still much smaller than the landholding small tenants in Cochinchina farmed. 
From Chapter 3, we also know that plantations and concessions to agrarian entrepreneurs 
were more important in Cochinchina than in Tonkin. Such plantations are not considered 
in Gourou's data, the largest estates in Cochinchina for which Gourou recorded income 
were those of middling landowners so Gourou's data do not permit comparisons of rural 
elites. A further problem with Gourou's data is that they do not include information on 
how the rural population was spread across these landholding categories. 
In Table 8.17, we provide a preliminary estimate of the breakdown of population by 
occupation in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. To obtain estimates of how the rural 
population might have been broken down, it was necessary to look at all the main groups 
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of social classes in the economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina for which data could be 
found. 
Table 8.17: Estimated Distribution of the Population in Cochinchina and Tonkin, 
by Occupation, 1929, (%) 
 
Cochinchina Tonkin 
Europeans 0.282 0.190 
Urban Population 14.000 4.300 
Commercial/Industrial Contracted Labour 0.724 0.873 
Mining Contracted Labour 0.000 0.857 
Agricultural Contracted Labour 0.497 1.095 
Daily Wage Labour (Rural) 38.023 36.330 
Tenant/Farmer/Small Landowner 45.890 55.611 
Large Landowner 0.583 0.744 
These data are the author's own calculations, as described in the text 
It is understood that Table 8.17 provide only preliminary estimations based on 
various assumptions. This data is for the year 1929. In 1929, the total population of 
Tonkin was 9 036 million people and that of Cochinchina was 5 471 million people.644 
The ASI recorded the total number of Europeans in each region in 1921 and 1931. By 
assuming constant growth in this group's population, we derived that there were about 17 
111 Europeans in Tonkin in 1929 and 15 444 Europeans in Cochinchina in 1929.645 
Dividing these numbers by the total regional population gave the percentage share of the 
European population in these regions. The share of the urban population is taken from 
Gourou's work as 4.3% in Tonkin and 14% in Cochinchina.646 Goudal's work showed the 
number of workers that were engaged in contracted labour either in agriculture, mining or 
industrial/commercial employment in 1929.647 We used these data as the number of active 
workers in this category of workers. Banens' estimated share of the population that was 
active was used to calculate the total number of people that would have been part of this 
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class of society (i.e. including dependents).648 Adding up these various shares provided us 
with a basis to estimate how the rural sector was broken down.  
To calculate the share of the population that owned large estates, we used the 
number of parcels as indicators. In 1931, Tonkin had nearly 7000 communes while 
Cochinchina had 1284.649 We used the number of communes in Tonkin as the number of 
households that owned large landholdings (assuming one large landholder per commune). 
We did not do so for Cochinchina, because Gourou argued that 2.5% of Cochinchina's 
rural population owned more than 50 hectares.650 He also suggests that in Cochinchina 
there were 255 000 rural proprietors.651 This would result in 6 375 households with more 
than 50 hectares, classifying as 'large landowners', about 5 times the number of 
communes.  In Tonkin, Gourou argued that large landholding households had on average 
9.6 members.652 In Cochinchina, all of Gourou's households were assumed to have 5 
members.653 Using this, we derived the number of people that might belong to this class in 
each region. Although this would seem to favour Tonkin as there would have been more 
'large landowners', the next section will clearly show that the size of land these 'large 
landowners' owned was much smaller in Tonkin than in Cochinchina, as befits 
description of the agrarian economies of the regions at the time. It is very likely that it 
was in this share of the population that large differences in income were experienced. 
Unfortunately, no data on their income has been found. However, considering its small 
size in both regions, this would have affected incomes for only an elite part of the 
populations of Tonkin or Cochinchina and would not necessarily affect our hypothesis 
that the largest shares of the populations of both regions experienced similar living 
standards. 
Bernard argued that 45% of Cochinchina's rural population was engaged in work 
on landholdings larger than 50 hectares.654 Certainly, many of the people working in these 
large holdings may have been engaged in sharecropping, however, it is also likely that the 
people employed on these lands would have been at the bottom of the socio-economic 
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ladder, not being owners of the land they farmed. We assumed that this meant that 45% 
of the remaining population was daily wage labour or coolies. This share represents 
38.023% of Cochinchina's total population. The remaining part (45.890%) was thus 
assumed to be tenants/farmers/small to middling landowners.  
For Tonkin, Popkin estimated that by 1930, 60% of all rural families were either 
landless or cultivated less than 0.36 hectares.655 This equated to 55.611% of the total 
population. The remaining share of the population (36.330%) thus became part of the 
tenant/farmer/small landowner share of the population. These shares seemed unlikely 
given the generally held belief that the majority of the peasants in Tonkin owned their 
own land. Popkin footnotes Yves Henry's seminal work on the breakdown of the agrarian 
population to justify his assertion, however we argue this is a misinterpretation: not only 
landless peasants worked communal lands. Instead, both Henry and Bernard argue that 
this 60% of the population were in fact small tenants, 656 while the remainder of the 
population might have been considered poorer. Consequently, we switched the resulting 
population shares in Table 8.17. This switch seemed to fit Bernard's view that 60% of the 
rural population worked on communal lands or on landholdings smaller than 5 hectares.657 
Considering this breakdown, it is clear that a comparison between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina's rural standard of living can be drawn by evaluating income and 
expenditure differences between the lower classes of rural households. 
Because of the small sizes of landholdings in Tonkin, the poorer households would 
have had to either rent out additional land or work as hired labour. This places the poor 
Tonkinese peasant between the financial situations of a coolie and of a small tenant in 
Cochinchina. For both regions, Gourou recorded that the majority of total income came 
from wages earned collecting the harvests and from jobs tending to the collected harvest 
such as husking rice. In addition, some secondary crops and stock raising supplemented 
the income. Gourou’s research prompted him to suggest that “in Cochinchina there does 
not seem to be a class at so miserable a level as in Tonkin”.658 Certainly a preliminary 
glance at Table 8.18 shows a relatively large gap in the income of the Tonkinese 'poor 
peasant' compared to the Cochinchinese coolie/small tenant. Poor Tonkinese peasants 
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earned 30-40% less than the coolies or small tenant of Cochinchina, respectively. This is 
less than the wage gap that existed between the urban centres, but remains quite 
substantial. It is likely that the price differential seen in the urban centres also existed in 
the rural sector. This would have reduced the gap slightly between the living standards of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina, although there would have remained a gap of 20-30%. 
Table 8.18: Income Per Person, in Various Categories of Households, 1936-1938, ($) 
Cochinchina 
Coolies 
Small Tenants* 
(< 5 hectares) 
Middle 
Tenants* (5-10 
hectares) 
Large Tenants* 
(>10 hectares) 
Middling 
Landowners*  
(8 hectares) 
27 30.2 40.6 107.6 107.6 
Tonkin 
Poor Peasants* (few hundred 
square meters) 
Small 
Landowners* (1 
hectare) 
Well to do rural 
Landowners* (1 
- 5 hectares) 
Wealthy Rural 
Landowners** 
(>5 hectares) 
18.4 36.2 104.2 167.4 
* households size of 5; ** household size of 9.6. 
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945, p.531; 
p.538-543. 
However, this preliminary evaluation may be misleading. In Tonkin, even the 
lowest income households owned some land, allowing them access to some home-grown 
products and potentially reducing the needs for monetary income. Moreover, Chapter 6 
established that more peasants in Tonkin also engaged in some rural manufacturing such 
as textile spinning or weaving to supplement their income than in Cochinchina. It is 
unclear if Gourou's data fully accounted for this extra income, but it seems likely that 
Tonkinese peasants would have needed less monetary income than their Cochinchinese 
counterparts. It is therefore not necessarily true that the Tonkinese peasant was 
significantly more miserable than the Cochinchinese peasants. Furthermore, the income 
patterns of the other classes of peasants in both regions show much more similarity. 
Considering that in both regions a large share of the population would have fallen within 
these categories, the judgment that Tonkinese peasants experienced worse living 
standards than Cochinchinese peasants seems an exaggeration. 
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Table 8.19: Share of Food in Total Expenditure, per Categories of Households, 
1936-1938, (%) 
Cochinchina 
Coolies 
Small Tenants* 
(< 5 hectares) 
Middle 
Tenants* (5-10 
hectares) 
Large Tenants* 
(>10 hectares) 
Middling 
Landowners*  
(8 hectares) 
71 60 60 43 36 
Tonkin 
Poor Peasants* (few hundred 
square meters) 
Small 
Landowners* 
(1 hectare) 
Well to do rural 
Landowners* 
(1 - 5 hectares) 
Wealthy Rural 
Landowners** 
(>5 hectares) 
79 63 63 N/a 
* household size of 5; ** household size of 9.6. 
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in French Indochina, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945, 
p.531; p.538-543. 
Table 8.19 shows the share of total expenditure going towards the purchase of food. 
The share of total income spent on food decreased substantially more in Cochinchina than 
in Tonkin as the rural household’s income increased. This would suggest that the Engel 
coefficient in Cochinchina was lower than in Tonkin. A lower Engel coefficient is often 
associated with a higher standard of living. We cannot further assess the Engel coefficient 
because we only have a snapshot in time and thus cannot follow these households’ 
progress over time. Nonetheless, the information suggests that the poorer classes of 
peasants may have experienced larger hardships in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. 
Previous scholars have often highlighted that peasants in Tonkin were 
undernourished,659 some suggesting that every year before the harvest, peasants could 
only afford one meal.660 Gourou estimated that an average Tonkinese peasant’s meal 
would cost around 0.64 francs, or 0.064 piastres, per person in the late 1930s. This meal 
would have included rice, various tubers, sesame, salt and some fish.661 Assuming one 
person ate only one such meal a day for a year, expenditure on food would require 
($0.064 * 365 =) $23.36. Clearly, this amount is larger than the income available for the 
poor landowner in Tonkin, but it is also a significantly larger share of the Cochinchinese 
coolie's income than Table 8.19 suggests they spent on food. This suggests that the 
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peasants either had to have even less to eat than this basic meal suggested in Gourou, or 
that they had to supplement their meal with their own production of goods, or with extra 
income.  
It further suggests that the poorer peasants in both regions, assuming prices and 
meal contents were similar, would have had difficulty reaching adequate nutrition based 
on these data, as did other peasants in Asia. The existence of non marketed and home 
produced goods makes it difficult to be categorical on this, but it is not impossible that 
the poorer households in both Tonkin and Cochinchina lived in rather bleak conditions. 
This was the case in other neighbouring economies. For example, in his surveys of 
Chinese living standards, Tao explains that the standard diet was “inadequate for health 
and wellbeing”. 662  Scholars have suggested this was also the case in the colonial 
economies of Burma and the Philippines.663 Indeed, Furnivall argued that there was a 
“racial division of labour” which resulted in Burmans having no choice but to engage in 
agricultural production and earning low incomes as a result of the dominance of the 
sector by moneylenders or large landholders.664 The majority of the population in both 
regions continued to have low standards of living. In fact, international comparisons 
suggest that living standards in Indochina were very low, based on consumption. Bruno 
Lasker suggests that, if one takes the USA's living standards as 100 in 1934-1938, 
Indochina stood at 17.7, on par with the Dutch East Indies, but lower than the Philippines 
at 25.7.665  
Certainly living conditions in Tonkin, at least in monetary terms, seem to have 
been worse than in Cochinchina for the poorest classes of peasants. However, scattered 
information suggests that these poor peasants in Tonkin had access to alternative sources 
of food and that their employment in rural manufacturing may have limited the actual 
impact of lower income on their standard of living. Moreover, the difference in potential 
standard of living for other categories of rural households does not suggest such a large 
gap in income. Considering the suggested breakdown of the rural population in Table 
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8.17, it is likely that on average standards of living in the rural populations of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina were much closer than standards of living in the regions' urban populations. 
If living standards were equally low for the majority of the population in Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, this may help explain the limited migration between the two regions, and 
thus the continuation of the economic divide during colonial rule. Therefore, once more 
the gap suggested in GDP per capita estimates vastly overestimates the standard of living 
differences between the rural populations of Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
 
8.5) Conclusion 
The findings do show that urban wages were much higher in Saigon than they were 
in Hanoi, while prices were only marginally higher in Saigon than in Hanoi. In rural 
areas however, home to the vast majority of the population, the data and other research 
suggests that standards of living in both regions was dismal for most. Although some of 
the larger landholders would have experienced much higher standards of living in 
Cochinchina than in Tonkin, the average peasants experienced similar standards of 
living, bleak for the most part. Booth argued that “it is widely recognized that trends in 
per capita GDP are not reliable guides to changes in living standard: economic growth 
often confers much greater benefits on some groups in society”,666 profits increase more 
rapidly than wages. Our previous analysis is in line with this assessment: the living 
standards for the majority of the population in both Tonkin and Cochinchina were likely 
to have been relatively similar, contrary to what GDP per capita estimates suggest. This 
may help explain why migration was so limited: the prospects of better living standards 
were illusionary for peasants. It may have been possible in the urban centres, but it was 
not guaranteed. In addition, considering that Tonkin had alternatives to help supplement 
income from agricultural work, reluctance to move was doubled. 
The colonial administration’s contribution to mise-en-valeur through expenditure 
on social services, such as health and education, provided inconclusive evidence on other 
improvements to standards of living. More public expenditure to these projects did go to 
Cochinchina, but in both cases it is very likely that traditional facilities supplemented 
colonial projects in health and education, albeit to differing degrees. Moreover, the 
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scattered data on the 'output' of these two indicators show only limited and slow 
improvements in both Tonkin and Cochinchina during French rule. The data available 
do not suggest a great difference in improvements of indicators of health and 
education over time for either region.  
Overall, supply of labour in Tonkin was higher than in Cochinchina, as Chapter 3 
showed. Saigon-Cholon, during this time period, was a much more significant urban 
centre than either Hanoi or Haiphong, or even than the two of those together. The 
population of Saigon-Cholon was about twice that of Hanoi-Haiphong, relative to their 
respective total population. The economic life of Saigon-Cholon was probably more 
dynamic: a more concentrated urban setting gives rise to an ever-increasing cycle of 
consumption and production. This has a number of possible implications: the already 
important urban centres of Saigon and Cholon were growing, which may have increased 
the demand for goods and services. Considering that Tonkin was more populous than 
Cochinchina in absolute terms, one would assume that the labour market was more 
competitive and that wages would have been lower in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. 
Looking at the wages of particular groups of workers we saw this to be the case: wages in 
Hanoi and Haiphong were generally half of wages in Saigon and Cholon.  
The greater commercial activity of Cochinchina might explain why living standards 
in urban centres seem to have better reflected the economic divide. Cochinchinese port 
cities' booming commercial activity would have attracted labour, and indeed Chapter 3 
showed urban centres near ports were of growing importance. The lesser importance of 
international commerce by the port city of Haiphong and of city life in Tonkin might 
partly explain the lower wages: demand for labour was more limited while the supply 
was very high. Standards of living with respect to wages and prices in the urban centres 
however do show a significant gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina that was not fully 
explained by cost of living differences.  
Although urban standards of living do show significant differences between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina, the analysis of rural standards of living does not. Income for the 
majority of Cochinchinese peasants was only marginally higher than income for the 
majority of Tonkinese peasants. Furthermore, Tonkinese peasants could supplement their 
monetary income more significantly: they owned at least some land whereas 
Cochinchinese peasants were mostly landless and depended entirely on wages or income 
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through tenancy/farming agreements or as wage labour. While average standards of 
living in the two regions were low, Cochinchinese peasants tended to be slightly better 
off than their Tonkinese counterparts, although not nearly to the extent one would expect 
from the economic divide GDP estimates suggested. 
We have argued that living standards did differ between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
but that this was mainly felt by the elite classes of the two regions. The vast majority of 
the population struggled with rather low standards of living, mainly in the rural 
sector of both the Tonkinese and Cochinchinese economies. We suggest that the 
similarity in living standards for Tonkin and Cochinchina may partly explain the limited 
migratory flows between the two regions, which perpetuated the existing differences in 
production and commercial patterns of each region. These patterns themselves influenced 
colonial policy and domestic preferences, thus further limiting integration between the 
regions. This may explain why the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
remained significant throughout this time period.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
In 1954, the Geneva Accords split Vietnam into two territories: North Vietnam under Ho 
Chi Minh’s Viet Minh administration and South Vietnam under President Diem’s 
administration and, by extension, America’s. Although at times this has been assumed as 
the origin of the political North-South divide in Vietnam, the country had already been 
divided under French colonial rule: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the middle, and 
Cochinchina in the south. The 1954 division did mark the start of the ideological divide 
between North and South: communism in the former, and capitalism in the latter. Recent 
GDP estimates on colonial Indochina show that an economic divide already existed 
between those two economies between 1900 and 1940. Tonkin's GDP per capita was, 
on average, 70% lower than Cochinchina's. This thesis has shown that the 
economies of Tonkin and Cochinchina displayed markedly different circumstances 
and production patterns during French colonial rule, which explain this economic 
gap. This thesis has also presented evidence that the GDP per capita gap far 
overstates the gap in the standard of living of the majority of the population of both 
regions. 
The literature on the economic history of Vietnam is relatively silent on the origin, 
nature and impact of the economic gap that existed between Tonkin and Cochinchina 
during the colonial period. A review of the literature on colonial Indochina published 
during colonial rule suggests that scholars of the Indochinese economy or history 
evaluated economic development in light of colonial ideology, using colonialism as the 
central mover of economic progress. This belief may in part explain why few other 
studies suggested alternative reasons for a divergence between Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
Even though much of the literature recognised the existence of an economic gap, few of 
these authors generally presented any evidence of significant differences between the 
colonial administration and policies of the two regions. Despite the obvious problem in 
this, no studies, that we are aware of, exist that explain why there was a GDP gap, how 
the economies actually differed in their production patterns or what the gap meant for the 
living standard of the Indochinese populations. The recent literature's relative silence on 
such issues is especially surprising considering that a gap between North and South 
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Vietnam since Doi Moi has emerged. Because little research on the historical aspect of 
such a gap exists, it is not possible to say whether or not the current gap is a continuation 
of the colonial gap a new phenomenon. This research makes a start in helping historians 
to assess this. In addition, the conclusions of this research may help shed light on the 
development of nationalism in the country, through a better understanding of potential 
differences in economic motivations between the various areas.  
 
Main conclusions 
The first part of this thesis, Chapters 3 & 4, re-evaluated the two suggestions found in the 
literature for the origin of the economic gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina: 
demographics and colonial policy.  
With respect to demographics, the argument was that Tonkin's greater population 
pressures and longer history of such population pressure resulted in less fertile soils. The 
populations of the two regions were certainly very different: Tonkin was twice as 
populous as Cochinchina throughout this time period and density in the cultivable areas 
was consequently much higher in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. The average population 
density in Tonkin was over 370 inhabitants per square kilometre, whereas in Cochinchina 
the most densely populated region only held about 170 inhabitants per square kilometre. 
There is no doubt this would have resulted in productivity differences considering that 
Indochina was a primarily agrarian country. Indeed, recent research suggested that 
Cochinchina's rice fields' yields were much higher than Tonkin's. French officials were 
correct in looking at population differences as a source of the economic gap based on 
their impact on land productivity.  
However, we have also suggested that demographics would have had another 
impact, specifically on land and labour utilisation patterns. The differences in population 
density and the fact that Cochinchina was populated much later than Tonkin would have 
had an impact on the way in which land was both divided and worked. Indeed, 
Cochinchina's land was divided in much larger estates than Tonkin's, where most 
households owned small plots of land. These differences, pre-dating French colonialism, 
would have been perpetuated by the colonial administration' land policy of concessions: 
more virgin land was available in Cochinchina and these were generally given out as 
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large estates for plantations thus continuing differences in landholding pattern. 
Landholding patterns acted as institutional constraints and guided the development of 
economic activity in the agrarian sector. Although data are limited and we have not been 
able to quantify their effect on economic activity, we argued that they had an impact on 
the output potential of both regions. In other words, although we do not discard Gourou 
and Henry's (amongst others) view that population differences had a direct impact on 
land productivity and thus economic performance, we further argued that 
demography and history had an indirect impact on the institutional organisation of 
agrarian production. 
Surprisingly, despite a significantly higher population density in Tonkin than in 
Cochinchina, migration from one region to the other did not occur on a large scale, even 
when government policy sought to encourage it through higher wages and retained 
earnings. After an initial boost in migration, flows decreased substantially. There is 
limited doubt that such a lack of integration in the two regions' labour market resulted in 
the continuing importance of the effect of population differences on economic growth, in 
the agrarian sector at least. In addition, the limited migration may have been due to the 
prevalence of large landholdings in Cochinchina. The demand for migrant labour was 
mostly for unskilled wage workers, which was relatively unattractive to the 
predominantly landowning peasants of Tonkin. The limited migration may also have, in 
part, reflected that despite a larger GDP in Cochinchina, the standard of living a 
Tonkinese migrant could expect from relocating was not high enough to overcome initial 
barriers to migration, even with the colonial administration's help. 
Furthermore, the larger significance of urban centres in Cochinchina relative to 
Tonkin, as well as the larger role of absentee landlords with larger landholdings, suggests 
that much of the wealth that may have been extracted from the Cochinchinese economy 
may have been concentrated in the cities. The limited growth of cities in Tonkin, 
considering the larger apparent population pressure, suggests that there were more 
alternative activities available for the Tonkinese peasant, which limited the need for 
movement of underemployed peasants to the cities. Indeed, we showed that both mining 
and manufacturing activities were more significant in Tonkin and we argued that the 
more limited urbanisation of Tonkin, as well as limited migration to Cochinchina, shows 
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that the population pressures were not necessarily perceived as an obstacle to 
employment.  
The literature's second suggestion for the origin of the economic gap between 
Tonkin and Cochinchina was the role of colonial policy. Certainly there were some clear 
political differences between the two regions. Tonkin was a protectorate and was 
indirectly ruled. Cochinchina on the other hand was a colony and subject to direct rule. 
This meant that, politically, Tonkin still relied on traditional governance structures, 
especially at the village level. This was not the case in Cochinchina, where the colonial 
administration was the only governance structure. In addition, political rule was less 
secure in Tonkin than in Cochinchina: Tonkin had been colonised later than Cochinchina 
and political unrest remained a serious matter throughout French occupation. Despite 
these differences, the ideology guiding colonial policy was the same for both regions: the 
French colonial policy in Indochina was one of mise-en-valeur, or economic development 
to the benefit of the metropolis: the Indochinese Union should be able to support itself 
financially and for this it needed better infrastructure.  
The application of the colonial policy could not be the same between the two 
regions because it had to address and respond to existing differences in the circumstances 
of both regions. In other words, colonial policy differed in response to differences 
between the regions and was not the cause for these differences. In Tonkin, the 
administration’s main duty was to ensure political stability to avoid uprisings. When 
political trouble arose, economic conditions deteriorated: tax revenue was not gathered 
and production tended to suffer. In Cochinchina, the administration’s main responsibility 
was to ensure stable trade conditions, otherwise political trouble would arise. In Tonkin, 
political realities seem to have had a strong effect on economic realities; in Cochinchina, 
economic activity seems to have affected politics. These different social climates had an 
impact on the way in which policies could be applied; in other words, colonial policy 
differences were a reflection of existing differences between the two regions.  
One of the main examples of how colonial policy differed to reflect existing 
differences was found in the tax system that was designed for Indochina. On the one hand, 
the general budget showed the colonial administration's desire for a unified policy 
towards Indochina. The general budget of Indochina was designed to cover the 
expenditures that would benefit the Union as a whole. Its revenue came primarily from 
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customs taxes and the excise boards on opium, salt and rice alcohol. The tax rates for 
these were the same in both Tonkin and Cochinchina. On the other hand, the local 
budgets differed because these were aimed at region specific effects. Consequently, the 
tax rates differed as a reflection of differences between these regions.  
The key differences in rates were for the head tax on the indigenous population and 
the land tax. In Tonkin, both these taxes were higher than they were in Cochinchina. 
Despite this, Cochinchina’s per capita tax burden was higher than Tonkin’s. 
Cochinchina’s revenue, therefore, was mostly made up of taxes that would not have been 
paid by the poor peasants: revenue was mainly extracted from large landowners, 
immigrants and license fees for professional employment. It seems clear that mise-en-
valeur in Cochinchina was not seen to come from the average peasant, but rather from 
large-scale plantations or alternative professional ventures. In Tonkin however, the tax 
revenue was mainly made up from the revenue on the personal tax on the indigenous 
population and taxes on land, which affected the majority of peasants. One result of this 
difference is that the tax burden on the poorer classes of the indigenous population 
appears to have been heavier in Tonkin than in Cochinchina. It seems that the 
administration found it easier or more lucrative to collect revenue in Tonkin from taxes 
from which revenue was constant whether in an economic boom or bust. In Cochinchina, 
revenue was dependent on economic performance. This was possibly a reflection of 
Cochinchina's more impressive growth record and shows that the colonial administration 
was guided by pre-existing patterns of economic performance in designing their tax 
policy.  
We show this was also the case with respect to public expenditure. Most 
expenditure was relatively similar between the two regions. The few differences that were 
found, such as various expenditures in administrative services, reflected the differences in 
the colonial identity of the two regions (whether protectorate or colony). One difference 
that should have had an impact on the economic development of the Indochinese Union, 
considering the mise-en-valeur policy, was that of public works expenditure. Although it 
is true that more was spent in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, in neither region was there a 
clear difference in how these infrastructural projects were used and it is also unclear 
whether or not they had any differential impact on economic performance. This chapter 
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has suggested that colonial policy was developed based on existing differences between 
the two regions.  
Our analysis does not rule out the fact that some of the policy choices helped 
perpetuate the differences that existed between Tonkin and Cochinchina. For example, 
lower tax rates on cultivated land helped lower the costs of investing in plantations and 
perpetuate the dominance of large landholdings in Cochinchina's agrarian sector. Despite 
differences in the way the administration governed the territories of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina, there is only limited evidence that colonial policy caused the economic 
divide seen in GDP estimates between 1900 and 1940. Instead, we have argued that 
colonial policy differences reflected the economic differences between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina.  
 
The second part of this thesis, Chapters 5, 6 & 7, addressed the nature of the economic 
divide. This was done in two parts. Firstly, an analysis of the characteristics of the 
agrarian and industrial sectors permitted an identification of differences in the production 
patterns of the two regions. Secondly, an evaluation of the commercial activity of the two 
regions showed that these production patterns explained differences in the level of 
engagement of both regions with the international economy.  
The economic divide was clearly seen in the agricultural sector through 
Cochinchina's much larger output of rice relative to Tonkin and in the rise of industrial 
crops such as rubber, which were much more prevalent in Cochinchina than Tonkin. 
Conversely, more varied crops existed in Tonkin. These differences illustrated that 
Cochinchina's agrarian sector was characterised by specialisation in a few crops, while 
Tonkin's was characterised by diversification. These production patterns had an impact 
on productivity, both of land and labour, and on the output possibilities of the regions. 
Larger landholdings in Cochinchina probably resulted in significant land inequality, but it 
is clear from the data that the output was larger and labour requirements lower in 
Cochinchina than in Tonkin, allowing for a larger per capita output. We have argued that 
this characteristic of the agrarian sector in Cochinchina was partly responsible for its 
better overall GDP performance, as opposed to the diversification and lower output of 
Tonkin. Output differences in the agrarian sector resulting from these differing 
production patterns mirrored the economic divide between Tonkin and Cochinchina.  
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These patterns were also found in the industrial sectors of Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
Handicraft industries, mining and modern industrial ventures were more significant in 
Tonkin than in Cochinchina. We have argued that this was a result of both the larger 
population pressures and the traditional tendency to be self-sufficient within the domestic 
economy. Both in mining and in the industrial sector, more people in Tonkin were 
contracted workers. However, this remained a rather limited class of workers. Even 
within the mining sector of Tonkin, many of the workers tended to only work for a few 
months of the year and then returned to the agrarian sector. We have argued that it was 
partly the growth of this sector and the possibility of temporary employment outside the 
agrarian sector that might have limited migration of Tonkinese peasants towards 
Cochinchina. We have also argued that the limited integration of the labour markets 
between these two regions in this time period partly explain their economic divide, as 
demographic differences partly accounted for the differing output potential of the 
agrarian sector. Consequently, the stronger growth of the industrial sector in Tonkin may 
have helped perpetuate its economic gap with Cochinchina. The relatively small size of 
that sector in Cochinchina further emphasised that region's reliance on specialisation in 
the agrarian sector. Despite Tonkin’s larger manufacturing sector, conditions were not 
optimal to close the gap in output prompted by Cochinchina's profitable specialisation in 
rice and rubber, at least in this time period.  
It has been argued that Cochinchina's specialisation in rice as opposed to Tonkin's 
diversification explain much of the economic divide between the two regions during 
colonial time. It is suggested that the production patterns highlighted in this sector were 
not necessarily a deliberate strategy, but were in part driven by demographic 
characteristics and their influences in landholding patterns as well as geographic 
characteristic and other circumstancial characteristics. It is likely these patterns would 
have had an impact on both the commercial orientation of the regions and on the living 
standards of the peasant populations. Cochinchina’s reliance on specialisation, as well as 
its more favourable man to land ratio had long-term implications: it would have 
encouraged a greater integration to the world economy. Tonkin’s tendency to self-insure 
and diversify resembled more an “industrious revolution path, due to natural resource 
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constraints such as land scarcity”. 667  This would suggest that Tonkin’s long-term 
economic performance revolved around its continued reliance on village authorities and 
full absorption of labour within the village bounds. In Tonkin, diversification in both the 
agrarian and industrial sectors was clearly aimed at accommodating a growing population 
with more limited connections to trade. This was examined in the last Chapter of this 
second part of the thesis. 
The Indochinese Union certainly had a high degree of tariffs and trading regulations 
and its tariff regime was considered more protectionist than most of its colonial 
neighbours. These trade barriers might have had a different impact on the two regions 
because they did not produce the same basket of exportable goods, or import the same 
quantities. We have argued that differences in the relative engagement of Tonkin and 
Cochinchina in the commercial sector were not necessarily influenced by these various 
taxes, but rather by their pre-existing patterns of production that either provided output 
for trade or not. Indeed, despite these Union-wide barriers, international trade was 
significant for both regions, although it was particularly so for Cochinchina. The trading 
network of Tonkin certainly appears to have been less extensive and dynamic than 
Cochinchina’s. Tonkin’s behaviour was more cautious with regards to international trade 
than Cochinchina’s whose specialisation in key crops appears to have ensured the region 
maximised potential advantages from the international market, but we argue this was a 
result of their production patterns, not because of regulations. 
Cochinchina's access to large trading houses, numerous credit institutions and 
infrastructure for trade seems to have been superior than Tonkin's. In addition, there was 
no doubt that, in financial terms, the trade balance of Cochinchina was much more 
favourable than Tonkin's. Cochinchina was the primary exporting region of Indochina. 
We have argued that investors and trading agents' greater attraction to Cochinchina's 
commercial sector reflected the greater profitability of that region's commercial sector. 
Tonkin's apparently lesser attractiveness again was a reflection of the more limited 
potential for trade that its production patterns allowed (less surplus was produced). We 
have also argued that production patterns and the production possibility frontiers they 
resulted in were more significant in determining the strength of their commercial activity 
                                                
667 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian path of economic development: a long-term perspective” in Giovanni 
Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita & Mark Selden (eds), The Resurgence of East Asia 500, 150 and 50 year 
perspectives, (London: Routledge, 2003), p 82. 
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than any differences in trading partners. Indeed, it seems that both regions were trading 
with the same countries. The only key differences in their trade relationships were in the 
composition of their trade baskets and the quantities traded, which were a direct 
consequence of their production patterns and choices. In total, the majority of the value 
from Indochinese exports came from Cochinchinese exports: around 75%. Tonkinese 
exports tended to bring in roughly 15% of total revenue.  
Cochinchina imported more, as one would expect from a more specialised economy. 
Tonkin's substantial share of the import marker however may be representative of an 
economy that was insufficiently productive to be self-sufficient. Despite its 
diversification and seemingly varied domestic supply of goods, sizeable imports were 
brought into the region. It is outside the scope of this project to demonstrate that 
Cochinchina's greater integration to the world economy in part drove its superior 
economic performance, but we suggested that the economic performance of Cochinchina 
was clearly driven by its ability to produce more per capita and there is no doubt that this 
ability was central in explaining its larger role in the international market. 
 
The last part of this thesis evaluated the impact of the economic divide on standard of 
living. This allowed a comparison of the gap suggested by GDP per capita figures to the 
gap found when comparing wages and prices in various classes of the populations of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. 
Booth argued that “it is widely recognized that trends in per capita GDP are not 
reliable guides to changes in living standard: economic growth often confers much 
greater benefits on some groups in society”.668 Consequently, Cochinchina's higher GDP 
per capita did not mean its population was necessarily better off. Our analysis showed 
that the living standards for the majority of the populations in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina were likely to have been relatively similar and even in the case when there 
was a gap, it was not as large as the one suggested by GDP estimates.  
Apart from the economic aspect of standard of living, other indicators also suggest 
that the developmental aspect of standard of living may have been similar in both regions. 
                                                
668 Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007(1)), p.131. 
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More public expenditure to health and education projects did go to Cochinchina, but it is 
very likely that traditional facilities for health and education may have closed the gap 
between the provisions of the two regions. Moreover, the scattered data on the 'output' of 
these two indicators show only limited and slow improvements in both Tonkin and 
Cochinchina during French rule. The data available do not suggest a great difference in 
improvements of indicators of health and education over time for either region.  
The findings showed that urban wages were much higher in Saigon than they were 
in Hanoi, while prices were only marginally higher in Saigon than in Hanoi, but that this 
gap was only half of the gap suggested in GDP per capita estimates. The price-adjusted 
wage gap between the two regions' urban centres was about 50% whereas the per capita 
GDP data suggested a gap of 70%. In rural areas however, home to the vast majority of 
the population, the data and other research suggests that standards of living in both 
regions were dismal for most. Although some of the larger landholders would have 
experienced much higher standards of living in Cochinchina than in Tonkin, the average 
peasants experienced similar standards of living. This may help explain why migration 
was so limited: the prospects of better living standards were illusionary for peasants. In 
addition, Tonkin's more numerous alternative sources of employment in mining, 
handicraft or manufacturing activities, further lessened the need for migration. The 
temporary nature of this work allowed peasants in Tonkin to reach similar income levels 
as peasants in Cochinchina. 
In the rural areas, it is harder to establish this gap. Income figures show as high a 
gap as 20-30%, adjusting for price differences on the same scale as in the urban areas. 
However, even this figure is deceptive since Tonkinese peasants' need for money might 
have been less than their Cochinchinese counterpart because, by owning their land and 
engaging in part-time manufacturing, most of them were able to produce much of what 
they needed. Consequently, we argue that standards of living for the majority of the rural 
population was much closer together than income data suggest and thus even closer than 
what GDP per capita estimates suggest. In other words, Cochinchina's more impressive 
GDP performance did not result in a proportionately higher standard of living for the 
majority of its population. This finding highlights the need for future research to 
investigate inequality in the region. 
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We suggest that the similarity in living standards for Tonkin and Cochinchina may 
partly explain the limited migratory flows between the two regions, which perpetuated 
the existing differences in production and commercial patterns of each region. These 
patterns themselves influenced colonial policy and domestic preferences, thus further 
limiting integration between the regions. This may explain why the economic divide 
between Tonkin and Cochinchina remained significant throughout this time period.  
 
Implications for further research 
Vietnam today remains a rural and agrarian economy: in 1999-2009, 70.4% of the 
population was living in the countryside.669 While agriculture is no longer the most 
significant sector: accounting for about 20% of GDP, compared to industry’s 41% 
share,670 government policy with regards to the sector has been central to Vietnam's post-
colonial administration. Post-reunification, the government hoped that applying the same 
policies of co-operatisation in the agrarian sectors of both economies would help the 
economic performance of both regions. The communist government's intention to apply a 
unified agrarian economic policy for both former Tonkin and former Cochinchina proved 
flawed: such a policy was unlikely to result in either surplus output or economic 
development. Presumably, much of this policy was guided by political philosophies, 
rather than economic rationale.  
Despite the government’s efforts to ensure northern production patterns in southern 
Vietnam,671 former Cochinchina did not seem particularly adept at engaging in self-
sufficient production. Interestingly, the current economic policies in Vietnam favour a 
move from “diversification towards production for exports”.672 This is not in line with the 
North’s previous agricultural policy of co-operatisation and self-sufficiency. 673  The 
economic policies associated with a continuation of the North’s agrarian production 
patterns, including communal farming, resulted in a crisis in the agricultural sector: 
                                                
669 Ramses Amer, “Vietnam in 2010”, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No.1, 2011, p.199. 
670 Vo X. Han, “Vietnam in 2007: A Profile in Economic and Socio-Political Dynamism”, Asian Survey, 
Vol.48, No.1, 2008, p.30. 
671 LSE 598(122): Nong Nghiep, Director of Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Agriculture 
of Viet Nam 1945-1995, (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 1995), p.118. 
672 LSE 598(150): Vietnam 2001-2002, Proceedings and commentary on the 10th session of the 10th 
National Assembly of Vietnam, held in Hanoi from 20 November to 25 December 2001, (Hanoi : Thế Giới 
Publishers, 2002), p.24. 
673 LSE 598(122): Nong Nghiep, op.cit., p.66. 
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while agricultural production cooperatives in the North were subject to a 
serious and comprehensive crisis, agricultural reforms were further conducted 
in the South in the same model contents, steps and methods as those practiced 
in the North674 
In other words, applying the North’s economic strategy to southern land proved 
problematic. Indeed, this was likely because, in the South, the traditional farming 
methods focused on production of commodities for export.675 The result is that despite 
population differences remaining similar to the ones noticed during colonial rule, current 
production patterns show that total food production in the South is far higher than in the 
North. This displays a continued tendency towards a more productive agrarian sector in 
the South, even if any surplus is redistributed towards the North.  
Table 9.1: Food Production by Region, 1993-1995, (Annual 
Average) 
Paddy Production 
(million tonnes) 
Food per Capita, per Year 
(kg) 
North South North South 
10.4 15.8 287 452 
LSE 598(122): Nong Nghiep, Director of Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery. Agriculture of Viet Nam 1945-1995, Hanoi: Statistical 
Publishing House, 1995, p.104. 
Industrial production also displays similar characteristics today as it did during 
French colonial times. The government recognises that Tonkin is still most proficient in 
handicraft production than Cochinchina. 676  This tendency for diversification and 
production for the domestic market still seems to very much characterise the Tonkinese 
economy. The politicians of contemporary Vietnam expect that growth will come from 
South Vietnam, that is former Cochinchina, rather than from former Tonkin.677 In other 
words, they recognise that Tonkin’s production patterns will probably not lead to 
economic growth. Current international trade also still displays significant differences 
between the two regions.  Currently, international trade revenue and foreign investments 
                                                
674 ibid, p.81. 
675 ibid, p.82. 
676 LSE 598(I51): Vietnam, Public Investment Program Period of 2001-2005, (Hanoi: General Statistical 
Office, 2002), p.75. 
677 ibid, p.82. 
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is a very large part of GDP.678 International economic links are still key to the overall 
economic health of the country. The South is still the centre of commerce and exports.679 
The government is aware that the South already has better trading links.  
The government policies, since the introduction of Doi Moi in 1985, have “aimed 
to reform the economy completely and to lead Vietnam rapidly toward market 
capitalism”. 680 Indeed, the government has recognised that the most rapid rates of 
urbanisation, industrial growth and service sector development were in the South Eastern 
region and the Mekong river delta, both areas located in former Cochinchina.681 Just like 
the French, the current government’s economic policies focus on developing the 
productive capacity of the economy. The Vietnamese government wants to bring into 
play the advantages of the major economic regions, through a “restructuring of the key 
Northern economic regions, and through further development in the Southern economic 
sector”.682 The language in this is very clear: development is spurred from the South and 
to achieve global development, the North needs to restructure and adapt. It is clear that 
the Vietnamese government's current policies are an attempt to close the gap between the 
two regions and they show an awareness of existing differences.  
Unlike the Red River Delta, the Southeastern region and the Mekong Delta have 
significant market infrastructure, market institutions and incentives structures,683 just as 
they did during French colonial rule. Research shows that the number of private 
enterprises is much higher in Ho Chi Minh City and in southern provinces in general.684 
The government’s economic policy to encourage growth, the Doi Moi, encouraged a 
transition to the market.685 As Fforde point out, the “[development in Vietnam] did not 
originate from changes in policy, but from adaptation of policy to pre-existing use of 
                                                
678 LSE 598(150): op.cit., p.19. 
679  LSE 598(153): Mạnh Hùng Nguyễn, Strategies, Plans, Programs of Vietnam Socio-Economic 
Development Investment to the Year 2010, (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2004), p.31-32. 
680 Donald B. Freeman, “Doi Moi Policy and the Small-Enterprise Boom in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam”, 
Geographical Review, Vol.86, No.2, 1996, p.178. 
681 LSE 598(122): Nong Nghiep 1995, op.cit. p.114. 
682 LSE 598(150): op.cit., p.28. 
683 LSE 598(ADB): Asian Development Bank, Which Institutions are Critical to Sustain Long-Term 
Growth in Vietnam? (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2004), p.55. 
684 Hoang Kim & Hoang Vu Cuong, Chapter 7 “Vietnam’s Private Economy in the Process of Renovation” 
in Irene Nørlund, Carolyn L. Gates & Vu Cao Dam (eds), Vietnam in a Changing World, (Richmond, 
Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p.152. 
685 LSE 598(ADB): Asian Development Bank 2004, op.cit., p.52. 
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markets in the economy”. 686  Clearly, government policy still has to address the 
differences that exist between the two regions. These differences do not seem hugely 
different from what they were during the colonial era. This re-emphasises why a better 
understanding of the colonial economic divide between North and South was necessary 
for analyses of current Vietnamese economic performance.  
The similarity between the colonial era and today are seen in government policies. 
The government believes that pro-growth policies can best be applied in former Tonkin 
through “developing infrastructure, increasing domestic and international trade, seeking 
investment in existing industrial zones, developing labour-intensive industries, 
developing agriculture through the production of commodity products”… 687  These 
policies are similar to the policies the French attempted to introduce in Tonkin through 
mise-en-valeur. As seen earlier, however, the contextual differences between the two 
regions were significant enough for some of these policies to be impractical, particularly 
in relation to international trade and commodity production.  
The current government’s economic policies with respect to the South are more 
ambitious: “to strengthen and develop industry, push up production of fertilizers and 
chemicals, to push up investment and infrastructure, to make full use of soil for industrial 
crops and consolidate intensive growing, promote commerce, finance and banking and 
promote economic strengths”.688 Again, the expectations for Southern development are in 
line with the French’s expectations and show the continuation of what we defined as 
Cochinchina’s outward-oriented economic trajectory. Finally, although the government 
recognises that foreign investment is still an engine of growth, 689  it has still not 
acknowledged that most of the FDI coming into Vietnam go to South Vietnam. Instead, 
the current government, just like the French colonial government, tries to equal out the 
flow of investment by encouraging domestic development in the North.690 The fact that 
the economic trajectories today reflect those of the regions’ colonial past is significant: 
there is a large degree of path dependency in the two regions’ development. 
                                                
686 Adam Fforde, “Economics, History and the Origins of Vietnam’s Post-War Economic Success”, Asian 
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The results of the new government policies have centred on Ho Chi Minh City, 
rather than Hanoi. Certainly, this is partly explained through communist rule in the North 
over a longer time period. However, it is interesting that this appears to be a continuation 
of the North-South divide seen during French colonial rule. This suggests that the 
characteristics of the colonial gap between Tonkin and Cochinchina explored in this 
thesis may still be very relevant to the current political and economic developments in 
Vietnam.691 There are still two clear economic trajectories existing in today’s Vietnam. 
However, to maintain its image of a unified country, the government seems unwilling to 
admit to it. More importantly, the North-South gap is an under discussed subject in 
contemporary policies, despite the fact most rhetoric hint at its existence. 
This brief discussion of current trends in the Vietnamese economy suggests that 
many of the circumstances that make sense of the economic divide between Tonkin and 
Cochinchina in the colonial era remain significant in today's Vietnam. It is unlikely that 
the long-term effects of the trends outlined in this thesis fully explain the current 
economic divide. Indeed, the ravaging effects of the war had severe repercussions on the 
economies of both North and South Vietnam. The ideological switch to communism 
would also have changed the economic context of the country. However, it is not 
unrealistic that there is a measure of path dependence in the economic performances of 
both regions. Further research relating the colonial economic divide to the current divide 
would go a long way in evaluating the relevance of path dependence in Vietnam's 
economy and in evaluating the nature of the challenges policy-makers in Vietnam face. 
Certainly, regional differences have always existed within a county and these are 
not usually a problem for long-term development. However, in this case, the government 
rhetoric might be problematic: it refuses to acknowledge the importance these differences 
have. According to Taylor “those who strive to rule all Vietnamese people will insist 
upon a single Vietnamese history and culture, with a single origin and a single driving 
force throughout time and space”.692 Indeed, the government is still intent on upholding 
and demonstrating the fact that Vietnam is a single entity: “the Vietnamese are used to 
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call themselves ‘Dong Bao’ [meaning compatriot that came from the same foetus]”.693 
Possibly, the balance between Northern and Southern influences in policy making can 
ensure a gradual integration of the two regions. For some years, the top leadership has 
been split between Northerners and Southerners: “the top political positions in 2007 
appear to be a stable combination of northern party loyalty and reform-mindedness on the 
one hand, and southern entrepreneurial spirit on the other”.694 Presumably, the balance 
between these two forces allows for the government to balance its policies. The 
government is willing to recognise that “the formulation of economic plans must be 
marked by bureaucratic centralism”, however, the government is unwilling to admit that 
there are significant differences between North and South Vietnam, particularly in the 
private sector, the key contributor to growth.695  Therefore, although the key economic 
policy of today’s Vietnamese government is to “narrow the gap between different 
regions,”696 “the disparity between the North and South has continued to increase”.697  
  
                                                
693 LSE 598(128): Dr. Tran Hoang Kim, Vietnam’s Economy: The Period 1945-1995 and its Perspective by 
the Year 2020, (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 1996), p.148. 
694 Vo Xuan Han, “Vietnam in 2007: A Profile in Economic and Socio-Political Dynamism”, Asian Survey, 
Vol.48, No.1, 2008, p.33. 
695 LSE 598(I53): Mạnh Hùng Nguyễn, op.cit., p.204, 219. 
696 ibid, p.259. 
697 Alan De Brauw & Tomoko Harigaya, “Seasonal Migration & Improving Living Standards in Vietnam”, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.89, No.2, 2007, p.5. 
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Appendix 1) Selected Revenue of the Indochinese General Budget, 1923-1936, (1000 $) 
 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Customs revenue 22032 24651 18957 14953 14055 15078 13369 13164 
General Import Taxes 4239 4099 2782 2271 3046 3216 3353 3562 
Other Revenue from Imports or Exports 587 727 732 695 677 754 3671 4194 
Mining Extraction Taxes 3 203 190      
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Excise Boards 30965 28399 21822 16877 12787 9470 10689 11185 
Mining Duties    141 134 103 107 101 
Total Revenue 93793 94745 76703 65245 62420 57802 56718 62403 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: 
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Appendix 2) Selected Expenditure of the Indochinese General Budget, 1923-1936, (1000 $) 
 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Debts 4255 4033 3355 5923 9476 13225 14022 13415 
Contributions to the Metropolis 11568 10896 11517 10562 7210 7064 3941 4131 
Political & General Administration 288 382 494 733 703 594 521 321 
General Government 2040 2236 2047 1937 1477 1136 1076 1108 
Justice 890 962 2423 2265 2058 2060 1901 2064 
Financial Services 24777 20213 19551 17573 16719 10786 10395 11504 
Economic Interests 3841 6942 9662 7759 4302 2316 2178 2250 
Public Works 16537 23520 15158 9090 5091 4397 4545 6850 
Industrial Exploitations 7426 8428 8946 7322 6219 5681 5373 6052 
Social Interests 2941 3514 3581 3381 2803 2532 2471 2602 
Common Expenditure 4452 4443 4316 3292 2575 4429 2453 1755 
Extraordinary 1980 2479 3194 2911 1313 338 257 928 
Contributions 13462 16193 10762 10559 7877 8255 6316 5995 
Total Expenditure 94457 104241 95006 82847 67743 62843 55449 59814 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. 
Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 3a) Local Budget Revenue for Cochinchina, 1913-1936, (1000 $) 
  1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Direct Contributions 
Head Tax on Europeans               16 56 65 69 66 65 61 65 70 89 84 87 83 75 70 65 66 
Head Tax on Indigenous 
Population 710 732 748 765 779 798 802 852 844 852 866 872 902 904 943 965 1098 990 925 880 818 851 950 948 
Head Tax on Workers 
from Annam or Tonkin                                   56 48 30         
Capitation Tax for Asian 
Foreigners 1184 1204 1187 1119 1326 1388 1500 1963 2377 2284 2270 2232 2226 2315 2355 2479 2661 2452 2074 1638 1377 1393 1339 1407 
Exceptional 
Contribution on 
Revenue Exceeding 
8000 piastres 
                                            75 172 
Tax on 
Rice fields 
Total 1855 1886 1893 1914 1926 1942 1933 2081 2473 2416 2446 2392 2452 2430 2491 2571 2907      2115 2213 
Indigenous                                   2357 2242 2065 1864 1984     
Tax on 
Other 
Crops 
Total 324 325 330 332 336 344 350 362 448 475 446 429 445 485 536 548 630      587 621 
Indigenous                                   388 380 364 352 348     
Tax on 
Urban 
Centres 
Total 113 112 111 110 1114 114 112 112 425 527 525 537 553 619 671 737 833      763 688 
Indigenous                                   496 504 486 431 422     
Additional Tax for 
Chamber of Agriculture                                         25 27 27 21 
Licenses 293 315 314 457 500 499 488 574 1595 1521 1529 1510 1560 1650 1809 1956 2285 2115 1975 1669 1473 1340 1272 1191 
Additional Tax for 
Chamber of Commerce                                           19 18 16 
Court Fees                                   36 44 41         
Extraordinary Additions                                   780 617           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
336 
Total Direct 
Contributions 4479 4574 4583 4697 5981 5085 5185 5960 8218 8140 8151 8038 8203 8464 8870 9326 10503 10395 9618 7969 7114 7121 7211 7343 
Assimilated Taxes 
Tax on Weight Checks 10 9 12 13 12 12 11 13 15 16 16 16 18 17 17 18 27 25 23 21 20 20 22 23 
Tax on Barges 157 165 231 238 237 239 240 243 248 252 250 242 242 243 246 255 270 267 252 221 202 203 208 212 
Tax on Cars                 60 75 85 106 135 166 215 249 319 167             
Tax on Entertainment                                       17 23 3 34 35 
Income from Domain 135 86 23 53 221 83 209 147 185 155 71 388 532 822 777 1061 1216 552 136 87 35 31 84 49 
Income from Forests 186 318 324 330 308 336 383 426 522 637 687 665 717 812 803 767 889 828 484 510 468 541 615 636 
Income from Rented Out 
Land 96 103 103 102 195 110 109 106 113 116 116 118 122 109 108 105 109 118 123 129 136 136 98 89 
Income from Industry 179 173 168 183 206 221 230 252 263 266 251 228 230 139 258 315 393 411 375 194 175 152 176 196 
Various 113 111 115 94 96 101 105 173 193 160 168 199 183 266 327 374 402 400 280 209 174 156 228 206 
Fines 43 64 66 71 59 59 20 45 43 42 117 53 68 36 46 87 84 39             
Interest from Reserves 8 14 14 30 46 81 59 75 95 91 72 62 51 27 9                   
From Expenditure 
Reduction 115 105 127 127 143 154 215 228 289 332 348 394 426 428 453 627 838 1028 1080 917 820 985 936 1097 
From Various Sources 38 41 49 37 36 35 38 61 89 142 115 152 142 259 276 294 397 355 481 561 577 387 438 373 
From End of Fiscal 
Exercise 88 101 67 65 56 78 78 129 195 274 29 6 126 184 239 98 243 232 229 559 557 819 785 557 
Total Assimilated Taxes 1168 1290 1299 1343 1615 1509 1697 1898 2310 2558 2325 2629 2992 3508 3774 4250 5187 4422 3463 3425 3187 3433 3624 3473 
Subventions from Other Sources 
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Cochinchina's Share of 
Indochinese Lottery                                             21 53 
Refund from General 
Budget for Road Work                                           214 161 179 
Subsidies from General 
Budget 1465 1959 1656 2212 1869 999 928 1853 1441 1220 280 569 1127 3704 3612 4064 3814 3830 12 7 7       
Bonus from Increased 
Exit Fees on Rice               255 668 542 325 231 285                       
Bonus from Mineral Oil 
Consumption Tax                                   137 273 273 274       
Other 223 228 244 205 201 471 312 425 479 688                             
Reimbursement from 
Colonial Budget                                         21 11 3 5 
Reimbursement from 
General Budget                                             9 3 
Reimbursement from 
Other Countries                     737 662 776 118 95 239 118 228 184 112 155 131 125 147 
Reimbursement from 
Other Provinces                           193 232 684 841 98 86 26 56 51 83 87 
Reimbursement from 
Municipalities                           758 780 863 887 1300 1072 130 95 78 75 46 
Reimbursement from 
Port                           38 36 37 41 37 38 38 36 34 34 34 
Total Subventions 1688 2187 1900 2417 2070 1470 1240 2533 2588 2450 1342 1462 2188 4811 4755 5887 5701 5630 1665 586 644 519 511 554 
Total Revenue 7335 8051 7782 8457 9666 8064 8122 10391 13116 13148 11818 12129 13383 16783 17399 19463 21391 20447 14746 11980 10945 11073 11346 11370 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 3b) Local Budget Revenue for Tonkin, 1913-1936, (1000 $) 
  1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Direct Contributions 
Head Tax on Europeans               16 47 58 64 63 66 65 69 75 78 90 105 100 90 80 71 64 
Head Tax on 
Indigenous Population 2842 2883 2910 2917 2940 2953 3211 3519 4091 4204 4353 4452 4551 4641 4714 4763 4864 4774 4491 4591 4154 4191 4205 4277 
Personal Tax on 
Indigenous People in 
Urban Areas 
                                  48 37 38 34 37 37   
Tax (per family) in the 
High Regions                                   182 164 151 156 108 135 135 
Capitation Tax from 
Asian Foreigners 86 90 138 141 146 144 143 152 231 228 220 222 226 257 254 265 265 289 274 245 79 92 86 84 
Landed 
Property 
Tax 
Europeans 
& Foreign 
Asians 
16 29 64 95 88 87 99 101 102 104 104 115 151 123 154 160 162 234 234 169 56 58 54 59 
Indigenous 3206 3342 3412 3409 3416 3435 3438 3458 3630 3756 4020 4088 4144 4692 5014 5027 5069 5109 4742 4831 4591 4599 4550 4588 
Exceptional 
Contribution from 
Revenues above 8000s 
piastres 
                                            24 63 
Additional Tax for 
Chamber of Agriculture                                   2 2 1 1 2 1 2 
Additional Tax on 
Indigenous & Foreign 
Asians  
                                  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Urban Landed Tax 34 35 35 36 36 37 36 37 38 28 33 31 31 34 35 35 37 89 69 75 79 82 68 68 
Licenses 
All 77 83 294 310 313 315 154 368 526 552 573 623 666 666 718 729 772 961 872 793 213 214 205 204 
Indigenous 40 45 120 126 127 125 135 156 226 235 251 286 303 300 316 326 342 448 69           
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Total Direct 
Contributions 6301 6507 6973 7034 7066 7096 7216 7807 8891 9165 9618 9880 10138 10778 11274 11380 11589 12246 11079 11014 9473 9483 9456 9564 
Assimilated Taxes 
Tax on Barges 12 12 13 13 13 12 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 16 16 17 18             
Tax on Cars                         5 12 13 15 19 20             
Tax on Other Vehicles                             90 85 97 103             
Additional on Rental of 
Markets and Ferries 862 878 885 890 898 908 910 921 662 686 695 699 698         103             
Income from Domain 2 4 10 5 3 2 8 14 15 19 26 28 40 47 36 76 57 28 43 95 71 64 125 128 
Dues from Mines             23 17 44 56 42 39 64 80 103 107 152 110 59 98 70 152 136 93 
Income from Forests 258 262 273 297 257 275 309 363 378 414 533 588 556 546 544 585 695 620 516 443 320 390 392 426 
Income from Rented 
Out Land 249 243 229 244 230 245 261 277 274 301 313 335 376 395 385 444 472 465             
Receipts from Industry 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 54 32 51 59 57 10 2         
Various 109 101 95 105 108 108 130 143 161 154 196 223 238 250 204 251 349 316 194 131 101 114 106 142 
Fines 45 45 43 46 48 31 27 31 43 44 58 76 63 51 56 90 102 94 74 3 2 12 7 4 
Interest from Reserves 11 12 10 9 7 28 20 19 25 25 19 17 14 10 13 11 12 1             
From Expenditure 
Reduction 27 29 29 41 84 76 77 71 92 95 110 110 163 154 186 212 247 351 487 440 439 390 352 371 
From Various Sources 11 34 82 33 29 127 73 140 394 933 361 111 77 82 45 25 89 289 120 95 125 176 44 175 
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From End of Fiscal 
Exercise 11 130 13 32 11 26 35 17 53 27 29 17 24 23 395 46 55 45 32 71 110 66 44 127 
Total Assimilated Taxes 1599 1752 1684 1718 1691 1840 1886 2026 2155 2768 2397 2259 2335 1719 2118 2014 2422 2620 1535 1378 1238 1364 1206 1466 
Subventions from Other Sources 
Tonkin's Share of 
Indochinese Lottery                                             19   
Reimbursement from 
Loan Fund                                             46   
Subsidies from General 
Budget 178 305 304 656 644 498 800 1200 932 1900 2595 2582 1782 3593 3231 3736 3170 5493 3 50 50 34 42 109 
Refund from General 
Budget for Road Work                                   50 180 180 141 141 106 168 
Bonus from Rice Exit 
Fees                     78 38 47                       
Reimbursements 55 145 198 201 190 173 313 332 365 467 516 482 492 904 1057 1142 1340 1625 245 186 182 143 90 105 
Other 137 157 158 203 225 235 255 280 867 840 809 779 612 213 88 25 145 271 2   1       
Total Subventions 370 607 660 1060 1059 906 1368 1812 2164 3207 3998 3881 2933 4710 4376 4903 4655 7439 430 416 374 318 303 382 
Total Revenue 8270 8866 9317 9812 9816 9842 10470 11645 13210 15140 16013 16020 15406 17207 17768 18297 18666 22305 13044 12808 11085 11165 10965 11412 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
341 
Appendix 4a) Local Budget Expenditure for Cochinchina, 1913-1936, (1000 $) 
  1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Political & General Administrative Expenditure 
Pensions                     70 76 75 125 150 113 230 177 70 97 156 38 27 34 
Government 
Offices 
Personnel 197 188 171 169 159 159 169 223 286 339 407 434 472 469 494 542 628 620 612 689 544 545 505 546 
Material 20 32 26 29 28 32 32 33 54 83 77 86 91 103 126 92 134 180 136 100 91 70 73 78 
Provincial Administration 696 686 638 633 612 496 490 676 662 626 584 549 556 595 602 634 718 417 412 445 422 450 383 366 
Judicial 
Services 
Personnel 370 389 379 338 296 300 315 452 629 583 635 663 635 622 810 714 818 855             
Material 33 42 44 38 45 48 57 58 70 66 71 74 68 64 76 77 84 82             
Police and 
Immigration 
(joined in 
1922) 
Personnel 249 259 253 246 237 250 262 308 351 330 1183 1141 1255 1271 1352 1521 1701 1944 2008 1041 841 845 810 909 
Material 32 31 33 33 32 35 35 33 38 47 35 55 62 97 90 83 92 162 157 100 75 67 79 86 
Penitentiary 
Personnel 134 129 132 143 143 157 157 245 281 289 296 277 315 321 337 328 348 395 410 452 353 325 290 313 
Material 160 151 176 170 166 157 173 207 173 232 214 207 230 256 274 256 284 405 390 375 249 243 281 269 
Gendarmerie 
Personnel 48 85 75 98 101 125 140 154 173 247 238 215 212 236 265 313 290 368 487 519 401 378 326 329 
Material 4 8 5 7 5 4 5 6 6 6 11 13 14 16 15 17 20 13 59 27 24 25 22 23 
Indigenous Justice (Saigon-
Cholon)                                           2     
Transports 318 319 321 325 322 327 337 326 329 334 648 765 317 463 708 359 813 1319 633 721 697 1118 814 111 
Flotilla 
Personnel 18 18 18 24 29 36 42 55 66 73 72 76 75 93 93 101 108 133 140 121 99 95 88 94 
Material 32 33 35 46 42 62 64 82 80 108 113 123 129 93 144 167 190 174 172 114 71 84 88 76 
Various 297 250 462 396 330 354 553 590 765 592                             
Subsidies to Private Ventures                     76 82 100 140 169 242 258 584 544 528 326 330 408 313 
Unpredicted 17 35 25 16 32 20 25 42 17 42 177 191 220 398 407 292 583 354 292 381 270 283 662 740 
Surveillance Fund                                           24 30 29 
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Secret Fund 11 12 14 12 12 13 17 14 15 15 22 22 30 30 29 29 20 20 30 24 24       
Total General and 
Administrative 2636 2667 2807 2723 2591 2575 2873 3504 3995 4012 4929 5049 4856 5392 6141 5880 7319 8202 6552 5734 4643 4922 4886 4316 
Financial Services 
Treasury 
Personnel  191 196 183 186 169 177 182 226 331 348 324 330 319 340 383 364 458 437             
Material 5 4 5 9 8 8 9 30 19 31 21 25 34 24 26 32 31 42             
Direct 
Contributions 
Personnel  8 9 9 8 9 8 10 13 44 44                             
Material           1 1 1 2 5                             
Land Register 
Personnel  241 221 186 170 146 175 197 295 308 314 288 291 341 349 338 330 371 383 413 396 337 306 285 301 
Material 66 70 60 59 49 61 83 57 89 125 82 125 153 143 121 448 491 331 231 181 115 104 111 111 
Landed 
Property 
Service (in 
Financial 
Services after 
1930) 
Personnel                                     89 87 106 114 112 125 
Material                                     30 24 20 20 20 22 
Total Financial Services 511 500 443 432 381 430 482 622 793 867 715 771 847 856 868 1174 1351 1193 763 688 578 544 528 559 
Economic Interest 
Public Works 
Personnel 567 591 516 483 463 495 510 705 812 817 751 763 818 924 995 1124 1171 1110 781 745 479 389 316 361 
Maintenance 378 399 336 303 361 453 412 480 612 673 639 705 755 938 1368 1907 2040 1790 1454 860 567 587 666 621 
New 926 1656 1226 1625 1359 1757 1701 1639 2327 2030 1260 1696 1701 3983 3587 3604 3211 2692 804 311 186 283 351 911 
Industry 
Personnel 84 85 71 82 68 85 32 73 80 104 39 53 52 2                     
Material                     69 50 52 5                     
Agrarian 
Hydraulic & 
Navigation 
Improvements 
Personnel                                           53 58 79 
Material                                           95 168 175 
Agriculture 
Personnel 45 45 46 55 55 60 89 88 105 112 145 139 144 137 175 188 190 215 191 167 123 115 103 98 
Material 90 97 85 83 110 120 160 182 200 230 256 239 254 278 346 293 274 205 148 99 87 78 81 70 
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Fairs & Exhibits                                     80     5 1 4 
Forest 
Development 
Personnel 139 150 130 119 104 131 152 219 242 270 287 277 280 286 307 323 357 373 413 482 366 345 320 344 
Material 25 29 25 24 18 18 26 40 20 44 51 47 52 57 59 43 64 46 30 14 15 15 15 10 
Veterinary 
Services 
Personnel 7 6 9 8 6 12 13 29 45 59 59 69 76 77 95 108 124 132 150 159 119 106 106 124 
Material   7 9 9 14 19 11 58 35 25 34 65 39 64 71 68 55 40 26 89 93 47 24 34 
Landed 
Property 
Services (in 
Economic 
Interests 
1927-1930) 
Personnel                             9 32 49 75             
Material                             15 15 19 30             
Total Economic Interest 2261 3065 2453 2791 2558 3150 3106 3513 4478 4364 3590 4103 4223 6751 7027 7705 7554 6708 4077 2926 2035 2118 2209 2831 
Social Interest 
Health 
Personnel 149 168 161 152 140 165 274 408 417 461 493 481 510 562 592 646 809 767 840 800 674 672 651 709 
Material 122 171 156 186 184 227 282 299 352 455 407 418 417 509 622 677 1215 1139 971 1035 634 638 474 517 
Education 
Personnel 351 372 354 165 344 440 527 770 891 980 1113 1194 1340 1280 1482 1793 1856 1716 1837 1791 1467 1385 1203 1276 
Material 135 139 133 144 188 270 268 257 300 303 334 353 408 456 461 611 573 571 616 523 368 274 248 267 
Subsidies to Charitable 
Societies                                           86 100 120 
Extraordinary                                   20 15           
Total Social Interest 757 850 804 647 856 1102 1351 1734 1960 2199 2347 2446 2675 2807 3157 3727 4453 4213 4279 4149 3143 3055 2676 2889 
Subventions and Reimbursements 
Reimbursement to Colonial 
Budget                                   36 47   2 4 3 4 
Reimbursement to General 
Budget                     19 10 3 7 5 2 9 2 1     36 35   
Subvention to Cambodian 
Budget                                         2 2 2 2 
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Subventions to Saigon-
Cholon Region 606 785 802 659 797 716 835 858 424 379 41 68 134 477 663 644 354 347 347 42 42 32 27 11 
Reimbursement of Police 
Fines to Originating Cities 24 34 31 36 29 32 24 19 33 35 75                           
Reimbursement to Provincial 
Budget 35 52 47 61 53 243 288 266 406 378 437 310 244 529 352 355 230 388 367 317 274 326 334 313 
Reimbursement of Product 
from Timber sales to 
Originating Provinces 
1 4 5 6 7 6 10 9 14 23 24 31 28   28 35 56 65 45 42 38     3 
Refunds to Local Budgets                       9   30 57 31 91 58 48 15         
Other 5 5 6 5 4 10 6 5 4 4                             
Subvention to Saigon Port                                   2 2 3   3 3 3 
Total Subventions & 
Reimbursements 671 880 891 767 890 1007 1163 1157 881 819 596 428 409 1043 1105 1067 740 898 857 419 358 403 404 336 
Total Expenditure 6836 7962 7398 7360 7276 8264 8975 10530 12107 12261 12177 12797 13010 16849 18298 19553 21417 21214 16528 13916 10757 11042 10703 10931 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 4b) Local Budget Expenditure for Tonkin, 1913-1936, (1000 $) 
  1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Political & General Administrative Expenditure 
Pensions                     60 73 85 106 105 170 86 186 164 338 229 201 207 209 
Government 
Offices 
Personnel 185 169 175 175 182 180 211 256 296 307 313 290 290 345 370 438 475 516 530 512 466 391 369 384 
Material 26 31 27 29 28 25 25 37 46 38 35 42 42 48 64 56 66 65 86 71 76 62 63 77 
Provincial 
Administration 
Personnel 818 832 761 673 636 698 651 934 1009 1010 963 947 993 970 991 986 1028 1184 836 825 760 670 561 576 
Material 175 183 174 222 225 227 204 240 255 258 214 198 216 197 241 255 236 249 161 182 117 83 90 100 
Indigenous 
Administration 
Personnel 471 462 436 427 441 434 481 540 645 600 591 604 600 767 808 874 884 905   24 7 5 13 16 
Material 17 16 15 19 29 32 32 43 27 27 25 29 27 30 32 27 31 32 1 5 3 3 3 3 
French Justice 
Personnel 87 85 93 79 69 94 90 122 167 176 182 208 180 170 223 197 216 279             
Material 10 8 9 11 12 29 12 11 16 17 19 21 18 18 22 25 33 34             
Indigenous 
Justice 
Personnel             78 88 93 86 99 106 132 140 146 154 156 178   2         
Material             16 18 19 22 27 31 26 24 31 28 29 34             
Police & 
Immigration 
Personnel 133 139 137 135 137 142 145 156 161 333 753 728 781 790 846 921 1046 1227 583 543 425 419 393 510 
Material 17 17 20 21 21 22 23 22 23 24 27 28 29 29 34 41 55 55 56 53 58 43 45 50 
Penitentiary 
Personnel 32 30 38 37 38 50 58 93 96 104 111 105 111 114 133 151 147 169 168 168 152 154 152 176 
Material 191 199 186 197 194 184 202 244 293 292 296 331 338 321 361 359 393 401 294 408 234 119 104 83 
Gendarmerie 
Personnel 114 177 156 167 150 194 280 209 311 413 353 293 256 280 314 345 350 409 417 454 398 254 205 204 
Material 3 3 3 2 5 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 6 
Indigenous Guard 
Personnel 1007 972 964 979 1032 1121 1312 1457 2201 1931 1747 1623 1695 1671 1791 1904 1980 2030 2224 2214 1879 1875 1870 2107 
Material 164 213 138 168 140 207 135 153 281 278 166 178 191 418 328 276 341 316 198 147 130 137 117 149 
Flotilla 200 204 196 163 148 111 110 115 122 105 59 100 45 109 125 119 159 158 65 53 39 24 28 48 
Transport 389 380 386 389 377 387 374 378 390 414 972 703 596 911 949 586 607 1069 838 688 865 838 360 363 
Various 529 556 379 979 562 427 1420 519 787 1175                             
Subsidies to Private Ventures                     144 144 174 136 151 128 170 186 166 152 115 173 203 153 
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Unpredicted 22 43 47 34 27 26 77 85 61 61 172 153 240 175 164 394 120 348 118 107 287 184 143 96 
Surveillance Fund                                       52 48 47 49 50 
Secret Fund 19 21 22 21 26 22 23 22 25 22 24 24 30 35 38 45 46 46 48           
Total Political & Administrative 4609 4740 4362 4927 4479 4614 5962 5745 7327 7697 7356 6962 7100 7807 8270 8482 8658 10079 6958 7002 6291 5686 4979 5360 
Financial Services 
Treasury 
Personnel  175 162 169 162 163 173 166 215 234 284 277 265 274 297 332 323 347 308             
Material 29 29 34 28 31 32 23 34 21 21 19 18 20 17 17 17 19 98             
Land Register 
Personnel  64 101 79 95 97 106 113 126 160 181 208 197 225 260 255 246   422 85 92 64 64 50 51 
Material 7 20 164 282 283 205 245 198 16 12 11 11 17 49 26 26   16 15 11 11 10 16 9 
Landed Property 
Service 
Personnel                                     8 12 16 17 17 19 
Material                                     3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total Financial Services 275 312 446 567 574 516 547 573 431 498 515 491 536 623 630 612 366 844 111 118 94 94 86 82 
Economic Interest 
Public Works 
Personnel 622 662 648 629 631 709 712 850 967 886 810 788 823 775 782 793 755 857 682 584 450 448 400 461 
Upkeep 864 1164 894 568 676 776 1022 1052 1024 1017 1007 1092 1133 1625 1883 1945 1909 1893 585 523 495 463 455 566 
New 478 408 528 859 781 850 640 583 723 548 793 935 1343 1797 1277 1027 1181 1191 479 88 245 312 204 328 
Rural Post 19 20 21 29 31 34 35 43 49 56 75 143 77                       
Agriculture 
Personnel 80 80 68 61 63 66 62 92 105 114 108 116 119 127 146 150 151 176 103 132 97 94 103 130 
Material 79 101 106 98 80 92 96 107 113 118 134 125 146 124 132 125 121 126 69 82 77 70 64 69 
Fairs & Exhibits                                           5 8 3 
Forest 
Development 
Personnel 110 129 128 128 128 150 163 287 277 273 276 288 312 289 322 351 392 426 411 409 330 320 287 328 
Material 22 42 23 29 23 21 30 14 18 19 37 27 51 49 52 47 54 50 51 46 48 45 41 43 
Veterinary 
Personnel 59 64 56 54 53 51 60 92 132 160 161 157 178 172 201 203 217 228 223 217 199 180 169 203 
Material 22 27 23 25 23 26 32 42 33 59 49 46 59 46 41 42 49 63 58 49 40 41 30 40 
Total Economic Interest 2355 2697 2495 2480 2489 2775 2852 3162 3441 3250 3450 3717 4241 5004 4836 4683 4829 5010 2661 2130 1981 1978 1761 2171 
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Social Interest 
Sanitary and 
Medical 
Personnel 201 221 198 181 172 175 186 284 366 402 450 481 506 590 655 696 798 792 344 413 305 309 303 340 
Material 212 253 237 254 297 307 303 331 366 499 429 459 452 502 637 625 682 708 636 661 651 548 507 548 
Public Instruction 
Personnel 383 392 415 418 456 463 461 679 858 1032 1762 1447 1634 1820 1987 2181 2312 2710 852 970 765 687 660 736 
Material 46 62 58 59 111 93 115 113 132 158   324 326 320 341 345 407 358 208 169 140 76 73 89 
Other 109 111 118 121 127 126 147 155 219 337                       41 35 37 
Extraordinary                     469 262 34 566 239 94 111 33 19 19       94 
Total Social Interest 951 1039 1026 1033 1163 1164 1212 1562 1941 2428 3110 2973 2952 3798 3859 3941 4310 4601 2059 2232 1861 1661 1578 1844 
Subventions and Reimbursements 
Reimbursement to Provincial 
Budget                                           543 1116 1660 
Reimbursement to Colonial and 
General Budget                     25 25 61 3       35 27 19 433     98 
Reimbursement to Cochinchinese 
Budget                                   51       96 88 108 
Reimbursement to Municipal 
Budget (Hanoi & Haiphong) 70 64 349 267 348 379 423 378 447 422 379 366 323 410 445 446 477 555 613 741 43 20 20 77 
Reimbursement of Tribunal Fines 
to Originating Communes   8 7   7 9 11 3 22 21 27 58 36 28 32 53 61 57 46 52         
Total Subventions & 
Reimbursement 70 72 356 267 355 388 434 381 469 443 431 449 420 441 477 499 538 698 686 812 476 659 1224 1943 
Total Expenditure 
  8260 8860 8685 9274 9060 9457 11007 11423 13609 14316 14862 14592 15249 17673 18072 18217 18701 21232 12475 12294 10703 10078 9628 11400 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Finances Publiques” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 5) Export Revenue, by Category of Goods, 1933-1936, (1000 Francs) 
 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Live Animals 3889 2680 11003 4683 
Animal Products 27888 20049 26005 23329 
Fishing Products 71103 59406 59706 62980 
Medicinal Products 250 376 545 426 
Material (Difficult to Cut) 519 352 536 626 
Foodstuffs 632553 644247 794038 1060900 
Fruit & Grains 9114 5085 11219 13992 
Perishable Goods (pepper, sugar...) 25541 34221 33644 34905 
Oils & Vegetable Saps 69300 110627 149349 259027 
Medicine 1939 2309 1946 3303 
Timber 15233 16060 12575 11767 
Fibres 9486 7359 7633 8206 
Dyes 1945 1164 1344 1283 
Vegetable Products 402 378 518 1120 
Drinks 6209 4568 3791 3337 
Minerals & Combustible Materials 70645 63685 75683 91841 
Metals 33350 42197 48856 54182 
Chemical Products 3001 320 946 2197 
Prepared Dyes 8 9 2 2 
Dyestuffs 212 108 81 99 
Various Chemical Compounds 554 493 462 820 
Pottery, Glass & Crystals 1853 657 483 278 
Threads 440 361 96 81 
Textiles 4993 24717 31138 37104 
Embroidery 1042 650 431 476 
Clothing 1421 1116 878 863 
Paper & Paper Products 1617 1271 710 1233 
Hides 639 412 303 447 
Metallurgical Goods 4598 3479 4565 7023 
Arms, Powder & Munitions 452 93 140 201 
Furniture & Woodwork 3615 3724 4164 5189 
Musical Instruments 116 82 42 19 
Rope work & Fibre work 7676 4545 12118 9223 
Other 4098 3793 3329 6888 
Source LSE 59(R4):  Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 6) Quantity of Various Indochinese Exports, by Country of Destination and Indochinese Region of Origin, 1930-1933  
Export Unit 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Coming From Going to Coming From Going to Coming From Going to Coming From Going to 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Others 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Others 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Others 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Others 
Live Animals Heads 6482 28275 35 3364 29374 20 1964 1564 18282 33 847 18930 0 36 4303 7405 29 3994 7126 74 486 6193 1360 6 5389 1036 412 710 
Animal 
Products Tonnes 2480 3387 439 2215 1769 1 1143 1794 2169 279 1939 1040 7 698 1729 2345 316 2694 570 7 487 1914 3700 887 3086 912 8 721 
Fishing 
Products Tonnes 663 37863 3811 6106 25587 670 2352 882 35115 1637 8804 21783 721 2942 697 27921 1058 7308 16999 426 2827 422 28814 337 7217 17145 334 4195 
Material 
(Difficult to 
cut) Tonnes 
876 638 32 656 0 826 0 378 559 0 601 0 336 0 341 1037 0 1050 0 325 3 235 811 0 821 0 232 3 
Foodstuffs 1000 tonnes 74 1085 345 376 90 192 243 34 1017 394 363 42 48 210 74 1318 612 485 11 66 218 149 1440 904 521 20 23 122 
Fruit & Grains Tonnes 2368 10162 10321 1696 113 41 359 2898 8542 8395 2605 70 63 307 1337 8033 4389 3806 152 26 997 1399 11755 7805 3468 148 85 1648 
Perishable 
Goods Tonnes 1514 2216 3848 1207 45 29 601 2158 4494 4375 1497 13 10 757 2036 3320 3579 1311 0 8 458 1860 3813 4286 1122 0 14 254 
Oil & 
Vegetable Saps Tonnes 2521 10485 5176 975 5895 4 956 2034 12009 5397 944 5506 53 2123 2416 14652 6354 518 5449 140 4607 1639 18864 7658 665 4490 220 7470 
Medicinal 
Products Tonnes 554 709 630 492 16 27 98 509 915 465 469 4 7 479 841 412 544 455 2 8 244 398 732 324 244 23 14 524 
Timber Tonnes 2091 25893 2553 7915 960 3457 13109 4217 24005 2447 6463 731 3049 15532 2398 18532 1269 7841 101 2494 9225 696 22202 3043 8520 44 817 10474 
Fibre, Stalk & 
Hard Fruit Tonnes 2575 1791 135 2254 0 414 1563 2804 2133 322 2197 0 771 1283 1494 1575 466 838 19 590 1156 1686 2354 658 1015 86 500 1780 
Dyes Tonnes 6582 676 0 6515 0 66 677 4855 648 0 4800 0 55 648 3673 593 0 3499 0 174 593 2774 166 0 2615 0 159 166 
Vegetable 
Products Tonnes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 251 227 58 0 116 76 159 443 277 4 0 21 300 104 550 345 3 5 26 275 
Drinks Hl 228 12523 9936 30 5 2488 292 223 13442 9824 477 8 3239 217 282 12408 9607 233 0 2606 244 204 2648 1012 152 0 1681 7 
Combustibles 1000 tonnes 1358 0 40 207 12 638 451 1401 0 97 268 17 532 487 1460 0 114 369 5 563 410 1425 0 185 186 6 451 598 
Metals 1000 tonnes 33 1 16 0 1 0 17 20 1 15 0 2 0 5 5 1 2 0 2 0 2 9 1 6 0 2 0 2 
Chemicals 1000 tonnes 42 0 0 38 0 0 4 33 0 0 29 0 0 4 29 0 0 18 0 0 11 69 0 0 6 0 1 63 
Chemical 
Compounds Tonnes 203 58 10 38 2 210 1 132 36 0 67 0 97 4 92 49 1 37 0 91 12 61 31 14 34 0 42 2 
Glass Tonnes 2196 256 19 852 634 688 259 1289 49 20 154 362 764 38 1171 5 0 459 103 439 175 2515 52 23 911 64 1386 183 
Threads Kgs               8597   8594       3 599 9 600       8 3193 1780 3100       1800 
Textiles 1000 tonnes 46 5 49 1 0 0 1 38 6 42 1 0 0 1 25 4 28 0 0 0 1 40 3 43 0 0 0 1 
Paper & Paper 
Products Tonnes 150 0 0 143 0 6 1 84 0 0 83 0 0 1 46 0 0 45 0 0 1 128 30 27 10 14 104 5 
Hides Tonnes 166 0 2 122 0 41 1 177 14 14 162 0 15 0 86 0 0 63 0 23 0 57 0 0 36 0 21 0 
Metallurgical 
Goods Kgs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 299 424 619 94 0 3 7 165 28 44 1 0 0 4 331 335 581 0 0 49 36 
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Furniture & 
Woodwork Tonnes 41 7 45 0 0 0 3 265 10 180 4 0 88 3 227 2391 1964 114 0 183 336 10 1 9 0 0 0 2 
Rope work & 
Fibre work Tonnes 7 46 12 1 17 23 0 8 56 8 27 0 28 1 80 6 80 0 2 3 1 10 23 17 0 7 5 4 
Total 1000 tonnes 1582 1186 479 654 139 837 738 1553 1115 573 692 90 586 732 1615 1405 779 903 42 634 663 1712 1539 1164 742 51 479 814 
Does not include categories in heads, hl.;  
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 7) Quantity of Indochinese Imports, by Country of Origin and Indochinese Region of Destination, 1930-1933  
Import Unit 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Going to Coming From Going to Coming From Going to Coming From Going to Coming From 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Other 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Other 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Other 
Annam-
Tonkin 
Cochinchina-
Cambodia France 
Hong 
Kong Singapore China Other 
Live Animals Heads 3359 4507 27 7835 0 4 0 3299 4452 30 7706 0 15 0 3507 4490 205 7642 0 0 80 3412 3231 125 6367 0 116 35 
Animal 
Products Tonnes 1347 3258 871 140 97 13 3437 1327 2968 806 139 61 14 3275 1439 2756 1186 123 34 10 2842 1153 2716 875 140 41 2 2832 
Fishing 
Products Tonnes 142 919 171 554 4 35 344 154 531 140 365 9 39 132 153 371 221 228 2 17 66 167 655 170 281 0 16 221 
Material  
(Difficult to 
cut) Tonnes 
8 3 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 10 0 147 0 0 5 113 6 0 117 0 0 0 
Foodstuffs 
1000 
tonnes 11 30 0 37 1 1 2 10 25 0 32 1 2 1 11 22 0 28 1 2 2 9 23 0 23 1 1 3 
Fruit & Grain 
1000 
tonnes 2 10 0 6 3 1 0 2 11 0 6 4 2 1 2 9 0 5 3 1 1 2 7 0 5 1 1 2 
Perishable 
Goods 
1000 
tonnes 6 16 4 11 1 1 6 5 10 3 9 1 1 2 3 6 2 4 1 0 1 2 4 2 3 1 0 1 
Oils 
&Vegetable 
Saps Tonnes 
328 654 767 45 22 3 145 260 591 616 73 21 18 123 261 503 616 51 18 1 108 291 1262 643 62 10 5 833 
Medicinal 
Products Tonnes 1662 1277 10 2700   149 80 1876 1054 8 2746 47 123 6 1361 1047 7 2203 35 156 8 1112 1170 7 1994 38 224 19 
Fibres, Stalks 
& Hard Fruit Tonnes 5074 39 0 438 0 8 4667 2359 899 0 1136 364 376 1386 3779 1018 47 1383 378 456 2533 4240 1059 60 924 319 536 3455 
Vegetable 
Products Tonnes 3 17 1 11 2 5 1 4 15 1 11 2 4 1 3 15 2 9 3 3 0 3 16 2 10 2 4 1 
Drinks 
1000 
hl 51 69 109 0 0 1 8 46 40 80 0 0 1 6 45 40 83 0 0 0 3 42 36 73 0 0 0 4 
Combustibles 
1000 
tonnes 52 123 4 1 5 0 164 50 88 3 2 0 5 129 52 95 8 2 4 0 133 45 77 4 3 44 2 109 
Metals 
1000 
tonnes 27 38 50 4 0 6 11 25 31 29 7 0 0 21 18 15 23 5 0 0 5 15 15 20 2 0 1 6 
Chemicals 
1000 
tonnes 5 14 14 1 0 0 3 3 6 8 0 0 0 1 2 4 5 1 0 0 1 9 4 5 0 0 0 8 
Prepared 
Dyes Tonnes 179 383 172 71 299 0 20 234 418 230 72 302 0 48 215 612 256 6 530 0 35 81 515 196 7 337 0 56 
Dyestuffs Tonnes 104 290 313 3 0 0 78 197 183 337 0 0 0 43 257 515 722 14 0 1 35 363 506 801 18 0 0 50 
Chemical 
Compounds Tonnes 895 3415 1766 1803 5 710 26 788 2761 1198 1625 2 699 25 876 2645 1449 121 1419 509 19 834 2206 1048 1504 16 415 57 
Potteries Tonnes 462 1739 963 515 33 324 366 647 1046 1155 115 29 10 384 1172 1044 939 407 59 168 643 548 1176 668 352 3 158 543 
Glass Tonnes 1131 2687 3103 43 11 3 658 761 1384 1776 66 2 2 299 1081 1537 2327 31 4 0 256 812 1081 1513 29 1 2 348 
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Threads Tonnes 1372 1248 1209 721 416 100 168 750 1093 1046 200 323 90 183 793 977 1170 136 236 48 181 971 783 1039 238 228 63 185 
Textiles 
1000 
tonnes 6 9 11 2 1 0 1 3 5 7 1 0 0 0 3 6 8 0 0 0 0 4 24 8 5 13 2 0 
Paper & 
Paper 
Products 
1000 
tonnes 
5 7 5 2 0 2 2 5 5 5 2 0 1 1 4 5 5 1 0 1 1 4 7 8 1 0 0 1 
Hides Tonnes 129 115 228 0 0 8 8 57 62 108 2 0 6 3 102 48 138 2 0 6 4 71 52 108 1 0 6 9 
Metallurgical 
Goods 
1000 
tonnes 14 23 21 0 0 0 14 26 28 17 0 0 0 36 7 13 18 0 0 0 3 7 11 16 0 0 0 2 
Arms, 
Powder & 
Fireworks Tonnes 
508 264 740 24 1 2 5 247 350 404 92 0 2 5 300 388 632 35 0 17 3 187 85 98 37 1 1 136 
Furniture & 
Woodwork Tonnes 1 52 41 1 0 0 11 40 45 36 26 0 4 9 24 12 11 18 0 0 0 25 1259 73 17 0 12 1171 
Musical 
Instruments Tonnes 24 56 54 5 1 3 17 30 25 48 0 0 0 7 19 17 30 0 0 0 6 16 18 25 1 0 0 8 
Other Tonnes 2074 5671 4888 2 19 3 2734 1381 4551 3306 23 19 1 3433 1019 1754 2383 5 6 2 377 1271 2124 2953 10 3 2 422 
Total 
1000 
tonnes 145 309 126 82 16 17 218 145 241 84 78 9 17 202 119 204 86 59 16 8 155 113 204 74 59 62 13 144 
*This does not include goods in hectolitres, thousands, numbers, pairs, etc.… 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 8) Tonnage of Main Exports, 1913-1935, (Tonnes, unless specified) 
 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Live Animals (in 
1000 heads) 44 26 99 61 61 60 63 45 77 40 81 112 55 88 112 62 68 35 20 12 2 2 7 
Animal Products 5807 3125 2712 3157 2989 3262 3588 2518 2385 3773 5135 4254 4398 5397 6071 6405 7198 5576 3973 4074 6153 7354 10718 
Fishing Products 
(1000 tonnes) 37 38 38 30 27 24 35 36 37 32 34 47 40 38 37 38 37 39 37 29 29 27 27 
Medicinal 
Products                     16 17 26 
Material 
(Difficult to Cut) 227 1513 1222 1126 1307 774 1215 1350 1610 1086 1394 900 779 947 827 823 1361 1514 1240 1398 803 995 1569 
Foodstuffs (1000 
tonnes) 1422 1521 1438 1288 1261 1619 961 1180 1751 1475 1381 1273 1578 1665 1727 1930 1621 1245 1056 1392 1589 1986 2163 
Fruit & Grains 
(1000 tonnes) 7 11 9 7 4 6 4 6 12 10 16 14 16 16 14 17 16 13 15 9 14 9 16 
Perishable 
Goods (1000 
tonnes) 
9 8 13 13 4 6 15 14 13 14 20 21 10 14 12 8 8 6 7 5 6 7 8 
Oils & 
Vegetable Saps 
(1000 tonnes) 
3 2 3 2 2 3 7 7 6 8 9 11 12 12 13 13 14 13 15 17 21 24 33 
Medicine 280 536 660 427 495 580 548 506 836 1554 2541 1323 1388 1982 1388 2696 1683 1263 1509 1253 1132 1315 1335 
Timber (1000 
tonnes) 7 7 6 6 6 11 9 7 6 11 16 19 27 33 32 25 25 28 29 21 23 24 19 
Fibres (1000 
tonnes) 12 7 6 6 5 6 3 7 8 7 7 6 5 3 6 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 
Dyes 6708 8011 7334 4437 4453 4487 4420 4955 7334 7150 8237 7256 5241 7179 5861 5092 6483 7258 5502 4266 2941 2015 2377 
Vegetable 
Products                   602 602 725 998 1512 
Drinks (1000 hl) 0 0 0 33 106 3 13 40 38 7 8 10 12 14 15 14 13 13 14 13 1 1 1 
Minerals & 
Combustible 
Materials (1000 
tonnes) 
366 482 556 575 471 362 468 664 786 755 845 1047 847 952 1046 1244 1396 1359 1401 1460 1426 1299 1663 
Metals (1000 
tonnes) 28 19 34 40 26 14 9 42 29 28 33 37 52 50 61 45 43 34 21 7 12 11 11 
Chemical 
Products (1000 
tonnes) 
27 20 24 15 16 3 116 36 20 56 11 4 6 20 28 36 26 26 33 29 70 1 33 
Prepared Dyes   56 139 76 302 469 394 225 93           46 15 5 
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Dyestuffs                     42 27 24 
Chemical 
Compounds  46 74 392 533 443 964 964 545 585 457 414 518 424 464 452 293 261 165 141 132 110 174 
Pottery, Glass & 
Crystals           380 362 264 502 963 806 1582 2452 1338 1176 2654 444 327 
Threads 1712 2155 1791 2241 1111 341 796 468 693 564 702 663 183 711 724 246 29  9 1 14 16 8 
Textiles 38 113 5 5 8 14 165 27 37 113 186 149 174 209 191 199 116 51415 1015 1451 622 20285 26596 
Embroidery                     71 43 33 
Clothing                     74 63 80 
Paper & Paper 
Products   58 447 146 205 171 174 80 100 100 116 152 108 110 133 148 150 84 46 142 70 61 
Hides 993 985 1074 447 938 886 918 848 887 787 577 459 379 386 358 255 197 166 191 87 68 22 48 
Metallurgical 
Goods                   1 0 850 594 878 
Arms, Powder & 
Munitions                     24 5 5 
Furniture & 
Woodwork  1841 856 1149 259 973 1443 1056 503 396 61 75 75 83 101 121 61 48 1552 2588 2424 4303 4914 
Musical 
Instruments                     36 43 26 
Rope work & 
Fibre work 4096 2798 882 2142 1347 413 1926 2383 1358 3709 3921 3460 3726 3630 3156 4314 3685 3086 3506 2331 3616 4153 6232 
Other   185 43 217 396 434 430 104 61 23 24 30 7 16 22 15 53 83 86 322 252 2838 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 9) Tonnage of Main Imports, 1913-1935, (Tonnes, unless specified) 
 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Live Animals 
(heads) 270 17290 20595 15455 16976 34700 66950 60650 60408 47079 48985 46471 52943 42530 16818 8869 9193 7866 8257 7997 394 451 438 
Animal 
Products 1801 1589 1381 1492 822 993 1259 2086 1422 2076 2863 3270 2988 4246 4183 4737 5650 4605 4401 4195 1527 1425 1720 
Fishing 
Products 855 594 484 584 448 379 268 713 407 440 678 1133 1195 2199 1857 2039 2224 1058 685 524 837 1453 1425 
Medicinal 
Products                     6 15 28 
Material 
(Difficult to 
Cut) 
15 10 22 13 9 4 31 39 144 76 18 15 19 21 26 28 15 14 96 152 47 37 45 
Foodstuffs 
(1000 tonnes) 15 14 12 11 14 13 17 23 19 20 27 31 30 38 42 43 41 41 36 33 30 29 34 
Fruit & Grains 
(1000 tonnes) 8 9 9 10 8 9 8 13 12 14 12 12 10 12 14 16 13 14 13 11 9 10 11 
Perishable 
Goods (1000 
tonnes) 
14 10 9 10 10 12 4 8 14 12 12 16 20 28 28 34 29 22 15 9 8 7 8 
Oils & 
Vegetable 
Saps 
188 120 98 175 261 112 250 1024 588 553 771 755 819 1613 907 1905 1230 982 919 794 1021 907 948 
Medicine 2745 2313 2130 2316 2039 2182 2845 2870 1988 2140 2217 1923 2093 2893 2453 2476 1657 2939 2930 2408 2282 2565 2608 
Timber                     2554 1590 14334 
Fibres 6470 4748 3775 5128 3287 4878 5588 6037 4984 6280 7439 7012 8061 8461 6646 6392 3210 5113 3377 4797 5771 9908 9941 
Dyes                     139 199 148 
Vegetable 
Products 
(1000 tonnes) 
10 7 11 10 10 10 10 13 8 9 11 15 14 18 19 23 25 20 19 18 21 23 25 
Drinks (1000 
hl) 88 80 72 59 42 53 60 107 72 74 116 120 118 170 131 167 153 119 85 85 9 10 10 
Minerals & 
Combustible 
Materials 
(1000 tonnes) 
76 70 51 61 57 61 49 53 57 77 105 133 136 159 151 185 186 175 136 147 124 132 129 
Metals (1000 
tonnes) 10 12 9 10 7 9 7 22 21 30 43 43 46 47 67 50 79 61 51 29 28 51 40 
Chemical 
Products 66 1256 905 776 711 979 1047 1246 1324 1446 3034 3680 7408 7977 11488 10041 13474 18355 9483 6132 15538 9097 14443 
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Prepared Dyes 67 430 309 513 796 834 846 622 598 497 745 927 911 1047 1062 878 810 562 724 827 621 597 1762 
Dyestuffs  612 241 244 203 116 223 657 470 607 207 216 230 340 270 390 559 394 756 772 1179 1319 1364 
Chemical 
Compounds 
(1000 tonnes) 
1 3 3 3 3 2 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 6 5 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Pottery, Glass 
& Crystals 
(1000 tonnes) 
4 7 4 5 5 5 7 11 8 10 12 22 22 25 31 22 14 21 9 8 4 4 7 
Threads (1000 
tonnes) 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 8 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Textiles (1000 
tonnes) 27 32 18 27 23 28 20 32 34 20 13 12 11 27 21 11 15 15 8 10 27 35 44 
Embroidery                     10 3 13 
Clothing                     239 194 308 
Paper & Paper 
Products 6210 6211 6809 6717 5599 6136 7137 9580 11606 11150 9065 11063 9500 12199 12667 12532 13351 11519 10290 8261 8835 9027 9189 
Hides 85 89 26 56 44 18 99 149 106 147 205 207 230 322 227 201 292 244 110 150 158 149 207 
Metallurgical 
Goods (1000 
tonnes) 
3 4 3 5 4 4 5 9 19 20 24 34 37 29 39 35 49 37 53 21 18 30 20 
Arms, Powder 
& Munitions 1046 801 899 923 576 830 840 1370 1157 1407 1434 1686 1311 1762 1928 1519 369 772 539 688 302 302 357 
Furniture & 
Woodwork     319  40 89 174 106 613 786 508 793 857 711 681 53 75 36 1738 1960 2341 
Musical 
Instruments                  80 55 36 41 45 53 
Rope work & 
Fibre work 2362 1404 1446 1141 1797 543 898 1078 726 781 740 736 447 626 992 920 661    297 337 870 
Other (1000 
tonnes) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 6 10 7 9 8 9 8 7 3 5 5 6 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 10) Import Revenue, by Category of Goods, 1933-1936, (1000 Francs) 
 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Live Animals 1933 1793 1404 2104 
Animal Products 13256 12282 14211 13536 
Fishing Products 3269 4087 4917 3976 
Medicinal Products 42 61 77 80 
Material (Difficult to Cut) 112 89 83 201 
Foodstuffs 25114 20222 24283 23200 
Fruit & Grains 16957 17457 19072 21929 
Perishable Goods 48434 41356 43984 52931 
Oils & Vegetable Saps 28823 23608 4469 4771 
Medicine 8049 8610 9483 10019 
Timber 384 381 8648 8166 
Fibres 20546 28956 31521 38391 
Dyes 130 198 146 166 
Vegetable Products 17170 16725 16238 18359 
Drinks 36487 33819 28747 32408 
Minerals & Combustible Materials 98001 87782 73308 80720 
Metals 49113 68786 65207 79809 
Chemical Products 18694 13677 18242 24474 
Prepared Dyes 4125 4811 5821 5716 
Dyestuffs 5761 6503 6728 7371 
Chemical Compounds 22206 22989 20143 27522 
Pottery, Glass & Crystals 12064 12332 16721 17989 
Threads 28582 33475 30503 35005 
Textiles 230868 246700 246743 223933 
Embroidery 96 37 80 155 
Clothing 4731 3287 5613 3846 
Paper & Paper Products 34741 35509 31808 36502 
Hides 4856 4023 3950 4805 
Metallurgical Goods 104135 86238 84629 90824 
Arms, Powder & Munitions 5312 4228 4259 4651 
Furniture & Woodwork 2352 2299 3086 4105 
Musical Instruments 1424 1310 1257 1753 
Rope work & Fibre work 562 493 1129 1095 
Other 67368 70135 74848 88215 
Source LSE 59(R4): Gouvernement Général de l’Indochine: Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. “Commerce” in Annuaire Statistique 
de l'Indochine. Vol. I-VIII. Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrème-Orient, 1927-1939. 
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Appendix 11) Comparative Characteristics of Daily Wages, for the Main Categories of Employees in Saigon-Cholon and Northern Cities (mainly Hanoi & Haiphong), 1931-1936, ($) 
Specialised Worker 
  
Mean Median Most frequent Deviation 
Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North 
1931 1.42 0.74 1.36 0.62 1.3 0.6 0.15 0.35 
1932 1.4 0.68 1.38 0.57 1.4 0.4 0.17 0.34 
1933 1.29 0.68 1.26 0.58 1.4 0.6 0.07 0.34 
1934 1.185 0.62 1.15 0.53 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.32 
1936 1.1 0.56 1.09 0.475 1.1 0.4 0.23 0.32 
Male Unskilled Labour 
  
Mean Median Most frequent Deviation 
Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North 
1931 0.74 0.38 0.705 0.36 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.17 
1932 0.68 0.36 0.62 0.34 0.6 0.3 0.11 0.15 
1933 0.62 0.35 0.59 0.33 0.6 0.3 0.11 0.17 
1934 0.55 0.285 0.54 0.28 0.5 0.25 0.06 0.14 
1936 0.53 0.26 0.51 0.255 0.5 0.25 0.07 0.11 
Female Unskilled Labour 
  
Mean Median Most frequent Deviation 
Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North Saigon-Cholon North 
1931 0.45 0.22 0.44 0.22 0.45 0.2 0.14 0.16 
1932 0.45 0.24 0.46 0.21 0.5 0.25 0.15 0.08 
1933 0.41 0.21 0.39 0.21 0.45 0.2 0.18 0.14 
1934 0.43 0.19 0.42 0.19 0.45 0.2 0.14 0.17 
1936 0.38 0.175 0.39 0.175 0.4 0.2 0.09 0.14 
Source SOAS: French Indochina. Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1936. Hanoi: 1937. p.1050 
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Appendix 12a) Retail Prices in Hanoi, for Goods Included in the European Cost of Living Index, 1910-1922, ($) 
Article Unit of Measurement 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 
Bread Kg 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Beefsteak Kg 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Veal breast Kg 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Lamb 
shoulder Kg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Pork Kg 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.62 0.6 0.6 
Sugar Kg 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.49 0.6 0.8 0.42 0.76 0.61 0.51 0.43 
Coffee Kg 1.26 1.29 1.18 1.17 1.23 1.17 1 0.97 0.82 1.45 0.86 0.63 0.65 
Chocolate Kg 1.41 1.44 1.32 1.31 1.38 1.42 1.36 2.17 1.4 1.07 0.93 1.14 1.04 
Oil Lt 1.6 1.64 1.5 1.49 1.57 1.91 1.7 2.15 1.78 3.37 2.33 2.5 2.23 
Butter Box 0.7 0.72 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.82 0.76 1.18 1.05 1.38 0.73 1.06 1.04 
Noodles Kg 0.53 0.54 0.5 0.49 0.52 0.81 0.85 0.69 0.58 1.15 0.75 0.36 0.5 
Nestié 
milk Case 12.87 13.15 12.04 11.95 13.44 13 17 17.27 17.6 28.41 18.18 20.58 17.68 
Cakes Piece 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Fish Kg 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.7 0.7 
Chicken Couple 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.92 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 
Eggs Per 100 1.4 1.45 1.45 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.85 1.85 2.37 2.2 2.3 
No2 rice Quintal 6.6 7.05 7.05 6.66 6.33 6.6 7.75 6.76 6.08 8.75 11.6 7.93 8 
Potatoes Kg 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 
Haricot 
beans 500 g 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.3 0.32 0.4 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.33 
Table wine Container 77.25 78.94 64.25 65.73 69.32 67.07 105.44 100.27 136.15 153.6 69.28 95.58 92.53 
Beer 48 bottles 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.3 
Rent of 
35$ Month 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 40 45 50 50 
Rent of 
45$ Month 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 55 60 60 
Rent of   
60$ Month 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 70 80 90 90 
Electricity Kw-hr 0.34 0.35 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.2 0.16 0.1 0.08 0.16 0.16 
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Coal 100 kg 0.65 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.6 0.68 0.63 0.7 0.7 0.8 1 1.05 
Firewood 100 kg 2.43 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.43 2.32 3 2.7 3.07 3.15 
Water Cube meter 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Dining 
room Monthly use 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 80 80 95 95 
English 
salon Monthly use 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 50 50 50 50 
Bedroom Monthly use 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 284 284 284 284 
Glasswork 12 glasses & 1 carafe 25.75 26.31 24.09 23.9 25.21 24.39 20.4 16.71 14.08 23.04 25.97 52.94 55.75 
Domestic 
help Monthly use 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 12 12 12 12 
Congaie 
(maid) Monthly use 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 10 10 10 10 
Dry 
cleaning Piece 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
White 
shoes Pair 8 8 8 8 10 15 15 14 13 12 12 12 12 
Men’s hat   10.72 10.96 10.03 9.96 10.5 16.26 13.6 22.28 18.77 15.26 8.65 13.23 11.49 
Hairdresser Service 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 1.2 
Soap Kg 2.12 2.21 1.98 1.97 2.08 2.13 1.78 1.74 2.01 4.54 3.24 2.59 2.53 
Doctor House call 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 44 5 5 5 
Paper   21 22 20 21 24 28 57 47 63 40 40 58 37 
Class 
books   2.14 2.19 2 1.99 2.1 2.03 2.04 1.67 1.99 1.3 1.21 2.05 2.05 
Second 
class 
railway 
ticket 
100 km 4 3.85 3.5 3.75 3.85 3.7 3.72 2.75 2.6 1.93 1.15 3.5 3.5 
Rickshaw Hour/per ride 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Journal Per number 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Piano Monthly rent 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 15 15 
Cinema Seat 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Source SOAS: French Indochina. Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1922. Hanoi: 1923. p.645-652. 
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Appendix 12b) Retail Prices in Saigon, for Goods Included in the European Cost of Living Index, 1910-1922, ($) 
Article Unit of Measurement 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 
Bread Kg 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Beefsteak Kg 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.35 0.31 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.31 0.39 0.45 
Veal breast Kg 0.4 0.36 0.35 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.67 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.59 0.7 
Lamb 
shoulder Kg 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.72 1.14 1.47 1.22 0.91 0.89 0.9 1.05 1.18 1.32 
Pork Kg 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.59 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.7 0.65 
Sugar Kg 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.3 0.35 0.3 
Coffee Kg 1.29 1.1 1.41 1.16 0.84 1.2 1.3 1.3 1 1.1 1 0.7 1 
Chocolate Kg 0.99 1.54 1.41 0.92 0.97 1.63 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.5 0.9 1 
Oil Lt 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2 2 2 2 1.6 1.3 1 
Butter Box 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.67 0.73 0.95 0.95 1 1.1 1 0.9 0.85 
Noodles Kg 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.65 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Nestié milk Case 12.65 12.65 12.65 12.65 13.49 13.5 15.25 16.15 16.83 16.25 15.04 18.75 18.33 
Cakes Piece 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Fish Kg 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Chicken Couple 0.6 0.62 0.68 0.9 0.74 0.68 0.76 0.8 0.82 0.88 1.1 1.06 0.96 
Eggs Dozen 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.36 0.37 
Vegetables Mean 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.3 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.335 
No2 rice Quintal 6.26 7.75 8.94 5.98 5.61 5.98 5.69 4.86 5.98 11 11.58 7.74 7.61 
Potatoes Kg 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
Table wine Container 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 80 100 100 60 100 100 
Beer 48 bottles 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13.5 13.5 14 14 
Rent of 50 
$ in 1910 Month 50 52 54 55 55 54 48 45 45 50 50 62 75 
Rent of 40 $ Month 40 42 44 40 40 38 34 28 28 34 34 44 50 
Rent of 10$ Month 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 25 26 
Electricity Kw-hr 0.281 0.285 0.261 0.26 0.274 0.263 0.219 0.18 0.152 0.096 0.163 0.188 0.186 
Charcoal 100 kg 3.5 4 3.5 1.9 3.2 3 3 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 3 4.36 
Heating 
wood 100 kg 5 6.95 7.4 4.6 3.31 4.84 4.38 4.57 4.57 4.5 4.2 4.2 3.85 
Water Monthly use 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Dining room Monthly use 265 265 265 265 275 275 275 275 275 275 308 308 308 
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English salon Monthly use 150 150 150 150 150 150 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Bedroom Monthly use 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 625 625 625 625 625 625 
Glasswork 12 glasses & 1 carafe 5.6 6 6 6 6.4 6.4 6.4 5.24 6.44 4.4 4.06 7.66 7.6 
Linen Service 8.58 8.77 8.84 9.6 10.08 12.19 13.6 12.53 10.56 9.97 16.01 23.35 22.39 
Bep (cook) Monthly use 20 20 20 22 22 22 25 25 25 25 30 30 30 
Boy 
(servant) Monthly use 15 15 15 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 22 22 25 
Congaie 
(maid) Monthly use 10 10 10 12 12 12 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Sais 
(gardener) Monthly use 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Driver Monthly use 35 35 35 35 35 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Dry cleaning Piece 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
White shoes Pair 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 17 1.9 1.9 2 2.2 2.2 
Men’s hat   3.15 3.95 3.61 3.6 3.78 4.88 5.1 4.18 3.99 3.32 3.56 4.38 4.48 
Women’s hat   9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 14 14 14 
Men’s suit Suit 6.44 6.58 6.002 6 6.3 7.32 8.5 8.36 9.39 9.97 7.12 10.95 11.19 
Calico Meter 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.51 0.68 0.67 0.7 0.66 0.53 0.73 0.75 
Percale Meter 0.64 0.66 0.6 0.6 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.82 1 0.76 1.17 1.04 
Woven cloth Meter 2.04 2.08 1.93 1.92 2.02 2.44     9.39 8.31 8 11.68 8.96 
Hairdresser Service 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Soap Kg 0.3 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.21 0.2 0.22 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.22 
Doctor House call 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Paper   0.43 0.44 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.49 0.41 0.56 0.47 0.4 0.26 0.29 0.3 
Class books   0.43 0.44 0.4 0.4 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.2 0.21 
Second class 
railroad 100 km 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.9 2.9 3.2 
Rickshaw Hour 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3 
Master car   325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 300 300 300 
Car   76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Journal Per number 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Piano Monthly rent 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Cinema Seat 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Source SOAS: French Indochina. Service de la Statistique Générale de l’Indochine. Bulletin Economique de l’Indochine Année 1925. Hanoi: 1926. p.442-447. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
363 
 
